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PREFACE - During the 1994 Regular Session of the Kentucky General 
Assembly, 1309 bills and 263 resolutions were introduced. Of 
these, 367 were Senate bills and 942 were House bills. Of this 
number, 146 Senate bills and 311 House bills passed both chambers 
and were delivered to the Governor for signature. In addition, 54 
joint and concurrent resolutions were p~~sed. 
Among the aforementioned bills were eight labor and employment 
bills which passed both chambers and were signed into law by the 
Governor. In addition, one House Concurrent Resolution dealing 
with OSHA compliance was passed by the House. 
By far, the most sweeping of the labor and employment bills was 
House Bill 928, the workers' compensation reform legislation. Due 
to its length and complexity, it will be the last enactment covered 
in this outline. 
HOUSE BILL 762 - The relevant section of this bill provides that no 
employer may require, as a condition of employment, that a 
prospective employee waive, agree to arbitration, or otherwise 
diminish any right to which the prospective employee is entitled 
under state or federal law. The provisions of this bill will be 
added as a new section to· Chapter 336 of the Kentucky Revised 
Statutes. 
This bill was in reaction to the practices of a number of large 
employers in Kentucky who specifically required on applications for 
employment, as .a condition of employment, that prospective· 
employees waive their right to sue in court and agree:to binding 
arbitration with respect to all allegations of personal rights 
violations such as age discrimination, sex discrimination, race 
discrimination, etc ... 
SENATE BILL 331 - This bill mlrrors House Bill 762. 
HOUSE BILL 719 - Under current Prevailing Wage laws (those dealing 
with construction by public authorities), employees must be paid 
overtime for all hours worked in excess of eight hours a day and 
forty hours a week. 
This bill increases the maximum hours from eight hours a day to ten 
hours a day before overtime pay is mandated in those instances in 
which the employer and employee voluntarily enter into a written 
agreement prior to the employee working anyone day in excess of 
eight hours, or where provided for in a collective bargaining 
contract. The bill will be codified as an amendment to KRS 
337.540. 
The bill was introduced at the behest of the Associated General 
A-I 
Contractors of Kentucky. The executive director of AGC stated in 
committee hearings that many workers lived in one part of the 
state, worked in another and desired to work four ten hour days as 
opposed to five eight hour days in order to have longer weekends to 
spend with their families. Under current law, contractors were 
unwilling to allow the ten hour days because of the necessity of 
paying overtime for all hours in excess of eight hoursa·day. 
HOUSE BILL 661 - This bill allows the Labor Cabinet to place a lien 
on all property of an employer who 
penalty imposed pursuant to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
a new section of Chapter 338 of the 
has failed to pay a monetary 
provisions of the Kentucky 
This bill will be codified as 
Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
The lien shall not be filed until all administrative and judicial 
appeals have been exhausted or the time for same has expired. 
HOUSE BILL 660 - This bill allows the Labor Cabinet to p~ace a lien 
on all property of an employer who has failed to pay a penalty 
imposed pursuant to the wage and hour laws of Chapter 337 of the 
Kentucky Revised Statutes. This bill will be codified as a new 
section of Chapter 337 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
As in House Bill 661, the lien shall not be filed until all 
administrative and judicial appeals have been exhausted or the time 
for same has expired. 
SENATE BILL 271 - KRS 337.010 currently exempts from the definition 
of employee "[a] ny individual employed as a babysieter in an 
employer's home, or live-in companion to a sick, convalescing, or 
elderly person whose principal duties do not include housekeeping." 
The significance of these exceptions is that "employees" must be 
paid overtime pursuant to Chapter 337. 
Over the years a problem arose with respect to the definition of 
" Ii ve- in companion." Wage and hour investigators have defined 
"Ii ve-in" a number of ways over the years. The most recent 
definition requires that the companion stay for at least twenty-
four hours at a time in order to be considered as a "live-in" . 
. This was unfair to those persons in nursing homes who had 
companions who stayed with them at night only or to individuals who 
lived at home, but only had companions during the day. 
This bill deletes the term" live-in" and therefore exempts from the 
definition of "employee" a companion to a sick, convalescing, or 
elderly person. The bill mirrors the language in fed~ral wage and 
hour laws. 
SENATE BILL 284 - This bill makes it unlawful and contrary to 
public policy for an employer to require another employer to waive 
its rights under the workers' compensation laws in order to be 
awarded a contract. It further makes it illegal for an employer to 
give a preference to one employer over another for voluntarily 
waiving rights under the workers' compensation laws, 
This bill was in response to situations in which prime contractors 
were making waiver of workers' compensation subrogation rights by 
sub-contractors a condition precedent to receiving a contract. 
This bill will be codified as an amendment to KRS 342.700. 
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 60 - This resolution directs the 
Interim Joint Committee on Labor and Industry to perform a study 
with respect to the issue of independent contractors and compliance 
wi th unemployment insurance laws, income tax withholding, and 
workers' compensation laws. The resolution further directs the 
committee to report its findings to the Legislative Research 
Commission no later than October I, 1995 and recommend any 
legislation necessary to assure compliance by employers and 
independent contractors with both federal and state OSHA laws. 
This resolution was in response to a fear that many employees are 
being treated as independent contractors in· an effort by their 
employers to circumvent employment and OSHA laws. 
HOUSE BILL 928 - This bill is the workers' compensation reform 
legislation. The bill contained an emergency clause and became 
effective on April 4, 1994, the date the Governor signed it. This 
bill contains so many changes to prior law, that it will:be divided 
into topic areas for the purposes of this outline. 
Definitions The bill excludes compensation claims for 
psychological, psychiatric or str~ss-related conditions unless they 
resuit from a specific physical"· injury. The so-called mental-
mental claims will no be longer be compensable. KRS 342.0011. 
Reorganization - All components of workers' compensation, with the 
exception of the Uninsured Employers Fund, are now consolidated 
within the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. KRS 336.015. 
Board Authority - The Workers' Compensation Board, which heretofore 
exercised administrative functions as well as appellate functions, 
is limited to deciding appeals from the Administrative Law Judges. 
KRS 342.215. 
Additional Administrative Law Judge - The bill" provides for an 
increase in the number of Administrative Law Judges from 15 to 16 
and provides for the appointment of a Chief Administrative Law 
Judge. The Chief Judge shall be responsible for overseeing 
caseload assignments and dockets and otherwise assist the 
Commissioner of Workers' Compensation. KRS 342.230. 
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Medical disputes - In those instances in which an injured employee 
and the employer are in disagreement with respect to the planned 
performance of a medical procedure, such as surgery, the bill 
provides for a speedy resolution of the dispute. KRS 342.735. 
Commissioner of Workers' Compensation - The Commissioner will be 
appointed by the Governor from a list of three nominees submitted 
by the Workers' Compensation Nominating Commission. Senate 
confirmation of the appointment is required. KRS 342.213. 
Ombudsmen The bill provides for the creation of ombudsmen 
positions within the Department of Workers' Claims. The ombudsmen 
are charged with the responsibility of advising all parties of 
their rights and obligations, answer inquiries, and perform such 
other duties as required by the Commissioner through administrative 
regulations. This change will appear in a new section of Chapter 
342. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution - The bill provides for alternative 
dispute resolution. This change will appear in a new~section of 
Chapter 342. 
Medical Costs Reduction - Within 100 days after the effective date 
of the act, the Commissioner shall promulgate a fee schedule which 
effects a 25% reduction in the total medical costs within the 
workers' compensation system. KRS 342.033 
Litigation-related Fee Schedule By December 1, 1994, the 
Commissioner shall establish a fee schedule for charges by medical 
providers for testimony presented and medical reports furnished 
within the course of litigation. KRS 342.033. 
Twenty-four Hour Coverage - The bill allows for pilot projects for 
twenty-four hour coverage if approved by the Commissioner of 
Workers' Claims and the Commissioner of Insurance and if In 
conformi ty wi th administrative regulations to be promulgated by the 
Commissioner of Workers' Claims. This change will be codified in 
a new section of Chapter 342. 
Permanent Partial Disability - The bill provides for the payment 
of functional impairment benefits rather than occupational 
disability benefits to an injured worker who returns to work at his 
or her pre-injury· salary unless the worker establishes a greater 
degree of disability as determined by KRS 342.0011 (11) In that 
event, benefits may not exceed two times the functional impairment 
rating. KRS 342.730. 
If an injured employee establishes an occupational disability 
exceeding fifty percent, he or she will receive permanent partial 
disability benefits for 520 weeks rather than 425. KRS 342.730. 
The provisions of Chapt~r 342 with respect to permanent partial 
disability remain the same for those injured employees who do not 
return to work at their pre-injury wage. . -
A - 4 
Teledyne - The bill provides that only work-related disability may 
be taken into consideration in determining whether an employee is 
totally disabl~d for purposes of a lifetime award. KRS 342.730. 
Reduction of Benefits The' bill proves for a 10% per year 
reduction in benefits beginning at age 65 until the worker reaches 
the age of 70 at which time the benefits will be frozen at 40% of 
the original benefit amount. KRS 342.730. 
RIB Benefits 
RIB benefits. 
Working miners will no longer be eligible to receive 
KRS 342.732. 
Calculation of Benefits - For purposes of computing benefits, the 
average weekly wage figure shall remain frozen for two year's, then 
remain permanently two years behind the then current average weekly" 
wage. KRS 342.143. 
Competitive State Fund - The bill provides for the creation of a 
competitive state workers' compensation fund 
Employers' Mutual Insurance Company which must be 
policies no later than September I, 1995. . This 
codified in a new section of Chapter 342. 
Attorney's Fees - The bill caps attorney's. fees 
attorneys at $15,000. KRS 342.320. 
known as the 
ready to issue 
change will be 
for claimants' 
Managed Care - The act requires the Commissioner to promulgate 
adrninistrati ve regulations incorporatirig managed Care . into the 
workers' compensation system. KRS 342.033. 
There are many other changes contained in House Bill 928, but the 
above changes are the ones which seem to excite the most interest 
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On June 3, 1993, the united states Department of Labor issued 
Regulations (29 CFR Part 825) designed to address questions 
unanswered by the text of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
("FMLA") . The following presentation is an overview of these 
significant regulations, together with an analysis of the FMLA's 
relationship to the ADA and workers' compensation. 
FMLA QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
1. Does this law apply to all employers? 
No, employers are covered only if they have employed at least 
50 employees for 20 or more calendar workweeks in either of the 
last two years. Thus, as of August 5, 1993, an employer must count 
the number of employees employed in both calendar years 1992 and 
1993 to determine if it employed at least 50 employees during 20 or 
more weeks in either year. 
In determining whether or not 50 or more employees have been 
employed for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks, the Regulations state that "employ" is intended to mean 
maintain on the payroll. It is thus not necessary that every 
employee perform work on each working day to be counted. The 
Regulations also specify that part-time employees and employees on 
leaves of absence will be counted, but those on long-term or 
indefinite layoff will not. 
2. My home office in another s~ate has over 50 employees, 
yet my satellite operation has only 25 employees. Must 
I grant a family medical leave to each one of my 
employees? 
Not necessarily. The law does not cover any employee of a 
site with fewer than 50 employees unless 50 or more employees work 
for that same employer wi thin 75 miles of the employee's work site. 
The 75-mile distance is based on surface miles on public 
roads. Also, the Regulations provide that this judgment concerning 
distances and numbers of employees is to be made when the employee 
requests the leave, although the employee is then free to renew 
his/her request at a later date when circumstances may have 
changed. 
1Portions of this written text have been reproduced with the 
permission of M. Lee Smith Publishers & Printers, which publishes 
the Kentucky Employment Law Letter i .. Edi tor Richard S. Cleary f 
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald. 
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3. Are all employees eligible for leave? 
No. In order to be eligible, an employee must have worked for 
his/her employer for at least 12 months, with no less than 1,250 
hours of work during that 12-month period. 
All hours worked under federal wage/hour guidelines will be 
counted toward the 1,250 hour mark. Salaried exempt employees 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) are presumed to have met 
the 1,250 hours or work requirement where no hours-worked records 
have been kept. 
4. When is an eligible employee entitled to leave? 
There are four circumstances under which an eligible employee 
is entitled to family leave: 
a) Birth of a son or daughter and in order to care for the 
child; 
b) Placement of a son or daughter with the employee for 
adoption or foster care; 
c) Care for the employee's spouse, child, or parent with a 
"serious health condition"; or 
d) Care for the employee's own "serious health condition" 
that makes the person unable to perform the functions of 
the job. 
For adoption leave, the Regulations do not require use of 
licensed adoption agencies. However, the definition of "foster 
care" requires state action rather than just an informal 
arrangement to take care of another person's child. 
"Spouse" is to be defined under applicable state law. 
Unmarried, domestic partners do not qualify for family leave to 
care for their partner .. 
The "son or daughter" may be a minor or a child 18 years or 
over who is "incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical 
disability" as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) • 
5. What is a "serious health condition"? 
A "serious health condition" means an illness, injury, 
impairment or physical or mental condition involving: 
a) A period of incapacity or treatment connected with 
inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, 
hospice, or residential medical care facility; or 
B-2 
b) A period of incapacity requiring absence of more than 3 
calendar days from work, school, or other regular daily 
acti vi ties that also involves continuing treatment by (or 
supervision of) a health care provider; or 
c) continuing treatment by (or supervision of) a health care 
provider for a chronic or long-term health condition that 
is incurable or so serious that, if not treated, would 
result in a period of incapacity of more than 3 calendar 
days; or for prenatal care. 
For a "serious health condition, 11 the health care provider may 
be required to certify: 
a) For family medical leave, that the employee is 1Ineeded to 
care for" the family member; this encompasses both 
physical and psychological care; 
b) For employee medical leave, that the employee is unable 
to perform the functions of his or her position. This 
encompasses the employee's inability to work at all or to 
perform any of the essential functions of the job within 
the meaning of the ADA; and . 
c) For leave taken intermittently or on a reduced schedule, 
"the medical necessity for such leave." 
6. What does "continuing treatment" by a health care 
provider mean? 
continuing treatment includes: 
a) Two or more visits to a health care provider; 
b) Two or more treatments by a health care practitioner 
(e.g., physical therapist) under orders or referral by a 
provider; or 
c) One visit to a health care provider that results in a 
regimen of continuing treatment under supervision of the 
provider; or 
d) A situation where the person has a serious long-term or 
chronic incurable condition and the person is under the 
continuing supervision of, cbut not necessarily being 
actively treated by, a health care provider (e.g., 
persons with Alzheimer's or persons in the late states of 
cancer) . 
Remember, for any condition other than one that requires 
inpatient care, the employee or family member must be receiving 
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continuing treatment by a health care provider for the employee to 
qualify for leave. 
7. What about voluntary or cosmetic treatments? Can they be 
serious health conditions? 
Generally, no, unless inpatient hospital care is required. 
However, restorative dental surgery after an accident or removal of 
cancerous growths would be included. Routine physical exams are 
explicitly excluded. Treatments for allergies, stress, and 
substance abuse also are included in the definition if all other 
conditions of the Regulations are met. 
8. What is a "health care provider"? 
A health care provider is either an appropriately licensed 
doctor of medicine or osteopathy, or any other person determined by 
the secretary of labor to be capable of providing health care 
services. 
The Regulations define this second category to include only: 
podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, 
chiropractors under certain circumstances, nurse practitioners and 
nurse midwives, and Christian Science practitioners listed with the 
First Church of Christ, scientist in Boston, Massachusetts. (Where 
a second or third certification is being sought by an employer, it 
may require that the certification be from a health care provider 
other than a Christian Science practitioner.) 
9. How much leave is an eligible employee entitled to take? 
An eligible employee may take a total of 12 workweeks of leave 
during any l2-month period. The employer may choose from among the 
four following methods to determine the "12-month period" in which 
the leave entitlement occurs: 
(1) Calendar year; 
(2) Any fixed 12-month "leave year" (e.g., fiscal year; year 
based on employee's anniversary date) ; 
(3) 12-month period forward from the date any employee's 
first FMLA leave begins (e. g., an employee would be 
entitled to 12 weeks of leave during the year beginning 
on the first date the FMLA leave is taken; the next 12-
month period would begin the first time leave is taken 
after completion of any previous 12-month period); or 
(4) A "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the 
date an employee uses any FMLA leave (may not extend back 
before August 5, 1993). 
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10. Must the employer use the same method for determining the 
12-month period with every employee? 
Yes. The method used to determine the 12-month period must be 
applied uniformly to all employees. An employer may change methods 
only if it gives at least 60 days' notice to all employees and does 
not prevent employees from retaining the full benefit of the 12 
weeks of leave during the transition. 
11. By what date must childbirth, adoption, or foster care 
leave be concluded? 
Leave taken for childbirth, adoption, or foster care placement 
must be concluded at the end of the 12-month period following the 
date of the birth, adoption, or placement unless otherwise 
permitted by the employer or state law. 
12. We have many families who work for us. Is each family 
member entitled to a full 12-week leave each year? 
Generally, yes. However, a husband and wife who work for the 
same employer may take only 12 weeks of leave in the aggregate for 
the birth of a child, adoption, or foster placement, or for the 
care of a sick parent (not parent-in-law). For the employee's own 
or a child's serious heal th condition, each parent would be 
entitled to the full 12 weeks. 
13. If husband and wife both use a portion of the total 12-
week leave for the birth of a child, adoption, or foster 
care placement, are they entitled to take any more leave 
in the event of personal illness, or for the care of a 
sick child or the other spouse? 
Yes. Each spouse would be entitled to the difference between 
the amount he or she has taken individually and 12 weeks. 
14. Can the employer require that" the 12-week leave period be 
taken all at once or is the employee entitled to use it 
intermittently? 
For birth of a child, adoption, or foster placement, an 
employer may decide to require that the 12-week period be taken at 
one time. However, an eligible employee who requests the leave due 
to the serious health condition of the employee or a spouse, child, 
or parent may take the leave intermi ttently or on a reduced 
schedule leave when medically necessary. "Intermittent leave" is 
defined as leave taken in separate blocks of time for a single 
illness or injury and may include leave of periods from an hour or 
more to several weeks. 
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15. What is "reduced schedule leave"? 
"Reduced schedule leave" is a leave schedule that reduces an 
employee's usual number of working hours per workweek or hours per 
workday. While there is no limit on the size of a leave increment 
of an intermittent or reduced schedule leave, an employer may limit 
such leave increments to the shortest period of time used by its 
payroll system to account for absences or use of leave. 
16. Are there any protections for the employer when an 
employee requests an intermittent leave or a reduced 
schedule leave? 
Yes, a few. If the employee's need for intermittent or 
reduced schedule leave is foreseeable based on planned medical 
treatment, the employee must make a reasonable effort to schedule 
the treatment so as not to IIdisrupt unduly the employer's 
operation. II The employer also has the option of temporarily 
transferring the employee to an available alternative job that 
better accommodates the necessary periods of leave than the 
employee's regular position. The employee must be qualified to 
perform the alternative job and the job must have equivalent pay 
and benefits. It is important to note that transfer to an 
<alternative position may require compliance with an existing 
collective bargaining agreement, federal law such as the ADA, and 
state law. 
17. How is the amount of used leave determined where an 
employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced 
schedule? 
Only the amount of leave actually taken may be counted toward 
the 12 weeks of leave entitlement (e.g., 8 hour days: 4 hours of 
leave = 1/2 week of leave each week affected). 
Leave for employees who work part-time schedules or variable 
hours is determined on a pro rata basis by comparing the new 
schedule with the employee's normal schedule (e.g., 30 hours per 
week: 10 hours of leave = 1/3 of a week). 
For employees whose schedules vary from week to week, a weekly 
average of the hours worked over the 12 weeks prior to the 
beginning of the leave period is used to calculate the normal 
workweek. 
18. Where leave is unpaid, mayan employer deduct hourly 
amounts from an employee'S salary without affecting the 
employee'S exempt status under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act? 
Yes. An employer may deduct from the exempt employee's salary 
for any hours taken as intermittent or reduced schedule FMLA leave 
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within a workweek without affecting the employee's exempt status 
for purposes of the FLSA. 
19. Are employees entitled to pay for the time they are on 
leave? 
No, but if the employer offers paid vacation, personal leave, 
family leave, sick or medical leave, then the employee may choose 
or the employer may require the employee to sUbstitute any such 
accrued paid leave as applies for all or any-part of the l2-week 
period. Unless the employer permits otherwise, paid family leave 
may be substi tuted only under circumstances permi tted by the 
employer's family leave plan. 
Only paid leave under circumstances which qualify as FMLA 
leave counts against the 12-weekleave period. For example, paid 
sick leave used for a medical condition not considered to be a 
serious health condition does not count against the 12 weeks' leave 
entitlement. 
An employee using paid leave must comply only with the 
employer's requirements for use of paid leave and not the more 
stringent FMLA notice or certification requirements unless the 
employee wishes to extend a paid leave period with unpaid FMLA 
leave; then the notice and certification requirements apply as of 
the first date of the leave period. 
20. Does the employer designate whether the leave is paid or 
unpaid? 
Yes. It is the employer's responsibility in all cases to 
designate at the time of the leave request whether the leave is 
paid or unpaid, whether it is FMLA-qualifying (based on what the 
employee tells the employer), and whether any paid leave must be 
substituted for unpaid leave. 
21. Must the employer continue the employee1s benefits during 
the leave period? 
An employer must maintain the employee's insurance coverage 
under any group health plan throughout the period the employee is 
out on leave under this law. Coverage under the plan must be the 
same as though the employee were not on leave. An employee may 
choose not to retain health coverage during FMLA leave but must be 
reinstated to coverage upon return on the same terms as prior to 
taking the leave, Le., no qualifying period, physical examination, 
or exclusion of pre-existing conditions. Where an employee has 
informed the employer of intent not to return from leave, the 
employee fails to return from leave or the- employee has exhausted 
FMLA leave entitlement, the employer's obligation to maintain 
health benefits ceases unless COBRA applies or the employee is a 
"key" employee as defined below. 
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22. How may employees on FMLA leave pay their share of health 
benefit premiums? 
If the leave is paid, the employee's share of premiums must be 
paid by the method normally used during any paid leave. If leave 
is unpaid, the employer may require payment at the same time as it 
would be made if by payroll deduction, on the same schedule as 
under COBRA, in accordance with a cafeteria plan, according to the 
employer's existing rules for payment by employees on IIleave 
without pay" as long as such rules do not require prepayment, or 
any other system voluntarily agreed to by the employer and 
employee. 
23. What happens if the employee fails to make timely health 
plan premium payments? 
An employer may discontinue health insurance coverage if the 
employee's premium payment is more than 30 days late. However, the 
employee's failure to pay does not change any other obligations the 
employer has under the law, e.g., reinstatement of the employee's 
coverage/benefits upon return from leave equivalent to those the 
employee would have had if leave had not been taken or premium 
payment(s) had not been missed. 
24. May the employer recover premiums it paid for maintaining 
"group health plan" coverage during FMLA leave? 
Yes. Besides the circumstances discussed at 21, 22, and 23, 
an employer may recover any such premiums paid on the employee's 
behalf if he or she fails to return to work after FMLA leave has 
been exhausted, except where the failure to return is due to: 
(1) The continuation, recurrence, or onset of a serious 
health condition, unless the employer requests that the 
employee provide medical certification from the health 
providers of the employee· or the employee's family 
members within 30 days, and the employee fails to do so. 
(2) Other circumstances beyond the employee's control, e.g., 
the employee's spouse's unexpected transfer to a job 
location more than 75 miles from the employee's worksite; 
a serious health condition of a relative or individual 
other than an immediate family member, requiring the 
employee to provide care; the employee's layoff while on 
leave i the employee's status as a "keyll employee as 
defined in Question 28. 
In all other circumstances, the employer may recover both its 
share and the employee's share of the health benefit premiums that 
the company paid during the course of the leave. No health benefit 
payments may be recovered for any periods of paid leave. 
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25. What means may the employer use for recovering health 
insurance premium payments made for the non-returning 
employee? 
Under Kentucky Wage-Hour Law, if a written authorization is 
signed by the employee, an employer may deduct the amount due from 
any sums owed to the employee, e.g., vacation pay, final paycheck, 
etc. A self-insured employer may only recover its share of 
allowable "premiums" as would be calculated under COBRA, excluding 
the 2 percent administrative fee. 
26. Is the employee guaranteed the same job upon returning 
from leave? 
Generally, yes, but where such is not possible, the employee 
may be given an equivalent position involving equivalent employment 
~enefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. 
27. What is an equivalent position? 
An equivalent position is one having the same pay, benefits, 
and working conditions, including privileges, perquisi tes, and 
status, as well as the same or substantially similar duties and 
responsibilities entailing substantially equivalent skill, 
responsibility, and authority. The employee is also entitled to 
any new or additional benefits not dependent upon seniority or 
accrual during the leave period. An employee must also be given a 
reasonable opportunity to fulfill job requirements upon return to 
work where the employee's special qualifications for the position 
may have lapsed during the employee's leave. 
28. What is a 1Ikey" employee? 
A "key" employee is any salaried employee among the highest 
paid 10 percent of all salaried and non-salaried, eligible and 
ineligible employees within 75 miles of his or her worksite. If a 
"key" employee's job restoration would cause "substantial and 
grievous economic injury" to the operations of the employer, the 
employer need not reinstate the employee following the expiration 
of leave. 
The determination of whether a salaried employee is among the 
highest paid 10 percent must be made at'the time of the request for 
leave. In determining which employees are "key," year-to-date 
'earnings (wages, premium pay, incentive pay, all bonuses already 
earned) are divided by weeks worked by the employee, including 
those weeks in which leave is taken. 
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29. What does "substantial and grievous economic injury" 
mean? 
The test is not whether the employee's absence will cause such 
harm or injury, but instead whether restoring the employee to his 
or her position will have that effect. Factors used in determining 
sUbstantial and grievous economic injury include the employer's 
ability to replace the "key" employee on a temporary basis i whether 
permanent replacement is unavoidable; and, if so, what effect it 
would have on company operations to reinstate the employee in an 
equivalent position. Minor inconveniences and costs that the 
employer would experience in the normal course of doing business 
would not constitute "substantial and grievous economic injury." 
30. What are the employer's duties with respect to "key" 
employees? 
The employer must provide written notice to the employee at 
the time of the leave request that the employee qualifies as a 
"key" employee. No later than the commencement of the employee's 
leave, the employer must also fully inform the employee of the 
potential consequences relative to reinstatement and maintenance of 
health benefits if the employer believes it is likely that the 
"key" employee will not be reinstated because of substantial and 
grievous economic injury to the employer's operations. Failure to 
provide timely notice will result in the employer's loss of its 
right to deny restoration for any reaspn. 
31. What must the employer's notice contain? 
The employer must serve notice, ei ther in person or by 
certified mail, stating the basis for the employer's finding that 
sUbstantial and grievous economic injury will result. If the 
employee is already on leave, the notice must provide a reasonable 
time to opt to return from the leave. 
Unless the "key" employee indicates that he or she \vill not 
return to work after notice of non-restoration of his or her 
position, the employer is obligated to maintain health benefits and 
cannot recover its cost of health benefit premiums paid under the 
FMLA leave provisions. A "key" employee who opts to continue leave 
after notification of non-restoration of his or her position may 
seek reinstatement at the exhaustion of the leave period. At this 
point, the employer must determine whether substantial and grievous 
economic injury still exists and so notify the employee on writing. 
32. Is an employer obliged to notify employees of their 
rights under this law? 
Yes. Covered employers must post a notice describing the 
Act's provisions. Employers must also furnish notice and 
information to employees on their rights and obligations for FMLA 
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leave through applicable employee handbooks or other written 
policies used by an employer. If an employer does not have written 
policies, manuals, or handbooks, the employer must provide separate 
written guidance about the law to its employees at the time they 
request leave. 
In addition, when an employee applies for FMLA leave, the 
employer must provide a detailed explanation of the employee's 
+ights and obligations which may apply particularly to that 
employee's situation, such as any requirement to furnish medical 
certification sUbstantiating a serious health condition, 
arrangements for paying the employee IS portion of the insurance 
premiums during the leave period, his/her status as a "keyll 
employee, and any requirement for medical certification of fitness 
to return to work. 
33. Must the employee notify the employer before taking 
family and medical leave? 
Only where the need for the leave is foreseeable due to 
childbirth, foster care, or planned adoption, or for planned 
medical treatment. In such cases, employees are generally required 
to give at least 30 days' advance notice or as much notice as 
possible. There is no notice requirement for an unforeseeable 
leave, but an employer may require notice provided as soon as 
possible under the circumstances, ordinarily within one or two 
business days of when the employee learns of the need for such 
leave. Verbal and even telephonic notice to the employer is 
sufficient. An employee's spouse or other family member may give 
such notice if the employee is unable to do so due to a serious 
health condition. 
34. Does the employer have a right to verify the existence of 
a "serious health condition?!' 
Yes. The employer may require certification from a health 
care provider to support FMLA leave requests to care for a serious 
health condition. Employees must provide such certification in lIa 
timely manner," defined as within 15 calendar days unless 
impracticable. Employers must inform employees in writing that 
such certification will be required. 
35. Mayan employer question a medical certification? 
Yes. If there is reason to doubt the validity of the 
certification, the employer may get a second opinion at its own 
expense. The second health provider may not be employed on a 
regular basis by the employer. If a conflict exists between the 
first and second opinions, the employer and employee may approve 
getting the opinion of a third medical provider at the employer's 
expense. Both parties must act in "good faith. II If good faith is 
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lacking on either party's part, the medical opinion unfavorable to 
that party's position will be binding. 
If an employee fails to provide timely certification within 15 
days (where practicable) of the employer's request and the need for 
such leave was foreseeable, the leave request may be denied until 
the certification is produced. If the need for leave is not 
foreseeable, the employee must still attempt to provide the 
certification within 15 days of the employer's request, or as soon 
thereafter as practicable. 
36. Are recertifications permissible? 
Yes, as long as they are requested on a reasonable basis. The 
employer may request such recertification not more than once every 
30 days unless (1) the employee requests an extension of leave; (2) 
changed circumstances occur regarding the illness or injury; or (3) 
the employer receives information that casts doubt upon the 
continuing validity of the most recentccertification. 
37. Can an employer require periodic reports from the 
employee on his present status and/or intent to return to 
work? 
Yes. However, if the employee states an intention to return 
to work, even if the statement is somehow qualified, he/she remains 
enti tIed to the remainder of the leave. Where an employee gives an 
unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work, so ends the 
employer's obligations to reinstate the employee as well as to 
restore the employee as well as to restore the employee's medical 
insurance coverage (subject to COBRA). 
38. Can the employer require medical evidence that the 
employee is capable of returning to work? 
Yes, as long as the employer's policy is applied uniformly to 
all similarly situated employees and complies with ADA and similar 
laws, or any applicable collective bargaining agreement. Note that 
an employer may seek such fitness-for-duty certification only with 
regard to the particular health condition that caused the 
employee's need for leave. Also, the certification need only be a 
simple statement that the employee can "return to work. Of course, 
an employer must comply with ADA requirements that any return-to-
work physical be job-related. Notice of the need for a "fitness-
for-duty" certification must be given by the employer either at the 
time the leave is requested or immediately after the leave 
commences. No second or third fitness-for-duty certifications may 
be required. 
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39. How will the Act be enforced? 
Both individual employees and the Department of Labor can 
bring suit against an employer who doe3 not comply with the Act. 
40. What is the statutory time limit for bringing an action? 
A court action must be brought within two years of the date of 
violation except where the violation is willful, in which case the 
action must be brought within three years of the date of the last 
event constituting the violation. 
41. What happens if an employer is notified of a violation of 
the posting requirement? 
If the Department of Labor determines that the posting 
violation is willful, a notice of penalty (of as much as $100 per 
affected employee) will be served on the employer in person or by 
certified mail. 
42. Mayan employer appeal the penalty assessment for willful 
violation of the posting requirement? 
Yes. A review may be obtained from the Wage and Hour regional 
administrator for the region in which the violation occurred by 
filing a petition in writing containing. the legal and factual bases 
for the petition wi thin 15 days of receipt of the notice of 
penalty. The decision resulting from the petition constitutes the 
final order of the secretary. 
43. What happens if the employer does not pay the penalty 
assessment? 
The regional administrator may seek recovery of the unpaid 
final order along with interest and penalties. The final order may 
also be referred to the solicitor of labor for collecting, or the 
secretary of labor may file suit in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
44. What records must be kept to comply with FMLA? 
• Records containing basic payroll information similar to 
that required under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
• Dates of FMLA leave taken by the employee to include 
requests for leave, etc. (and leave must be designated as 
FMLA leave). The records must not include leave provided 
under state law or an empl9yer's plan not covered by 
FMLA. Where leave is taken in increments of less than 
one full day, a record must be kept of the hours of the 
leave. 
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• Copies of employee notices of leave given to the employer 
and all notices, general and specific, given to the 
employees relative to FMLA leave. 
• Any documents describing employee benefits or employer 
policies and practices regarding the taking of paid and 
unpaid leave. 
• Premium payments of employee benefits. 
• Records relative to any dispute between the employee and 
employer regarding matters pertainin~ to FMLA leave. 
• Records and documents relating to medical certification, 
recertification, or medical histories of the employee or 
the employee's family members. (Such records should be 
treated as confidential, maintained in separate files, 
and released on a "need to know" basis.) 
• Records must be kept for a period of three years, and an 
employer may not be requested to submit books or records 
for audit more than once a year unless the Department of 
Labor has reasonable cause to believe a violation exists. 
45. What if an employer is not subject to the FLSA 
recordkeeping regulations for purposes of minimum wage or 
overtime compliance? 
In that case, an employer need not keep a record of actual 
hours worked as long as: 
(1) Eligibility for leave is presumed in the case of 
employees who have been employed for at least 12 months; 
and 
(2) The employer and employee agree on an employee's normal 
schedule or average weekly hours worked, and such 
schedule is reduced to a written agreement where an 
employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced 
schedule basis. 
46. How do other laws, employer practices, and collective 
bargaining agreements affect employee rights under FMLA? 
An employer must observe any employment benefit program or 
plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights than 
those under FMLA. Any provisions of a law or collective bargaining 
agreement which diminishes rights under the law are superseded by 
the FMLA. 
Where employers are also covered by state law, such as under 
maternity leave statutes, etc., and the leave requested qualified 
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under both FMLA and the applicable state law, the leave used counts 
against the employee's entitlement under both laws. The converse 
is also true. If applicable state or local laws provide for leaves 
which do not qualify as FMLA leave (e.g., for care of a parent-in-
law), such leave must be given in addition to the 12-week FMLA 
leave. 
47. What about FMLA leave and the ADA? 
Where the employee is "qualified disabled" under the ADA, the 
employer must make reasonable accommodations but at the same time 
afford an employee his or her FMLA rights. 
For example, if an employee became disabled, a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA might be accomplished by providing the 
employee with a part-time job with no health benefits. However, 
FMLA would permit an employee to work a reduced schedule leave 
until 12 weeks of leave were used, witbhealth benefits maintained 
during this period. At the end of the FMLA leave entitlement, an 
employer is required to reinstate the employee in the same or an 
equivalent position to that which the employee held when leave 
commenced, with equivalent pay and benefits. The employer's FMLA 
obligations would be satisfied if the employer offered the employee 
an equivalent full-time position. If the employee were unable to 
perform the equivalent position because of a disability, and the 
employee had exhausted his or her FMLA entitlement, the ADA might 
permit or require the employer to make a reasonable accommodation 
at that time by placing the employee in a part-time job, with only 
those benefits provided to part-time employees. 
If FMLA entitles an employee to leave, an employer may not, in 
lieu of FMLA leave entitlement, require an employee to take a job 
with a reasonable accommodation. However, ADA may require that an 
employer offer an employee the opportunity to take such a position. 
If an employer requires certifications of an employee's 
fitness for duty to return to work, as permitted by FMLA under a 
uniform policy, it must comply with the ADA requirement that a 
fitness-for-duty physical be job-related. 
/:; 
48. What about FMLA leave and workers' compensation? 
The primary conflict between the FMLA and workers' 
compensation involves light duty work and temporary total 
disability benefits. If the FMLA qualifying condition is in 
connection with a workers' compensation claim, the employer may 
attempt to return the empoyee to work in a light duty position, 
thus decreasing workers' compensation payments. However, under the 
FMLA the employee may be entitled to refuse the light duty work and 
continue on unpaid leave. Of course, any such refusal should 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Overview. In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") primarily in response to 
growing concerns regarding the inadequate standards and safeguards 
then applicable to the establishment, operation and funding of 
employee benefit plans. ERISA §2, 29 U.S.C.S. §1001b. While the 
initial congressional focus centered around abuses in the area of 
retirement plans, ERISA coverage was extended to encompass other 
employee benefit plan programs as well. 
ERISA's broad scope can easily be detected by reviewing its 
table of contents. Title I is intended to protect employees and 
plan participants by establishing minimum standards regarding (i) 
reporting and disclosure (ERISA §§101-111, 29 U.S.C.S. §§1021-
1031); (ii) participation and vesting (ERISA §§201-211, 29 U.S.C.S. 
§§1051-1061)i (iii) minimum funding standards (ERISA 55301-308, 29 
U.S.C.S. §51081-1086) i (iv) fiduciary responsibility (ERISA 55401-
414, 29 U.S.C.S. §§1101-1114) and; (v) administration and enforce-
ment (ERISA 5S501-515, 29 U.S.C.S. 551131-1145). 
Substantive additions to Title I of ERISA were enacted in the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA") 
imposing continuation coverage requirements under group health 
plans. COBRA health care continuation requirements are contained 
in Part 6 of Title I of ERISA. (ERISA §§601-608, 29 U.S.C.S. 
§§1161-1168) . Corresponding tax provisions are contained in 
section 4980B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended 
("Code"). 
In addition to participant rights and employer obligations, 
Title II of ERISA also governs the tax treatment associated with 
employee benefit plans. In many instances you will find that a 
particular requirement will be codified in both the provisions of 
the Code and the Labor provisions of the united States Code. This 
means that the requirement is imposed as a condi tion of tax 
qualification and the employer or the participant has enforceable 
duties or rights. Examples include minimum vesting standards 
(ERISA 5203, Code S411), the exclusive benefit rule (ERISA 
S402 (c) (1), Code S401(c) (1», written plan requirements (ERISA 
§402(b), Code 5401(a», benefit distributions forms (ERISA S205, 
Code §401(a) (11) and 417), and benefit accrual requirements (ERISA 




further establishes registration and information 
a declaratory judgement procedure relating the 
of retirement plans and internal operational 
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requirements for the Internal Revenue Service in monitoring 
employee benefit issues. 
Title III of ERISA governs the jurisdiction, administration 
and enforcement of employee benefit plans, establishes a Joint 
Pension, Profit Sharing and Employee Stock ownership Plan Task 
Force, commissions other Congressional studies involving employee 
benefit issues, and establishes a Joint Board For The Enrollment of 
Actuaries. 
A comprehensive federal insurance plan for the termination of 
defined benefit employee pension benefit plans is included in ERISA 
Title IV. Passage of ERISA created the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, which is charged with the responsibility of monitoring 
the termination insurance program. Plans subject to Title IV are 
required to pay annual premiums and are subject to strict termina-
tion procedures. Addi tionally, employers maintaining plans subj ect 
to Title IV also risk exposure for the under funding of terminated 
plans. 
1.2 Plan Types. Most practitioners view ERISA as mandating 
legal requirements for "qualified" retirement plans. In fact, 
employee pension benefit plans providing retirement benefits are 
governed by ERISA and probably receive more attention under ERISA 
than other plans. Employee pension benefit plans can either be 
"qualified" or "non-qualified." Qualified retirement plans 
entitle plan sponsors, the plan and plan participants to 
preferential tax treatment. Non-qualified retirement plans do not 
afford the same degree of preferential tax treatment but are 
generally not subject to the stringent qualification rules 
otherwise imposed on qualified plans. 
Many of the provisions of ERISA also apply to welfare plans, 
which are plans that.are established and maintained for the purpose 
of providing medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits in the 
event of sickness, accident, disability, death, unemployment, 
vacation, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care 
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services. During the 
infancy stages of ERISA employers, employees and many governmental 
agencies virtually ignored or were unaware of the application of 
ERISA to employee welfare benefit plans. As a result· of the 
developing crisis in the health care industry our national focus is 
now being shifted towards welfare benefit plans. Undoubtedly, 
mounting pressures resulting from the budget deficit will require 
a decline in federally funded benefits such as Medicare. Assuming 
such a trend, it is likely that Congress will implement even more 
far reaching changes in the welfare benefit plan area in the 
future. 
1.3 Legal Authorities. In reviewing potential ERISA claims 
it is important to note that ERISA's provisions impose restrictions 
applicable to both sUbstantive claims as well as the tax treatment 
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associated with employee benef i tplans. In many instances there is 
an overlap between legal requirements imposed upon a plan, giving 
participants rights under the plan, as well as detrimental tax 
treatment for failure to abide by tax rules. Overall, it is easy 
to view ERISA as two components -- tax and non:-:-tax. Tax components 
of ERISA are embodied in 29 U.S~C.while the tax provisions are 
embodied in the Internal Revenue Code .' 
Because of the overlap of tax and labor provisions, on August 
10, 1978 the President issued ERISA Reorganization Plan No. 4 for 
the purpose of clarifying jurisdiction of issues relating to the 
Department of Treasury and the Department of Labor. 
2. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
2.1 Administrative Enforcement. section 502 of ERISA (29 
U.S.C.S. §1132) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to investigate 
civil and criminal violations of ERISA and related laws and to 
forward violations to the Attorney General for appropriate action. 
(a) The Secretary may sue to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates the reporting and disclosure requirements, or the 
participation, vesting and funding rules of ERISA, or to obtain any 
other appropriate relief necessary to enforce those rules. ERISA 
§502(a) (5) i 29 U.S.C.S. §1132(a) (5). 
(b) The Secretary may not bring an action for equitable 
relief for violation of the participation, vesting or funding rules 
of ERISA in the case of a qualified plan, or a plan for which an 
application for qualification is pending, unless requested to do so 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. ERISA §502(b) (1) (A) i 29 U.S.C.S. 
§1132 (b) (1) (A) . 
(c) Participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries may 
request that the Secretary exercise enforcement authority with 
regard to the participation, vesting or funding rules. ERISA 
§ 5 02 (b) (1) (B) i 29 U. S • C. S • S 113 2 (b) (1) (B) • 
(d) The Secretary may sue a plan fiduciary in order to 
secure restitution to the plan for any losses resulting from a 
breach of fiduciary duty and to seek the removal of the breaching 
fiduciary. 
(e) The PBGC has authority to make investigations and 
may sue in federal district court for appropriate legal and/or 
equitable relief in order to enforce the termination insurance 
provisions of ERISA. ERISA S4003; 29 U.S.C.S. S1303. 
(f) The Department of Labor's ("DOL") preferred method 
of handling ERISA violations is through voluntary compliance unless 
immediate action is necessary in order to preserve plan assets or 
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to protect participants' rights. 
(g) In d~tel:;'1nining whether immediate action is necessary 
the DOL will consider . such factors as the flagrancy of the 
violation and the threat of loss of plan assets or records during 
the voluntary compliance period. 
(h) Judicial review of DOL regulatory actions is 
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act which is specifically 
incorporated into the labor provisions of Title I of ERISA. 
(i) Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over actions for judicial review brought under Title I of ERISA. 
Such actions are to be brought in the district court in the 
district where the plan has its principal office or in the District 
of Columbia federal district court. ERISA §502(f), 29 U.S.C.S. 
§1132(f). 
2.2 Private Actions. 
(a) Right to Bring Action 
(i) A fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary 
may bring a private action under sections 502(a) (1) and (a) (3) of 
ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1132) in order to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates the: provisions of ' Title I of ERISA, the rules-for 
the protection of employee benefit rights, or the terms of the 
plan, or in order to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to 
redress such violations. 
(ii) A civil action may be brought· by . a plan 
participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due, enforce rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan. ERISA §502{a)(1); U.S.C.S. 
§1132 (a) (1) . 
(iii) section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. § 1140) 
prohibits anyone from discharging, fining, 'suspending, expelling, 
disciplining or discriminating against a participant or beneficiary 
for exercising rights protected by ERISA or taking part in a legal 
proceeding under its provisions. 
(b) Standing to Sue 
(i) outside parties who deal with an employee 
benefit plan do not have standing to sue to enforce their rights 
~gainst the plan under ERISA. 
(iii) The courts have generally held that a plan 
participant who has received a lump sum distribution is no longer 
a participant with standing to bring suit under ERISA because such 
participant is no longer eligible to receive benefits under the 
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plan. In an action by a former pension plan participant the 
Seventh Circuit, while holding that the participant lacked 
standing, stated that there was "merit to the argument that a 
former employee who has already received vested benefits should be 
allowed to bring an action within a reasonable amount of time 
against the administrator for failure to provide information and in 
order to ascertain the accuracy of the amount already received." 
The court, however, refused to find standing as the participant 
waited three years from her date of termination to file suit. 
Winchester v. Pension Committee of Michael Reese Health Plan, etc., 
942 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1991). 
(iii) The Fourth Circuit, invoking its prerogative 
to create federal common law under ERISA, held that the federal 
courts have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a plan 
administrator under Section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. 
§1132). The court held that while section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA 
provides a federal cause of action only for participants or 
beneficiaries, an ERISA action governed by federal common law 
arises under federal law where the issues in dispute are of central 
concern to the federal statute. Provident Life and Accident 
Insurance Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 
111 S.ct. 512 (1990). 
(iv) In Kennedy v. Connecticut General Life Ins. 
Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1991), the court held that a health 
care provider has standing under ERISA to sue for benefits assigned 
to him by a participant in an employee welfare benefit plan. The 
court held that in such a situation the health care provider was a 
beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA. 
(v) The court in Hawaii Teamsters v. City Express 
Inc., 751 F.Supp. 1426 (D. Haw. 1990), held that where a union is 
the bargaining representative of. plan participants, the union has 
standing to sue under ERISA to vindicate rights under the plan on 
behalf of its members. 
(vi) The Supreme Court recently held in Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 60 U.S.L.W. 4242 (March 24, 1992), 
that the term "employee", as used in ERISA, incorporates 
traditional agency law principles for identifying employer-employee 
relationships. The court held that where a statute, such as ERISA, 
does not define the term "employee," it is presumed that Congress 
intended an agency law definition unless clearly indicated 
otherwise. The Court adopted a multi-factor common law test for 
determining who is an "employee" and held that all of the incidents 
of the employment relationship must be assessed and weighed, with 
no one factor being. decisive, in order to determine whether an 
individual will be considered an employee under ERISA. 
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2.3 statute of Limitations. 
(a) ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations 
period for suits brought to enforce its provisions except for 
actions brought for breach of fiduciary duty or for actions under 
the special provisions relating to multi-employer plans. 
(b) The controlling limitation period will be that 
contained in the most analogous state statute of limitations. 
Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Committee, 966F2d 190 (6th Cir. 
1992), applying an ohio 15 year state statue in a benefit claim 
case. The courts will apply the statute of limitations of the 
state in which the operative events relating to the cause of action 
occurred. 
(c) Generally, a participant's cause of action is said 
to arise when the participant becomes aware of the facts necessary 
to state a claim, not when the participant discovers that he or she 
has a possible legal claim based upon those facts. 
(d) According to section 413 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. 
S1113) claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty, absent fraud 
or concealment, may not be brought after the earlier of; 
(i) 3 years after the complaining party has actual 
knowledge of the breach or after the filing of a report with the 
Secretary of Labor from which the complaining party could have 
reasonably been expected to obtain knowledge of the breach; or 
(ii) 6 years after the date of the last action 
constituting a breach, or, in the case of an omission, the last 
date by which a fiduciary could have acted to cure the breach. 
Ziegler v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548 (9th 
Cir. 1990), held that not all actions for breach of fiduciary duty 
under ERISA require that harm occur as a result of the breach 
before they will accrue. The court stated that the language of 
section 413 of ERISA clearly states that actual knowledge, and not 
harm, triggers the limitations period. The court applied a two 
part test in determining when the statute of limitations period 
should commence, looking first at the time that the alleged breach 
or violation occurred and secondly at the time that the plaintiff 
had actual knowledge of such breach or violation. The court noted 
that to require actual harm before an action may be brought for 
breach of fiduciary duty would prevent the prosecution of breaches 
of fiduciary duty which Congress intended should be prosecuted in 
enacting ERISA. Such breaches include the failure to perform 
fiduciary duties for the exclusive benefit of participants and 
their beneficiaries or the transfer of plan assets to parties in 
interest. 
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Another case which recognized the stringent requirement of 
actual knowledge, not merely constructive knowledge, for barring 
claims against fiduciaries prior to the expiration of the six year 
statute of limitations was Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 15 E.B.C. 1095 
(3rd Cir. 1992). The court held that "actual knowledge of a breach 
or violation" as required under section 413 of ERISA requires that 
a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts necessary 
to understand that some claim exists. Such facts might include 
necessary opinions of experts, knowledge of a transaction's harmful 
consequences, or actual harm. 
In the case of fraud or concealment, fiduciaries remain 
vulnerable to suit for a period of six years from the discovery of 
their breach or violation. The courts are divided as to whether 
the term "fraud or concealment" refers to the action giving rise to 
the ERISA claim or only to actions by the fiduciary to hide the 
breach. 
2.4 Pre-Litigation Claims Procedure. 
Section 503 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1133) requires that 
every employee benefit plan establish special appeal procedures 
which provide for written notice of a claim denial to the 
participant or beneficiary making the claim for benefits and a 
reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review of the decision 
denying the request. 
Many courts require the exhaustion of interplan claim 
procedures as a prerequisite to bringing a suit for benefits under 
ERISA. In Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1991), 
the court held that a plan participant who is not provided with a 
written denial of benefits, as required under ERISA, may still be 
required to appeal the claim denial before proceeding in federal 
court. The court held that even though a written denial of 
benefits was not issued, the participant, who had a copy of the 
plan document, was notified of the denial and could have sought 
review. 
Springer v. Wal-Mart Associates' Group Health Plan, 908 
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990), held that a plan administrator's refusal 
to process a claim did not excuse a participant from the 
requirement that the participant exhaust the administrative 
remedies available under the plan prior to filing a suit for 
benefits. 
This prerequisite may be waived if the appeals procedures 
would be futile or if there has been a wrongful denial of access to 
such procedures. In Curry v. Contract Fabricatory. Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1990), the court permitted a 
participant to maintain an action under ERISA for the denial of 
benefits despite the participant's failure to exhaust the plan's 
administrative remedies. The plan administrator failed to provide 
the participant with plan documents describing the remedies 
available under the plan or to document the reasons for the denial 
of the participant I s claims. The court held that the plan 
administrator's actions denied the participant meaningful access to 
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the review process and therefore exhaustion of the plan's 
administrative remedies was not required. 
In Graphic Communications v. GCIU - Employer Retirement 
Plan, 917 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1990), the plan stated that a claim 
for benefits would initially be reviewed by the plan administrator 
whose decision could then be appealed to the fund trustees. If a 
participant was dissatisfied with the trustees decision, a 
participant could take the remaining step in the plan's 
administrative process which was final and binding arbitration. A 
participant in the plan declined to arbitrate and instead filed 
suit in Federal District Court under section 502 of ERISA (29 
U.S.C.S. §1132) contending that the arbitration provisions in the 
plan were unenforceable. The court held that judicial review of 
the benefit claim denial was unavailable due to the participant's 
failure to follow the plan's mandatory arbitration procedures. The 
court stated that arbitration clauses are unenforceable when the 
claim in question is one that arises under ERISA, but are 
enforceable where the claim involves plan interpretation. The 
court held that ERISA does not forbid enforcement of an agreement 
to arbitrate questions of coverage under ERISA plans. 
2.5 Jurisdiction and Venue. 
(a) Except in the case of a civil action under ERISA 
section 502 (1) (B) by a participant or beneficiary to recover 
benefits, enforce rights or to clarify rights under a plan, Federal 
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions 
brought by participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries. ERISA 
section 502(e) (1). 
(b) The federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
with state courts in actions brought by participants and 
beneficiaries to recover benefits, enforce rights or clarify 
rights. 
(c) Venue for civil actions under ERISA is the place 
where the plan is administered, where the breach that is the 
subject of the suit occurred, or where the defendant resides or may 
be found. ERISA section 502(e) (2). 
2.6 Availability of Jury Trial. 
(a) ERISA has generally been regarded as an equitable 
statute, and since it does not expressly provide for jury trials, 
the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial has generally been 
held not to apply to ERISA actions. 
(b) There is, however, a split of authority whether jury 
trials are required under the Seventh Amendment. The Third, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, and a district court in the 
First Circuit have ruled that neither ERISA nor the Seventh 
Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in actions to 
recover benefits. 
(c) Supreme Court cases have indicated that remedies 
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other than equitable ones may be available under ERISA. In 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S.ct. 948 (1989), the 
Court compared benefit claims to breach of contract actions which 
are legal in nature, and in Ingersole-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 
S.ct. 478 (1990), the Court indicated that compensatory damages, a 
legal remedy, are within the scope of ERISA. In light of these 
developments, courts have begun to re-examine the issue of the 
right to a jury trail under ERISA. 
3. PREEXPTION 
3.1 The Preemption Clause. 
ERISA section 514 (a) provides in part: "Except as provided in 
sUbsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and 
title IV shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may 
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in 
section 4(a) [29 USCS § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b) 
[29 USCS § 1003 (b)]." This statute, known as the "preemption 
clause," cannot, according to its terms, supersede state laws if 
the employee benefits do not constitute an employee benefit plan. 
Assuming that an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) 
and not exempt under section 4(b) of ERISA exists, the question 
then becomes whether the state law "relates to" the plan. 
The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "relate to" should 
pe given a broad common-sense meaning, "such that a state law 
relaters] to a benefit plan in the normal sense of. the phrase, if 
it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." See 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 
S. ct. 2380, 2389 (1985) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983». In fact, the Court has stated that the 
preemption clause was designed to displace all state laws falling 
within its scope, even laws that mirror ERISA's SUbstantive 
prOV1Slons. Id., 105 S. ct. at 2389 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-
99) . The Court has emphasized, however, "that the pre-emption 
clause is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect 
employee benefit plans." See pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 
U.S. 41, 47-48, 107 S. ct. 1549, 1553 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 
U.S. at 98). 
This broad interpretation of the preemption clause is 
consistent with the legislative history of the statute, and the 
Supreme Court has noted that congressional purpose is the "ultimate 
touchstone" in determining whether a state law is preempted by 
federal law. Id. at 45, 107 S. ct. at 1552. 
3.2 The Savinq Clause. The preemption clause is qualified 
by section 514 (b) (2) (A) of ERISA. That section, known as the 
"saving clause," provides, "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance .... 11 
29 U.S.C.S. S 1144(b) (2) (A) (Law. Co-op. 1990). For a state law to 
be "saved" from the application of the preemption clause, it must, 
according to the Supreme Court, pass a test which may, depending on 
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the facts of the case, have two parts. The first prong of the 
test, which is present in every case, is whether a law "regulates 
insurance." To determine whether a law regulates insurance, the 
Supreme Court has devised a two-step test. First, it asks whether 
the statute in question regulates insurance from a "common-sense 
view." See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48, 107 S. 
ct. 1549, 1553 (1987). To pass this test, "a law must not just 
have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically 
directed toward that industry." See ide at 50, 107 S. ct. at 1554. 
The second part of the "regulates insurance" test asks whether the 
law at issue meets certain criteria used to determine whether a 
particular practice falls within the McCarran-Ferguson Act's 
q~ference to the "business of insurance." Those criteria are: 
" [FJirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or 
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an 
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and 
the insured; and third i whether the practice is limited to entities 
within the insurance industry. " See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743, 105 S. ct. 2380, 2391 (1985) 
(quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129, 
102 S. ct. 3002, 3008 (1982» (emphasis in original). If a state 
law passes both the "common-sense" and the McCarran-Ferguson tests, 
it will fall under the "regulates insurance" language of the saving 
clause. 
Even if the state law passes the "regulat [ing] insurance" 
hurdle, it still might not be held to be saved from preemption. In 
pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52, 107 S. ct. 1549, 
1555 (1987), the Court found that because "the state cause of 
action seeks remedies for the improper processing of a claim for 
benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding of the 
saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning 
the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA S 502 (a), 29 
u. S. C. § 1132 (a) . " In other words, where the state law at issue is 
remedial in nature, the Court found that it had to consider not 
only the tests for meeting the "regulates insurance" language of 
the saving clause, "but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA 
as a whole." See ide at 51, 107 S. ct. at 1555. The Court in 
pilot found that the civil enforcement scheme set forth in section 
502 (a) was intended to be the exclusive remedy for asserting 
improper processing of claims, and that this exclusivity would be 
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries could 
obtain relief under varying state law remedies that were rejected 
by Congress when it crafted ERISA. In holding that the state law 
cause of action for improper processing of an insurance claim was 
not saved by the saving clause, and was therefore preempted by the 
preemption clause, the Court noted that the most important factor 
in its decision was Congress' intent that ERISA's civil 
enforcement provision be exclusive. See ide at 52, 54, 57, 107 S. 
ct. at 1555-56, 1558. Consequently, in cases where the state law 
in question might affect the remedies section of ERISA, it is not 
enough that the state law meets the "regulating insurance" test; it 
must also pass the "role-of-the-saving-clause-in-ERISA-as-a-whole" 
test. 
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3.3 The Deemer Clause. Even if a state law meets all the 
applicable requirements of the saving clause test, it still may be 
preempted by virtue of section 514(b) (2) (B) of ERISA, known as the 
deemer clause. That clause provides: 
"Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 
4 (a) [29 USCS § 1003 (a)], which is not exempt under 
section 4 (b) [29 USCS § 1003 (b)] (other than a plan 
established primarily for the purpose of providing death 
benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, 
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other 
insurer • or to be engaged in the business of 
insurance. • for purposes of any law of any State 
purporting to regulate insurance companies • [or] 
insurance contracts .•.• " 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of the deemer 
clause: "(I] f a plan is insured, a state may regulate it indirectly 
through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance 
contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the state may not regulate 
it." See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. ct. 403, 411 (1990). As a 
result of the Court's holding in FMC, employers attempting to 
implement self-insured plans affecting employees in different 
states should not have to confront "conflicting or inconsistent 
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans." FMC Corp., 
111 S. ·ct. at 411 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 463 U.S. 
85, 99, 103 S. ct. 2890, 2901 (1983» (quoting remarks of Sen. 
Williams). 
In summary, preemption analysis can be broken down as follows:' 
step one: Determine whether the law at issue relates to an 
employee benefits plan. If so, go to step two; if not, the law is 
not preempted and the analysis is at an end. 
step two: Determine whether the law is saved by the saving 
clause. This determination can consist of one or possibly two 
tests: 
1. Does the law regulate insurance? This prong of the 
saving clause analysis always applies and consists 
of two questions: (a) Taking a common-sense view 
of the saving clause language, is the law 
specifically directed towards the insurance 
industry?, and (b) Does the law meet any or all of 
the three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors: (i) 
whether the practice has the effect of transferring 
or spreading a policyholder's risk; (ii) whether 
the practice is an integral part of the policy 
relationship between the insurer and the insured; 
and (iii) whether the practice is limited to 
entities in the insurance industry? If the law 
passes these two tests, it regulates insurance~ It 
mayor may not be saved from preemption, however, 
depending on whether the second prong of the saving 
clause analysis applies and whether the law can 
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survive the second prong. 
2. The second prong of the saving clause analysis, 
which mayor may not apply depending on the facts 
of the case, is whether the law is consistent with 
the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole. 
In one case, the Supreme Court has held that 
allowing a state remedial law to survive preemption 
would defeat the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA, 
and the court considered this the most important 
factor in preempting the law. 
If the state law passes all of the saving clause 
hurdles, it still must be determined whether or not 
the deemer clause preempts the law in spite of the 
saving clause. 
step three: Determine whether the state law purporting to 
regulate insurance deems an employee benefit plan to be an 
insurance company or other insurer or to be engaged in the business 
of insurance. If so, the law is preempted by the deemer clause; if 
not, the law survives preemption analys is. practically, the deemer 
clause will apply to preempt a state law if the law attempts to 
regulate plans directly or to regulate self-insured plans directly 
or indirectly. 
Although the principles set forth above seem relatively 
straightforward, they have proved difficult to apply in practice. 
3.4 Application of Preemption Tests - Insurance. 
One of the landmark cases that dealt directly with health 
insurance arrangements was Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. ct. 2380 (1985). In that case, 
the Court considered whether a Massachusetts statute, which 
required minimum mental health benefits be provided to 
Massachusetts residents who were insured under a general insurance 
policy, an accident or sickness policy, or an employee health-care 
plan covering hospital and surgical expenses, was preempted by 
ERISA. See ide at 727, 105 S. ct. 2382-83. Because the Attorney 
General of Massachusetts found that appellant insurers Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company and Travelers Insurance Company were issuing 
policies outside of Massachusetts which failed to provide the 
requisite mental health coverage mandated by the statute, and 
because the insurance companies reserved the right to challenge the 
applicability of the statute to any policy they issued to an ERISA 
plan within Massachusetts, he brought suit for declaratory and 
~njunctive relief to enforce the statute. Id. at 734-35, 105 S. 
ct. at 2386. The insurers asserted, inter alia, that the mandated-
benefits statute was preempted by ERISA, while Massachusetts argued 
that the statute, as applied to insurance companies that se-ll 
insurance to ERISA plans, was a law regulating insurance and was 
thereby saved by virtue of the saving clause from the operation of 
the preemption clause. See ide at 733-34, 105 S. ct. at 2385-86. 
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The Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts had found that the statute related to a benefit plan 
and thus would be preempted by ERISA unless it fell under one of 
the exceptions to the preemption clause. The lower court found 
that the statute was a law which regulated insurance and therefore 
was not preempted by ERISA. It rejected the insurers' claim that 
the saving clause was intended only to save "traditional" insurance 
laws (such as laws directly regulating insurers and laws regulating 
such matters as the way insurance may be sold), finding no such 
limitation in ERISA's language. In so finding, however, the lower 
court understood the saving clause to apply only to state laws that 
were unrelated to ERISA's sUbstantive provisions. Because ERISA 
did not regulate the content of welfare plans, the court declared 
that state regulation of insurance that indirectly affected the 
content of the plans themselves was not preempted by ERISA. 
Further, the lower court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
embodied Congress' intent that federal laws should not be found to 
supersede state laws regulating the business of insurance. Because 
the statute in question affected insurance and insurance policies, 
the court found that it was protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
and that therefore it was not preempted by ERISA. See ide at 735-
37, 741, 105 S. ct. at 2387, 2390. 
The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, although it 
employed a broader reading of the saving clause. ·See ide at 758, 
105 s. ct. at 2399. In arriving at its ultimate holding that the 
statute was not preempted by ERISA, the Court first examined 
whether the statute was related to ERISA within the meaning of the 
preemption clause. Noting that the phrase "relate to" was to be 
given a broad reading, the Court found that although the statute 
was not designated as a benefit plan law, it bore indirectly on but 
significantly affected all insured ERISA plans, because it required 
them to purchase the mandated benefits specified in the statute 
when they purchased certain kinds of insurance policies. Thus, the 
Court agreed with the lower court that the statute related to ERISA 
plans and thus fell within the preemption clause. See ide at 739, 
105 s. ct. at 2388-89. 
The Court found that the saving clause saved the statute from 
preemption. See ide at 744, 105 S.ct. at 2391. In arriving at its 
conclusion, the Court first examined the statute from a common 
sense point of view. It noted that because on its face the statute 
regulated the terms of certain insurance contracts, it seemed to be 
saved from preemption by operation of the saving clause as a law 
which regulated insurance. See ide at 740, 105 S.ct. at 2389. The 
Court stated that its interpretation was reinforced by the deemer 
clause, which prov,ides that a plan "shall not be deemed to be an 
insurance company for purposes of any law of any State purporting 
to regulate insurance companies • . • [or] insurance contracts . • 
." Id. at 740-41, 105 S. ct. at 2389 (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 
1144(b) (2) (B» (emphasis in original). The Court continued: 
By exempting from the saving clause laws regulating insurance 
contracts that apply directly to benefit plans, the deemer 
clause makes explicit Congress' intention to include laws that 
regulate insurance contracts wi thin the scope of the insurance 
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laws preserved by the saving clause. Unless Congress intended 
to include laws regulating insurance contracts wi thin the 
scope of the insurance saving clause, it would have been 
unnecessary for the deemer clause explicitly ~o exempt such 
laws from the saving clause when they are applied directly to 
benefit plans. 
Id. at 741, 105 S. ct. at 2389-90. 
The Court then turned to the question of whether the statute 
met the criteria for defining the business of insurance under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act. As to the first factor, the Court found 
that the statute effected the spreading of risk, as it was enacted 
to spread the risk of mental health patients through more risk 
pools. Second, the Court found that the statute regulated an 
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and 
the insured by defining the type of insurance that an insurer could 
sell. Finally, the Court found that the practice was limited to 
entities within the insurance industry, as the mandated-benefit law 
imposed its requirements only on insurers. In light of the fact 
that the statute met the common-sense definition of regulating 
insurance and all three McCarran-Ferguson factors, the Court held 
that mandated-benefit statutes such as the one in question were 
saved from the preemption clause by virtue of the saving clause. 
See ide at 743-44, 105 S. ct. at 2391. 
The Court expanded on its analysis of the saving clause in 
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. ct. 1549 
(1987). In Pilot, Dedeaux, an employee of Entex, Inc. ("Entex"), 
injured his back in an employment related accident. Entex had in 
place a disability benefit plan which it established by purchasing 
a group insurance policy from Pilot Life Insurance Co. ("Pilot 
Life"). Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following his 
accident, but Pilot Life terminated his benefits two years after 
the accident. Subsequently, pilot Life reinstated and terminated 
Dedeaux's benefits several times. Five years after the accident, 
Dedeaux sued pilot Life for tortious breach of contract, breach of 
fidu~iary duties, and fraud in the inducement. Pilot Life argued 
that Dedeaux's claims were preempted under ERISA, and the district 
court agreed, granting Pilot Life's motion for summary judgment. 
The Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 43-44, 107 S. ct. at 1551. 
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit. 
Id., 107 S. ct. at 1551. The Court quickly dispatched of the 
question of whether the common law causes of action related to an 
employee benefit plan; it held that they did. See ide at 47-48, 
107 S. ct. at 1553. The Court next turned to the question of 
whether the saving clause saved Dedeaux's cause of action for 
tortious breach of contract/bad faith. The Court found that the 
cause of action for ,bad faith did not meet the common-sense prong 
of the regulating insurance test. See ide at 48, 107 S. ct. at 
1553. The Court stated that in order for a law to regulate 
insurance, it "must not just have an impact on the insurance 
industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry." 
Id. at 50, 107 S. ct. at 1554. Noting that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court had identified the law of 'bad faith with the insurance 
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industry, the Court nevertheless held that the foundation of the 
law could be found in general principles of tort and contract law. 
Further, the Court found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors did 
not support Dedeaux's claim that the bad faith law regulated 
insurance. The Mississippi common law of bad faith could not be 
said to effect a spreading of policyholder risk, the Court noted, 
nor could it be said under the third factor that the law was 
specifically directed towards entities within the insurance 
industry, as the law of bad faith had derived from general 
principles of tort and contract law. Although the Court 
acknowledged that the common law of bad faith could be construed to 
concern the policy relationship between the insurer and the 
insured, it found that the relationship was tenuous. See ide at 50-
51, 107 S. ct. at 1554-55. Justice O'Connor, writing for the 
Court, noted: 
[TJhe common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the 
relationship between the insurer and the insured; it declares' 
only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the 
insurance contract, a breach of that contract may in certain 
circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain punitive 
damages. 
Id. at 51, 107 S.ct. at 1555. 
The Court went on to state that it had to be guided not only 
by the factors it considered in Metropolitan Life, but also by "the 
role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole." Id., 107 S. ct. at 
1555. The Court noted that in this case, unlike Metropolitan Life, 
the plaintiff was seeking remedies for improper processing of a 
benefits claim, and therefore the court had to consider the civil 
enforcement provisions of ERISA. The Court found that the civil 
enforcement provisions of ERISA were intended to be the exclusive 
means by which ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting 
improper processing of a claim for benefits could recover, based on 
the language' and structure of the statute and the legislati ve 
history of the statute. See ide at 51-52, 107 S. ct. at 1555. 
Thus, the Court held that based on the common-sense and the 
McCarran-Ferguson prongs of the regulating insurance test and the 
congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions be 
exclusive, the common law cause of action for bad faith was 
preempted by ERISA. See ide at 57, 107 S. ct. at 1558. 
After the Court's decision in pilot Life, a question that many 
of the lower courts addressed was whether a statutory claim for 
improper handling of claims/unfair settlement practices would 
survive the preemption analysis laid down in pilot Life. For 
~xample, one court addressed the issue of whether a statutory cause 
of action under the California insurance code for failure to pay 
claims promptly was preempted by ERISA. See Kanne v. Connecticut 
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 
U.S. 906 (1989). The Kannes sought reimbursement for airline fare 
to transport their son for surgery, as well as compensation for 
emotional distress caused by the delay in payments for the airline, 
doctor, and hospital bills. The lower court had awarded the Kannes 
over $750,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 491. 
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The court noted that California Insurance Code S 790.03(h) 
prohibited unfair insurance practices with respect to the 
processing of claims. Among the unfair practices listed in the 
statute was an insurer's failure "to acknowledge and act reasonably 
promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under 
insurance policies." Id. at 493 (quoting Cal. Ins. Code S 
790.03(h) (2». The Kannes argued that the statute was not 
preempted by ERISA because it was saved as a law regulating 
insurance. The court granted them the assumption that the statute 
was a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving 
clause. Nevertheless, the court decided that the private right of 
action for violation of the statute was preempted by ERISA. Id. 
- -
In deciding- that the California statute was-preempted, the 
court noted that the Supreme Court "made [it] abundantly clear that 
its preemption holding [in Pilot Life] was equally based [on the 
regulation of insurance test and] on its acceptance of the 
Solicitor General's view that Congress had clearly expressed an 
intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA S 502(a) be 
the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and 
beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for 
benefits." Id. at 494 (quoting pilot Life, 107 S. ct. at 1555). 
In interpreting the Supreme Court's language, the court held that 
it could not allow a state statute like the one in question to 
supplement the ERISA civil enforcement provisions. As a result, 
the court found that the Kannes' statutory cause of action for 
failure to pay claims promptly was preempted. See ide 
Further, the decision of the Court in pilot Life has - been 
extended to preempt a state common law holding that an insurer of 
a group employment health plan was required to notify plan 
participants of the cancellation or modification of the insurance 
policy caused by failure of the employer to pay the insurance 
premiums. See Presley v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, 744 F. 
Supp. 1051 (N.D. Ala. 1990). Charlotte Presley went to work for 
Benum Corporation ("Benum") on October 2 6 ,1987. Benum had at that 
point established and maintained an ERISA plan whereby participant 
employees could receive health and medical benefits. Under the 
terms of the plan, however, an employee was not eligible to 
participate in the plan until 90 days after the date of employment. 
The plan also provided that before coverage would begin for an 
employee or his dependents, the application would have to be 
completed, submitted and accepted. Thus, Presley was not eligible 
to participate in Benum's health plan until January 26, 1988. Id. 
at 1053. 
Presley had filled out an application card for health coverage 
under the plan for herself and her family on the date of her hire. 
Benum forwarded the application to Blue Cross and Blue Cross 
accepted Presley's application. On January 27, 1988, Larry Presley 
suffered a heart attack· and was admitted to a hospital. On 
February 1, 1988, all of Benum's employees were laid off for an 
indefinite period, and Benum became delinquent in its premium 
payments to Blue Cross as of January 15, 1988. Blue Cross notified 
Benum's personnel manager that it would carry a laid-off. employee 
for a period of two months and would bill in arrears for the 
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coverage. In.the third month, if payment was made in full, then 
coverage would be maintained; otherwise, the employee's coverage 
would be cancelled effective the date of the last payment. Neither 
Benum nor Blue Cross contacted Presley to tell her of the payment 
arrangement for Benum's employees. Blue Cross paid a nominal 
amount of Larry Presley's bills in relation to his heart attack, 
but refused all other claims. Among other things, plaintiffs 
claimed that Blue Cross, by failing to notify the plan 
beneficiaries of Benum's failure to pay premiums, violated the rule 
laid down in an Alabama Supreme Court case that an insurer of a 
group employment health plan was required to notify participants in 
the plan of the cancellation or modification of the insurance 
policy due to a failure by the employer to pay the premiums due on 
the policy. See id. at 1053-55,1059. 
Taking into account the broad construction that the Supreme 
Court had given to the "relate to" phrase, the·court held that it 
was clear that the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court was 
subject to the preemption clause unless. it was saved by the saving 
clause. The court further found that the decisional rule was 
specifically directed towards the insurance industry, and thus met 
the common-sense prong of the regulating insurance test. It found, 
however, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors were less clearly 
resolved concerning whether the rule was one regulating the 
business of insurance. The court found that the rule did effect 
the spreading of a policyholder's risk by affording him the 
opportunity to maintain in effect his policy which would allow him 
to spread the risk insured against to the insurance industry as a 
whole. The court found that the second factor was not met by the 
rule. It stated that compliance with the rule might create a 
relationship between the insurer and the insured, but as there was 
no such direct relationship prior to the employer's default on 
payments of the premiums, the rule could not represent an integral 
part of the relationship. The third factor was met because the 
rule was specifically directed towards the insurance industry. The 
court acknowledged that the question of preemption under the 
circumstances of the case was a close one; however, guided by the 
Supreme Court's language.in pilot Life that courts should look to 
the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole, it found that 
the decisional rule requiring notification was preempted by ERISA 
and was not saved by the saving clause. See id. at 1060-61. In so 
holding, the court commented that, "[TJhe lower courts have been 
instructed py the suprem~ Court that they are to find state laws 
within the saving clause in only the clearest of circumstances." 
Id. at 1061. 
Given that the lower courts appear extremely reluctant to find 
that the saving clause in fact saves an insurance statute or common 
law relating to insurance from preemption, the facts of the case 
and plaintiff's motivation for claiming damages become pivotal in 
a court's decision whether to preempt a state statute. For 
example, in Smith v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 781 F. 
Supp. 1159 (N.D. Miss. 1991), the plaintiff sued Blue Cross for 
violation of state statutes involving a group health policy under 
which the plaintiff was insured. The plaintiff requested as 
damages $30,000 for mental distress, punitive damages,. 
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embarrassment and humiliation, together with attorneys' fees, costs 
and expenses. The plaintiff conceded that his damages were to some 
degree measured by the amount of benefits he would have received 
but for the defendant's alleged fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. The defendants argued that because the essence 
of the complaint was an alleged wrongful refusal to pay benefits 
under an ERISA plan, the complaint fell under the exclusive remedy 
scheme set forth in ERISA. Id. at 1160-61. In response, the 
plaintiff alleged that his cause of action was in fact based on 
acts of fraud "in which an unlicensed insurer, BSC ~ife Insurance 
Company [( "BSC") ], through the defendants acting as unlicensed 
agents, sold policies and fraudulently assigned policies to an 
insolvent unlicensed insurer, Galaxia Life Insurance," in violation 
of the Mississippi insurance statutes. Id. at 1.161. 
Specifically, the complaint alleged that when the policy in 
question was issued, BSC did not have a license and was· not 
registered or authorized to do business in Mississippi. Further, 
the complaint asserted that the plaintiff and other employees were 
fraudulently induced by the defendants to purchase theBSC policy 
because the defendants represented that defendant Blue Cross backed 
the policy and that BSC was licensed and authorized to do business 
in Mississippi, and thereby covered by the Mississippi guaranty 
fund. After BSC suffered operational losses, the defendants 
(stated the complaint) conspired to defraud plaintiff by assigning 
insurance policies to Galaxia and, by silence, misrepresented that 
Galaxia was authorized and licensed to do business in Mississippi 
and therefore covered by the Mississippi guaranty fund. Plaintiff 
also asserted that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence 
by their failure to investigate Galaxia's ability to underwrite the 
assigned policies and/or fraud in knowing that Galaxia would be 
unable to pay BSC claims as they came due. The complaint further 
alleged that defendant Ritchey, an employee and agent of Blue Cross 
and BSC, assisted in the solicitation and issuance of the' 
plaintiff's policy as the soliciting agent. The complaint alleged 
negligence per se in violation of several statutes, one of which 
made it unlawful for any person as an insurance agent or broker to 
make, solici t or aid in the transaction of insurance except as 
authorized under the provisions of the chapter. The plaintiff 
asserted that the defendants' failure to comply with the statutes 
deprived him of the right to participate in the Mississippi 
guaranty fund intended to protect insureds in the event of an 
insurer's insolvency. See ide at 11.62-63. 
Noting that the complaint did not allege improper processing 
of a claim, the court found that the statutory scheme met the three 
McCarran-Ferguson criteria for laws regulating the business of 
insurance. It stated that the requirement that an insurance 
company be licensed to do business in the state ensured that the 
risk w~s shared through Mississippi's guaranty fund. As to the 
second factor, the court noted that the laws were integral to the 
relationship between the insurer a,nd the insured in that they 
limited insurers who might lawfully enter into an insurance 
contract in Mississippi. Further I the court noted that with regard 
to the third factor, the statutes applied only to entities within 
the insurance industry. Consequently, the court found that there 
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was a possibility of a valid state law claim based on, inter alia, 
the Mississippi insurance statutes. See ide at 1164-65. 
A review of the health insurance arrangement cases 
demonstrates that claimants who sue insurance companies under the 
state insurance codes will not usually be successful if they are 
suing for benefits. A plaintiff's state law claims, however, might 
survive ERISA preemption analysis if they are framed in such a way 
as to implicate the insurer's actions above and beyond a claim for 
improper processing of benefits. 
state laws can also escape preemption if they fall under the 
"too tenuous, remote and peripheral" exception to preemption 
analysis. For example, in BeneFax Corp. v. Wright, 757 F. Supp. 
800 (W.O. Ky. 1990), the court found that notwithstanding that the 
Kentucky administrator licensing statutes did not relate to an 
ERISA plan within the meaning of the preemption clause, it believed 
that the statutes would fall within the "too tenuous, remote and 
peripheral" exception to ERISA preemption. Id. at 804. BeneFax 
was a Kentucky corporation which served as a third-party 
administrator for employee benefit health plans. Plaintiffs 
Underwood, Harden, and Glogower were licensed third-party 
administrators who each owned one-third of the outstanding capital 
stock in BeneFax. In July, 1990, the Kentucky Commissioner of 
Insurance directed plaintiffs to cease doing business as third-
party administrators and directed the individual plaintiffs to 
surrender their administrator licenses, holding that plaintiffs 
failed to meet the statutory requirements necessary for an 
administrator license. The plaintiffs then sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, claiming that the commissioner had no authority 
to regulate their activities pursuant to the Kentucky administrator 
licensing statutes because the plaintiffs acted solely as third-
party administrators for self-funded employer health plans. 
Consequently, the plaintiffs asserted that the Kentucky 
administrator licensing statutes were preempted by ERISA. Id. at 
801-02. 
The court found that it had to determine whether the statutes 
at issues "relate[d] to". an employee benefit plan within the 
meaning of the preemption clause in a manner which was not tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral. See ide at 803. The court noted that the 
administrator licensing statutes applied to everyone acting as 
administrators in Kentucky regardless of whether a person provided 
services to ERISA plans. The court then likened these statutes to 
licensing statutes for attorneys, physicians, chiropractors, and 
accountants, and noted that the statutes at issue did not relate to 
ERISA plans any more than the other licensing statutes did. 
Instead, the court found that Kentucky was regulating the conduct 
of administrators regardless of whether the administrators serviced 
ERISA plans. The court noted that the licensing statutes were not 
directed towards an ERISA plan, represented a traditional area of 
state authority, and did not affect the relationship between 
principal ERISA entities, i. e., the employer, the plan, the plan 
fiduciaries, and the plan beneficiaries. As a result, the court 
found that the statutes did not relate to an ERISA plan and were 
not preempted by ERISA in any case because their connection with 
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ERISA plans was too tenuous, remote, or peripheral. See ide at 803-
04. 
4. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
4.1 General. section 402(a) (1) of ERISA provides that every 
employee benefit plan must be established and maintained pursuant 
to a written instrument providing for one or more named fiduciaries 
who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage 
the operation and administration of the plan. A named fiduciary is 
a fiduciary who is either named in the plan instrument or who may 
be identified pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan by the 
employer and/or employee organization maintaining the plan. 
According to section 405 (c) (1) of ERISA, a plan may expressly 
provide for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities (other 
than trustee responsibilities) among named fiduciaries and for the 
named fiduciaries to designate persons other than themselves to 
carry out their fiduciary responsibilities. 
A fiduciary is defined as anyone who exercises discretionary 
authority or control over the management of plan assets, renders 
investment advice for a fee,: or has discretionary authority or 
responsibility in the administration of the plan. 
4.2 Fiduciary Duties. certain statutory duties are imposed 
upon plan fiduciaries requiring them to act (i) exclusively for the 
benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries, (ii) prudently, 
(iii) to diversify plan assets, and (iv) in accordance with the 
plan documents so long as the plan documents are consistent with 
ERISA. 
There are a number of cases challenging fiduciary breaches of 
the exclusive benefit rule. In many instances allegations of this 
nature are asserted in conjunction with violations for the breach 
of other fiduciary obligations. Despite the lack of standards as 
to what constitutes adherence to the exclusive benefit rule, 
~~idance has been issued by the Internal Revenue Service in the 
area of investment of plan assets allowing an employer sponsoring 
the plan to incidentally benefit from plan investments so long as 
the following conditions are satisfied: (i) the cost of the asset 
does not exceed the fair market value at the time of purchase, 
(ii) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be 
provided except with respect to obligatory investments in employer 
securities by a stock bonus plan, (iii) enough liquidity must be 
maintained for required distributions under the plan, and (iv) the 
investment must have sufficient safeguards and diversity to be 
prudent. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88. 
4.3 Fiduciary Liability. A plan fiduciary who breaches any 
of the fiduciary duties will be personally liable to make good to 
the plan any losses resulting from the breach and to restore to the 
plan any profits the fiduciary made through the use of plan assets. 
The plan fiduciary will also be subject to such other equitable or 
remedial relief as a court may deem appropriate, including the 
removal of the plan fiduciary. ERISA §409 (a). Plans may not 
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contain any provision which relieves a fiduciary of personal 
liability for breach of fiduciary duties. Plans may, however, 
purchase insurance to cover liabili ty losses due to acts or 
omissions by plan fiduciaries. 
A fiduciary will not be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty 
committed before becoming a fiduciary or after ceasing to be a 
fiduciary. Nevertheless, a fiduciary may be liable for the 
investment decisions of another fiduciary. In Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1984), the Supreme Court 
refused to find a right under ERISA to contribution and indemnifi-
cation among plan fiduciaries. Since Russell, most courts have 
generally held that no right of contribution or indemnity exists 
under ERISA. In Chenung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 
14 EBC 1169 (2d Cir. 1991), the plan sponsor sued Sovran, a former 
fiduciary, for lack of prudence and due diligence with respect to 
investments made by a previous fiduciary and continued by Sovran. 
Sovran filed a third-party complaint against the prior fiduciary 
seeking contribution or indemnification. The Court determined that 
federal courts are authorized to develop a federal common law under 
ERISA, guided by the principles of traditional trust· law which 
clearly provides for a right of contribution among fiduciaries. 
Attorneys and accountants are not considered fiduciaries 
merely because they provide services to a plan. However, applying 
the principle of "knowing participation" courts have, until 
recently, held non-fiduciaries liable for breaches of fiduciary 
duty of which they had knowledge. Liability has usually been found 
only in situations where egregious facts have existed. See 
Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988); Whitfield v. 
Tomasso, 682 F.Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benvenuto v. Schneider, 
678 F.Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). In the case of Diduck v. Kaszycki 
& Sons Contractors Incorporated, No. 83 civ. 6346 (C.E.S.) (S. NY 
filed Apr. 24, 1991), the court found evidence of a tacit agreement 
between plan fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries to deprive plan 
participants of benefits and contributions to the plan fund. The 
court held the non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for the 
plan fiduciary's breach of duty. Other courts have refused to find 
that ERISA provides fbr a cause of action against non-fiduciaries 
for alleged· participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Russell, 473 U.S. 
134 (1985); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988). 
In Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial 
Consultants of New Jersey, 930 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third 
Circuit held that an insurance company was not a plan fiduciary 
within the meaning of ERISA where the insurer entered into a 
geposit authorization contract with an employer to fund the 
employer's defined benefit plan. The contract provided for the 
employer to make annual contributions to the insurer in the form of 
premiums which were credited to a "guaranteed fund account." This 
fund was a bookkeeping device in which interest was credited at a 
guaranteed minimum rate with the possibility of higher returns at 
the discretion of the insurer. The premium payments were held as 
part of the insurer's general assets and when a plan participant 
retired, the insurer issued a guaranteed annuity pursuant to the 
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terms of the plan. The cost of the annuity was then deducted from 
the guaranteed fund account. The court concluded that the deposit 
authorization contract was a guaranteed benefit policy because the 
contract provided benefits to participants, the amount of which 
were guaranteed by the insurer in the form of an annuity. Since 
section 401(b} (2) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1101) states that amounts 
paid by a plan to an insurer under a guaranteed benefit policy are 
not considered plan assets, the court held that the insurer was not 
a plan fiduciary as it did not have discretionary authority or 
control over plan assets. 
In reaching this conclusion the Third Circuit rejected the 
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Peoria Union stock Yard Co. 
Retirement Plan v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 
1983), in which the Seventh Circuit held that a similar contract 
was comprised of two phases: an accumulation phase, during which 
premium payments were held by the insurer in its general account 
for investment purposes; and a payment phase, during which the 
insurer made payments to plan participants in the form of annuities 
upon retirement. The Seventh Circuit concluded .that the contract 
was not a guaranteed benefit policy since the premiums paid to the 
insurance company during the accumUlation phase were not used to 
provide "benefits, the amount of which is guaranteed by the 
insurer," as required by the section 401(b} (2) (29 U.S.C.S. S1101) 
exception. 
The Third Circuit concluded that such contracts do not fail to 
satisfy the guaranteed benefit policy exception merely because the 
benefits provided under the contract are not delivered immediately. 
The court stated that the variable interest credited to the 
guaranteed fund does not vary benefits payable to participants, but 
merely shifts a portion of the investment risk from the insurer to 
the employer. The Third Circui t' s holding suggests that the 
investment component of such contracts are irrelevant if the 
insurer guarantees the participants' benefits, regardless of the 
amount of control the insurer exercises over the amounts available 
to pay such benefits. 
4.4 Liability of Non-fiduciaries. In the case of non-
fiduciaries, the recent Supreme Court case of Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates, 113 S. ct. 2063 (1993}, has substantially eliminated 
the ability to recover monetary damages against non-fiduciaries. 
In this case, the Petitioner represented a class of former 
employees of Kaiser Steel Corporation who participated in a Kaiser 
Retirement Plan. Hewitt Associates was the plan actuary that had 
assisted Kaiser, as a plan sponsor in its actuarial valuations. In 
the course of the litigation it was alleged that the plan actuary 
~ailed to change actuarial assumptions to reflect additional costs 
of the plan associated with early retirements resulting from plant 
shut-downs. Ultimately, plan assets became insufficient to satisfy 
benefit obligations and the plan was taken over by the PBGC. Plan 
participants were then entitled only to guaranteed benefits which 
were substantially lower than fully vested pension due under the 
plan. 
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The issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether ERISA 
authorized suits for monetary damages against non~fiduciaries who 
knowingly participated in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. 
ERISA makes fiduciaries liable for their breach of fiduciary duties 
and specifies remedies that are available against them. Those 
remedies include personal liabili ty to make good plan losses, 
restitution for profits and other equitable or remedial relief as 
the Court may deem appropriate. The civil enforcement provisions 
of ERISA are limited, however, to fiduciaries. Non-fiduciary 
liability is imposed under ERISA Section 502 (a) (3) authorizing a 
civil suit to join any act or practice violating ERISA, to obtain 
"other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations 
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of ERISA or the terms of the 
plan. "Noting that non-fiduciaries maybe liable for 
monetary damages in certain circumstances, the Court went on to 
hold that no provision of ERISA explicitly required non-fiduciaries 
to avoid participation, either knowingly or unknowingly, in a 
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. Noting that monetary damages 
are the classic form of legal relief, the Court went on to hold 
that non-fiduciaries are not liable for participation in fiduciary 
breaches. 
4.5 Prohibited Transactions. ERISA and the Code prohibit 
transactions between a plan and a "party in interest" (referred to 
as "disqualified persons" in the Code). "Parties in interest" 
include such individuals as the plan sponsor, a plan fiduciary, a 
plan service provider or plan advisor, an employee, officer, 
director or 10% or greater shareholder of the plan sponsor, a 
spouse or descendant of any of the prior parties, and a union 
covering plan participants. ERISA §406, Code §4975. Transactions 
between the plan and a "party in interest" violate ERISA even 
though the transaction was operated in good faith and competitively 
priced. 
Violations of the prohibited transaction rules may be 
penalized by the imposition of liability, as a breach of fiduciary 
duty, and the imposition of statutory penalties imposed under Code 
section 4975. Jurisdiction for enforcing penalties rest with the 
Internal Revenue Service and jurisdiction for enforcing liability 
rest with the u.S. Department of Labor. Reorganization Plan No.4 
of 1978. Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 the 
Department of Labor has been assigned enforcement responsibility 
for regulations, rulings, opinions and exemptions for prohibited 
transactions. section 408 of ERISA specifically authorizes the 
establishment of procedures permitting the issuance of individual 
and class exemptions from the application of the prohibited 
transaction rules. These exemption procedures are contained in 
proposed ERISA Regulation §2570, 29 C.F.R. §2570. 
5. SURVIVOR RIGHTS 
5.1 Pre-retirement Benefits. The Retirement Equity Act of 
1984 ("REA") requires that the spouse be the named beneficiary of 
a portion of the death benefits payable under a qualified plan. 
The only way to name a non-spouse beneficiary for the benefits 
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otherwise payable to the surviving spouse is with the written 
waiver of the participant and the written consent of the spouse. 
One of the most difficult decisions for a court to make 
involves the enforceability of antenuptial agreements. Often we 
are confronted with situations where spouses enter into antenuptial 
agreements specifically addressing the disposition of assets at 
death, including qualified plan assets. That was the case in 
Callahan v. Hutsell, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005 (6th Cir. 1993, 
unpublished decision), where the husband died only 2 months after 
his marriage. Immediately prior to marriage the participant 
(husband) and surviving spouse entered into an antenuptial 
agreement which provided that the retirement plan assets of the 
deceased spouse would remain separate property in the event of 
death. The participant died without having signed new beneficiary 
designation forms providing for his written waiver of spousal 
rights, as well as the spouses consent to the waiver. The only 
beneficiary designation, other than plan language, was a signed 
document designating a non-spouse beneficiary, which was executed 
prior to the marriage. 
Provisions of the antenuptial agreement specifically stated 
that the non-participant spouse consented, effective upon marriage, 
to the participant's election to waive a qualified joint survivor 
annuity form of benefit under the participant's retirement plan. 
Although the antenuptial agreement contained a written 
acknowledgement by the surviving spouse waiving benefits under the 
qualif ied plan and agreeing to execute all further documents 
requested of the participant to evidence the consents and waivers 
contained in the agreement, there was not a waiver signed after the 
individual actually became the participant's spouse. After the 
death of the husband, the surviving spouse filed a declaratory 
judgment action in the Western District of Kentucky seeking a 
determination that the surviving spouse was entitled to death 
benefits under the retirement plan. 
Although the plaintiff prevailed on ERISA arguments at the 
district court level, the initial decision by the District Court 
has been vacated and remanded to Federal District Court for 
determination of whether the surviving spouse's failure to execute 
a beneficiary designation form constituted a breach of obligations 
under the antenuptial agreement. 
In contrast, an Illinois appellant court held that an ante-
nuptial agreement was suff icient to waive a surviving spouse's 
right to receive benefits under the deceased participant's pension 
plan where the surviving spouse had not executed a spousal consent. 
In re Estate of Hopkins, 14 E.B.C. 1145(111. App. 1991). The 
ante-nuptial agreement provided that each party would retain his or 
her separate property and would have no rights in the estate or 
property of the other upon the termination of the marriage by death 
or legal proceeding. The court held that it was clear the parties 
intended that the surviving spouse would waive any current or 
future right to the deceased participant's retirement benefits. 
Although the deceased participant had named a minor child from his 
previous marriage as the plan beneficiary the surviving spouse had 
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not completed a spousal consent form, the court held that the ante-
nuptial agreement was a sufficient waiver of the surviving spouse's 
rights, since the agreement included a waiver which was in writing 
and notarized as required under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 
("REA"). The court, citing to a Seventh Circuit decision, also 
noted that it had previously been held that a surviving spouse may 
waive their interest in plan benefits under REA without following 
its specific waiver requirements. 
5.2 Beneficiarv Designations. A district court in 
Pennsylvania held that the exercise of a general power of attorney 
by a participant's attorney-in-fact is ineffective to change the 
participant's beneficiary designation where the power of attorney 
does not specifically authorize changes in beneficiary designations 
under employee benefit plans. Clouse v. Philadelphia, B.& E.R. 
Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256, (E.D. Pa. 1992). The court held 
that the black letter law of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
regarding powers of attorney, applies to ERISA governed plans. The 
court followed the· Restatement position that general powers of 
attorney are limited to acts done in connection with the act or 
business to which the authority primarily relates, and that any 
specific authorizations tend to show that more general authority is 
not intended. 
6. COBRA CONTINUATION COVERAGE 
6.1 General. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), as amended by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("OBRA 86"), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
("TRA 1986"), the Technical and Miscellaneous Review Act of 1988 
("TAMRA") and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA 
89") requires continuing health care coverage at group rates for 
employees and· their dependents who would otherwise lose health 
benefits upon the occurrence of certain specified events. Both the 
Code and ERISA contain statutory provisions added by COBRA. 
The COBRA requirements are found in section 4980B of the Code 
and sections 60l through 608 of ERISA and apply to all employers. 
However, employers who employed fewer than 20 employees during a 
typical business day in the preceding calendar year will be exempt 
from the COBRA requirements. An employer is considered as having 
normally employed fewer than 20 employees during a particular 
calendar year if it employed less than 20 employees on at least 50% 
of its working days during that year. Federal and state 
governments, governmental agencies and instrumentalities, and 
charities, other than churches, will also be exempt from COBRA. 
6.2 Coverage. COBRA applies to any group health plan of an 
employer who provides medical care to its employees, former 
employees, or the families of such employees or former employees, 
whether directly or through insurance, reimbursement or otherwise. 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Dental Maintenance 
Organizations (DMOs) maintained by an employer are also subject to 
COBRA. If an employer maintains a cafeteria plan which offers 
health care as one of its options, then COBRA continuation coverage 
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is applicable only with respect to those individuals who actually 
receive health care coverage under the cafeteria plan. Any 
individual who is or was provided coverage under such a group 
health plan due to the performance of services for one or more of 
the persons maintaining the plan, will be eligible for COBRA 
continuation coverage. An individual who is merely eligible for 
coverage under a group health plan is not eligible for continuation 
coverage if the individual is not or has not been actually covered 
under the plan. Agents, independent contractors (their employees, 
agents and independent contractors) and corporate directors will be 
treated as employees if they are covered by the plan. Leased 
employees who provide services to an employer will also be treated 
as employees of that employer. 
COBRA continuati«n coverage is available to all "qualified 
beneficiaries." Qualified beneficiaries are employees and former 
employees who are covered under a group heal th plan and are 
referred to as "covered employees." A qualified beneficiary is 
also any individual who, on the day before a qualifying event for 
a covered employee, is a beneficiary under a group health plan as 
the spouse or dependent child of the covered employee. [Non-
resident aliens who receive no u.s. source earned income from their 
employer will not be considered qualified beneficiaries.] 
6.3 Qualifying Events. COBRA continuation coverage is 
available to qualified beneficiaries upon the occurrence of anyone 
of the following "qualifying events" which results in the loss of 
heal th insurance coverage: (i) the death of the covered employee; 
(ii) the voluntary or involuntary termination of the covered 
employee (unless terminated for gross misconduct); (iii) a 
reduction in a covered employee's hours of employment; (iv) the 
di vorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the 
employee's spouse; (v) the covered employee's becoming entitled to 
Medicare coverage; (vi) the cessation of coverage for a dependent 
child under the terms of the plan; and (vii) bankruptcy 
proceedings of an employer under Title 11 of the U. S. Code, 
commencing on or after July 1, 1986. Effective for 1990 plans 
years, a loss of coverage will also be treated as a qualifying 
event. 
6.4 Election of continuation Coverage. The period during 
which continuation coverage may be elected must begin no later than 
the date coverage would otherwise cease due to the occurrence of a 
qualifying event. The election period must last at least sixty 
days, and may not end earlier than 60 days after coverage 
terminates due to a qualifying event or after the qualified 
beneficiary receives notice of his or her continuation rights. 
~ere there is a choice among types of coverage under a plan each 
qualified beneficiary will be entitled to make a separate election 
from among the types of coverage offered. Any election to receive 
continuation coverage by a spouse or covered employee will b~ 
deemed to include an election of continuation coverage on behalf of 
any other qualified beneficiary dependent who would lose coverage 
under the plan by reason of the qualifying event. However, a 
decision to reject benefits by a spouse or covered employee will 
not be binding on other qualified beneficiaries. A qualified 
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beneficiary who, during the election period, waives COBRA 
continuation coverage may revoke the waiver at any time prior to 
the end of the election period and elect to receive continuation 
coverage. If a qualified beneficiary waives COBRA continuation 
coverage and later revokes the waiver and elects coverage, coverage 
is not required to be provided retroactively. 
6.5 Claims During Election Period. According to the proposed 
regulations under section 4980B of the Code, claims incurred by a 
qualified beneficiary during the election period are not required 
to be paid before an election is made by the beneficiary. Group 
health plans that provide health services, such as HMOs or walk-in 
clinics, can require that a qualified beneficiary who has not 
elected and paid for COBRA continuation coverage choose between 
either electing and paying for the coverage or paying the 
reasonable and customary charge for the plan services if a claim is 
made prior to the election. A qualified beneficiary who chooses to 
pay for the services must be reimbursed within thirty (30) days if 
they later elect COBRA continuation coverage. 
6.6 Type of Coveraqe Provided. The continuation coverage 
provided must consist of coverage which, as of the time the 
coverage is provided, is identical to the coverage provided to sim-
ilarly situated beneficiaries under the plan with respect to whom 
a qualifying event has not occurred. If coverage is modified under 
the plan for any group of similarly situated beneficiaries, such 
coverage must also be modif ied in the same manner for those 
individuals receiving continuation coverage. While the group of 
qualified beneficiaries who are entitled to elect COBRA 
continuation coverage is closed as of the day before the qualifying 
event family members of COBRA beneficiaries may be added as 
dependents to the same extent and under the same terms as family 
members of active employees. Family members who are added in this 
manner will not, however, become qualified beneficiaries. 
6.7 Period and Cost of continuation Coverage. The 
continuation coverage period begins with the date of the qualifying 
event. However, beginning with 1990 plan years, a group health 
plan may chose to provide that the period of coverage begins with 
the date of coverage loss. The duration of the continuation 
coverage will depend on the qualifying event that triggered the 
loss of coverage. 
If loss of coverage was triggered by the termination of the 
employee or a reduction in the employee's employment hours, 
continuation coverage may be elected for up to 18 months. For plan 
years beginning on or after December 19, 1989, qualified 
beneficiaries who are determined to have been disabled at the time 
of the termination or reduction in work hours by the Social 
Security Administration may elect to extend the continuation 
coverage for an additional 11 months. 
The spouse and certain dependents of the covered employee may 
elect up to 36 months of coverage if loss of coverage is triggered 
by the death of the covered employee, if the covered employee 
becomes entitled to Medicare benef its, or if an employer, from 
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whose employment the covered employee retired 'at any time, 
commences bankruptcy proceedings under Title 11 of the U.S. Code. 
If the covered employee's dependent child loses dependent status 
under the Plan such child may elect up to 36 months of continuation 
coverage. 
If an additional qualifying event, other than bankruptcy, 
occurs within the initial 18 month period of continuation coverage 
(or during the extended 29 month period for disabled qualified 
beneficiaries), coverage must be provided for an additional 18 
months for a total of 36 months (or 47 months for a disabled 
qualified beneficiary) of continuation coverage after the initial 
qualifying event. continuation coverage may not be terminated 
upon coverage of a qualified beneficiary under the group health 
plan of an employer, other than the employer providing the 
continuation coverage, if such plan contains any exclusion or 
limitation with respect to any preexisting condition of the 
qualified beneficiary. 
COBRA continuation coverage may not be conditioned upon 
evidence of insurability. If coverage provided to similarly 
situated active employees is modified or eliminated but the 
employer continues to maintain one or more group health plans, the 
employer must permit the qualified beneficiary receiving COBRA 
continuation coverage to elect to be covered under any of the 
remaining group health plans maintained by the employer for 
similarly situated active employees. 
6.8 Cost of Coveraqe. An employer may require an employee to 
pay the cost of the continuation coverage, even if the employer 
subsidizes some or all of the coverage for active employees and 
their dependents. If the plan is insured, this premium charge may 
not exceed 102% of the applicable premium. The applicable premium 
is the cost to the plan for the period of coverage for a similarly 
situated employee for whom a qualifying even has not occurred. For 
self insured plans the applicable premium is equal to a reasonable 
estimate of the cost of providing coverage for the period to a 
similarly situated individual. In situations where a qualified 
beneficiary is determined to have been disabled, employers may 
charge 150% of the applicable premium for the additional eleven 
(11) months coverage which must be provided. A plan may not 
require the payment of any premium until 45 days after the day on 
which the qualified beneficiary made the initial election for 
continuation coverage and a plan must permit a qualified 
beneficiary to elect to pay the premium on a monthly basis. 
6.9 Loss of Coverage. A qualified beneficiary will lose the 
right to continuation coverage should the beneficiary fail to make 
timely payment under the plan or become covered under another group 
health plan that does not contain limitations or exclusions for 
preexisting conditions. A qualified beneficiary will also lose the 
right to continuation coverage in the event the beneficiary becomes 
entitled to medicare benefits or if the employer no longer 
maintains any group health plan. 
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6.10 COBRA Litigation. For the most part, COBRA Litigation 
has focused on rights of employees in the context of COBRA 
notification, coverage and elections. In Swint v. Protective Life 
Insurance Co., 779 F. Supp. 532 (S.T. Ala. 1991), a dependent child 
brought an action claiming that there had been insufficient notice. 
In this case the plan provided for coverage of a dependent to age 
19 and beyond if participant continued as a full-time student. 
Shortly after the dependent child's 19th birthday the child was 
involved in a serious accident leaving him comatose and incurring 
large medical expenses. The insurance company initially paid all 
of the claims of the dependent child, but 7 months after the 
accident the inSurance company completed an investigation which 
resulted in a determination that the individual was not a 
dependent. The insurance carrier promptly terminated coverage, 
returned all premiums and refused to pay additional claims. In 
this case the court held that a COBRA election was deemed to have 
been made because, had the defendant given the dependent his COBRA 
notice at the time it should have been provided, the defendant 
would have made the election. 
Courts have also been confronted with determining whether 
incapacity tolls the election. In Branch v. G. Bernd Company, 955 
F. 2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1992), the Court held that the 60-day 
election period was tolled until a personal representative could be 
appointed. The participant had been shot and become semi-comatose 
and never regained consciousness. Despite the fact that the 
employer had provided sufficient notice and had signed a form 
declining COBRA coverage for his . dependents, the legal 
representative was appointed more than 60 days after notice was 
provided to the employee. 
Meadows v. Caqle's, Inc., 14 E.B.C. 2513 (11th Cir. 1992), 
held that an employer and its medical benefits plan insurer who 
failed to provide a SPD outlining the COBRA continuation coverage 
election requirements to an incapacitated plan participant's 
guardian could not rely on plan documents to deny continuation 
coverage. The court held that notice of benefit continuation 
rights to an incompetent beneficiary will be ineffective unless 
accompanied by relevant plan documents which allow an informed 
decision to be made by the person who must make the coverage 
election for the incapacitated beneficiary. 
At the time the employer notified the participant, who had 
lapsed into a persistent vegetative state, about her COBRA rights 
her husband, who was acting as her guardian, requested an 
explanation of the election requirements. A representative of the 
employer claimed that the husband was told that the COBRA election 
was necessary to obtain coverage once the employer's coverage 
expired; however, the husband alleged that he misunderstood the 
need for the election. The court held that while oral statements 
allegedly made to the participant's husband would not prevent the 
employer and plan insurer from denying coverage if those 
representations were inconsistent with written plan documents, the 
fact that neither the employer nor the insurer provided the husband 
with a SPD made the COBRA notice invalid. The court held that for 
a COBRA election notice to be valid, the notice must be sent to a 
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person not only legally capable.of acting on it, but also capable 
of acting intelligently on it. In this situation the husband never 
received the information which was necessary to evaluate whether 
COBRA continuation coverage should be elected for his wife. 
The court in Truesdale v. Pacific Holding Co./Hay Adams, 778 
F.Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1991), held that an employer satisfied the COBRA 
notice requirements by twice mailing a notification and election 
form to a terminated employee's last known address in accordance 
with normal office procedures. The court stated that employers 
"must be allowed to rely in good faith on the information provided 
by their employees. To require employers to confirm receipt of 
what they believe to be properly mailed notices is outside the 
requirements of COBRA. The court held that an employer or plan 
administrator is acting in good faith compliance when they send 
notice, by first class mail, to the employee's last known address. 
A district court ruled that an employer will satisfy the COBRA 
notice requirements through the use of a computer-automated mailing 
system unless an employee can prove that notice was never actually 
received. Martin v. Marriott Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4713 
(D. C. Dist. Col., 1992). The court held that one former Marriott 
employee was entitled to a trial on the issue of whether the COBRA 
continuation notice was actually received as the notice had been 
mailed to the wrong address and Marriott's Human Resources division 
had been previously informed of the employee's newer, current 
address. However, with regard to another employee involved in the 
suit the court held that Marriott was entitled to a presumption of 
receipt asi t had proven that the COBRA continuation notice 
generated by the system had been mailed to the employee's correct 
and last known address. 
In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 762 F.Supp. 1539 
(D. Mass. 1991), the court held that an employee's 18.month COBRA 
continuation coverage period comm~nced upon the. employer's actual 
notice of coverage rather than the date the employee experienced a 
reduction in hours. The court held that under ERISA, an employer 
is obligated not only to provide continuation coverage but to give 
an employee proper notice of his rights to that coverage. Unless 
and until such notice is given to the employee the court held, the 
continuation coverage period cannot begin to run. 
In National Companies Health Plan v. Saint Joseph's Hospital, 
929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit held that 
while an employer is not required to provide continuation coverage 
to a terminating employee who is covered under his spouse's 
existing group health insurance plan, if the employer represents 
that continuation coverage will be available and the employee 
detrimentally relies on that information, the employer is precluded 
from later denying coverage. The court noted that since COBRA 
continuation coverage is a part of every ERISA plan, equitable 
estoppel may be applied in a situation where an employee has relied 
on oral or informal interpretations of his COBRA rights under the 
plan. 
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Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that equitable estoppel 
cannot be used to hold plan fiduciaries to oral promises or 
modifications concerning COBRA continuation coverage which are not 
incorporated in the written terms of the ERISA plan. Leiding v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 940 F.2d 1538 (lOth Cir. 1991). The 
court stated that permitting oral modifications of ERISA plans 
would undermine a central policy goal of ERISA since employees 
would not be able to rely on written plans if their expected 
retirement benefits could be radically affected by funds disbursed 
pursuant to oral agreements. 
7 • STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proper standard 
of review which should be applied with respect to the denial of 
benefit claims in Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). The 
Court held that a denial of benefits which is challenged under 
Section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. Sl132(a) (1) (B» should 
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan gives the 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. 
However, the Court held that if the administrator or fiduciary is 
operating under a conflict of interest, the conflict must be 
weighed as a factor in determining whether an abuse of discretion 
has occurred. 
The courts in applying and interpreting Firestone have 
generally been unable to agree on the degree of specificity 
necessary in the plan language to confer sufficient discretion to 
insure review under an arbitrary and capricious standard. In many 
cases, language conferring discretion on plan administrators and 
trustees to "construe and interpret" the plan has been deemed 
sufficient. See Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 
1990); Dewitt v. State Farm Ins. Co. Ret. Plan, 905 F.2d 798 (4th 
Cir. 1990) . Other courts have required an unambiguous 
authorization of discretion with respect to the specific issue 
before the court. See~, Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 
1989) . In Baxter the plan stated that the trustees had "final 
authority" to determine all matters of eligibility for the payment 
of claims. The Eighth Circuit held that such language did not 
grant the discretionary'authority necessary within the meaning of 
Firestone to interpret ambiguous plan terms, and therefore a de 
novo standard of review should be applied. 
The court in Firestone did not clearly define the meaning of 
de nQYQ review or the extent to which evidence not presented to 
plan administrators must be considered. 
In Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990) the 
court interpreted Firestone narrowly and limited de novo review to 
the evidence before the plan administrator. The sixth Circuit 
stated that a primary goal of ERISA was to provide for the 
inexpensive and expeditious resolution of disputes concerning 
benefits, and that permitting courts to hear evidence not presented 
to plan administrators will result in employees and their 
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beneficiaries receiving less protection than Congress intended. 
However, in Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86' 
(11th Cir.1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that Firestone permits 
a court conducting a de novo review to consider facts not available-
to the plan administrator at the time the final determination was 
made. According to the court, restricting the facts on review to 
only those which were available to the plan administrator would 
afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries then 
existed before the enactment of ERISA. 
There is a split among the Circuits as to whether a plan 
administrator's factual, as well as interpretive, determinations 
are subject to de novo review. 
The Third Circuit in Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and 
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d cir. 1991), held that the de 
novo standard of review should be applied to a plan administrator's 
fact-based determinations where the plan does not confer authority 
on the plan administrator to decide disputes between beneficiary 
claimants or require deference to the plan administrator's factual 
determinations. The court stated that the factual determinations 
of a plan administrator should not be given deference due to the 
fact that plan administrators are often lay persons who lack 
training, experience, or an understanding of ERISA, the rules of 
evidence, or the legal procedures necessary to assist them in fact 
finding. 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Pierre v. Connecticut 
General Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991), held that the 
de novo standard of review applies only to instances of plan 
interpretation in which the facts are not in dispute, and that a 
plan administrator's factual determinations in such a situation 
should be entitled to deference. According to the court, the 
discretion to make factual determinations is inherent in the nature 
of the plan administrator's job and, unlike the Third Circuit, the 
court believed that plan administrators are qualified to make such 
factual determinations. 
The Second Circuit has held that even where it is undisputed 
that a plan confers discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility and to interpret the plan, if an eligibility 
determination turns on a question of law, the reviewing court must 
apply a de novo standard of review. Weil v. Retirement Plan 
Administrative Committee of the Terson Co., 913 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir.,_ 
1990), vacated in part on rehearing, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991). ~ 
Under Firestone, if a plan provides the plan administrator 
with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits 
and to cOl1strue the terms of tl1e plan, decisions of the plan 
administrator will be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard rather than the de novo standard. 
Some courts have interpreted the arbitrary and capr1c10us 
standard to require an evaluation of the reasonableness of a 
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fiduciary's determination. In Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183 (7th 
Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit held that a fiduciary's 
interpretation of the plan should be given deference unless it is 
unreasonable. The court stated that a plan administrator's 
decision will be considered unreasonable where the fiduciary fails 
to consider important aspects of the issues involved, offers an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence, or 
where the decision is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to 
a difference in view or the product of the fiduciary's expertise. 
other courts have rejected the arbitrary and capricious 
standard in favor of an abuse of discretion standard. While most 
courts use the terms arbitrary and capricious and abuse of 
discretion interchangeably, the court in Nunez v. Louisiana Benefit 
Committee, 757 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. La. 1991), rejected the arbitrary 
and capricious standard in favor of an abuse of discretion standard 
stating that the court in Firestone explicitly rejected the 
arbitrary and capricious standard which would require the 
affirmation of a plan administrator's decision if any evidence 
existed to support it. 
In Yusuf v. Yusov, 920 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth 
Circuit held that under the arbitrary and capricious standard a 
court may reverse a denial of benefits only where a decision is 
made in bad faith, is not supported by SUbstantial evidence, or is 
erroneous on a question of law. 
According to Firestone the existence of a conflict of interest 
on the part of a plan fiduciary is relevant to the determination 
whether the fiduciary's decisions will be entitled to deference. 
In Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898 
F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S.ct. 712 (1991), the 
Eleventh Circuit held that "when a plan beneficiary demonstrates a 
SUbstantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary 
responsible for benefit determinations, the burden shifts to the 
fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions was 
not tainted by self interest." Id. at 1566. Brown involved an 
insured group health plan which was administered by the insurer 
providing coverage. The court held that an inherent conflict of 
interest existed between the roles assumed by the insurance 
company, since an insurance company pays claims out of its own 
assets rather than out of a trust, which places the insurance 
company's fiduciary role in conflict with its profit making role as 
a business. In such a situation, the court held that the 
fiduciary's determination will be arbitrary and capricious if it 
advances the fiduciary's self interest at the expense of the 
peneficiary, unless the fiduciary can justify its interpretation on 
the basis of the benefit provided to the entire class of plan 
participants. 
8 • PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
It has generally been held that ERISA does not provide for the 
recovery of extra-contractual damages. According to section 409 (a) 
of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. Sl109), which establishes liability for 
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breach of fiduciary duties, any fiduciary who is liable for a 
breach of fiduciary duty will be required to make good to the plan 
losses resulting from the breach, to restore to the plan any 
profits which the fiduciary received due to the improper use of 
plan assets and "shall be subject to such other equitable or 
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including 
removal of such fiduciary." section 502(a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. 
S1132(a», which provides for civil enforcement procedures under 
ERISA, states that an action may be brought under Section 409 for 
breach of fiduciary duty by the Secretary of Labor, a participant, 
beneficiary or plan fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 
409 or for "other appropriate equitable relief." The courts have 
generally held that neither Section 409 Ca) or 502 (a) of ERISA 
permits the recovery of extra~contractual or punitive damages. 
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 105 S.ct. 3085 (1985), held that section 409(a) of ERISA 
does not provide a cause of action for extra-contractual damages by 
a plan participant or beneficiary. The Court held that while 
section 502 Ca) (2) of ERISA authorizes participants or beneficiaries 
to bring actions against a fiduciary for violation of Section 409 
of ERISA, recovery for such violations inures to the benefit of the 
plan as a whole and not to the individual participant or 
beneficiary. The Court stated that the legislative history of 
ERISA indicated that the primary concerns in drafting Section 409 
of ERISA were the possible misuse of plan assets and remedies that 
would protect the entire plan rather than the rights of an 
individual beneficiary. Additionally, the Court noted that the 
statutory provisions under section 502(a) of ERISA are silent as to 
the recovery of extra-contractual damages. The Court concluded 
that in enacting a comprehensive legislative scheme such as ERISA, 
which includes an integrated system of procedures for enforcement, 
Congress deliberately omitted any such remedy. The Court declined 
to address the issue whether section 409 of ERISA authorizes the 
recovery of extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages in 
an action by a plan against a fiduciary. 
In Drir~water v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 Fe2d 821 (1st 
Cir. 1988), the First Circuit noted that while the Supreme Court's 
decision in Russell was limited to remedies available under section 
502 for violations of section 409 of ERISA, the Court expressly 
reserved the question of whether extra-contractual damages might be 
a form of "other appropriate equitable relief" available under 
section 502. However, the First Circuit agreed with and followed 
the holdings of other circuits that extra-contractual damages are 
unavailable under section 502, and that the term "equitable" is 
meant to intend injunctive or declaratory relief. 
Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors. Inc., 737 F.Supp. 792 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), held that punitive damages could not be sought 
under section 409 of ERISA. The court stated that the section 
409(a) grant of authority permitting a court to award equitable 
relief does not encompass extra-contractual or punitive damages. 
In reaching its decision the court looked to the analysis of the 
circuits in determining whether section 502(a) of ERISA encompasses 
extra-contractual or punitive damages for fiduciary violations. 
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The court concluded that Congress intended for ERISA to incorporate 
the fiduciary principals of the law of trust, under which trustees 
are generally not liable for puni ti ve damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty. Additionally, the court stated that ERISA's 
legislative history with regard to remedies for breaches of 
fiduciary duty contemplates traditional forms of equitable relief 
such as injunctions, constructive trusts, and the rem.oval of 
fiduciaries. 
Although the Seventh Circuit in a previous decision left open 
the possibility of extra-contractual recovery under Section 502 of 
ERISA, the court held that such damages were not available where 
the only extra-contractual damages sought by the plaintiff were 
punitive in nature and the allegations in the complaint did not 
support a claim for such damages. The court, relying on the 
supreme Court's holding in Firestone, supra, that ERISA is to be 
construed consistently wi th the common law of trusts, denied 
punitive damages as such damages are generally unavailable in the 
trust context. Petrilli V. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 144.1 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 14 E.B.C. 1290 (D. 
Mass. 1991), the plaintiff, relying on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Ingersoll - Rand Co. v. McClendon 111 S.ct. 478 (1990), in which 
Justice O'Conner, in dicta,. suggested that compensatory and 
puni ti ve damages were wi thin the power of federal courts to 
provide, sought such damages in relation to an ERISA violation by 
his employer. However, the court held that if the Supreme Court 
had intended to expand the realm of potential relief available 
under ERISA and to overrule its prior holdings, it would have done 
so explicitly and not in dicta. The court refused to overrule the 
express holding of the First Circuit in Drinkwater, supra, without 
a clear indication that the law will provide for extra-contractual 
damages under ERISA·. 
In Novak v. Anderson Corp., 15 E.B.C. 1127 (8th Cir. 1992). 
The court found that an ESOP participant was not entitled to 
monetary damages due to the employer's failure to notify the 
participant that his plan distribution could be rolled over into a 
tax deferred plan. The court held that the reference in section 
502(a) (3)(B) of ERISA to "other equitable relief" does not include 
monetary damages. The court concluded that neither the statutory 
language or the legislative history permits an expansion of the 
traditional equitable relief available - injunctive and declaratory 
relief and the imposition of a constructive trust - to include 
monetary damages. 
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PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE 
INTRODUCTION 
James D. Moyer 
stites & Harbison 
Concern over employee privacy rights is increasing 
as employer techniques for employee surveillance and 
monitoring are growing dramatically. The clash 
between our society's strongly held belief in the 
"right to be left alone" and the increasing arsenal of 
employer monitoring techniques is a guarantee for 
litigation and legislation throughout the near future. 
Consider, for example, the cautionary tale of Papa 
Gino's. The case is reported as O'Brien v. Pap Gino's 
of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986). An 
employer had received information that an employee was 
using drugs off-duty -- not necessarily in the 
workplace, but on Ifhis own time." The employer then 
required the employee to take a polygraph test. While 
some of the questions related to employment, some were 
outside the scope of employment concerns. When asked 
whether he used drugs, the employee answered that he 
did not. The polygraph examiner concluded that the 
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employee was lying in his denial. The trial jury 
found, and the First Circuit confirmed, that the 
interrogation techniques were invasive of the 
plaintiff-employee's privacy, and awarded damages in 
the amount of $400,000. 
This, however, is not the end of Papa Gino's'tale 
of woe and difficulty. Not content merely to 
administer an intrusive polygraph test, cC?mpany 
management apparently also decided to use the 
discharge as an example to others. The company told 
third parties that the employee was terminated for 
violating company drug policies. Even though that 
statement was arguably at least partially true, the 
jury also awarded damages to the plaintiff for 
defamation. The plaintiff had contended, and the jury 
apparently believed, that the employee had also been 
discharged for refusing to promote the godson of the 
owner. Thus, the employer allegedly misstated the 
reason for the discharge, relying on drug use (which 
apparently was viewed by the jurors as a pretextual 
reason), rather than truthfully stating the real 
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reason --- the refusal to knuckle under to management's 
attempt at nepotism. 
This case undoubtedly created a very bad day for 
someone at Pap Gino's. The company believed that it 
had validly terminated an employee for violating its 
important drug. policy, and it had corroboration of the 
drug use through the modern technique of the 
polygraph. Instead, it found itself liable in tort 
damages for both defamation and invasion of privacy to 
an ex-employee whom it had considered to be a drug 
user.; The jury's "20/20 hindsight" proved to be very 
different fr9m the employer's attempt to implement its 
drug policy. The point is not necessarily that the 
employer was bumbling, but rather than an 
investigation which management believes is well-
intentioned can be judged highly critically in 
retrospect by a finder of fact. 
The New York Times recently reported a story about 
a newly popular el.ectronic investigative technique. 
While video cameras have been commonplace in stores 
and restaurants for a number of years, there has been 
a growing·trend toward the use of hidden microphones. 
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See In a Growing Number of Stores, Hidden Security Microphones are 
Listening, May 28, 1994 at p. 6. The story reported 
that a very large customer in the Northeast was the 
Dunkin' Donuts chain. A security consultant commented 
that the system was particularly helpful in preventing 
employees from pocketing cash paymentsby·customers, 
rather than depositing them properly in the register. 
While the monitoring devices raise interesting 
questions under federal wiretap legislation, the 
companies involved apparently attempted to deal with 
such problems by posting small stickers with 
disclaimers such as "Audio monitoring on the 
premises. l1 A later Times story reported that the 
franchisor company discouraged the use of the audio 
surveillance, but suggested that it was apparently a 
choice of the individually-owned franchisees whether 
to install them •. 
Such audio surveillance techniques are so new that 
there are apparently no reported cases. They raise 
interesting questions concerning the store's potential 
liability, not only to employees, but also to 
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customers who may also find their otherwise private 
conversations the subject of monitoring and possible 
recording. Nevertheless, employers seem enthusiastic. 
The Times quoted a Kentucky businessman who was a 
Dairy Queen franchisee and who supported the new 
surveillance techniques. He had successfully obtained ... 
confessions from twelve employees that they were 
giving away free food to their friends and family 
members. 
Finally, the newspaper reported a video technique 
which may give consumers pause: the use of video 
cameras behind one-way mirrors in clothing store 
dressing rooms. Apparently, the venerable 
Bloomingdale's displays signs stating, "These dressing 
rooms are monitored by an inventory control checker." 
Whether Bloomingdale's uses cameras in changing areas 
or not, the liability issues raised by the use of one-
way mirrors and cameras are obvious. 
A. WORKPLACE INVESTIGATIONS 
i 
Employers can institute many types of practices 
which affect·the privacy of their employees. The two 
D - 5 
most frequently utilized by employers are workplace 
investigations and the testing of employees. 
The most common of the employer practices are 
workplace investigations. They involve a struggl~ 
between the employer's right to know what is going on 
within the busiriessand the~cemp16yee's right to 
privacy, even within the workplace. 
1. Questioning Employees. The first thing 
to consider when questioning an employee is whether 
the subject of the inquiry relates to the business 
itself. If the employer is legitimately concerned 
about a conflict within the business, the employer is 
probably allowed to question the employee on matters 
relating to that conflict. For example, since the 
Christian Science church teaches that homosexuality cis 
against its teachings, a inquiry into a prospective 
employee's sexual orientation is not an invasion of 
privacy. Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 
1160 (1985). 
But if the employer does not have a business 
concern in mind when questioning an employee, courts 
have held such questioning to be a privacy invasion. 
D - 6 
See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 
711 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that an 
employer invaded employee's privacy since the employer 
had no business need for information regarding 
employee's sexual activities). 
If the employer can demons-trate a business 
interest in the information requested from the 
employee, the next thing for the employer to consider 
is the manner in which the questioning is done. The 
more aggressive the manner of questioning, the more 
likely that the questions will be considered intrusive 
on the employee's rights. 
Questioning must be reasonable. In Hall v. May 
Dep't Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126, (1981), 
it was unreasonable for an employer to question and 
threaten an employee against whom the employer had 
very little evidence of wrongdoing. But several 
courts have held that requesting information from 
employees at the time they are hired is not 
unreasonable. In Spencer v. General Tel. Co, 551 F. , 
Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1982), an employer who requires 
employees to fill out an information sheet is not 
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violating the employee's privacy since the request for 
publiC information wouldn't be offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
Where does all of this leave the employer? 
Employers may be able to justify their questions by 
showing an employee's consent ... If an employee makes 
certain information public, he/she cannot· later claim 
that questions on that information are an invasion of 
privacy. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 
983 (N.D. Ind. 1986). Employer may ask their 
employees questions, so long as they are business 
related and reasonably executed. 
2. Workplace Searches. There is again a , 
balancing of interests with regard to searches in the 
workplace. On one hand is the employer's business 
interest in knowing what is going on. On the other is 
the employee's right to privacy. The most prominent 
case with regard to workplace searches is O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. ct. 1492 (1987). The 
basic issue in this case was to determine what an 
employee's "reasonable expectation of privacy" was 
within the workplace. 
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Since most employees do have some expectation of 
privacy, it becomes important to determine at what 
point employers can cross the line and institute a 
workplace search. The Court in Ortega held that there 
was a two-part test: (1) was the search justified (did 
there seem to be reasonable ground to suspect some 
wrongdoing)? and (2) was the search permissible in 
scope (was the method of the search reasonable)? If 
the answer to both of these questions is yes, the 
employee will have no claim for invasion of privacy. 
The privacy expectation that an employee has is 
lowered by notice from the employer that employee's 
personal things are subject to random searches. Since 
the employee then has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, there is no invasion be an employer's search. 
Am. Postal Workers' Union v. U.S. Postal Service, 871 
F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989). 
If the employer is to remember only one thing when 
conducting a search within the workplace, it should be 
that the search must be reasonable. There must be a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before a search is 
D - 9 
done, and the intrusiveness of the search must be 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
3. Surveillance and Monitoring of Employees. 
Observation of employees is not an invasion of privacy 
so long as the observation is in a public place and 
there is a good business reason for it. Employers may 
watch their employees in order to monitor job 
performance or to investigate wrongdoing. 
In several cases courts have not found violations 
of an employee's privacy right when the employer was 
observing in order to moni tor performance on the job. 
See Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 
(Fla. Dist.ct. App. 1980) (holding that non-malicious 
surveillance in the workplace by an employer does not 
invade an employee's privacy). 
Employers also have the right to watch employees 
who are being investigated for wrongdoing, whether the 
employee is in the workplace or in a public area while 
off duty. A detective who followed an employee 
suspected of wrongdoing and observed him in open, 
public places did not violate that employee's privacy. 
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp .. , 66 Md. App. 133, 
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502 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 479 u.s. 984, 107 s. ct. 
571 (1986). 
The employer must be aware that these previous 
cases all relate to observation of an employee in a 
public place. In most states, it would violate a 
person's right to privacy to observe a member of the 
oppasite sex in a private dressing room. White v. 
Davis, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P. 2d 222 (1975) (en 
banc) . 
The other method of employer surveillance is 
telephone monitoring. Most states and the federal 
government prohibit any interference with telephone 
communication. Listening devices for phones are also 
prahibited by federal law if the employee has a 
reasanable expectation of privacy when using the 
phone. There are two recognized exceptions to this 
general rule which wauld allow an employer to monitor 
the telephone conversations of their employees. 
The first exception allows an emplayer to monitor 
calls fram an extension phone for reasonable business 
purposes. The other exceptian allows wire 
communication service providers to. manitor calls to 
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investigate quality control. Both of these exceptions 
must be for valid business reasons and must reasonable 
in the invasion of private phone calls. 
If the monitoring of the telephone is for business 
purposes, employers may not be in violation of 
employees privacy rights. See Schmukler v. Ohio Bell 
Tel. Co, 116 N.E.2d 819, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213 (1953) 
(holding that the monitoring of calls to confirm 
. proper service is not an invasion of privacy) . 
a. Proposed Federal Monitoring 
Legislation. As this short outline no doubt makes 
clear, the pace of advance of technology in the field 
of electronic workplace monitoring and surveillance 
has far outstripped the pace of development of 
legislation and cornmon law. As a result, Congress is 
playing catch.,..,up with proposed legislation to address 
perceived gaps in current privacy law coverage. 
Currently pending in the House of Representatives 
is H.R. 1900 (perhaps H.R. 1984 would have been a 
better number to capture its sponsors' concerns). 
This bill, known as the Privacy for Consumers and 
Workers Act, has had relatively strong Democratic 
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support in the House. As noted be'low, similar 
legislation, S. 984, sponsored by Sen. Paul Simon, has 
also been introduced in the Senate. 
While the final version of this legislation has 
yet to be determined, the bill would, if adopted in 
anything like its current form, present major 
limitations on the use of electronic monitoring in the 
workplace. The bill would reach broadly to the 
collection or recording of data concerning employees' 
activities by electronic means. Included would be 
computer based monitoring, telephone monitoring, 
review of performance by techniques such as keystroke 
assessment, remote duplication of individual workers' 
computer screens, the use of electronic devices 
indicating an individual's whereabouts, data collected 
from key cards, video camera surveillance, audio 
surveillance, and similar techniques. Whether its 
scope extends to such traditional methods of 
monitoring as "time clocks" (which often now are 
electronic or computer-based in nature) is also an 
issue. 
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Following are some key points surrounding the 
proposed legislation. 
-- The legislation seeks to limit not 
just the techniques or the frequency 
of the use of information, but also 
the manner in which an employer can 
use it. As noted below, employee 
evaluation and discipline based on 
these techniques are also restricted. 
-- The legislation would 
significantly limit the use of 
monitoring devices and techniques in 
dressing areas, locker rooms, arid 
bathrooms. 
-- Following a disclosure model, the 
bill would require that employers 
using such monitoring techniques 
inform the employees that they are 
potentially subject to monitoring 
and, further, that their performance 
may be evaluated based on monitoring. 
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-- Apparently because of the 
widespread practice of telephone 
monitoring, employers engaged in such 
practices would have to give 
employees access to an unmonitored 
phone for personal calls. This will 
undoubtedly produce a whole new set 
of management issues and headaches 
for companies seeking to limit 
personal phone calls while on the 
job. 
-- There are limits on the frequency 
with which such monitoring can take 
place, depending on job tenure. In 
the present version of the bill, 
employees who have worked under 60 
days can be monitored an unlimited 
number of times; those who've worked 
more than 60 days but under two years 
can be monitored up to 40 times per 
month; and those veterans who have 
survived for two or more years are 
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protected from any monitoring more 
than 15 times monthly. 
-- The bill would permit continuous, 
contemporaneous video monitoring for 
security purposes, such as is common 
. now.· .. However, it would impose 
restrictions on after-the-fact review 
of such monitoring (presumably by 
systematic review of video tapes 
after they've been recorded). See M. 
Crichton, Rising Sun. 
The bill limits exclusive reliance 
on quantitative data as a method of 
evaluation or discipline. 
Ironically, such a provision could be 
an incentive to rely more heavily on 
subjective data, which raise their 
own kind of employment problems . 
. Examples would be providing raises or 
discipline to keyboard-based 
employees solely on the number of 
D -16 
keystrokes recorded over a computer 
network. 
-- The bill would impose strict 
limitations on periodic or random 
monitoring. It would, for example, 
be difficult to monitor a single 
individual; rather, most monitoring 
would have to be a part of an overall 
Hbona fide service observation 
program." 
-- Discipline as a result of such 
monitoring would further be limited. 
For example, any action which may 
have a "significant adverse effect" 
may need to be undertaken within as 
short a period as twenty ..... four hours 
after the monitoring. 
The final legislative outline is not yet clear. 
However, some problematic provisions also lurk in the 
Senate version, S. 984. Particularly unclear is a 
provision which would limit monitoring of employees 
who were in the act of "exercising First Amendment 
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rights." Such a provision would have the effect of 
importing a series of rules concerning freedom of 
expression which, except for union-oriented 
activities, are typically not protected in the private 
sector. The House bill does not presently contain 
such a provision, and it willbefwoith watching to see 
which version prevails. 
b. E-mail in the Workplace. One of the 
more intriguing topics involving privacy in the 
workplace is that of E-mail. Briefly, E-mail is a 
system of electronic mail which connects computers 
within a business and allow the direct transmission of 
notes and memoranda over a network without the 
traditional printing of the memo and physical sending 
and receipt. E-mail is more typical among larger 
businesses which have computer networks, although it 
is becoming more common in smaller businesses and 
firms as network technology becomes available outside 
the ranks of Fortune 500 businesses. 
E-mail inherently presents opportunities for 
employer review and monitoring of messages, because 
the messages are generated and transmitted through the 
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computer network system owned, installed, and 
maintained by the employer. In addition, all E-Mail 
systems have a feature of central storage of messages 
on a hard disk or file server somewhere in the system. 
Thus, while there appears to be an "original" message 
on the computer of the recipient, and a copy in the 
"outbox" of the sender, the message is always 
physically stored centrally in a computer file. 
Moreover, all networks are serviced and maintained by 
systems operators ("sysopSH) who have high levels of 
"security" which allow them access to files throughout 
the system, including E-mail. 
E-mail also has a certain allure for those who are 
not technophobes. Users can quickly send messages, 
reply to messages, copy them, and communicate in 
apparent privacy. There is not the opportunity for 
physical eavesdropping that a phone presents, although 
a message can always be read by a supervisor or co-
worker off the screen where it's being sent or 
received. E-mail offers the seductive opportunity for 
an apparently private, surreptitious note to a co-
worker. Not surprising, E-mail messages can be 
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antiestablishmentarian, expressing opinions contrary 
to the public posture and propriety of a larger 
business. Intercepted personal E-mail can be 
embarrassing to the sender, may indicate disloyalty or 
an"attitude," or may actually disclose illegal acts 
by an employee. Conversely, E-mail presents a 
temptation to the curious employer or supervisor with 
security access to the system: an apparently risk-
free way to read other people's mail, to browse 
through others' messages from the security of one's 
own terminal: mail interception without breaking and 
entering. 
Employers do have legitimate interests in having 
access to the system. First, their system operators 
have a real need to service and maintain the system. 
Second, the system represents a major capital 
investment by them, probably much larger than the 
telephone system. Third, personal use of the E-mail 
for non-business related reasons presents significant 
problems to the business. At the least, time spent 
sending, reading, and rec~iving personal E-mail 
messages is a diversion of time and resources away 
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from the business' activities, just like personal 
telephone calls. Moreover, the personal messages take 
up "disk space" on the system -- always a scarce 
commodity in a growing network. Finally, to the 
extent that E--mail is being used to implement breaches 
of company security, theft~- or otheriliegai Clctivity, 
the business has some legitimate interest in seeing 
that its capital investment is not used against its 
own interest. 
The law on employer surveillance of E-mail right 
now is decidedly murky. Again, this phenomenon 
presents a perfect example of technology rapidly 
outrunning the law. There is in place a relatively 
recent statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-2520. EPA 
was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 
The statute creates both civil and criminal 
penalties for the intentional interception, 
disclosure, or use of wire, oral or electronic 
communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)i § 2511. The;r-e 
are, however, exceptions to and exemptions from the 
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act which provide potential broad defenses to the 
review of E-mail by company supervisors. 
Perhaps most important is the provision in the Act 
which excepts from its coverage communications where 
one party to the communication has given his or her 
consent. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (d). Interestingly, 
only one side to the communication need consent, not 
both, so an employer would have two bites at the 
consent apple: one with the sender and the other with 
the receiver of E-mail. 
At least one court has construed consent to 
include implied consent. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 , 
F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, an employer could 
develop a strong defense of consent by developing and 
publicizing broadly a policy that indicates that E-
mail is not private, that the systems operators and 
other company officials reserve the right to review E-
mail just as they would any regular company business 
file, that E-mail is not to be used for personal 
communications, and that the company reserves the 
right to monitor E-mail communications either 
regularly or randomly. While not bullet-proof, a 
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clear and well-distributed policy would go a long way 
toward establishing implied consent and a lack of 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of 
employees. 
In addition, there is a statutory exception from 
ECPA for private communications providers in certain 
circumstances. When the ECPA was passed, the 
principal focus of the drafters was on public 
communications such as telephones, and not on E-mail. 
Thus, for private providers, there is an exception for 
interception or disclosure that is a "necessary 
incident to the rendition of ... service or to the 
protection of the rights or property of the provider 
of that service." 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (a) (i). While 
the application of this section is unclear in the 
context of E-mail, its language suggests that it is 
related to routine tasks performed by systems 
operators for system maintenance rather than random or 
focussed surveillance by supervisors for other 
purposes. In addition, a "business extension" 
exception, obviously designed for extension phones 
rather than E-mail, could have some application as 
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well. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a). Courts have generally 
read this interpretation rather narrowly. Watkins v. 
L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th eire 1983); 
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 
(5th Cir. 1980) .. 
:tnconclusion~ ·the law surroundinq·E-mail is far 
from clear. At the state level, appellate cases 
concerning whether E-mail surveillance violates any . 
common law privacy principles have not emerged to 
provide reliable guidance. At the federal level, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides some 
general rules which probably apply to E-mail, even 
though the statute is not well-drafted to cover it. 
The implied consent doctrine, along with the 
exceptions for system maintenance by private 
communications systems, probably provide E-mail system 
owners the upper hand. However, both the case law and 
state and federal statutory law are sure to develop in 
this area. 
4. Investigative Reports. Sometimes 
employers may hire an independent investigator to 
gather information on employees or prospective 
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employees. In order to fully protect an employer from 
invading the privacy of the employee and to meet the 
requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 
u.s.c. § § 1681-1681t, the employer must get the 
consent of the applicant or employee before obtaining 
any personal information. The employer should be 
completely open with the employee about the objectives 
of the investigation. While the consent of the 
employee is usually required, it is only in the case 
where a person has requested a job or a promotion. If 
the employer investigates an employee for a promotion 
that the employee is not aware of, the employee's 
consent is not required. 
B. TESTING OF EMPLOYEES. 
An emerging trend in employer practices is the 
testing of employees~ Today, employers use many tests 
in order to make a number of different employment 
decisions. 
1. Drug Testing. Federal agencies have been 
among the first to participate in the drug testing of 
employees. They began by testing those in sensitive 
positions such as national security, health, or 
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safety. In fact, the Drug--Free Workplace Act of 1988, 
41 U.S.C. § § 701-707 (1988) mandated that every 
government contractor and grantee have a drug-free 
workplace. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act sets but 
special rules concerning drug testing. First, section 
104(d) (1) of the Act states that na test to determine 
the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered to be 
a medicalexamination."'Medical examinations are 
otherwise severely restricted under the provisions of 
section 102(d) of the Act. Moreover, the Act excludes 
from the definition of disability any employee 
currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs. 
Section 104(a). However, the Act eliminates from the 
exclusion individuals who have successfully completed 
a supervised rehabilitation program, or anyone 
participating in ,a supervised rehabilitation program 
who is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs. 
Section 104(b) (1), (2). Finally, the ADA sets out 
certain assurances that ernployer,....imposed prohibitions 
against work-place drug use are not to be considered 
in violation of the Act. Section 104(0). 
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Most of the federal court decisions regarding the 
drug testing of employees deal with testing only 
public sector employees. The courts have held that if 
the testing is in the governmental interest, then it 
will be permitted without threatening an employee's 
privacy. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 109· 
S. ct 1402 (1989). See also Nat'l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Rabbb, 489 u.S. 656, 109 s. ct. 1384 
; 
(1989) (holding that an employer could test an 
employee even without reasonable suspicion if the 
employee is required to carry a gun) . 
Of the private sector employees the courts have 
held subject to drug tests are those in safety-
sensitive positions. These include employees in 
industries that are regulated. Regardless of whether 
the employees are in the public or the private sector, 
the testing must be based on reasonable suspicion and 
it must serve a compelling societal interest. 
2. Other Forms of Employee Testing. There 
are three other types of employee testing that are 
frequently used: (1) polygraph ("lie detector") 
testing, (2) honesty testing, and (3) genetic testing. 
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The polygraph test is otherwise known as a "lie-
detector" test. It is both physically and 
psychologically intrusive and the results are not 
completely accurate. It is so unpredictable that its 
use is largely forbidden federally by the Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 u.s.c. § 2001 (Supp. 
1990), with only limited exceptions. In O'Brien v. 
Papa Gino's of Am., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st eire 1986), the 
court went so far as to hold that the use of a lie-
detector test can give an employee a cause of action 
for invasion of privacy. Even if the use of the test 
is not forbidden completely, the types of questions 
that can be asked are restricted so as to not get 
personal answers that would result in an invasion of 
the employee's privacy. 
Another type of employee testing done by employers 
is honesty testing. Honesty tests avoid some of the 
problems of the lie-detector tests since the honesty 
tests are handwritten. The honesty tests are not 
forbidden, but questions are restri.cted as well. The 
employer must be very careful not to illicit personal 
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answers in response to their questions so as to invade 
the employee's privacy. 
The third type of employer testing is genetic 
testing. Genetic testing leads to serious privacy 
problems because there is nothing more personal that 
the results of tests on someone's genetic makeup. 
There are also problems with the disclosure of those 
results. There must be special precautions made to 
ensure the employee's privacy and confidentiality are 
kept in a situation of genetic testing. 




If an employee is suspected of having, using, or 
selling drugs, the first thing an employer should do 
is gather more information. This information can be 
collected using many of the practices considered in 
the first part of this discussion. The employer 
should adopt a practice based on the seriousness of 
the problem. If the facts say that the problem is 
serious, the employer will be more justified in using 
more drastic steps in the investigation, even if the 
employee's privacy is invaded. 
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For example, if an employee is only accused of 
stealing $20, a strip search is not warranted. 
Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657, 
review denied, 644 P.2d 11287 (Or. 1982). But the 
employer may use other methods of investigation, 
depending on the circumstances. These include: drug 
testing, the use of an undercover agent to·discover 
more facts, and various types of searches. 
If an employer must investigate an employee, the 
employer should limit disclosure only to those who 
"need to know" of the resulting facts in order to 
protect both the employee and the employer. See 
generally Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477 , 
(D.C. Me. 1985) (discussing publication of information 
discovered during an investigation) . 
D. "Off Duty" Conduct. 
Here is a genuine struggle between the employer 
and the employee. Employees often feel that what they 
do on their own time is their own business, while the 
employer's view is that an employee's off duty conduct 
can affect employer's reputation or employee's job 
performance. 
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In order for the employer to be justified in 
basing employment decisions on off duty conduct, the 
conduct must have an adverse effect on the employee's 
job performance. In Thorne v. City of EI Segundo, 726 
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 u.s. 979 
(1984), the court held that the employer had no right 
to inquire into the sexual matters of job applicants 
if they had no relation to that person's job 
performance. In Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serve Bd., '79 
F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1986), the Court held that sexual 
activities that were engaged in on the job did concern 
job performance and could be discovered by the 
employer without invading the employee's privacy. 
Private sector employers have generally needed to 
show the same type of business reasons for gaining 
personal off duty information regarding employees. An 
employer must have legitimate business reasons for 
firing, demoting, etc. and employee based on off duty 
relationship or misconduct. See Federated Rural Elec. 
Ins. Co. v~ Kessler, 131.Wis. 189, 388 N.W.2d 553 
(1986) (holding that a company can forbid an 
employee's relationship with another married employee, 
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so long as the policy applies equally to everyone); 
See also Kinoshitav. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 803 
F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an employer may 
terminate an employee for misconduct if the misconduct 
will reflect badly on the employer). 
There are no bright line rules on what off duty 
conduct an employer may use in making adverse 
employment decisions. But an employer must be sure 
that there is a connection between the employee's 
misconduct and a legitimate business concern for the 
employer. Otherwise, to use an employee's off duty 
conduct to injure the employee is to create potential 
liability for invasion of the employee's privacy. 
As with many other areas of the law involving 
privacy, whether employee conduct is permissible or 
wrongful depends on whether it's reasonable. While 
such a rule is easy to remember, its application in 
planning is uncertain. All a human resources manager 
or attorney can know for sure is that a group of 
jurors some years later can sit in a group and second 
guess his or her advice as to what's reasonable. That 
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sobering thought, on which we close, should be 
powerful counsel for self-restraint. 
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Temporary employment services is one of those industries where everyone 
can end up happy; the clients/employers because they get trained workers at cost-
effective prices and the workers because they get experience that may lead to 
permanent jobs with good pay~ 
The temporary services industry has evolved from the white-gloved Kelly Girl 
office worker into a popular source of employment for women and men in fields 
ranging from the traditional office and custodial positions to drafting and 
engineering jobs. Corporations these days can find a temporary employee to replace 
a vacationing or ill receptionist or secretary for one day or several weeks, or they 
can find someone to help with a special engineering project that might last as long 
as two years. 
Hiring temporary employees is a financially sensible move. The temp agency 
is responsible for recruiting, salary, and other financial matters, leaving the 
corporation free of paperwork and the costly burden of hiring someone full time. 
But before business do business with temporary service providers, they should be 
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mindful that the American workplace is changing and along with it, traditional 
employment relationships. Companies are establishing smaller "core" work forces 
and supplementing them with part-time, temporary, and other contract workers in a 
variety of flexible staffing arrangements. 
The growth of staffing services has raised issues regarding the legal 
relationships between the staffing firm, the employees it supplies, and the customers 
that use their services--including the potential liability of the customer to the staffing 
firm's employees. "Co-employment" is the term used to refer to this relationship and 
its legal consequences. Although co-employment historically has not posed 
significant problems for users of staffing services, it remains a subject of uncertainty 
and confusion. 
The following information reviews some of the legal and operational 
implications of co-employment in a number of areas such as civil rights, workers' 
compensation, labor relations, employee benefits, and other areas affecting the terms 
and conditions of employment. For an in~depth look at the general subject of co-
employment, see Linder, The Joint Employment Doctrine--Clarifying Joint 
Legislative--Judicial Confusion, 10 Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 321 
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(1989). 
11 Staffing services" is used throughout as a generic reference to the range of 
personnel supply services, including temporary help, employee leasing, facilities 
management, etc. The more specific term is used when needed to clarify or to 
distinguish between services when laws and regulations may affect them differently. 
E-3 
I.. DEFINITIONS 
A. TEMPORARY HELP 
Temporary help companies recruit, train, and test their own employees and assign 
them to Clients in a wide range of job categories. Temporary employees fill in 
during vacations and illnesses, meet temporary skill shortages, handle seasonal or 
other special workloads, and help staff special projects. The National Association 
of Temporary Services officially defines "temporary help service" as: 
... a service whereby an organization hires its own employees and assigns 
them to clients to support or supplement the client's workforce in work 
situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, 
seasonal workloads, and special assignments and projects. " 
This definition, or variations of it, has been adopted in a number of states exempting 
temporary help services from laws designed to curb employee leasing abuses in the 
workers' compensation area. 
B. EMPLOYEE LEASING 
The business purpose of employee leasing is very different from temporary help. 
According to the National Staff Leasing Association: 
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"Employee leasing company means a company which, in a majority of 
its contractual relationships, for a fee, places the employees of a client 
company onto its payroll and leases said employees to the client 
company on an ongoing basis ... " 
Thus employee leasing generally involves the transfer by an employer of all or most 
of its work force to the payroll of an employee leasing firm. The purpose is to 
"completely fill the accounting and internal administration duties related to payroll". 
It appeals primarily to small and mid-sized employers who find it cost-effective to 
lease their employees rather than hire a full-time payroll and human resources staff. 
Employee leasing companies charge a "service fee" based on a negotiated 
percentage of the client's payroll costs. 
Employee leasing differs from temporary help in two key ways:. (1) leased 
employees generally are the client1s former employees, and (2) leased employees 
work on a regular, ongoing basis. In contrast, temporary help involves providing 
employees as a temporary supplement to the customer's work force. It does not 
involve managing the customer's work force or assigning employees on regular, 
full-time basis. 
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Because of abuses by some employee leasing firms in the workers' compensation 
and health insurance areas, employee leasing is becoming a regulated industry. 
Some states are enacting laws to require leasing firms to maintain separate workers' 
compensation policies for each customer. 
c. PAYROLLING 
Many temporary help companies offer a service sometimes referred to as 
"payrolling." Here the customer, not the temporary help company, recruits the 
worker and then asks the temporary help company to hire the person and assign 
them to perform services for the customer. Payrolling is used when the client has 
specialized needs and is in the best position to screen applicants for the required 
skills. Other uses involve employees nearing retirement who are engaged in a 
project that is expected to continue beyond the employee's scheduled retirement 
date. Such workers can be payrolled with a temporary help firm until the project is 
completed. 
Payrolling is not the same as employee leasing because the individuals are assigned 
to temporary assignments or projects, and the arrangement generally does not 
involve taking over a customer's entire full-time work force to area of operation. But 
E - 6 
I 
! I patrolled employees may be considered lease employees under federal or state laws 
regulating employee leasing arrangements if they work on a long-term, open-ended 
basis. 
D. FACILITIES MANAGEMENT 
"Facilities management" (also sometimes referred to as "outsourcing") refers to 
arrangements in which the staffing firm contracts with a customer not just to provide 
personnel but to perform some specific business function that is generally peripheral 
to the customer's core business. Examples include operating a mail room or data 
processing center, supplying cafeteria services, landscaping services, guard services, 
or maintenance and janitorial services. In these arrangements, customers do not 
supervise or control the details oithe work performed by the contractor's 
employees. Therefore, co-employment issues generally should not arise. 
II. WHAT IS CO-EMPLOYMENT 
Co-employment describes a legal relationship between two or more employers in 
which each employer has actual or potential legal rights and duties with respect to 
the same employee or group of employees. Employers have many legal obligations 
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to their employees. These include providing wages and benefits, payment and 
withholding of employment taxes, providing workers' compensation insurance, 
complying with civil rights and labor laws, maintaining a safe work environment, 
and so on. Employers also may have obligations to third parties jf the employees' 
work-related activity causes harm to others. 
It should be noted that courts and statutes generally do not use the term" co-
employment" to describe the relationship we are discussing. "Joint employment," 
or, in the case of workers' compensation, "general" and "special" employer, are the 
terms most often used. 
Staffing companies and their customers often have enough contacts with the 
assigned employees that both will be viewed as employers. The staffing company 
pays the employee, pays and withholds all payroll taxes, provides workers' 
compensation coverage, has the ultimate right to p.rre and fire, hears and acts on 
complaints from the employee about working conditions, etc. Customers, on the 
other hand, frequently supervise and direct the employees' day-to-day work, control 
working conditions at the worksite, and determine the length of the assignment. 
Therefore, it many staffing arrangements, co-employment is an inherent aspect of 
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the relationship between the staffing firm and its customers. 
The precedents show that customer liability issues generally arise where the 
customer violates some law, or where the customer deals with a supplier that fails to 
meet its employer obligations. In one key area--workers' compensation--the 
customer's co-employer status often actually protects the customer from liability. 
III. WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
A. "General Employer" and "Special Employer" 
As every employer knows, state workers' compensation laws provide 
benefits, on a no-fault basis, to employees accidentally injured on the job. The basic 
premise of these laws is that, in return for such protection, employees are barred 
from suing their employer for damages. In other words, workers' compensation 
generally is the employee's exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. 
In a long line of cases, courts have extended the exclusive remedy provisions of 
state workers' compensation laws to customers of temporary help firms. In reaching 
this conclusion, courts have applied the common law "loaned" (or "borrowed") 
servant doctrine under which the customer is a "special employer" (the temporary 
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help fInn being the "general employer") of the loaned worker. 
The key elements in establishing a customer's special employer status are (1) that 
the customer supervises the work of the individual and (2) that the assigned 
.~ 
employee has consented to the arrangement. 
In another twist, a few states follow the common law rule that the employer who 
directs the employee's activities at the worksite is the employer for workers' 
compensation purposes. In such states, the customer will be directly liable to the 
staffing company's employees for the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
even where the staffing company has expressly agreed to provide the coverage. In 
states where the customer is viewed as the employer for workers' compensation, the 
staffing company may be exposed to liability for negligence if sued by its own 
employee who is injured on the job since it cannot claim immunity as an employer. 
B. Speical Rules for Employee Leasing Companies 
Special state laws may apply to employee leasing fmns with respect to 
workers' compensation liability. In response to abuses involving employers 
transferring their employees to leasing company payrolls to avoid high experience 
modifications, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NArC) and 
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the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCD have adopted model 
regulations that are in the process of being promulgated by state insurance 
departments. Temporary help services generally are excluded from these rules. 
Under the model rules, any entity that provides workers pursuant to a leasing 
arrangement must register with the state insurance department or face criminal 
penalties. "Employee leasing" is defined broadly to include any arrangements 
whereby one business leases workers to another business. The rules provide that 
leasing company customers must secure workers' compensation benefits and 
maintain appropriate levels of coverage unless the leasing company secures 
coverage in accordance with the rules. 
IV.. EMPLOYMENT TAXES (FICA, FUTA, SUTA) 
As employers, staffing companies pay all employment taxes. They pay the 
employer's share of social security (FICA) as well as federal and state 
unemployment taxes (PUT A and SUT A). Any staffing firm that doesn't do this, but 
instead sends its employees out as "independent contractors," exposes itself and its 
customers to substantial risk if the workers are held to be employees rather than 
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independent contracts. In general, it is unlikely that a staffing firm will be able to 
establish that the workers it supplies meet the IRS or Department of Labor 
definition of an independent contract. 
If staffing firms discharge their obligations as employers by paying all employment 
taxers and making all appropriate withholdings, customers generally shouldn't have 
to worry about liability for these payments as a co-employer. Temporary help firms 
have been expressly recognized by the IRS as employers for employment tax 
purposes. 
V. CIVIL RIGHTS 
A. Title VlI Claims 
In 1984, a federal court in New York held a temporary help customer 
to be a co-employer for the purpose of a suite brought by a temporary employee 
under Title VlI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Amamae v. Merrill Lynch, 611 F. 
Supp 344 (DCNY 1984). The temporary alleged that the customer discharged her 
from her temporary assignment and refused to hire her on permanent basis because 
of her sex, race, and national origin. The customer moved to dismiss the case, 
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arguing that it had to employer-employee relationship with her. The employee 
asserted that the customer was an employer because the customer "controlled her 
work hours, workplace, and work assignments; hired, trained, and assigned her; and 
ultimately discharged her." 
The court agreed that there was enough of an employer-employee relationship to 
support a Title vn claim against the customer. 
B. Americans with Disabilties Act 
The ADA makes clear that staffing firms cannot discriminate against their disabled 
employees or applicants which includes accepting discriminatory customer orders. 
For example, if a customer refuses to accept a qualified individual because of his or 
her disability, it would be unlawful for the staffing firm to fill the order. The staffing 
firm must make reasonable accommodations to enable its disabled employees to 
perform the essential function of the job. 
In addition to Title VII and the ADA, customers may be considered co-employers 
under other EEO laws such as the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, and laws prohibiting sexual harassment. 
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VI. LABOR RELATIONS 
Another important area in which the co-employment relationship may impose 
legal duties on the customer involves collective bargaining arrangements. The 
..•. c --National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and at least one federal court have held 
that the relationship between a staffing firm and its customer gives rise to a co-
employment relationship and that the employees assigned to the customer may be 
included in the customer's collective bargaining suit. 
VII. OSHA 
The loaned servant principle has been applied in determining who bears 
responsibility for worksite safety and for maintaining records of work-place injuries 
under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act). 
All employers have a general duty under the OSH Act to maintain a safe workplace 
and to comply with the Act's safety and health standards. 
In a pivotal case in 1976, a major staffing company was cited by OSHA as soley 
responsible for the safety violation that led to the death of one of its temporary 
E - 14 
employees. This was later over-ruled by an OSHA administrative law judge saying, 
"it would be unconscionable" to request temporary help firms to satisfy the safety 
requirements of each and every work situation. 
VIII. W AGE AND HOUR ISSUES 
In a 1968 ruling, the Department of Labor held that temporary employees 
assigned to work for various customers are "typically" employed jointly by the 
temporary help company and its customers--and customers may be jointly held 
responsible for overtime and minimum wage. In the case of overtime, it's dependent 
on the employee having worked more than 40 hours in the week. 
IX. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
Strictly speaking, a customer can't "fire" temporary employees. It can only 
ask that they be removed from the assignment. Only the temporary help company 
has the right to hire and fire, and employees removed from an assignment at the 
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customer's request may be immediately reassigned to another customer. Temporary 
employees generally understand that even if the assignment purports to be for a· 
specified period, the customer has an absolute right to terminate the assignment. 
. We know of nQ case in which a court has held that a temporary employee has the 
right to bring a wrongful discharge suit against a customer. 
X. BENEFITS 
This is not a co-employment question. Congress, in 1982, as part of that 
year's tax code amendments, passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act or 
"TEFRA". Section 414(n) does not say that the customer is a co-employer. It 
simply says the customer must include in its head count any contract employees who 
meet the service requirements. Generally, anyone working 1,500 hours in a year is 
considered to have worked "substantially full-time" and must be counted. Section 
414(n) does not, however, give leased employees any right to benefits under the 
customer's plans. 
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XI. IMMIGRATION--I9 VERIFICATION 
Regulations issued under the Immigration Reform on Control Act of 1986, 
makes clear that customers using contract services do not have any obligation to 
verify the employment status of the contracted employee.· The regulation provides 
that "in the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term 
'employer' shall mean the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or 
entity using the contract labor." 
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CONCLUSION 
It wasn't that long ago when the temporary work force was limited to secretaries and 
other administrative personnel. Today, you can find short-term contract employees 
performing virtually any business task. From engineers to computer programmers to . 
interim chief executives, the temporary help industry grew 20 percent in 1993. 
The increase in temporary workers is largely due to a trend called "outsourcing," 
farming work out to other companies. This trend is likely to dramatically change 
how many of us work in the future. 
Companies often outsource certain noncritical business functions to specialized 
firms and individuals who can perform these services cheaper and more efficiently. 
Mail rooms, security forces, employment departments and data processing centers 
have all been outsourced. In fact, it's becoming increasingly rare to find a business 
function that has not been outsourced by some company at some time. 
As these dynamic changes take place in the American workplace, it is reasonable to 
expect that businesses will use even more staffing services as part of their overall 
human resource management strategies. As we have seen, co-employment 
historically has been a concern but has had minimal legal impact on the use of 
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staffing services. As these services evolve in response to work force changes, it is 
reasonable to assume that the legal environment also will change. With common 
sense and intelligent planning, those issues should prove to be manageable in the 
new workplace as they have been in the old. 
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?. -General 
It is the policy of the University of Kentucky to pay all 
,""orkers in accoldance >;ith Internal Revenue Service 
guidelines. Pa}~ents to individuals for services shall be 
made through the Payroll Department utilizing the Payroll 
Authoriiation Record (PAR), when the individual is deemed to 
be an employee. When the individual is deemed to be an 
independent contractor, payment shall be made directly using 
a Departmental Authorization and Voucher (DAV) for amounts 
that do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). 
Payments in excess of one thousand dollars shall be on a 
Personal Service Contract, payable to a bona fide Independent 
Contractor. 
Proper classification of a worker as an EMPLOYEE or an 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR is mandated by Internal Revenue 
Service guidelines, and failure to do so may result in 
significant penalties to the University. The remainder of 
this section details the University's policies and procedures 
for classification of workers. 
B. Policy 
1. The department head or the employing official shall 
determine whether a worker is an l1Employeet1 ~r and 
"Independent Contractor 11 prior to any performance of 
work or service. 
2. Each Sector Personnel Office shall provide guidance and 
assistance in the classification of workers in their 
respective sectors. 
3. The University shall adhere to the ttCommonLaw Factors" 
as the primary source of information to assist in the 
classification of a worker. (liThe Common Law Rule" and 
the "Common Law Factors l1 are stated in detail in the 
following procedures.) 
4. The Controller/Treasurer Division, Accounts Payable 
Department and Payroll Department shall perform the 
final review of all classifications before approval for 
.payment. 
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5. Selected groups of workers have been clas~ified as 
follows. These workers should be classified and paid 
accordingly when employed to perform the services 
described. 
a. Continuing Education Instructors: Categorically. 
individuals hired to teach continuing education 
courses shall be paid as Independent Contractors. 
C. Procedures 
1. Classification of workers, as an employee or 
independ~nt contractor, shall be in accordance with the 
"Common Law Rule" and "Common Law Factors" as stated by 
the Internal Revenue Service and listed. below. 
Employing departments may also seek information and 
assistance from their Sector Personnel Off'ice and the 
Controller/Treasurer Division, Accounts Payable 
Department. 
2. Internal Revenue Service Guidelines for Classifying a 
Worker as Employee or Independent Contractor. 
a. The Common Law Rule: For all three employment 
tax laws, a worker is an employee under the . 
common law rules if the person for whom he/she 
works has the right to direct and control him/her 
in the way he/she works, both as to final results 
and as to the details of when, where and how the 
work is to be done. However, the employer need 
not actually·exercise the control; it is 
sufficient that he/she has.the right to do so. 
Where the employer does not possess that right, 
the individual is an independent contractor, not 
an employee. 
b. There are a number of factors that may aid in the 
determination of whether or not the requisite 
right of direction and control exists in a given 
situation. No one or small group of these 
factors is necessarily controlling. The factors 
are to be weighed against those that indicate an 
independent contractor·status. 
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Note that the relative importance of anyone factor may vary 
depending on the occupation under consideration. The 
following is a list of some of the factors that might be 
considered: 





A person who is required to comply with instructions 
about when, where and how the person is to work is 
ordinarily an employee. Again, it is the employer's 
right to instruct, not the exercise of that right, that 
is important. Instructions may be oral or in written 
procedures or manuals. 
Training of an individual by an experienced employee 
who works with the worker (or individual) is a factor 
of control because it indicates that the employer wants 
the services performed in a particular method or 
manner. Independent contractors ordinarily use their 
own methods and receive training from the one who 
purchases their services. 
Integration of the person's services in the business 
operations generally shows that the worker is subject 
to direction and control. That is, when the success or 
continuation of a business depends to an appreciable 
degree on the performance of certain kinds of services, 
those performing the services must necessarily be 
subject to a certain amount of control by the owner of 
the business. 
If services must be rendered personally and if the 
employer is interested in who does the job as well as 
in getting the job done, it indicates that the employer 
is interested in the methods used as well as the result 
of the services rendered. 
Hiring, supervising and payment by an employer 
generally show control over the persons on the job. 
Sometimes one worker will hire, supervise and pay other 
workers under a contract in which the one worker is 
responsible for the attainment of a given result. In 
such a case, that worker is an independent contractor, 
not an employee. 
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(6) The existence of a continuing relationship between an 
individual and the person for whom the individual 
performs services is a factor tending to indicate the 
existence of an employer-employee relationship. 
Services may be continuing even though they are 
performed at irregular intervals, on a part-time basis, 
seasonally, or over a short term. 
(7) The establishment of set hours of work by the employer 
is a factor indicative of control since such a 
condition bars the worker from being the master of the 
worker's own time, which is a right of an independent 
contractor. 
(8) i If the worker must devote full time to the business of 
the employer, rather than engaging in other gainful 
work, then the worker is probably an employee. An 
independent contractor, on the other hand, is free to 
work when, for whom and for as many employers as the 
worker pleases.' Note that full time does not 
necessarily mean an eight-hour day or a five-day work 
week. Its meaning will vary depending on the intent of 
the parties. 
(9) Doing the work on the employer's premises is not, of 
itself, indicative of control but it does imply 
control, especially if the work is of such a nature 
that it could be performed elsewhere. One who works in 
the employer's place of business is at least physically 
within the employer's direction and supervision. . 
Conversely, however, the fact that work is done off the 
employer's premises does not, of itself, mean that no 
right to control exists. 
(10) If a person must perform services in a prescribed 
sequence, it shows that the person may be subject to 
control. Here, too, it is the right to set the 
sequence, not the exercis~ of that right, thai 
controlling. 
(11) Regular reports, submitted by the worker, indicate 
control. 
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(12) Payment for ,-;ark done by the hour, weel~ or month is 
usually-the manner for compensating employees; 
independent contractors are customarily paid by the job 
in a lump sum or on a commission basis. The guarantee 
of a minimum salary or the granting of a drawing 
account over earnings tends to indicate the existence 
of an employer-employee relationship. 
(13) Payment by the employer of the worker's business and/or 
traveling expenses is a factor indicating control over 
the worker. But, a lack of control is indicated where 
the worker is paid on the job basis and has to take 
care of all the workers expenses. 
(14) The furnishing of tools, materials and the like by the 
employer is indicative of control over the worker. If 
the worker furnishes tools and equipment, it indicates 
a lack of control subject to recognition of the fact 
that in some jobs it is customary for the employees to 
use their own hand tools. 
(15) A significant investment by persons in facilities used 
by them in performing services for another tends to 
show an independent contractor status. Facilities 
include, generally, equipment or premises necessary for 
the work, but not tools, instruments, clothing ~nd the 
like that are provided by employees as common practice 
in their trade. 
(16) A person who is in a position to realize a profit or 
suffer a loss as a result of the person's services is 
generally an independent contractor, while an employee 
is not in such a position. 
(17) The fact that a person makes services available to the 
general public is usually indicative of an independent 
contractor status. "Making services available" may 
include hanging out a "shingle", holding business 
licenses, supplying advertising and telephone 
directory listings, etc. 
(18) The right to discharge is an important factor in 
determining whether the one possessing that right is an 
employer of an employee. An employee exercises control 
through threat of dismissaL An independent 
contractor, on the other hand, cannot be fired so long 
as a result that measures up -to ~he contract 
specifications results. The fact that a right to 
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discharge may be limited under a collective bargaining 
agreement does not detract from the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship. 
(19) An employee has the right to end the relationship with 
the employer at any time without incurring liability. 
An independent contractor usually agr€es to complete a 
specific job and is responsible for its satisfactory 
completion or is legally obligated to make good for 
failure to complete the job. 
3. Payment to an Employee 
Pay~ents to employees must be made in accordance with 
the University of Kentucky Business Procedures E-14 
4. Payments to Independent Contractors ($1,000.00) 
a. Contracts in excess of One Thousand Dollars 
$1,000,00) 
Pay~ents to Independent Contractors for amounts 
in excess of One Thousand dollars ($1,000.00) 
must be on a Personal Services Contract, and in 
accordance with University of Kentucky Business 
Procedure B-9-11. (See B-9-11 for Details) 
b. Contracts of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or 
Less 
Payments to Independent Contractors for One 
Thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or less, may be made 
by Departmental Authorization and Vouchers as 
follows; 
1. Prepare a Departmental Authorization and 
Voucher (DAV), payable to the Individual. 
2. The description on the DAV must contain the 
following: 
a. What work was completed. (A 
description of the actual task 
performed) 
b. When the work was performed. 
E - 26 
~-trNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY BUSINESS PROCEDURES Page 7 of 7 
SUBJECT 
OFFICE OF CONTROLLER AN-D TREASURER 
Number: E-7-2 
Date Effective: 2-1-90 
Date Issued: 2-1-90 7. Non-Payroll Pa}~ent for 
Individual Services 





TMD & RSW 
H.C.O. 
c. Where the work was performed. (Were 
University facilities, tools~and ~quip~ent 
used?) 
d. How the amount paid for the work was 
determined. (Was the Contractor paid an 
hourly amount, or a contracted amount?) 
5. The following statement must be on the DAV, and signed 
by the responsible University official. 
HI have reviewed the University of Kentucky procedures 
for classifying an Employee/Independent Contractor, and 
I believe this individual meets the criterion to be 
classified as an Independent Contractor." 
6. Attach a completed 111099 Information Sheet" to the DAV 
(See University of Kentucky Business Procedure E-7-1 
for details) Attachment A. 
I. Attach a complete copy of the "University of Kentucky 
Agreement Between Independent Contractor and Client". 
Attachment B. 
8. Forward the completed DAV to the Accounts Payable 
Department for final revievL 
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UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND CLIENT 
APPENDIX 2 
WHEREAS. _____________ ----:_.,.-_.....,-___ ("CUEI\'Y') intends to contract with 
__________________ (independent contractor -- "IC") for the performance of certain tasks; 
WHEREAS. Ie's principal place of business is located at the following address: 
________________ -"; Ie's Employee Identification Number __________ ....:. 
WHEREAS. CUENTs principal place of business is located at the follOwing address: ___________ --'_-'-
WHEREAS. IC declares that IC is engaged in an independent business and has complied with all federal, state and local 
aws regarding business permits and licenses of any kind that may be required to carry out the said business and the 
asks to be performed under this agreement 
WHEREAS. IC declares that IC is engaged in the same or similar activities for other clients and that CUENT is not Ie's 
-ole and only client or customer. 
THEREFORE. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING REPRESENTATIONS AND THE FOlLOWING TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS. THE PARTIES AGREE: 
] . SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED. CUENT engages IC to perform the following tasks or services: 
2. TERMS OF PAYMENT. CUENT shall pay IC according to the [allowing terms and conditions: 
IC shall submit invoices to CUENT for the payments called for in this paragraph. 
3. INSTRUMENTAUTIES. IC shall supply all equipment. tools. materials and supplies to accomplish the 
designated tasks except as follows: _______________________ ~ 
4. CONTROL. IC retains the sole and exclusive right to control or direct the manner or means by which the 
work described herein is to be performed, CUENT retains only the right to control the ends to insure its 
conformity with that specified herein. 
5. PAYROLL OR EMPLOYMENT TAXES. No payroll or employment t,axes of any kind shall be withheld or 
paid with respect to payment to IC. The payroll or employment taxes that are the subject of this 
paragraph include but are not limited to FlCA, FUTA. federal personal income tax, state personal income 
tax. state disability insurance tax. and state unemployment insurance tax. 
6. WORKERS' COMPENSATION. No workers' compensation insurance has been or will be obtained by the 
CUEI\'T on account of IC or IC's employees. IC shall comply with the workers' compensation laws with 
respect to IC and Ie's employees. 
7. TERMINATION. This agreement shall end on and may not be terminated earlier 
(except for cause) without days prior written notice form one party to the other. 
Agreed to this ____ dayof _____ --', 199_, at ________ " State of ______ --'-
CLIENT: INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: 
8Y:--7N71a-m-e-a-n-d~T~it7Ie------------- By:.,-__ --=-=--:-_________ _ Name and Title 
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Please Type or Print 
1. NAME: 
(First) 
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 




2. HO¥£ ADDRESS: ________________________________________________ ___ 
ZIP CODE: ----------------
3. VOUCHER NUMBER: 
4. ACCOm.TT NUMBER: OBJECT CODE: USER CODE: ------- --------
DOCUMENT l'.TUMBER: 
5. DAV., P.O., etc. SOCIAL SECURITY NO: 
6. REASON FOR PAYMENT: 
7. AMOUNT: DATE: 
8. 1099 CODE: 
9. ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT: 
Instructions: 
1. .. _ The University Department reques.ting payment must complete all items above 
except item No. 3 and item No.8. 
2. Items No. 3 and No. 8 will be completed by the Accounts Payable Department. 
3. Attach the completed form to the paying document. (DAV or P.O.) 
FORM PA-l 
Revised 6-87 
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APPENDIX 4 
AuOW1."G "POltyable Department 
331 Peterson Service Building 
University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, Kentucky 4050~5 
606-257-1402 





Deans, Directors, Departmental Chairpersons, 
and Admi~.st ative. OfficersV H.C. Owen na. ~ 
Controller easur r ~ 
Nonresident Alien Contractors 
This memorandum is to clarify federal tax withholding requirements on 
compensation for services performed by nonresident alien contractors. 
These payments generally are for guest lectures, speaking engagements, 
consulting services, honoraria, and other activities. 
Federal Tax Withholding Requirements 
1. The University is required by federal tax law to withhold 
taxes equal to 30% of the gross amount paid for services 
unless specifically exempted by tax treaty between the 
nonresident alien's country of residence and the United 
States of America. 
2. Tax withholdings V>7ill be deposited with the Internal 
Revenue Service under the name and social security 
number of the individual. (A tax identification number 
will be assigned by the Office of the Controller Treasurer 
if the individual does not provide the University with a 
social security number.) 
3. Internal Revenue Service Publication 515 provides tax 
information relating to payments for services performed 
by nonresident alien contractors. Publication 515 can be 
obtained directly from the Internal Revenue Service. 
An Equal Opportunity University 
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Procedures for Payment by Department Authorization Voucher (DAY) 
1. Review University of Kentucky Business Procedures 
Manual Section E-7-2 to determine that the individual 
meets the tests to qualify as an independent contractor. 
2. Complete a DAV with the individual as payee. Include . 
complete mailing address. 
3.· Provide a complete description of the services performed 
and state the reason for requested payment by DAV. 
4. Attach a completed 8233 form (original and one copy) 
when the individual claim~ to be exempt from 
withholding. *See note below. 
5. Attach a copy of the individual's Visa. 
6. Forward the DAV and attachments to the Accounts 
Payable Department, Room 331, Peterson Service 
Building 0005. 
* Note: A sample of form 8233 is-attached. Additional forms 
may be obtained from the I.R.S. or the University 
Payroll Department. 
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Form 8233 
(!'lev. hcust 1990) 
~rtment of tht lrusuf)' 
·In\emal Re.enU<! SeM~ 
APPENDIX 5 
Exemption From Withholding on Compensation 
for Independent Personal Services of a 
Nonresident Allen Individual 
OMS No. 1S4~795 
~7·31·93 
This exemption is applicable for compensation for calendar year 19 ___ • or other tax year beginning ____________ .19 ___ • 
and ending ____________ • 19 ___ . . 
Nonresident Alien Individual (Students, teachers, and researchers: 'See Genef7JllnstructJons. 
Taxpayer identification number ______________________ _ 
(see instructions) 
~~~ress~(~~~-r-a-~~~-rH-t7).~n~tht-U~n7n~~Su~t~~------------------~ United States visa number (If any) ____________________ _ 
City. SUIte. and ZIP code 
CItizens of Canae. or Muico complete enht, line> la and III or I~ 2; all othtrfile1$ Complete lines la. Ib,.nd 2. 
III Country issuing passport ______ ..: ______ -' ____ ~ ___ _ _ 2 Permanent foreign address 
b Passport number ___________________________ _ 
3 Compensation for independent personal services: 
• Description (see instructions) __________________ ~ _______________ . ________________________________ _ 
------------------------------------------------------ -----~--------------------~-----b Amount (see instructions) $ ________________________________________________________ :.. _____ .": ___ _ 
c If compensation is exempt from withholding because of a U.S. tax treaty. provide; 
(1) Taxtre~ty and provision under which you are claiming exemption from withholding ___________ . __________________ _ 
(2) Your country of residence ___________ . ____ "'_~ _________________ ~ _____________________________ _ 
cf Is your compensation otherwise exempt (or will it be otherwise exempt) from income tax during the tax year? . . • 0 Yes 0 No 
(If you checked "Yes •• 8ttach a statement explaining why.) 
e Additional facts to justify the exemption from withholding ______________________ • _________________________ _ 
.. Number of personal exemptions you are claiming (see 
instructions ~ 
5 Number of dayS in the period during which indePendent personal 
services are to be rlormed in the United States • 
Under pena~ie$ of periUf")', I declare that t havoe eltllm.~ this form.nd.ny accompanying sute_nlS .• nd. to the bes1 of my knowledge a~ belief, they Ire true. COfTect, and 
complete.lats.o declare. under pe,..,atties of pe'juf)'. thai lam ncrt a citizen Of resident of the Uni1~ Sutes. 
Signature of nonresident alien individual •. Oate ~ 
Withholding Agent Certification 
Employer I6entlflcatlon number 
AcIaress (number ana ~rHt) 
Cny. ~ate •• nd ZIP coOe 
Onder penaltres of perjury, I certify that 1 havoeexami~ this form and any accompanyi"€ ~atements. that I am gtisfte<1 tna: an exemption from witllholdlTli is """rantea .. and 
that I do not knol>'.or have ruson to know thai the nonres~nl alien indMClual's compensation IS ncrt entnled to the exempllOn or that the i:lieibilny of the nonr~idenl ahen's 
compensatIOn for the exempt.on aTnnot be readily determine~. 
Signature of withholding agent. 
General Instructions 
(Section references are to the internal 
Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated.) 
tperwork Reduction Act Notice.-We ask 
..... r the information on this form to carry out 
the Internal Revenue laws of the United 
States. If you ¥.tant to receiv!! exemption from 
withholding on compensation for independent 
personal services, you are reqUIred to give us 
the information. We need it to ensure that you 
are complying with these laws and to allow us 
to figure and collect the right amount of tax. 
The time needed to complete and file this 
form will vary depending on individual 
circumstances. The estimated average time is: 
Recordkeeplng 26 mins. 
lurnlng about the ~w or the 
form 12 mins. 
Preparing and ~endlng the form 
to IRS 41 mins. 
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Date .. 
If you have comments concerning the 
IIccuracy ofthese time estimates or 
suggestions for making this form more simple. 
we would be happy to hear from you. You can' 
write to both the Internal Revenue Service, 
Washington. DC 20224. Attention: IRS 
Reports Clearance Officer. T:FP. and the 
Office of Management and Budget. 
Paperwork Reduction Project (1545·0795). 
Washington, DC 20503. 
rom> 8233 (Rev. 8-90) 
DO NOT send the tax form to either of these 
offices. Instead, give it to your withhoiding 
agent as specified in the instructions under 
·Purpose of Form.· 
Students, Teachers, Researchers.- Form 
8233 should be used by nonresident alien 
students. teachers, and researchers to claim 
exemption from withholding on compensation 
for services that is exempt from taxation under 
a U.S. tax treaty. Students must provide the 
information required by Revenue Procedure 
87-8,1987-1 C.B. 366. Teachers and 
researchers must provide the information 
required by Revenue Procedure 87·9, 1987-1 
C.B. 368. All these individuals must also 
f)rovide the information required by Form 
8233, disregarding references to independent 
personal services. Then, they should submit 
the form to their withholding agent. 
Purpose of Form.-In general, section 1441 
requires that 3096 of a mounts paid to a 
nonresident alien individual as compensation 
for independent personal services (i.e., services 
performed where there is no employer· 
employ" relationship) be withheld by the 
person paying the amount (the withholding 
agent) to the individual. This form is used by 
nonresident alien individuals to claim 
exemption from withholding on compensation 
for independent personal services (under 
section 1441 and its regulations) if the 
exemption is based on a U.s. tax treaty or on 
the personal exemption amount. The form is 
complete'd by the nonresident alien individual 
claiming exemption and presented to the 
withholding agent for review. If the withholding 
agent accepts form 8233, the withholdi"6 
agent so certifies on the same form and 
forwards it to the Director, Office o-f 
Compliance, Assistant Commissioner 
(International), at the address shown under 
Part II on this page. An accepted form 8233- is 
effecti"'E only for the tax year shown on tne 
form. Do not use Form 8233 if you have an 
office in the United States regularly available to 
you for performing personal services. If you 
have an office in the United States regula rly 
Ivailable to you, contact the !!lirector, Office of 
Compliance, Assistant CommissiQner 
(International). for more information. 
Definitions 
Nonresident Alien Individual.-Any 
individua I who is not a resident or citizen of 
the United States is a nonreSIdent ahen 
individual. The term also includes a 
nonresident alien fiduciary. An alien 
individual meeting either the "green card . 
test· or the "substantial presence tes~· for the 
calendar year is a resident. Those no~ meeting 
either test are nonresident alien indlvldua!s. 
Note: Nonresident 'lien individuals married 
to U.S. citizens or resident aliens may choose 
to be treated as lesident aliens fOI income tax 
purposes (e.g., for purposes of filing a Joint 
income t,x return). However, these 
individuals _ considered nonresidents for 
purposes of withholding taxes on nonresident 
.Iiens. For further information on residen! 
and nonresident alien status, the teslS lor 
residence. and the exceptions to them, se£ 
Publication 519, U.S. Tax Guide for Ahens. 
available from the !RS . 
Nonresident Allen Fiducilry (£States and 
Trusts).-A nonresident alien fIdUCIary is a 
nonresident allen guardian, trustee. exeCI..'tor, 
administrator, receiver. conservator. or o!ner 
person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any 
person. However, a nonresident alien 
fiduciary is not a nomInee. 
Compenutlon for Independent Personal 
Services.-lndependent persOn21 Sf'vlces 
are personal services perfo~med '" tn~ Un!led 
stites by an independent nonresident alien 
contractor, rather than by a nonreside:1! alien 
employee. Included in compensation are 
payments for professional services, such as 
fees of an attomey, physician, or acco:mtant 
made directly to the person performing the 
services, consulting fees, .n.d paymems for 
performances by public entertainers, such as 
artiSts, actors, musicians, and athletes. For 
further information, see Publication 51 S, 
Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Ahens and 
foreign Corporations, available from the IRS. 
Withholding Acent.-Any person required to 
withhold tax on payments made to a 
nonresident alien individual is a withholding 
agent. Generally, the person who pays or 
conveys the item of U.S. source income to the 
nonresident alien individual (or to his Of her 
agent) is liable for the tax and must witnhold, 
The withholding agent may be an individual, 
corporation, partnership, trust, association, or 




Taxpayer Identification number.-If you area 
nonresident alien individual (other than a 
nonresident alien estate ortrust)and yo:.: have a 
social security numbergryou ere require:lto get 
a social security number ,you must use it when 
an identific:atiQn number is required for Federal 
tax purposes. If you do nat have a socia! Hcurity 
number. applyfor one on form 5S·S, 
Application for a Social Security Card, which you 
can get at Social Security Administration offices. 
When the number is received, promptly give it to 
the withholding agent. In some cases. if~u do 
not have a social security number or are not 
otherwise requireato getone, YOIl may usean 
IRS-issued identification number.if.an 
application has been made for a numbe~!lut it 
has not been received, write "TIN ap;lh~ for" 
and1he date you applied in thespace provided 
on this form. for (non-residentalien) eS:2tes or 
trusts, use your employer identific:ation number. 
Unes la, Ib, and 2.-AlI filers must complete 
lines la.lb, and.2. except citizens of Car.ada or 
Mexico, who can complete either lines 1a, 1 b, 
or line 2. 
line 3a.-Describe the independent ~rsonal 
services for which the compensation is Qelng 
(or will be) received, and describe the r..anner 
of compensation (e.g., lump sum, momnly 
payments, etc.). 
line 3b • ....;Enterthe amount of compe:1Sation 
for independent personal scervices you .... ill be 
receiving during the tax year to which this 
Form 8233 applies. Enter an estimatec 
amount if the exact amount is not knoy;~. 
line 3d.-lf the exemption from inCOl'r1t talC 
withholding is (or will be) nased on othe: than a 
U.S. tax treaty (e.g., the personal exem;tion 
amount), explain this in an attached sta1ement. 
line 4.-Fordetermini"6the amount C'! . 
compensation exempt from 30% withnc!:ling 
because ofthe personal exemptionamo~nt .. one 
personal exemption is allowed a nonresillent 
alien indi",idual who is not a resident of C2nada 
or Mexico, or'is n01a U.S. national durinithe 
tax year. However. a nonresident alien 
indIVidual covered by a U.S. tax treaty w;:'" his 
or her country may be entitled to exemv.·ons for 
a spouse and dependents under ce 1'1 a It: 
circumstances. See the applic.a!lle tax t!eatyfor 
further information. A nonresideirtalte~ 
individual who is a resident of Canada c· Mexico 
orisa U.S. national isgenerallyallowec:~e . 
same personal exemptiOns as a U.S. cittlen or 
resIdent. (F orfu:'ther information. see 
PublIcatIon 519.) Each aUowatlleexem::,o'l 
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must be prorated according to the number of 
days in the period during which the-personal 
services are to be performed in the United 
States (line 5 on Form "8233). To figure the daily 
proration amount for each allowable exemption, 
divide the personal exe.mption amount (for 
example, $2,050 if the individual's tax year 
begins in 1990) by 365 (366 for a leap year). 
Round off the result to the nearest cent. Note: 
The personal exemption amount for any year 
can be obtained from the IRS. 
$ignature.-The nonresident alien individual, 
or his or her legally authorized representative, 
must sign and date Form 8233 in the 
appropriate place. 
Part II 
Withholding Agent's Responsibilities 
_ Reguding Form 8233.-When the 
nonresident alien individual gives you Form 
8233, review it to see if you are satisfied that 
the exemption from withholding is warranted. 
If you are satisfied, based on the facts 
presented, certify that you accept the form 
8233 by completing and signing Part II. 
Within 5 days of your acceptance, forward 
form 8233 and any Ittachments to: 
Assistant Commissioner (International) 
Director, Office of Compliance 
IN:C:E:62 . 
Intemal Revenue Service 
950 L'Enfant Piau South, S.W. 
Washington, DC 20024 
Give a copy of the completed Form 8233 to 
the nonresident alien individual. Attach a copy 
of Form 8233 to the Form 1042, Annual 
Withholding Tax Return for U .S •. Source Income 
of foreign Persons, that you file with the IRS. 
Keep a copy of Form 8233 for your records. 
Note: Each copy of Form 8233 must also 
include any attachments originally submftted 
by the nonresident alien individual. 
The exemption from withholding becomes 
effective for payments made at least 10 days 
after you have mailed Form 8233 to the IRS. 
(See the instructions for Part I,line 4, for 
information on amounts exempt from 
withholding because of the personal 
exemption amount.) 
Ypu must not accept Form 8233 if either of 
the following applies: 
• if you know or have reason to know that 
any of the facts or statements on form 8233 
maybe false; or 
• You know or have reason to knowthatthe 
eligibility of the nonresident alien indIvidual's 
compensation for the exemption cannot be 
readily determined (e.g., if you know or have 
reason to know that a nonresident alien 
individual has an offIce in the United States 
regularly available for performing personal 
servic.es). 
If you accept Form 8233 and subsequently 
find that either of the situations described . 
immediately above applies, you must promptly 
notify the D,rector, OffIce of Compliance, 
Assistant CommiSSIoner (International), in 
writing, and you must withhold on any amounts 
not yet paid. If you are notified by that office 
that the eligibility for the exemption of the 
nonresIdent alien individual's compensation is 
in doubt Of that the compensation is ineligible 
for the exemption. YOI: must withhold. See 
Regulations section 1.1441-4(b)(2)(iii) for 
examples illustrating these rules. 
Signature.-The withholding agent, or a duly 
authorized agent of the withholdi"6 agent, 
must sign and date form 8233 in the 
appropriate place. (See Regulations section 
1.1441·7(b) fOf further information regarding 
duly au1horized agents.) 
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HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: 
PITFALLS AND PREVENTIVE PRACTICES 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Richard G. Griffith 
STITES & HARBISON 
The unveiling of allegations that the President of our country 
engaged in workplace misconduct before taking office graphically 
demonstrates the increased scrutiny of employers' actions in 
today's business climate. In that same vein, the enactment of 
significant and comprehensive federal and state statutes that 
address numerous workplace issues and the steady, and often 
dramatic, annual increases in the number of workplace claims filed 
by employees have led many employers to the breaking point. There 
can be no doubt that an employer's survival in this era of multi-
million dollar verdicts in employment law cases may depend upon its 
ability to manage its human resources effectively. 
This outline is designed to provide an overview of some of the 
most significant issues faced by human resource professionals and 
to provide suggestions concerning the manner in which these issues 
should be addressed. 
II. THE NEED TO BE AWARE OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS. 
No employer can hope to have effective human resources 
management without a general understanding of the laws that govern 
its operations. Although a comprehensive review of all laws that 
touch on human resource issues is beyond the scope of this outline, 
every employer needs to be aware of certain basic obligations and 
principles. 
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A. Issues Relating To Employment Terminations. 
The Employment-At-Will Doctrine. Kentucky Courts 
have long endorsed the employment-at-will doctrine, under which a 
person's employment may be terminated for any reason or even no 
reason. See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, Ky., 666 
S.W.2d 730, 731 (1984) ("Ordinarily an employer may discharge his 
at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that 
some might view as morally indefensible."). 
Though the doctrine is still viable, its reach has been 
significantly eroded in recent years through the evolution of 
certain common law principles and the enactment of numerous 
statutes and ordinances. 
2. The Principal Exceptions To The Employment-At-Will 
Doctrine: 
a. Employment Contracts. 
(1) Express Contracts. It is beyond question 
that an employer generally is free to enter into an express, 
written contract with an employee. Thus, an employer may choose to 
obtain from an employee a covenant not to compete, an agreement not 
to disclose confidential information and virtually any other type 
of contractual commitment. An employer also may choose to alter 
contractually an employee's at-will status by, for example, 
agreeing that it can terminate the person's employment only under 
certain conditions. 
(2) Implied Contracts. In recent years courts 
throughout the nation, including those in Kentucky, have shown an 
increased willingness to find the existence of implied contractual 
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relationships between employers and employees. Thus, even in the 
absence of a written employment contract an employer may be 
restricted by an implied contract in its ability to terminate a 
person's employment. See, e.g., Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber 
Corp., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1983). 
b. The Tort Of Wrongful Discharge. In Kentucky it 
is unlawful for an employer to terminate a person's employment 
where the motivation for the termination is the person's "failure 
or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment" or the 
"employee's exercise of a right conferred by well-established 
legislative enactment." Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 
(1985). The employee does not have a viable cause of action where 
the legislative enactment provides both rights to the employee and 
a remedy for the violation of those rights. Id. at 401. Examples 
of statutes that do not prescribe a remedy, and therefore may 
provide a basis for a wrongful discharge claim, are: KRS 38.460 
(prohibiting retaliation against a member of the Kentucky National 
Guard on active militia because of military duties); KRS 118.035(2) 
(prohibiting retaliation against an employee for properly 
exercising his or her right to vote); KRS 311.800(5) (6) 
{prohibiting retaliation against employees and other who refuse to 
participate in the performance of an abortion); KRS 427.140(4) (a) 
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee whose earnings are 
garnished for one .indebtedness) ; KRS 436. 165 (prohibiting employers 
from discriminating against employees who refuse to work on Sundays 
or their Sabbath). 
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c. statutes Or Ordinances That Prohibit Discrimin-
ation. An important exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
is embodied in the many statutes and ordinances that prohibit 
employment discrimination. The protection granted by these laws 
includes, but is not limited to, the prohibition of an unlawful 
discharge. based upon the employee's specific traits, such as 
gender, age, national origin, etc ... The principal statutes that 
Kentucky employers are governed by are cited in the endnotes. 1 
B. Other Legal Issues. 
1 • statutes Or Ordinances That Prohibit Discrimination. 
The statutes that prohibit discrimination in employment prohibit 
unlawful termination and unlawful discriminatory treatment in any 
of the terms and condition of employment. 
2. Wage And Hour Laws. State2 and federa13 statutes 
generally govern the method in which wages are paid to employees. 
3. Organized Labor. Federal statutes primarily govern 
the regulation of organized labor relations. 4 
4. Employee Benefits. A federal statute primarily 
governs the area of employee benefits. s 
5. Workplace Safety. State6 and federa17 statutes 
address issues pertaining to workplace safety. 
6. Unemployment Compensation. StateS and federa19 
statutes address issues pertaining to the rights of persons to 
receive unemployment benefits. 
7. Workers' Compensation. A state statute primarily 
governs the area of Workers' Compensation.lO 
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8. Common Law Obligations. Employers need to be aware 
of common law theories that impose certain restrictions on their 
conduct, such as the tort of wrongful discharge lI , breach of 
implied contract 12, promissory estoppel13 , defamation, invasion of 
privacy, tort of outrage, tortious interference with prospective or 
existing business relations and negligent hiring and retention. 
9. Miscellaneous Statutes. There are numerous statutes 
that govern miscellaneous aspects of the employment relationship. 
Examples of the substantive issues addressed by such statutes are 
the right to require an employee to take a polygraph examination14 , 
the restrictions on an employer in effecting a plant closing or 
mass layoff0, the obligations of an employer to provide health 
care continuation coverage to a departing employeel6 , the 
obligations of certain employers to adopt a drug-free workplace 
policyl7, and the obligations of an employer to obtain basic 
information from prospective employees about their citizenship.18 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP FROM START TO FINISH. 
A. Events That Should Precede The Employment Relationship. 
An employer's best opportunity to avoid liability is before 
the employment relationship begins; the old adage that an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure is nowhere more true than in 
the area of employment law. Discussed below are some of the more 
significant steps that an employer can take to avoid serious 
problems. 
1 • Regular Review And, Where Appropriate, Revision Of 
Personnel Policies. Because employment laws have changed so 
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dramatically in recent years, and because the pace of change 
continues to escalate, every employer should periodically review 
its forms and policies. There are certain forms and policies that 
are particularly likely to be oui:dated and thus in need of 
revision. 
a. Application Forms. Any employer that continues 
to use the same applicatiori form it used in the 1980's is almost 
certainly at risk. Among the high-risk questions frequently found 
in such forms are detailed questions about the applicant's 
health19, questions that elicit from the applicant, either directly 
or indirectly, his or her age, and questions about the applicant's 
arrest or conviction re6ords.~ 
There also are some provisions tha t an employer should 
consider inserting in its standard application form. They include: 
• A provision exp~essly informing the applicant that if he 
or she becomes employed it will be on at-will basis. See 
discussion ofd{scla{mers, infra. n 
• A provision authorizing the employer to check references 
and run a thorough background check on the applicant. 
• A provision waiving any claims against former employees 
arising out of the provision of information about the 
applicant. 
b. Employee Handbooks. Employers are not required 
by ·law to utilize employee handbooks, and whether any particular 
employer should prepare a handbook depends·· upon a number of 
factors, including the size of the employer, the regularity of 
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employee turnover and the complexity of the employer's operations. 
If an·· employer chooses . to issue an employee handbook, among 
the most critical policies to be included in the handbook are: 
(1 ) Equal· Employment Opportunity statement. 
A clear, comprehensive equal employment opportunity statement can 
be a valuahle piece of evidence in a discrimination suit. The 
statement should be reviewed periodically and revised, where 
appropriate, to include newly protected traits, such as a person's 
HIV-positive or smoking status. 
(2) Disclaimer. Every employer should at 
least consider inserting in its handbook a disclaimer providing 
that the handbook does not create contractual rights and that 
employees continue to be·terminable-at-will. The disclaimer also 
should provide that only one person has the authority to enter into 
an employment contract with employees and that the specified person 
may only bind the company if the contract is in writing and he or 
she signs it. It is generally considered advisable to include all 
of the above information on an acknowledgement form that each 
employee signs at the inception of the relationship. 
(3) Anti-Harassment Policy. It is now widely 
recognized that every employer, large or small, should adopt and 
disseminate to all employees an effective anti-'-harassment policy. 
At a minimum, the policy should condemn all forms of unlawful 
harassment (not just sexual harassment), promise an appropriate 
level of confidentiality and prompt action and provide an 
alternative reporting mechanism (include several reporting options 
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and do not, under any circumstance, require the employee to report 
the harassment only to the person's immediate supervisor) and a 
specification of actions, including termination, that will be taken 
if harassment has occurred. 
(4) Flexible Approach To Employee Discipline. 
It is not unusual for an, employee handbook to contain a section 
that sets forth'in great detail the behavior the employer deems 
, 
inappropriate' and the process by which the employer will address 
that behavior. Although an employee discipline section is not 
always unacceptable, it is very important to draft such a section 
so that the ,employer retains discretion to handle in an appropriate 
manner all types of employee conduct. This' can be accomplished by, 
among other things, clearly stating that the list of "bad acts" is 
not exhaustive and by expressly reserving the right to impose any 
form of di.scipline, including discharge, that is appropriate under 
the circumstances. 
(5) Other Policies. Other policies that an 
employer may wish to include in a handbook are policies that set 
forth: 
, • hiring and promotion policies; 
• the manner in which employees will be paid; and 
• safety rules 
c. Performance Appraisal Forms. The performance 
appraisal form may be the single most important document in the 
employer's formbook because of its frequent appearance on 
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claimants' trial exhibit lists. Notwithstanding its importance, 
the form is rarely scrutinized and is too often designed in such a 
way that it invites risk. An employer reviewing its ,appraisal form 
should at a minimum consider eliminating the following: 
(1) "Satisfactory" Ratings. Experience 
teaches us that_supervisors and others involved in the evaluation 
process cannot resist the temptation to give a satisfactory rating 
to marginal or even poor employees. The appraisal form should 
force a supervisor to provide a meaningful assessment. For 
example, the form could, provide only the following performance 
ratings: Excellent, consistently meets expectations, needs 
improvement, and poor. By employing these, or similar ratings I the 
employer is more likely to receive mecmingful information and is 
less likely to find itself explaining an inflated appraisal to a 
j ur'y. 
(2) "Overall" Ratings. Although most forms 
contain an overall rating, it is our experience that the use of 
such a rating leads to the same problems that arise from the use of 
a, "satisfactory" rating. This is especially true where the 
employee who is being evaluated is generally performing at an 
acceptable level, but has severely deficient performance in one or 
two areas. If such an employee receives an acceptable overall 
rating T, the employer will find it hard to justify a discharge even 
where the discharge is supported by the performance in the problem 
areas. 22 
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2. Preparation Of Lawful Advertisements And Other Forms 
Of Employee Solicitation. Every employer should exercise great 
care in the crafting of job advertisements or other forms of 
employee solicitation. There are many serious mistakes that 
employers frequently make with respect to these pre-employment 
communications, including the use of language that may create a 
binding employment contract with the persons who are solicited and 
.the use of language that is either facially discriminatory or 
reflects a policy that has a discriminatory impact on a protected 
group. 23 
3. Interviews Of Prospective Employees. As with poorly 
conceiv~d advertisements, interviews, where poorly conducted, can 
lead to significant exposure for employers~ The person cOnducting 
the interview should, among other things, avoid suggesting that the 
posi tion which the applicarit is seeking is guaranteed for a 
particular duration and should not characterize the wages or salary 
in annual terms. 24 
The person conducting the interview also should avoid 
eliciting information that may not be lawfully relied upon in the 
employment decision, such as whether the· applicant is pregnant, 
disabled, or over 40. 
It is important to remember in. carrying out the employee 
selection process that in the EEOC's view an employer does not 
typically ask a question unless it intends to be influenced by the 
answer it receives. 
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4. Reference Checks. Employers generally should check 
an applicant's references before offering that person a job. 
Presently, employers find themselves caught between competing 
concerns: the need on their part to· be diligent in seeking 
information about applicants25 and the reluctance on the part of 
the persons and entities who could provide information to expose 
themselves to defamation or related claims. Although the pursuit 
of information about an applicant may not yield much that can be 
used in the selection process, the mere fact that the employer 
tried to obtain information should be useful in the defens~ of a 
claim for ne~ligent hiring or retenti6n. 
5. Negotia tioris Wi th Prospective Employees. ,Each 
employer should determine before the beginning of the employee 
sblicitationprocess whether.it has any unique goals that it wishes 
to pursue or assets that must be protected as a part of the 
process. Among the issues that should b~ considered are: 
• whether the employer wishes to offer the prospective 
employee the opportunity to purchase all or a portion of 
the· business; 
• whether the employer has trade secrets or other tangible 
or intangible assets that it wishes to protect during the 
life of and following the employment relationship; and 
• whether the employer wishes to obtain a covenant not to 
compete from the prospective employee. 
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Armed with the answers to these questions, an employer will be 
able to negotiate with prospective employees with the reassuring 
knowledge that it has planned for the future effectively. 
6. Offer Letters. An offer letter should be drafted 
carefully so that, if the offer in it is accepted, it will not be 
deemed to alter inadvertently the employee's at-will status. For 
example, an, offer that sets forth the proposed wage or salary in 
annual terms may be construed to create a one-year employment 
contract. Similarly, the offer letter alSo should not contain an 
assurance that the relationship cannot be terminated 'except "for 
cause" or other such bases. 26 
7., Creation' Of Employment Contracts. 
a. Express Contracts. It is beyond the scope of 
this outline to' discuss in detail the provisions that typically 
should be included in an express written employment contract. It 
is important to recognize" however, that an employer that wishes to 
utilize written employment contracts should at the outset determine 
its objectives in light of the industry and the business climate i~ 
which it functions. Thus, a medical P.S.C. may need a markedly 
different contract from that of a manufacturer. 
b. Implied Contracts. There has been a 
significant amount of litigation throughout the country during the 
last decade in which the issue was whether an oral statement or a 
statement in an employee handbook or other writing should be deemed 
to create an implied contract. Kentucky courts have not avoided 
this trend. 
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The Kentucky cases that have been rendered to date provide the 
following guidance to human resource managers and labor lawyers: 
(1 ) It is risky to characterize the early period of 
employment as "probationaryll27 or to characterize an employee's 
wage or salary in annual terms.~ 
(2) It is advisable where it will not create an 
undue risk of a union organizing campaign (assuming the employer 
wishes to maintain a union-free setting) to include a disclaimer in 
an employee handbook that says that the handbook is not contractual 
and that all employees are terminable at will.29 
8. . Pre-Employment Physical Examinations. Historically, 
many employers required applicants or even new employees to take 
physical examinations before beginning their employment. Employers 
in today's legal environment must follow strictly the procedures 
governing such examinations that are set forth in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. They are: 
a. The examination should take place only after an 
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to 
the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant. 
b. The offer of employment may then be condi tioned 
on the results of the examination if: 
• all entering employees .are subj ected to such an 
examination regardless of disability; 
• information obtained regarding the medical condition or 
history of the applicant is collected and maintained on 
separate forms and in separate medical files and is 
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treated in almost all respects~ as a confidential 
medical record; and 
• the results of the examination are used only in 
accordance with the employment title of the ADA. 
Ih The Employment Relationship. 
1. Consistent Enforcement Of Personnel Policies. Every 
employer should, to the maximum extent possible, enforce its 
personnel policies in a consistent fashion. The failure to enforce 
policies consistently can. lead to serious morale problems in the 
work force and ultimately to employment disputes. The need for 
consistent enfo~cement of policies has never been greater because 
virtually every employee is a member of at least one protected 
group and therefore any preferential treatment of an employee could 
be relied upon as proof of discrimination by another similarly 
situated, but less favbrably, treated employee. 
2. Performance Reviews And Promotions. As noted above, 
performance appraisal forms are frequently introduced as evidence 
at trial because too often they reflect evaluation inflation. In 
addition to revising the form that it uses, an employer also should 
consider maintaining its review program on a regular basis to be 
sure that the performance· assessments are accurate and do not 
reflect the consideration of impermissible criteria. 
Proper training of supervisors also is a critical component of 
a successful performance appraisal system. It is unrealistic to 
believe that superv,isors will have an inherent ability· to assess 
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the performance of subordinates accurately; in fact, the contrary 
is typically true. 
Among the components of a satisfactory program are: 
• educating the supervisors concerning the job duties of 
tlie employees whom they are evaluating and the objective 
performance criteria, if any, by which the employees' 
performance will be evaluated; 
• informing the supervisors that their performance will be 
judged in part based on the accuracy of the evaluations 
they complete; 
• informing the supervisors of· the basic employment laws 
that govern their conduct and the many factors that 
cannot lawfully influence the appraisals; and 
• informing the· supervisors concerning the. very various 
risx-s that can flow from inflated appraisals. 
Every employer also should consider the need to devise an 
effecti ve policy for handling promotions. One of the principal 
advantages of a formal promotion policy, especially if the policy 
incorporates objective criteria for advancement, is that the 
promotions that are given under it can be defended more easily. 
3. Progressive Discipline. It is widely recognized 
that an employer should adopt a progressive discipline policy and 
follow it whenever possible. Such a policy should give each 
employee an opportunity to improve performance, provide to the 
employee a specific time frame within which the improvement should 
or must be made and provide to the employee a clear explanation of 
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the consequences that will flow from a failure to improve 
performanc8.. 
There are some circumstances, of course, in which it is not 
possible or ,advisable tO,exercise progressive discipline, such as 
where an employee has stolen money or engaged in other cle~rly 
improp~r _ conduct. It is for this reason that an employer must, not 
articulate, orally or in writing, a strict progressive discipline 
policy that does not give it the flexibility it needs. 
A critical'component of any progressive discipline policy is 
the documentation of .each step.in'the process. As with any other 
document that is generat~d in' the employment relationship, a 
document that memorializes a, step in the progressive discipline 
process should be carefully drafted so that, if necessary, it will 
support the employer's defense in litigation. 
c. Termination Of Employment. 
There are' several steps that an employer should consider 
taking whe'nit appears that it may need to terminate a person's 
employment. :31 
1 • Careful Review Of Documents. The first essential 
step to take is to review the employee's personnel file, the 
employer's personnel policies, and any other tangible materials 
that may relate to the decision. Such materials can be powerful 
evidence at an administrative hearing or trial and therefore the 
employer should carefully consider their content before making a 
final decision to terminate a person's employment. 
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2 . Unbiased Assessment Of The Facts. It is fairly 
common for a supervisor on whose recommendation the termination 
decision is based to have an emotional investment in the decision. 
Consequently, it is wise for the employer to appoint someone else T 
- typically a personnel manager --to review the situation and make 
an unbiased assessment. By doing this, . the employer may avoid . 
making an ill~advised decision and will also have the benefit of 
demonstrating to a jury or other fact finder that its procedures 
are fair and include apprppriate safeguards. 
The empioyer should consider including as a part of the review 





The purpose of this step is to require certain basic 
to . be answered before any employment terJuination is 
The checklist could include. the following items: 
Do the documents and o'thertangible data support the 
decision? This question includes, but is not limited to, 
whether the decision is consistent with written personnel 
policies and, where the decision is based on the person's 
unsatisfactory performance, whether the decision is 
supported by performance appraisals and other documents 
relating to performance. 
• Is the decision consistent with the manner in which 
similar situations have been handled in the past? If 
not, is there a lawful explanation for the disparate 
.appr°ctch? 
F -17 
-Would the decision result in the infringement of any of 
the person's statutory or other legal right~? 
• Has progressive di~cipline been exercised? 
- Have other, less extreme options been employed? This can 
. be especially important if the employee isdisab~ed and 
is therefore entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 
- Has the employee been given an adequate opportunity to 
express his or.her vieWpoint? 
3.. The Termination Meeting. In most circumstances the 
termination meeting shou~d be carried out in the presence of two 
management-level employees and in an otherwise private setting. 
The employees who are chosen to conduct the meeting. should be 
prepared to explain concisely the basis for the decision. The 
failure to adopt and communicate a consistent· basis for the 
discharge, beginning with the termination interview and continuing 
through a trial, can be damaging proof of pretext. 
The employer also should admonish the employees who are chosen 
to conduct the meeting to remain calm at all times.. It is not 
uncommon for a .terminated employee to become upset during a 
termination meeting, . and the failure of the employer's agents to 
resist the urge to respond emotionally can significantly increase 
the risk of litigation arid related problems. 
4. separation Agreements. An issue that frequently 
arises at the· time of an employee termination is whether to enter 
into a separation agreement with the employee. The principal 
purpose of entering into such an agreement is to obtain a release 
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of claims from the employee ~ As a general rule, an employer should 
consider seeking a release only if it concludes that offering the 
release. will not increase the likelihood that the employee will 
file a claim and only if,it is prepared to offer compensation or 
benefi ts to the employee in addition to tpose to which the employee 
otherwise would be entitled. 
If the employee is over 40 years of age, a covered employer 
will not be able to enforce the release unless the release complies 
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended 
by the Old~i Workers' Benefit Protectiori Act, 29 U.S.C. section 
621, et seq. The Act requires the release to include numerous 
provisions to be effective and sets forth different procedures for 
obtaining· enforceable releases from a single employee32 and from 
groups of employees33 • 
The separation agreement should include, among other things, 
an agreement by the employee that he or she will not reapply with 
the Company in the future. 
D. Ev~nts Following Termination. 
An employer must continue to act prudently following the 
termination. Indeed, it is often post-termination conduct that 
leads to litigation. 
1 . The Unemployment Compensation Hearing. Aithough 
there has been a significant amount of focus on whether a decision 
rendered by an unemployment compensation agency should have a 
preclusive effect in other litigation,~ that is no longer an issue 
in Kentucky. 35 Nevertheless, the events that unfold at an 
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unemployment compensation hearing can be guite important. As noted 
above, an employer can significantly increase its exposure by 
changing in titigation its' explanation of the reason for a 
discharge . from that offered at the unemployment compensation 
hearing. Accordingly, an employer that decides to contest a claim 
for, unemploym~ntbenefits should be prepared to explain the basis 
for the discharge in a concise, and consistent fashion. 
2. Requests For References. The I?revai'ling view 
, , ' 
continues., to be that an employer should provide ver,y limited 
information -- typically the dates of employment, arid the position 
, , 
held -- in re~po~se to a reference request. .It is important to 
note, however, that this view has been questioned recently by some 
commentators because it arguably leads to the Gontinuep employment 
of poor or:even dangerous employees and makes it less likely that 
the formel:' employer which gives the limited reference will receive 
helpful information froin other employers when it is making an 
employment decision. See Reuben, Employment Lawyers Rethink 
Advice, A.B.A.J., June, 1994 at 32. In addition, there is at least 
some academic support for the creation of' a tort of negligent 
referral .. Id. Accordingly, this' is an area where the evolving law 
should be reviewed regularly. 
'Regardless of the approach the employer takes' -- that is, 
whether it provides much or little information it should adopt 
a policy on references that requires all requests to be routed to 
a single person or department. If all employees believe they are 
free to respond to reference requests as they see fit, the employer 
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almost certainly will eventually find 
propriety of an employee's statements. 
itself litigating the 
3. Anti-Retaliation Rules. 
discrimination statute contains a 
Virtually every anti~ 
provision that prohibits 
retaliation against any person who files or otherwise participates 
in the pursuit of ... a discrimination claim.36 Because of the 
sUbstantial obligations imposed by the various anti-retaliation 
statutes, an employer should regard any person who has filed a 
charge or who has in any way participated in a proceeding under the 
relevant statutes as having a level of protection, and an adverse 
employment decision with respect to such a person should be 
carefully scrutinized. 
The risks under these anti-retaliation statutes do not 
necessarily go away when the protected person's employment ends, 
even where the separation is voluntary. There is authority for the 
proposition, for example, that the dissemination of adverse 
employment Ireferences can constitute a violation of Title VII if 
motivated by discriminatory intent.n 
4. Reducing Exposure. Occasionally an employer will 
find itself in the unenviable position of realizing that it has 
violated an employee's rights and is facing significant exposure. 
Where this occurs, the employer should consider cutting off 
prospecti ve damages by making an unconditional offer of 
reinstatement to a terminated employee. 
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Another loss reduction method that is available after 
litigation has commenced is the making of an offer of judgment 
under Rule 68 of the state or Federal Civil Rules. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206; Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, 
et seq.; The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act 
of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012, et seq.; Veterans Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2021, et seq.; Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101, et seq.; 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, (amends portions of The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); KRS Chapter 344; The Equal Opportunities Act, KRS 
207.130, et seq.; Kentucky's Equal Pay Law, KRS 337.420, et 
~ 
2. See KRS Chapter 337 (relating to wages and hours); KRS 
339.205, et seq. (relating to child labor) . 
3. See The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 
(relating to wages and hours) . 
4. See, e.q., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 
167, et seq.; Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 
U.S.C. § 141, et seq. 
5. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
1001, et seq. 
6. See KRS Chapter 338. 
7. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq. 
8. See KRS Chapter 341 
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 501, et seq. 
10. See KRS Chapter 342. 
11. See discussion at page 3 of the outline. 
12. See discussion at pages 2-3 of the outline. 
13. See McCarthy v. Louisville Cartaqe Co., Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 
10 (1990) (recognizing doctrine of promissory estoppel in 
non-employment context). 
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14. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001, 
et seq. (prohibiting use by employers of results of 
polygraph examinations and other lie detector tests except 
under speaific circumstances) . 
15. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 
29 U.S.C.§2101, et seq. 
16. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
("COBRA"), as amended (COBRA added several new statutes and 
amended others) . 
17. Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701, et se0. 
18. Immigration Reform and Control act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 8 
U.S.C. § 1324 (a). 
19. Such questions are.expressly prohibited by the Americans 
With Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2) (A) ("a 
covered entity shall not conduct 'a medical examination or 
make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such 
applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the 
natur6~ or severity of such disability"); 29 CFR Part 1630, 
Appendix (providing interpretive guidance on Title I 
(employment] of the ADA) ("An employer may not use an 
application form that· lists a number of potentially 
disabling impairments and ask the applicant to check any of 
the impairments he or she may have.") 
20. Such a question could consist of an express request for the 
applicant's date of birth or a detailed request for 
information.about the applicant's educational background, 
which includes a request for the years of attendance. 
21. The beneficial effect of such a provision is demonstrated in 
Novosel v.Sears Roebrick & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 
1980), in which the court held that the employee's 
recognition of at-will employment through the execution of 
an application form containing disclaimer language prevented 
the employee from successfully pursuing a wrongful discharge 
claim. 
22. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") takes 
the position that a policy of declining to hire a person 
because that person has been convicted of a crime has an 
adverse impact on blacks and hispanics and therefore is 
violativ~ of Title VII unless the policy can be justified 
by"business necessity" . The EEOC is even more critical of 
questions about an applicant's arrest record. 
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23. For example, the EEOC maintains that the use of pre-
selection inquiries which determine an applicant's 
availability to work during an employer's scheduled working 
hours violates Title VII "unless the employer can show that 
it: (1) did not have an exclusionary effect on its employees 
or prospective employees needing an accommodation for the 
same practices; or (2) was otherwise justified by business 
necessity. 11 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3. 
24. Such a statement could be construed to alter the person's at 
-will status and imply that the. employment will continue for 
at least one year. See Putnam v. Producers Livestock 
Marketing Assoc., Ky~, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934). 
25. It is generally recognized that employers face greater risks 
today of defending claims of negligent hiring and negligent 
retention than in the past. See generally Peteren and 
Massengill, TheNegl~gent Hiring Doctrine - A Growing 
Dilemma For Employers, ,15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 419(1989-90). 
26. See, e.g., Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., Ky., 655 
S.W,.2d 489 (1983). 
27. See Trusty v.Big Sandy Health Care, Inc., 38 K.L.S. 4 at 5, 
Motion for Discretionary Review' Denied and Court of Appeals 
opinion ordered not to be published, 38 K~L.S. 11 at 30 
("While an employer need not establish personnel 'policies or 
practices, ,where anemployer.chooses to establish such 
policies and practices and makes them known to its employees 
the employment relationship is presumably enhanced . . . It 
is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own 
interest, to create an environment in which the employee 
believes that, whatever the'personnel policies and . 
practices, they are established and official at any given 
time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and 
uniformly to each employee.") . ' 
, 
28. See Putnam v. Producers Livestock Marketing Assoc., supra at 
note 24. 
29. See Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 824 
(1987) . 
30. The records may be released under certain circumstances. 
See 42 u.s.c. §12112 (l1supervisors and managers may be 
informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or 
duties of the employee and necessary accommodations; first 
aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, 
if the disability might require emergency treatment; and 
government officials investigating compliance with this Act 
shall be provided relevant information on request") ~ 
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31. This section of the outline focuses on involuntary 
employment terminations in anon-reduction'inforce context. 
32. The,waiver of·a federal'age discrimination cla.im'Dy an 









is part of a written agreement that 'is readily 
understandab+e by the employee; 
refeis spe~.ificallytb claims under the federal 
act; 
does not purport to ~aive claims arising out of 
r • 
fUDure conduct; 
is,given iil exchange for 'consideration over arid 
above any benefit for payment to which the 
employeeisentitle<;i; 
proyidesthatthe employee has been advised to 
consult with an attorney before signing it; 
gives the'employee at least 21 days to review and 
sign it; 
gives the employee at least 7 . days to revoke it 
~fier signing it .. 
29 u~s.c. § 626. 
33. The waiVer of a federal age discrimination claim in cases of 
a group exit incentive program must include the statements 
set forth in endnote 32' and in addition must: 
(a) give the employees at least 45 days to review and 
sign it; 
(b) disclose: 
• the group of employees elig.ible for the 
program; 
• the program requirements; 
• any time limitations under the program; and 
• the job titles and ages of all employees 
eligible or selected for the program and the 
same information for those not "eligible or 
. selected. 
29 U.S.C. § 626. 
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34. See, e.g., Kelley v. Tyler Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188 
(3d Cir. 1988). 
35. See K.R.S.341.420(5) .("No finding of fact or law, judgment, 
conclusion, or final order made with respect to a claim for 
unemployment compensation under this chapter may be 
conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action 
or proceeding in another forum, except proceedings under 
this chapter, regardless of whether the prior action was 
between the. same or related parties or involved the same 
facts. ") . . 
36. See, e.g~, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3("It shall be an unlawful 
employment pr-actice,for an 'employer, to discriminate against 
any of its· employees or applicants. for employment, ... 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, as~ist~d,or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proce~ding, or hearing under 
this subchapter. ") ;KRS 344.280 (lilt shall be an unlawful 
practice ... [t]o retaliate or diScriminate in any manner 
against a person because he,has opposed a practice declared 
unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a charge, 
filed a complalrit/ testified, assisted/ or participated in 
any manner in any investigation, proceeding/ or hearing 
under this chapter;.. . .1.1). 
37. See, e.g., London v~ Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811 f 817 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
F - 27 

HARASSMENT: SEXUAL AND OTHERWISE 
© 1994, Linda Scholle Cowan 
Linda Scholle Cowan 




HARASSMENT: SEXUAL AND OTHERWISE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... G-l 
II. GOVERNING STATUTES ..................................................................................................................... G-2 
ill. EEOC GUIDELINES .............................................................................................................................. G-3 
IV. FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ................................................................................................ G-4 
A. Quid Pro Quo IIarassment .................................................................................................................. G-4 
B. Hostile Environment IIarassment ....................................................................................................... G-4 
V. CASE LAW .................................................................. , ........................................................................... G-5 
A. Meritor Savings Bank: v. Vinson ..................................................................... , ................................... G-5 
B. Ifarris Vi Forklift Systems. Inc ............................................................................................................ G-5 
C. Kentucky Cases .................................................................................................................................... G-6 
VI. RACIAL HARASSMENT ....................................................................................................................... G-9 
VII. OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION ............................................................................................. ; ............... G-IO 
A. Tort Claims .......................................................................................................................................... G-IO 
1. Outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress ............................................................... G-IO 
2. Invasion of privacy ........................................................... '" ........................................................ G-II 
3. Assault; assault & battery ............................................................................................................. G-II 
4. Otheitorts .................................................................................................................................... G-12 
5. Statutory civil rights claims ......................................................................................................... G-12 
VIII. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES ......................... , ......................... G-12 
A. Hostile Environment Cases .................................................................................................................. G-12 
I. Co-worker discrimination cases .................................................................................................. G-12 
2. Supervisor harassment cases ......................................................................................................... G-13 
B. Strict Liability and the "Quid Pro Quo" Theory ................................................................................. G-13 
IX. LITIGATION AVOIDANCE: PREVENTION OF CLAIMS ............................................................. G-14 
X. CONCLUSION ...................................................... : .................................................................................. G-16 
SECTIONG 

HARASSMENT: A PRACTITIONER'S PRIMER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas in 
1991, the issue of sexual harassment has continued to grab the attention of headline writers and 
the general public. The U.S. Navy, in the celebrated "Tailhook" inquiry, has undergone 
scrutiny of its treatment of female officers and the responsibility of senior officers for the 
apparent "beer party" atmosphere of the Tailhook Convention. President Clinton faces 
embarrassing litigation by a former Arkansas state employee who alleges then-Governor Clinton 
sexually harassed her. These are not isolated incidents. 
While racial harassment has not received the same degree of public attention, it is equally 
unlawful, and courts have not failed to sanction employers who permit acts of racial harassment. 
Damages assessed against offending employers can be huge. Recently, the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky agreed to pay six women over $500,000 in damages for the sexual 
harassment of them by a male supervisor in the Cabinet of Human Resources. This settlement 
is not unique. Obviously, a small company might experience severe financial ramifications if 
found liable for even a fraction of such damages. 
Further, general commercial liability policies seldom cover the expense of litigation of 
these cases, or the damages assessed. So-called "boutique" policies for employment-related 
claims are available, but only at great expense. 




C. That causes injury or harm 
D. For which the employer bears responsibility 
These elements will be discussed throughout this paper. 
II. GOVERNING STATUTES 
Harassment is prohibited by state and federal statutes, as well as by local ordinances in 
Lexington, Louisville and Jefferson County. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 
u.S.C. §2000e-2(a) provides that it is unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees in each of twenty (20) or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.c. §2000e(b). 
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.040 tracks the language of Title VII. The Act 
applies to employers of eight or more employees within Kentucky in each of the twenty (20) or 
I 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. KRS 344.030(1). 
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The Ordinances of Louisville and Jefferson County apply to employers of two or more 
employees in each of four or more calendar weeks in this or the preceding calendar year. An 
administrative complaint may be filed with the Louisville and Jefferson County Human Relations 
Commission within 90 days of the offending act. Louisville Ordinances §98.15-21. See also, 
Jefferson County Resolution No. 15, Series 1978. 
Lexington/Fayette County also has a local commission to review and rule on alleged 
violations of its anti-discrimination ordinance. 
m. EEOC GUIDELINES 
Under current EEOC guidelines (29 CFR§1604.11), "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
sexual harassment" violative of Title VII in certain delineated situations. 
The EEOC has issued new guidelines covering harassment. The comment period for 
these guidelines ended on November 30, 1993. No date has yet been scheduled for final action. 
Generally, the proposed guidelines (Fed. Reg. Vol. 58, No. 189, p. 1266; proposed 29 
CFR §1609) are more expansive than the current ones. (29 CFR §1604.11). While 29 CFR 
§1604.11 addresses sexual harassment,l the text of the proposed regulation applies to 
"[h]arassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability 
... " and cites the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA, 29 U.S.c. §621, et seq.); 
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA; 42 U.S.c. §12101, et seq.); and the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701, et seq.) in addition to Title VII. 
lA footnote stated, "The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or natural origin." 
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In a broad stroke, the proposed regulation defines harassment as "verbal or physical 
conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion towards an individual because of his/her 
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or disability," and which has an effect on the 
individual's employment. Harassing conduct is delineated. The Commission adopts a 
"reasonable person" of the alleged victim's situation or class standard. 
IV. FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Case law and the EEOC regulations recognize two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro 
quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. 
A. Ouid pro guo harassment exists where "submission to the unwelcome sexual 
advances of supervisory personnel was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits 
or a tangible job detriment resulting from the employee's failure to submit to the sexual demands 
of supervisory employees." Highlander v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th 
Cir. 1986). It must affect the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Henson v. City 
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982). 
B. Hostile environment harassment arises where verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature permeates the work environment and unreasonably interferes with the employee's 
ability to work or creates a hostile and intimidating environment which interferes with her work. 
See §V infra. 
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v. CASE LAW 
A. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 91 L.E.2d 49, 106 S.Ct. 2399 
91986), the Supreme Court recognized that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title 
VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination. The Vinson Court recognized the two forms 
,-' 
of actionable sexual harassment, hostile environment (so called environmental harassment) and 
quid pro quo harassment. 
The Vinson court firmly rejected the defense of voluntariness to allegations of 
harassment, "in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will." 
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the [alleged victim] by her conduct indicated that the 
alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome .... " 477 U.S. at 68. Relevant to this 
determination, according to Vinson, are such factors as the nature of the sexual advances; the 
context in which they arose; and the complainant's sexually provocative speech, conduct and 
dress at work. 
Further, the Court held that economic lflJUry need not be present for the 
harassment to be actionable. "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive 
working environment. '" 477 U.S. at 67, citing, Henson v. City of Dundee, supra. 
B. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 
In its second consideration of sexual harassment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its holding in Vinson that hostile environment harassment violates Title VII. The Court refined 
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its vision of actionable harassment, choosing "a middle path between making actionable any 
conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a psychological injury." 510 
u.s. __ , 126 L.Ed.2d 295, 302, 114 S.Ct. __ (1993). Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's 
peremptory affirmance of the District Court's requirement of psychological injury, the Court 




The Court then established a two-pronged test for proof of hostile environment 
(1) The conduct must be pervasive or severe enough to create 
a work environment which a reasonable person would find hostile 
or abusive (an "objectively hostile or abusive" environment), AND 
(2) The complainant must "subjectively perceive the 
environment to be abusive. " 
126 L.Ed.2d at 302. 
Rejecting a "mathematically precise" test to determine the severity of the 
harassment, the Court directed fact finders to look at the totality of the circumstances. It aided 
in this analysis by listing guides to consider, including: the frequency of the conduct, its 
severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely an offensive utterance, 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. 126 L.Ed.2d at 
302-303. Psychological injury is one factor that may be considered. 
C. The Kentucky Cases 
In determining claims of discrimination pursuant to KRS 344.010, et seq., our 
state courts look to federal precedent. Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Justice, 586 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). 
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In Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1992), 
the Court (Leibson, 1.) considered multiple challenges to a Fayette County jury's verdict 
awarding $100,000 to a female victim of hostile environment sexual harassment. First, it 
analyzed whether the Kentucky Worker's Compensation Act (KRS 342.690) preempts the 
Kentucky Civil Rights Act and whether it is an exclusive remedy where the complainant alleges 
damages arising not only from emotional distress and humiliation, but also from a disabling 
panic disorder related to work place harassment. Justice Leibson declined to assume a causal 
connection between the claim for emotional distress and that for the panic disorder, and 
interpreted the jury's verdict as one for generally characterized "emotional distress" rather than 
the specific mental disability. He found support for this proposition from the fact that the 
instructions included the panic disorder in the "overall claim" for the emotional injury, and did 
not provide a separate instruction on this disorder. 
Justice Leibson then dispensed with any lingering questions regarding whether 
future litigants might revisit this issue by applying rules of statutory construction and found that 
KRS 344.010, et seq. is a specific statute, thereby controlling "as contrasted with the general 
law on the subject in the Worker's Compensation Law." 840 S.W.2d at 819. While the "two 
statutes might provide alternative sources of statutory relief, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act 
provides an independent cause of action for damages arising out of discrimination in the 
workplace." Id. 
Justice Leibson next considered the evidence necessary to prove sexual 
harassment, adopting the Vinson standard of "sufficiently severe and pervasive" conduct. The 
opinion deferred to the fact finder to determine the sufficiency of the severity and pervasiveness 
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for purposes of proof, and declined to review the trial court's finding de novo. It noted, 
however, that there is ample evidence of severe and pervasive harassment in the record to 
support the jury's verdict. 
Finally, for purposes of this chapter,2 the Court gave its imprimatur to the use 
of "but for" language in instructions on the cause of alleged retaliatory or sex-based discharge 
. in miXed motive cases. Citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 
104 L.Ed.2d 268, (1989) and Board of Trustees of U of Ky. v. Hayes, 782 S.W.2d 609 (Ky. 
S.Ct. 1989), it found such language does not mean "solely because of," but, rather, that the 
illegal sexual discrimination is a "contributing and essential factor" to be considered by the jury. 
In a recent case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the effect of Harris 
v. Forklift Systems. Inc., supra, on jury instructions in a quid pro quo and hostile environment 
sexual harassment case brought pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Hall v. Transit 
Authority of Lexington-Fayette County, 41 K.L.S. 3, 1994 WL 83226 (Ky.App., 3/18/94). The 
court approved the following jury instructions as conforming to the Harris standards: 
Act. 
Do you believe from the evidence: 
(a) that Patrick Hamric subjected Barbara Hall, because of her 
female sex, to un welcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; 
(b) that such conduct was so severe and pervasive that it had the 
purpose or effect or unreasonably interfering with a reasonable 
female employee's work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment for a reasonable female 
employee; 
2The opinion also analyzes issues of statutory attorney's fees and the right to a jury trial under the Kentucky Civil Rights 
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AND 
(c) that such conduct caused injury to the psychological well-being 
of Barbara Hall? 
There was no discussion of 3(c) of the instructions requiring a showing of 
psychological harm, in apparent contravention of Harris. 
The Court also approved admission of evidence relating to plaintiff's well-known 
extra-marital affair with a co-worker as relevant and not outweighed by possible prejudicial 
effect. 
VI. RACIAL HARASSMENT 
While it has not received as much publicity as sexual harassment, racial harassment is 
equally violative of Title VII and KRS 344.010, et seq., and can prove just as costly to 
employers found to have condoned it. 
The Sixth Circuit first recognized a claim of racially motivated hostile environment 
harassment in Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. 
den. 475 U.S. 1015 (1986), a case presaging Vinson, but tried under 42 U.S.c. §1981 and not 
under Title VII. Applying a two-part standard requiring a finding of repeated racial slurs and 
management's tolerance of the harassment, the Court affirmed an award of both punitive and 
compensatory damages. 
In Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 109 S.Ct. 
3166 (1988) the Court distinguished between sexual and racial harassment cases, concluding that 
proof of racial harassment claims may be determined by the standards set forth in Erebia, and 
not by the more demanding sexual harassment standards in Vinson or Rabidue v. Osceola 
G-9 
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 481 U.S. 1041, 95 L.Ed.2d 823, 107 
S.Ct. 1983 (1987). However, in Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 
475 (6th Cir. 1989), the court revised this position, and held that the same standards apply in 
both racial and sexual harassment cases. 
In a recent racial harassment case, a District Court analyzed the claims according to the 
same standards as sexual harassment claims. In Gardinella v. General Electric Co., 833 F.Supp. 
617 (W.D.Ky. 1993), the court applied standards enunciated in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
supra. in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
VII. OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Tort Claims. 
Allegations of tortious conduct can be effective when pled alternatively to statutory 
claims. In fact, they are a necessary vehicle when an employer has fewer than eight (8) 
employees precluding reliance on KRS 344.010 et~, or fifteen (15) employees precluding use 
of Title VII. A summary of possible tort claims include the following: 
1. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress: 
Kentucky recognized this tort in Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d. 247 
(Ky.Sup.Ct. 1984) adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §46(1): 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the 
other results from it, for such bodily harm. 
The Court held that "the essence" of the tort is the right to be free of emotional distress due to 
acts of another. The conduct complained of must be considered truly outrageous "as· to go 
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beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community." Humana of Ky., Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1,3 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
The Court of Appeals, however, in Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 
853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. App. 1993), has attempted to limit this claim to situations where it may 
be used as a "gap filler" where no other traditional common law tort actions apply. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §47 (1965). See, however, Capital Holding v. Bailey, _ S.W.3d __ , 41 
K.L.S. 3 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1994) holding that no physical contact or injury is necessary to establish 
the tort. See also, Bednarek v. Local Union 227, 780 S. W.2d 630 (Ky. App. 1989) (the tort of 
outrage did not apply on the facts in a retaliatory discharge case); Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 
ESupp. 1361 (W.n Ky. 1988) (use of polygraph on employees did not constitute outrageous 
conduct). 
2. Invasion of Privacy involves the intentional or unreasonable intrusion into 
the private solitude or affairs of another. There are no reported Kentucky cases involving 
invasion of privacy in harassment cases. However, other jurisdictions have recognized this 
cause of action. See, for example, Busby v. Truswal Systems Corp., 551 So.2d 322 (Ala. 1989) 
(finding an invasion of privacy for hostile environment harassment where defendant intruded into 
plaintiffs' lives in an offensive manner); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services. Inc., 711 
E2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that questions about plaintiff's sexual proclivities constitutes 
intentional intrusion in to the solitude of another, and that publication is not a necessary 
element). 
3. Assault; assault and battery: Kentucky has long recognized a civil cause 
of action for assault and battery involving sexually wrongful touching. Ragsdale v. Ezell, 49 
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S.W. 775 (Ky. 1899). Hatchett v. Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266, 172 S.W. 533 (Ky. 1915). See 
also, Koch v. Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529 (Ky.App., 1960); Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250 
(Ky. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
4. Other tort actions include (a) false imprisonment and (b) loss of consortium 
for the spouse of the harassed employee. 
5. Statutory civil rights claims in addition to Title VII inClude allegations 
pursuant to 42 US.c. §§ 1981 and 1983. While a discussion of these statutes is beyond the 
purview of this paper, see, for example, Gardinella v. General Electric Co., supra. 
VIII. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES 
The courts have constructed a multi-tiered structure for analysis of employer liability for 
the alleged sexually harassing acts of employees. An excellent overview of the Sixth Circuit's 
view of the law can be found in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992), 
cert. den., 113 S.Ct. 831 (1992). 
In Kauffman, Judge Boggs reiterated the Vinson court's view that common law agency 
principles should be applied to determine liability, and that strict liability does not lie in all 
cases.3 The court then reviews precedent and outlines employer liability as follows: 
A. Hostile Environment Cases 
1. Co-Worker discrimination cases: Citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 
805 F.2d611, 621 (6thCir. 1986), cert. den., 481 US. 1041,107 S.Ct. 1983,95 L.Ed.2d 823 
3In Vinson, the Court also held that "absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from 
liability. 477 U.S. at 72. 
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(1987), the court will find liability where "the employer ... knew or should have known of the 
charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action." 
See also Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (no liability where 
employer takes reasonable steps to correct harassment by non~supervisory personnel). 
2. Supervisor Harassment Cases will be decided by application of traditional 
agency principles. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987). The court set up 
a two-pronged test for supervisory environmental claims: (1) whether the harassing actions were 
foreseeable or fell within the scope of the agent's employment, and, if they were, (2) whether 
the employer "adequately and effectively" acted to "negate liability." Kauffman at 184. (See 
§IX, infra.) Important for the determination of whether the acts took place within the scope of 
employment are: when the acts took place; where; whether the employer had prior notice of 
similar behavior; and whether the supervisor had "significant input over ... conditions of 
employment." Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 185. 
B. Under the QUID PRO QUO theory, strict liability applies to the acts of 
supervisory employees with "plenary authority" over hiring, advancement, dismissal, discipline 
or who otherwise exercise significant control over the conditions of complainant's employment. 
Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 186, citing, Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 
(6th Cir. 1986). Economic loss is not required. 
The Sixth Circuit has recently held that an employer's prompt remedial action in response 
to a complaint of hostile environment harassment relieves the employer of liability for the 
harassment. Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 19 F.3d 19,1994 WL 56930 (6th Cir., 2/4/94); reh. 
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den., 4124/94, Case No. 93-5031. See also, Gardinella v. General Electric Co., 833 ESupp. 
617, 620 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
IX. LITIGATION AVOIDANCE: PREVENTION OF CLAIMS 
Employers can take measures to prevent claims from ever being filed. The enactment 
of str~ng ~assmenf policies, their iniplementation and consistent application, and training of 
supervisory employees may well be the best defense an employer has to the initial filing of 
claims and their eventual successful resolution. Since Meritor Savings Bank: v. Vinson, courts 
have recognized the mitigating effect of implemented harassment policies. See, for example, 
Kauffman v. Allied Signal. Inc., supra. 
A well-written harassment policy should include: 
1. A policy statement that harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, 
gender, national origin, age or disability is against the law and the policy 
of the employer; 
2. A definition of harassment (see §IV, supra); 
3. Examples of harassing conduct; 
4. The possible sanctions for engaging in harassment, including termination; 
and 
5. A complaint procedure which identifies more than one individual who may 
take complaints in the employer's organization, and which assures prompt 
investigation and the confidentiality of the complainant. 
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The policy should be distributed in the same manner as other employment policies; and 
should be included in an Employee Handbook if the employer has one. 
The person(s) identified to receive the complaint can include the alleged victim's 
supervisor, but must also include other individuals in case the supervisor is the harasser or 
harbors bias against the complainant. Yates v. Avco Com., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(supervisor with responsibility for reporting harassment was the harasser; employer liability thus 
established). The investigation of the complaint should be initiated immediately upon notice of 
the complaint.4 It should be thorough and fair, and should include interviews with both the 
complainant/victim and the alleged harasser, as well as any witnesses either identifies. Paucity 
of witnesses should not doom a co~plaint since quid pro quo sexual harassment frequently is 
committed without witnesses. 
If it is determined that harassment occurred, sanctions are advisable, depending on the 
severity and duration of the harassment, its likely repetition, and the effect on the victim~ 
Minimal sanctions might include a period of suspension without pay, probation, or a transfer 
within the organization. More serious sanctions include demotion, geographical transfer, and 
termination. While separation of the harasser and victim within the organization might suffice 
(moving the harasser and not the victim to avoid allegations of retaliation), investigating 
personnel should attempt to obtain the victim's written acknowledgement of the sufficiency of 
this action. Mediation is also an option if the parties agree. 
4navis v. Monsan1D Chemical Co., 850 E2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (no employer liability where employer takes reasonable 
steps to correct or prevent harassment by nonsupervisory employees). 
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Investigations should be fully documented to protect the employer from subsequent formal 
complaints of harassment and from actions for defamation. Should the accused employee later 
allege defamation, an employer can claim a qualified privilege under certain circumstances. 
Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 ESupp. 1361 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Wyant v. SCM Corp., 692 
S.W.2d 814 (Ky. App. 1985). However, to assert such a claim, the employer must confine 
investigatory information to those with a need to know of the investigation. 
Under no circumstances should the complainant be discharged for filing his or her 
complaint. Title VII prohibits retaliation against complainants, even if it is later determined that 
the complaint is without merit. 
In addition, where feasible, the employer should provide training to all employees on 
intercultural understanding, race and gender awareness, and the availability of the employer's 
procedure for the resolution of complaints. 
x. CONCLUSION 
With increasing racial and sexual integration at all levels of employment, harassment. 
cases will, no doubt, provide fertile territory for litigation in the years ahead. Litigation and the 
harmful, costly effects of harassment can be minimized, however, by careful planning and 
increased emphasis on professionalism and mutual respect. 
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A. Federal Law: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the 
major federal wage hour law. In general it regulates 
four areas: minimum wages, equal pay, overtime and child 
labor standards. Employees covered by the FLSA include: 
1. Employees who are engaged in interstate commerce, 
producing goods for interstate commerce, or 
handling, selling or working on goods or materials 
that have been moved in or produced in interstate 
commerce. For most employees an annual dollar 
volume test of not less than $500,000 applies. 
2.· certain employees covered are covered regardless of 
dollar volume including hospitals; companies taking 
care of the sick, aged, mentally ill or disabled; 
schools and federal, state and local agencies. 
3. Employees who do not meet the $500,000 annual 
dollar test may be covered in any workweek in which 
the employee is engaged in interstate commerce, the 
production of goods for interstate commerce, or an 
actively closely related and directly essential to 
the production of such goods. 
4. Domestic service workers are covered if they work 
more than 8 hours in a week for one or more 
employers or receive at least $50 in wages in a 
calendar quarter. 
5. certain classifications of employees are exempt 
from the FLSA overtime and maximum wage provisions. 
They include: 
a. Executive, administrative and professional 
employees; 
b. Employees of seasonal amusement or 
recreational companies; 
c. Employees of small newspapers and switchboard 
operators of small telephone companies; 
d. Seamen on foreign vessels; 
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e. Employees engaged in fishing operations; 
f. Farm workers on small farms (i.e. less than 
500 man-days in any calendar quarter); and, 
g. Casual babysitters and persons employed as 
companions of the elderly or disabled. 
There are certain other classifications of employees who 
are exempt or partially exempt only from the FLSA 
overtime requirements. 
B. state Law - KRS Chapter 337 contains the state law 
provisions on wage and hour requirements. 
Under KRS 337. 010 (2), an "employee is any person employed 
by (or permitted to work for) an employer, with the 
following exceptions: 
a. Individuals employed in agriculture; 
b. Individuals employed in bona fide executive, 
administrative, supervisory or professional 
capacity, including outside salesmen and outside 
collectors; 
c. Employees of the United states; 
d. Individuals employed in domestic service in a 
private home; 
e. certified learners, apprentices, handicapped 
workers and sheltered workshop employees; 









g. Baby-sitters and newspaper delivery persons; and, 
h. Employees of non-profit camps, religious or non-
profit educational conference centers in operation 
for less than seven months in any calendar year. 
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II. Employer obligations 
A. Federal Law 
1. Minimum Wages 
The FLSA requires employers of covered employees 
who are not otherwise exempt to pay these employees 
a minimum wage of not less· than $4.25 an hour. 
Employers may pay employees on a piece-rate basis, 
as long as they receive at least the equivalent of 
the required minimum hourly wage rate. Employers 
of tipped employees, i.e. employees who regularly 
receive more than $30.00 a month in tips, may 
consider the tips as part of wages. However, the 
tip credit may not exceed fifty (50) percent of the 
required minimum wage. 
2. overtime 
The FLSA requires employer to pay covered employees 
1 1/2 times their regular rate for each hour or 
fraction of an hour of work in excess of forty (40) 
during any given workweek. The FLSA does not 
require employers to pay overtime for hours worked 
in excess of a daily maximum, nor does it specify 
overtime for work performed on Saturdays, Sundays 
or holidays. No employee may waive his right to 
overtime. 
a. Workweek - A workweek for FLSA purposes is a 
fixed and recurring period of 168 hours 
comprising seven consecutive 24 hour periods •. 
It does not need to coincide with a calendar 
week. The schedule of payment (e.g. daily, 
weekly, biweekly) does not affect the workweek 
basis of overtime computation. 
b. Regular Rate - Employers must average certain 
payments into an employees' hourly rate for 
purposes of determining an employee's "regular 
rate" for overtime purposes. The majority of 
employer's overtime problems concern the 
proper determination of an employee's regular 
rate. 
1. Pay normally included in "regular rate" 
computation: 
i. Pay for time worked-wages, salary, 
commissions or piece rates; 
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ii. incentive bonuses; 
iii. cost-of-living allowances; 
iv. premiums for "dirty" work; and, 
v. other payments considered 




2. Pay normally excluded from IIregular rate" 
computation: 
i. Premium pay under collective 
bargaining agreement, for work on 
Saturday, Sunday, or holidays; 
ii. pay for time not worked e.g. 
vacation, holidays, sick leave; 
iii. pension or health insurance 
contributions; and, 
iv. outright gifts. 
3. Records, Notices and Inspections 
a. Records - The FLSA requires employers to make, 
keep and maintain records of persons employed 
and of wages, hours and other aspects of 
employment. The following records must be 
maintained for three years: 
i. Payroll and other records containing 
information required by the record-
keeping regulations; 
ii. Sales and purchase records relevant to 
determining whether a company meets 
FLSA's "business volume" test; 
iii. Collect bargaining agreements; 
iv. Plans, trusts, employment contracts, and 
union contracts involving exclusions from 
regular pay rates; 
v. Contracts pertaining to "Belo-type" 
contracts that guarantee fixed weekly pay 
for fluctuating hours; 
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vi. Agreements basing overtime pay on 
piecework, hourly, or basic rates; and, 
vii. Certificates and notices mentioned in the 
recordkeeping regulations, including 
certificates authorizing the employment 
of learners, apprentices, handicapped 
workers, students, homeworkers, and child 
laborers. (29 CFR 516.5). 
The following records must be maintained for 
at least two years: 
i. Basic employment and earnings records 
such as timecards or "production cards"; 
ii. Hourly, daily, weekly or pay period wage 
rate tables, or piece-rate schedules; 
iii. All schedules of the employer that 
establish the hours of days of employment 
of individual employees or of separate 
work forces. These schedules can be in 
any form, such as notices, company 
letters, or office memoranda; and, 
iv. All customer orders or invoices, incoming 
or outgoing shipping or delivery records, 
bills of lading, and non-cash billings to 
customers, which the employer retains or 
makes in the course of its business. 
b. Investigations - section 11 (a) of the FLSA 
gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to 
investigate and gather data regarding the 
wages, hours and other conditions of 
employment. This includes the power to enter 
an employer's facilities, inspect records and 
to interview employees. An employer is 
obligated to produce for inspection any 
records which are relevant to a determination 
of wages paid, hours worked or tasks performed 
by employees. 
c. Notices - The Department of Labor has prepared 
a poster addressing employees' rights under 
the FLSA. It addresses requirements for 
minimum wage, overtime, child labor and 
training wages. The poster also specifies how 
the FLSA may be enforced. Employers are 
required to display the poster where employees 
can readily see it. 
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4. Equal Pay Act 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was technically an 
amendment to the FLSA of 1938. It covers any 
employee who is subject to the FLSA minimum wage 
standards. It provides that an employer may not 
discriminate "between employees on the basis of sex 
by paying wages to employees in such establishment 
for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working 
conditions, except where such payment is made 
pursuant to (i) seniority system; (ii) a merit 
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production, or (iv) a 
differential based on any other factor other than 
sex .... " 
In a nutshell, this law prohibits an employer from 
paying a lower wage to women than to men or vice-
versa for substantially equal work. Whether work 
is substantially equal depends on whether its 
performance requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility. Those are the key concepts in 
determining equality of work. 
The inclusion of unequal rates of pay in a 
collective bargaining agreement which results in 
one sex being paid less for substantially equal 
work is a violation of the Equal Pay Act. A union 
cannot cause an employer to discriminate. 
5. Davis-Bacon Act 
a. Coverage: Covers mechanics and laborers 
engaged in construction of public buildings or 
public works whose specifications require an 
expenditure of more than $2,000.00. The Act 
also applies to certain other federal laws, 
such as the Federal Aid Highway Act and the 
Area Redevelopment Act. 
b. Requirements: Payment of minimum wages as 
established by the Secretary of Labor. 
c. Enforcement: The Comptroller General is 
authorized to wi thhold payments to the 
contractor if necessary to make good any 
underpayments to employees. In addition, if 
the amount withheld is insufficient to cover 
the back pay owing, the employee may bring an 
individual action against the contractor. 
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d. Penalties: The names of contractors who do 
not observe the requirements of the Act are 
placed on a list of contractors who are barred 
from receiving federal contracts, which is 
distributed to all departments of the 
government for a period of three years. 
6. Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act 
a. Coverage: Employers who have contracted with 
a government agency to manufacture or supply 
articles in any amount exceeding $10,000. 
Only those employees engaged in producing or 
furnishing the contract articles are covered. 
b. Requirements; The Walsh-Healy Act requires: 
i. The payment of minimum wages as set by 
the Secretary of Labor; 
ii. The payment of 1 1/2 times the basic rate 
for hours worked in excess of 40 a weeki 
iii. The maintenance of sanitary and non-
hazardous working conditions and complete 
payroll records; and, 
iv. That any minors who are employed be over 
16 years old. 
7 . Child Labor 
The child labor provisions of the FLSA are designed 
to protect the educational opportunities of youths 
and prohibit their employment in jobs and under 
conditions detrimental to their health and well-
being. 
The FLSA restricts the hours of work and 
occupations for youths under age 16. These 
provisions set forth 17 hazardous occupations 
orders for jobs declared by the Secretary of Labor 
to be too dangerous for minors under age 18 to 
perform. The permissible jobs and hours of work, 
by age, in nonfarm work are as follows: 
i. youths 18 years or older may perform any job 
for unlimited hoursi 
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ii. Youths age 16 and 17 may perform any job not 
declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor, 
for unlimited hours; 
iii. Youths age 14 and 15 may work outside school 
hours in various nonmanufacturing, nonmining, 
nonhazardous jobs under the following 
conditions: no more than 3 hours on a school 
day, 18 hours in a school week, 8 hours on a 
nonschool day, or 40 hours in a nonschool 
week. In addition, they not begin work before 
7 a.m. nor work after 7 p. m. ,except from June 
1 through Labor Day, when evening hours are 
extended until 9 p.m. Youths age 14 and 15 
who are enrolled in an approved Work 
Experience and Career Exploration Program may 
be employed for up to 23 hours in school weeks 
and 3 hours on school days (including during 
school hours) . 
Notwithstanding the above, youths may at any age 
deliver newspapers, perform in radio, TV movies, 
etc.; work for their parents in wholly owned 
nonfarm businesses (except those deemed hazardous 
by the Secretary of Labor) or gather evergreens and 
make evergreen wreaths. 
Employers must keep records of the date of birth of 
any employees under age 19, as well as daily and 
weekly hours worked, daily and weekly start and 
quitting times and the employee's occupation. 
B. state Law Obligations 
1. Overtime 
An employee working more than forty (40) hours in 
a workweek must be paid for hours in excess of 
forty at a rate of at least of one and one-half 
times the hourly wage rate at which he is employed. 
KRS 337.285. Employers are not required to pay 
time and one-half for hours worked over eight in 
one day. (There is an exception for the 
construction of public works requiring payment of 
"prevailing wages" under KRS 337.540. See below). 
This provision does not apply, however, to 
employees of retail stores engaged in work 
connected with selling, purchasing and distributing 
merchandise, or to employees of restaurant, hotel 
or motel operations or to employees exempted from 
the overtime provision of the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. sections 213(b) (1), 
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213(b) (10) and 213(b) (17). Also exempted are 
employees whose function is to provide twenty-four 
hour residential care on the employer's premises in 
a parental role. 
2 . Minimum Wage 
The minimum hourly wage in Kentucky, effective July 
15, 1991, is four dollars and twenty-five cents 
($4.25) unless provided otherwise by statute. KRS 
337.275. For example, a different rule applies to 
employees engaged in an occupation in which they 
customarily receive more than twenty dollars per 
month in tips. Also, an employee under twenty 
years of age may be paid minimum wage of three 
dollars and sixty-one cents ($3.61) an hour until 
he has been employed a cumulative total of ninety 
days at that wage. KRS 337.275(3) (a) and (c). 
3. Payment of Wages 
4. 
Employers must, no less often than semi-monthly, 
pay employees all wages earned to a day not more 
than eighteen days prior to the date of payment. 
KRS 337.020. An employee who quits or is 
discharged must be paid all wages earned no later 
than the next normal pay period or fourteen days 
after leaving, whichever last occurs. KRS 337.055. 
It is unlawful for an employer to withhold any part 
of an employee's wages unless authorized to do so 
by local, state or federal law or when a deduction 
is expressly authorized in writing by the employee 
to cover insurance premiums, hospital and medical 
dues, or other deductions not amounting to a rebate 
or deduction from the standard wage. This includes 
deductions for union dues authorized by collective 
bargaining agreements negotiated between employers' 
and employees' representatives. KRS 337.060(1). 
However, employers may not deduct from the wages of 
employees any fines, cash shortages in a common 
money till, breakage, or losses due to defective 
workmanship, lost or stolen property, or damage to 
property if such losses are not attributable to an 
employee's willful or intentional disregard of 
employer's interest. KRS 337.060(2). 
Records, Notices and Inspections 
Every employer must keep a record of the amount 
paid each pay period to each employee, the hours 
worked each day and each week by each employee, and 
other information required by the Commissioner. 
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KRS 337.320(1). Such records must be kept on file 
for at least one-year after entry, and shall be 
open to inspection of the commissioner or his 
representative "at any reasonable time." KRS 
337.320(2). In Cabe v. Kitchen, 415 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 
1967), it was held that the one year period is not 
a limitation upon the right of the Department of 
Labor to inspect the employment records of an 
employer. 
Employers subject to Kentucky's wage and hour 
statutes must post summaries of wage and hour laws 
and regulations issued by the Commissioner in a 
conspicuous and accessible place on the premises. 
such notices are furnished to employers by the 
state on request without charge. KRS 337.325. 
Every employer must permit the Commissioner or his 
representative to question any of his employees at 
the place of employment and during work hours 
regarding wages paid to and hours worked by such 
employee or other employees. KRS 337.340. 
5. Lunch and Rest Periods 
Employers must grant employees a "reasonable period 
for lunch" as close to the middle of the employee's 
scheduled work shift as possible I but in no event 
sooner than three hours nor later than five hours 
after the work shift commences. KRS 337 . 355. 
However, this provision shall not negate any 
provision of a collective bargaining agreement or 
other mutual agreement between an employer and 
employee. 
Employees must be provided a rest period of at 
least ten minutes during each four hours worked in 
addition to the regularly scheduled lunch period. 
No reduction in compensation may be made for such 
rest periods for either hourly or salaried 
employees. KRS 337.365. 
6. Wage Discrimination Based on Sex 
a. Discrimination Prohibited 
Kentucky has its own Equal Pay Act, KRS 
337.420 through 337.433. It is 
distinguishable from federal equal pay law 
which prohibits an employer from 
discriminating between employees on the basis 
of sex for "equal work on jobs the performance 
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of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions", with certain 
exceptions. 29 U.S.C. section 206(d) (1) . 
Kentucky law, on the other hand, prohibits 
discrimination between employees on the basis 
of sex "for comparable work on jobs which have 
comparable requirements relating to skill, 
effort and responsibility." KRS 337.423(1). 
While Kentucky's·· Equal Pay Act is certainly 
not the equivalent of the "comparable worth" 
theory (under which the value of dissimilar 
jobs are analyzed and compared), the statutory 
language is clearly more liberal than federal 
law in that it prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex for work which is merely 
"comparable,1I rather than "equal. " The 
expansive reach of this statute has not been 
tested in the courts. 
b. Coverage 
The statutory coverage of KRS 337.423 does not 
apply to "any employer who is subject to the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended, when that act imposes comparable or 
greater requirements than contained in KRS 
337.420 to 37.433." However, an employer must 
file with the Commissioner of the Department 
of Workplace Standards a statement that it is 
covered by the FLSA, KRS 337.423 (1) . The 
Kentucky Department of Labor's position is 
that an employer covered by the FLSA is exempt 
from coverage under KRS 337.423. 
7. prevailing Wages 
Federal and state prevailing wage laws refer to the 
particular wage that "prevails" in a local 
community for a particular classification of 
workers, requiring federal and state labor 
secretaries to conduct wage studies to determine 
the prevailing wage rate for particular projects 
governed by statute. The prevailing wage in a 
community with union workers will typically 
approximate the wages paid to unionized workers in 
various craft and labor classifications. 
Prevailing wage laws generally have as their 
purpose the protection of employees of government 
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contractors. Kentucky's prevailing wage statutes 
are set forth at KRS 337.505 to 337.550. 
a. Applicability 
Before advertising for bids or entering into 
any contract for construction of public works, 
every public authority must notify the 
Department of Workplace Standards in writing 
of the specific public work to be constructed, 
and must ascertain from the Department of 
Labor the prevailing rates of wages for each 
classification of laborers, workmen and 
mechanics for the class of work called for in 
the construction of the public works in the 
locality where the work is to be performed. 
This schedule of the prevailing rate of wages 
must be attached to and made part of the 
specifications for the work, and must be 
printed on the bidding blanks and made a part 
of every contract for the construction of 
public works. KRS 337.510(1). 
The public authority advertising and awarding 
the contract must include in the proposal and 
contract a stipulation to the effect that not 
less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages 
shall be paid to all workers performing work 
under the contract. It must also require in 
all contractors' bonds that the contract 
include provisions which will guarantee the 
performance of the prevailing hourly wage 
clause in the contract. KRS 337.510(2). 
b. overtime 
Workers employed more than eight hours in one 
calendar day or more than forty hours in one 
week must be paid not less than one and one-
half times the basic hourly rate of pay. KRS 
337.540. 
c. Records and Postings 
contractors and subcontractors must keep full 
and accurate payroll records covering all wage 
payments, including the hours worked by and 
amount paid to each employee each day_ 
Records cannot be destroyed for one year 
following the completion of the public work, 
and must be open to inspection by the 
Commissioner at any reasonable time _ KRS 
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337 . 530 (2) .' Contractors and subcontractors 
must post and keep posted in conspicuous 
places at the work site a copy of the 
prevailing rates and working hours for the 
project. KRS 337.530(3). 
8 . Child Labor 
a. What is "Gainful Occupation"? 
Kentucky's child labor. statutes concern 
"gainful occupation"by children. . This term 
does not include employment in farm work or in 
domestic service in a private home; occasional 
employment by a householder in connection with 
the household such as grass cutting; the 
delivery of newspapers on regularly scheduled 
routes; employment as a performer in films, 
theater, radio or television; or employment of 
minors by their own parents. KRS 339.210. 
b. Minimum Ages 
No minor under fourteen years of age shall be 
employed in gainful occupation at any time, 
except in connection with an employment 
program sponsored by the school or school 
district the child attends. The program must 
be approved by the Department of Education. 
KRS 339.220. However, minors age eleven and 
over may be employed as caddies at golf 
courses, with certain restrictions. KRS 
339.225. 
Minors under age sixteen may not be employed 
during regular school hours, unless the school 
authorities have made arrangements for him to 
attend school other than the regular hours, or 
he has graduated from high school. KRS 
339.230(1) . 
c. Hazardous and Special Occupations 
A minor under eighteen years of age may not 
be employed in any occupation, or during the 
hours of the day, or more than the number of 
hours per day or days per week, which the 
Commissioner of Workplace Standards determines 
to be hazardous or injurious to the life, 
health, safety, or welfare of the minori in 
connection with an establishment where 
alcoholic beverages are distilled, rectified, 
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compounded, brewed, manufactured, bottled, 
sold for consumption, or dispensed, unless 
permitted by regulations of the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Board (except in places where 
the sale of alcoholic beverages by package is 
merely incidental to the main business 
actually conducted). KRS 339.230(2). 
There are many restrictions on. the gainful 
occupation of minors between ages fourteen and 
sixteen. These restrictions are set forth in 
detail at 803 KAR 1:100, section 2(1) and (4). 
d. Hours of Work 
There are no restrictions on hours or time of 
work scheduled for minors who have graduated 
from high school or approved vocational school 
equivalent to high school; minors who are no 
longer attending school and have not attended 
school for the previous sixty days; minors not 
required to attend school for the period 
described as "school not in session." 
Enrollees in work training programs 
established by a local board of education or 
the federal government and approved by the 
federal government shall be exempt for 803 KAR 
1:100, section 3(2), except under no 
circumstances shall a minor be employed more 
than eight hours per day or more than forty-
eight hours per week. 803 KAR 1:100, Section 
3 (3) • 
specific hour limitations on the employment of 
minors can be found in 803 KAR 1:100, section 
2(2) and section 3. 
e. Lunch Periods 
No minor under eighteen years of age may be 
permi tted to work for more than five hours 
continuously without an interval of at least 
thirty minutes for a lunch period, and no 
period of less than thirty minutes shall be 
deemed to interrupt a continuous period of 
work. KRS 339.270. 
f. certificates and Records 
Upon request, the local board of education 
must issue to any minor under the age of 
eighteen desiring to enter employment a 
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certificate of age upon presentation of proof 
of age. Every employer shall be required to 
obtain from any employee proof of age that the 
employee is at least eighteen years of age. 
KRS 339.360. 
Every person employing minors under eighteen 
years of age must keep a separate register 
containing the names, ages and addresses of 
such employees, and the time of commencing and 
stopping of work for each day, and the time of 
the beginning and ending ~ of the daily meal 
period. Also required of such persons are 
continuous postings in the establishment 
wherein any such minor is employed a printed 
abstract of KRS 339.210 to 339.450, with a 
list of the occupations prohibited- to such 
minors and a notice stating the working hours 
per day for each day in the week required of 
them. Such records must be open at all times 
to the inspection of school directors, of 
pupil personnel and probation officers i and 
representatives of the Department of Labor and 
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TITLE VII OF 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. [hereinafter Title 
VII.]. 
A. Facial Discrimination and the BFOQ Defense 
1. Background 
A per se violation of Title VII occurs when an employer has a 
policy that on its face expressly applies only to one group 
(women) and not to another group of employees (men). See, e.g. 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542 
(1971)(employer refused employment applications from women, 
but not men, with pre-school age children). A facially 
discriminatory employment policy based on sex, religion, or 
national origin can only be accommodated under Title VII, if at all, 
if the employer is able to prove that such a requirement is a bona 
fide occupational qualification [hereinafter .BFOQ]. The BFOQ is 
limited to hiring and assignments, and cannot be invoked as a 
defense to any type of facial race discrimination. . 
2. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 
(1991). 
a. The United States Supreme Court struck down as violative 
of §703(a) of Title VII an employer's policy of barring all women, 
except those medically documented as infertile, from jobs 
involving either actual or potential lead exposure in excess of the 
relevant OSHA standard. Because only women employees were 
required to prove their inability to reproduce, the Court held that 
the policy was facially discriminatory. Such policy could only have 
been permissible if the employer established that sex was a bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under §703(a)(1}. 
b. The Court narrowly construed the BFOQ defense in 
holding that this exception to the Act's command of. 
nondiscrimination reaches only to "certain instances" where sex 
discrimination is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" 
* The speaker acknowledges the invaluable work of Lee Guice, a third year law student at the University of 
Kentucky College of Law, in the preparation of this outline. 
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of the "particular" business. That is, the exclusion of all fertile 
women, but not fertile men, from a particular job is permissible if, 
and only if, fertility detrimentally effects female employees' 
abilities to perform the particular job at issue. The Court found 
that fertile women can participate in the manufacture of batteries 
as efficiently as anyone else. 
c. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)(exclusion 
of women from position of guard in a maximum security male 
prison upheld because women's employment would create "real 
risks of safety to others if violence. broke out) and Western 
Airlines, ,Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)(exclusion of 
persons over the age of 60 from position of flight engineer u'pheld 
because "age-connected debility" might prevent a flight engineer 
from assisting the pilot thereby causing a safety emergency 
endangering airline customer safety), the Supreme Court 
recognized a BFOQ for safety. However, in Johnson Controls, 
the Court rejected the employer's attempt to bring its policy within 
that exception. Although the employer claimed it was motivated 
by a desire to in sure the "safety" of fetuses from the danger of 
lead exposure, the Court limited the "safety exception" to those 
instances wherein a third-pa'rty or customer's safety is "essential 
to the business." It held that the unconceived fetLis' is neither a 
customer nor a third party whose safety is essential to the 
business of battery manufacturing. 
d. In Johnson Controls, the Court stated that Title VII does 
not prevent an employer from trying to lessen the potential for 
injury to a fetus caused by lead exposure. Title VII does prevent, 
however, an employer from adopting sex-specific fetal protection 
policies in its attempt to address that problem. 
e. In response to the employer's contention that compliance 
with Title VII would expose the employer to potential tort-liability 
for injury to the fetus, the Court said that "if, under general tort 
principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the 
employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer 
has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable 
seems remote at best." 
f. The specter that hiring fertile women will cost employers 
more because of the potential for tort-liability to their, as, yet, 
unconceived fetuses because of lead exposure was rejected by 
the Court as a defense for the employer's discriminatory refusal to 
hire women. "The incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify 
discriminating against them." 
g. Finally, the Court also relied on the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) [hereinafter the 









establishes that discrimination based on a woman's ability to 
become pregnant is facially sex based. 
3. Compare, Fleming v. Ayers & Associates, 948 F.2d 993 
(6thCir.1991). 
The Sixth Circuit held that the discharge of a female employee 
motivated by the employer's desire to avoid the high future 
medical costs for the employee's child (the baby was born 
prematurely and suffered from hydrocephalus), did not violate the 
PDA because it was not discrimination based on the employee's 
gender. The Court reasoned that "[t]he fact that her pregnancy 
ultimately produced her child does not make actions taken with 
respect, to the child actions "because of or on the basis of" her 
pregnancy." Id. at 996. 
Disparate Treatment or Intentional Discrimination 
1. Burden of Proof 
a. The Supreme Court defines disparate treatment 
discrimination as encompassing those situations wherein the 
employer treats a particular person less favorably than others 
because of' the person's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive or intent is critical to the 
success of such a claim. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335,n. 15 (1977). In 
a series of cases over more than twenty years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has' attempted ,to develop a practical framework that 
provides "orderly wayu to inquire into what the Court has 
described as the "elusive factual question of intentional 
discrimination." 
b. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1972), the Court held that the plaintiff must first establish a 
"prima facie" case by proving 1) that the plaintiff belonged to a 
protected group, 2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position 
for which the employer was seeking applications, 3) that the 
plaintiff was rejected, and 4) that the position remained open and 
that the employer continued to seek applicants with the same 
qualifications as the plaintiff had. The establishment of a prima 
facie case creates an inference that the employer unlawfully 
discriminated against the plaintiff because the plaintiff has 
eliminated the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for failure 
to hire, demotion or firing: that the plaintiff was unqualified for the 
position or that the position was no longer available. 
c. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that after the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to 
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the employer to articulate, but not prove, some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. If the 
employer does so, then the plaintiff must be given the opportunity 
to prove, by a preponderance of all the evidence, that the 
articulated, nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for 
discrimination. The Burdine Court concluded that the ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times 
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff may succeed in persuading the 
court that s/he has been the victim of intentional discrimination 
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory. 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Id., at 256. 
2. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2742 
(1993). 
a. The plaintiff alleged that he was demoted and discharged 
from his position as a correctional officer at a halfway house 
because of his race. At trial, the plaintiff established a McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case thereby giving rise to a presumption of 
intentional discrimination. The employer, in turn, rebutted the 
presumption by articulating two nondiscriminatory reasons for its 
actions - the severity and the accumulation of rules violations 
committed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then successfully 
convinced the trial court that the reasons proffered by the 
employer were not the real reasons for the plaintiff's demotion and 
discharge. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the 
determining factor in his employer's decision to demote and 
dismiss him. It concluded that "although [the plaintiff] has proven 
the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven 
that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated." 
Id. at 2748. 
b. The U.S. Supreme Court concurred in the judgment of the 
trial court. It held that if the employer carries its burden of 
production by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions, the presumption of intentional discrimination that arose 
when the plaintiff made out a prima facie case "drops out of the 
picture." The trier of fact proceeds, then, to decide the ultimate 
question whether the plaintiff has proven that the employer 
intentionally discriminated against her/him. The factfinder's 
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the employer "(particularly 
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show 
intentional discrimination." However, rejection by the court of the 
defendant's proffered reasons does not entitle the plaintiff to a 
judgment as a matter of law. It still remains for the factfinder to 
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determine whether the plaintiffs proffered reason (intentional 
discrimination) is correct. The trial court's determination of that 
ultimate question must be reviewed by the appellate court under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of. Civil 
Procedure 52(a). 
3. Harris v. Forklift Systems, _ U.S. _'_,114 S.Ct. 367 (1993). 
This case is reviewed in the material on "Harassment: 
Sexual and Otherwise" prepared Linda Scholle Cowan. 
C. Disparate Impact Discrimination 
The Supreme Court defines impermissible disparate 
impact discrimination .as employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but . 
that fall more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by a business necessity. Proof of 
discriminatory intent is not required under the disparate 
impact theory of impermissible employment discrimination. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States,431 U.S. 324, 335, n. 15. 
There are no new U.S. Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit 
cases to report. 
D. 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Issue of Retroactivity 
1. Background 
a. Any new legislation raises the question whether its 
provisions should be applied retroactively by the courts to 
pending cases and pre-act conduct or only prospectively to 
post-act conduct. With the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 (Pub.L. No. 102-166, Stat. 1071-1100) [hereinafter the Act] 
the question of retroactivity was particularly problematic. 
b. With two exceptions, the Act did not include any express 
direction in favor or against the retroactive application of its 
provisions. 
c. The Congressional Record was replete with contradictory 
memoranda and comments from various members of Congress 
on the issue of the retroactive application of the Act. 
d. The United States Supreme Court has two lines of 
seemingly contradictory cases on the appropriateness of the 
retroactive application of congressional enactments. Compare, 
Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974)(New 
statute must be applied retroactively to a case pending on appeal 
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at the time of enactment "unless doing so would result in a 
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative 
history to the contrary. ") and Bowen v. Georgetown University 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988)("Retroactivity is not favored in the law 
... [and] congressional enactments ... will not be construed to 
have retroactive effect unless their language requires this 
result."). 
e. The Act was passed in responses to at least five 1989 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting Title VII and 
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights' Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1981) 
[hereinafter §1981]. See, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989)(mixed motive/disparate treatment discrimination); 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
(business necessity defense/disparate impact discrimination); 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)(standing to challenge 
consent decrees); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 490 U.S. 
900 (1989)( statute of limitations for challenges to seniority 
systems); and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989)(intentional discrimination under § 1981). 
f. In addition to amending Title VII and §1981, the Act also 
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(29 U.S.C. 621- 634); the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 1988); and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.). 
g. The Act also responded to three 1991 decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 1991)(extraterritoriality of Title VII); West Virginia 
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) 
(compensation for expert's fees); and, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452 (1991 )(mandatory retirement for state court judges is not 
a violation of the ADEA). 
2. Landgraf v. US) Film Products, _ U.S. _. 114 S.Ct. 1483 
(1994). 
a. The Supreme Court articulated a test for determining the 
appropriateness of applying a federal statute to events that 
occurred prior to the law's enactment: 
1.. Did Congress expressly prescribe the statute's 
proper reach? 
2. If yes, that expression of intent is to be followed by 
the courts. 
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3. If no, the court must determine whether the new 
statute would have a retroactive effect. A statute does not 
necessarily operate "retrospectively" merely because it is 
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating - the 
statute's enactment. Factors the court looks at in 
determining whether the rule operates retrospectively are 
whether the new law would impair rights a party possessed 
when the party acted, increase a party's liability for past 
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed. 
4. If the statute does have a retroactive effect, the 
"default rule," absent a clear expression of congressional 
intent to the contrary, is that the statute does not govern 
pre-enactment conduct. 
b. The Supreme Court also expressly stated that although 
one provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act might not be applied to 
pre-enactment conduct under this test, "there is no special reason 
to think that all the diverse provisions of the Act must be treated 
uniformly .... " Id. at_ 
3. Damages in Cases of Disparate Treatment [Intentional] 
Discrimination 
a. Background. 
1. As originally enacted, Title VII only provided for the 
award of equitable relief such as reinstatement to a 
successful complainant. Monetary damages in the form of 
compensation for economic loss (e.g., back pay, front pay 
and interest on back pay) could be awarded, but 
compensatory and punitive damages were unavailable. 
Victims of sexual harassment were particularly prejudiced 
by the exclusion of compensatory damages from the relief 
a court could grant to a successful complainant. Often the 
victim of sexual harassment does not suffer an economic 
loss as a result of this type of unlawful employment 
practice. . 
2. Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides 
that compensatory damages are available for all victims of 
intentional (but not disparate impact) employment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the American's 
with Disabilities Act (with caps). Punitive damages are 
also authorized if the plaintiff shows that the defendant 
"engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an 
aggrieved individual." 
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3. Prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
, the trial court in the Landgraf case found that the plaintiff 
had been sexually harassed by a co-worker, but that the 
harassment was not so severe as to justify her decision to 
quit. Thus, she was not entitled to equitable relief because 
her termination did not violate Title VII, and because Title 
VII did not then authorize other relief, she was not entitled 
to compensatory and punitive damages. The 1991 Civil 
Rights Act became law while her appeal was pending. 
The Supreme Court rejected her claim that her case 
. should be remanded fora .determination of damages 
under the newly enacted Section 102. 
b. Retroactive Application of Punitive Damages in 
Section 102(b)(1) Prohibited. 
1. The Landgraf Court held that application of the 
punitive damage provision to pre-Act conduct would be 
retroactive in effect. Therefore, because there was no 
clear congressional expression of intent to reach such a 
result, the "default rule" in favor of prospective application 
was adopted by the Court. 
2. The Court also pointed out that if there had been 
an express congressional declaration of intent to apply the 
punitive damage provision retroactively, a serious 
constitutional question of a potential ex post facto problem 
would have been created because punitive damages share 
key characteristics of criminal sanctions. 
c. Retroactive Application of Compensatory Damages in 
Section 102(a)(1) Prohibited. 
1. The Landgraf Court found that application of 
compensatory damage provision of the Act to pre-
enactment conduct would also operate retrospectively 
even though it reached discriminatory conduct already 
prohibited by Title VII. 
2. However, the Court found that compensatory 
damages are quintessentially backward-looking. They 
sanction wrongdoers by affecting the liabilities of 
defendants. The Court reasoned that the right to receive 
compensatory damages is also the type of legal change 
that would have an impact on private parties' planning. 
3. And, in this particular case, because prior law 
afforded no relief for an employee in the plaintiff's 
situation, § 102 could be seen as creating a new cause of 
action. Therefore, since Congress did not clearly express 
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an intention to make the compensatory damage provision 
retroactive, the Court applied the "default rule" in favor of 
prospective application of a new law to conduct occurring 
after its enactment. 
4. Jury Trial 
a. Background. 
1. As originally enacted, Title VII did not provide for 
jury trials. Regardless of the type of discrimination (facial, 
disparate treatment, or disparate impact) or the relief 
sought, the plaintiff was only entitled to a bench trial. 
2. The 1991 Civil Rights Act §102(c)(1) expressly 
provides that any party seeking compensatory or punitive 
damages or an employer defending against such claims 
for relief may demand a trial by jury. 
b. Retroactive Application of Jury Trial Provisions in 
Section 102{c){1) Prohibited. 
The Landgraf Court recognized that the jury trial provision 
of the Act is a procedural change of the sort that would 
ordinarily govern trials conducted after its effective date. 
However, because §102{c) makes jury trials available only 
"[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive 
damages," the jury trial option fell with the attached 
damages provisions. 
5. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
a. Background. 
1. In Patterson v. McLean, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the 
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's claims of racial 
harassment, failure to promote, and discriminatory 
discharge were not actionable under Section 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. That section, according to the 
Court, was restricted in its scope to forbidding intentional 
racial discrimination in only the "making and enforcement" 
of private contracts. It did not provide relief for racial 
discrimination in post-contract formation conduct of the 
employer. 
2. Section 101 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act clearly 
overrules this constricted view of §1981. The Act defines 
the term" make and enforce contracts" as used in § 1981 to 
include lithe making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 
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privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship." The Act also codifies the Supreme Court's 
holdings in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
421 U.S. 454 (1975) and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160 (1976) that prohibitions of § 1981 apply to private, 
nongovernmental contracts. 
b. Rivers v. Roadway Express, _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 
1510 (1994). 
1.. The plaintiffs filed a complaint under §1981 alleging 
that the employer fired them on baseless charges because 
of their race and because they insisted on the same 
procedural protections afforded to white employees. 
Before trial, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the 
Patterson decision holding that §1981 does not apply to 
conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract. 
Relying on Patterson, the trial court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' discriminatory discharge claims. While the 
plaintiffs' appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
became law amending § 1981. 
2. Retroactive Application of the Definitional 
Provision in Section 102 Prohibited. 
a. In reliance on its decision in the Landgraf 
case, the Supreme Court first determined that § 101 
would act retrospectively if applied to pre-Act 
conduct because it enlarged the category of 
conduct that is subject to § 1981 liability (all aspects 
of the contractual relationship, including contract 
terminations). The Court pointed out that 
Patterson decision did not overrule any prior 
decision of the Court. Its construction of § 1981 
was an authoritative statement of what the statute 
meant before as well as after the decision. Thus, 
§ 101 the Act did expand the type of conduct 
subject to commands of § 1981. 
b. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that § 101 should apply to their case because it was 
"restorative" of the understanding of §1981 that 
prevailed before the Patterson decision. "Our 
decisions simply do not support the proposition that 
we have espoused a "presumption" in favor of 
retroactive application of restorative statutes." The 
Court said that it still requires clear evidence of 
intent to impose even a restorative statute 
"retroactively." Id. at_. 
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E. Other Issues 
c. The Court also held that Congress' decision 
to "legislatively overrule" a Supreme Court case 
does not, by itself, reveal whether Congress 
intended the statute to apply retroactively to events 
that would be otherwise governed by the judicial 
decision. And, even assuming that the enactment 
of § 101 reflected congressional disapproval of 
Patterson's holding, that does not demonstrate 
congressional intent to apply the new definition to 
past acts. "Even when Congress intends to 
supersede a~rule of law embodied in one of our 
decisions with what it views as a better rule 
established in earlier decisions, its intent to reach 
conduct preceding the "corrective" amendment 
must clearly appear." Id. at_ 
1. Jury Trial and Principles of Collateral Estoppel 
a. Background 
In Parklane Hosiery Co. V. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court held that an equitable 
determination can have collateral estoppel effect in a 
subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not 
violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury 
in suits at common law. In that case, a judgment had 
been issued by a District Court and affirmed on appeal in a 
suit in which a jury trial was not constitutionally required 
(injunctive action by SEC alleging the issuance of a 
materially false and misleading proxy statement). The 
District Court's resolution of the issues in that case 
collaterally estopped relitigation of the same issues in a 
second, separate action, even though the plaintiff was 
entitled to a jury trial in the second action(stockholder's 
class action}. 
b. Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545 
(1990). 
1. Plaintiff brought an action under both Title VII and 
§1981 alleging that the employer had engaged in both 
discriminatory discharge because of his race and 
retaliation because he fileq a charge with the EEOC. Title 
VII claims are equitable in nature and do not require a jury 
trial while the right to a jury trial attaches to the legal 
claims arising under §1981. 
1-11 
2. 
2. The trial court determined that Title VII provided the 
exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff, dismissed the 
§1981 claims, conducted a bench trial, and granted the 
employer's motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's 
case. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the 
dismissal of the § 1981 claim was erroneous because Title 
VII and § 1981 are separate, independent, and distinct. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court's findings with respect to the Title VII claims 
collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating his §1981 
claims because the elements of a cause of action under 
the two statutes are identical. 
3. The United States Supreme Court refused to 
extend Parklane Hosiery to this case and reversed. The 
plaintiff had properly joined his legal and equitable claims 
in one suit. It was only by virtue of the trial court's 
erroneous dismissal of the §1981 claims that enabled the 
court to resolve the issues common to both claims. 
Otherwise, the common issues would have been resolved 
by a jury. The Court found that it would be anomalous to 
hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of the 
right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a 
jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but that a 
court could accomplish the same result by erroneously 
dismissing. the legal claim. Relitigation was the only 
mechanism for completely correcting the error. 
c. Korte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954 (6thCir. 1990). 
, 
The Sixth Circuit held that a jury verdict in favor of a 
county employee on her Equal Pay Act,· 29 U.S.C. 
§206(d)(1), claim is binding as to her Title VII 
discriminatory compensation claim. The Court rejected the 
position of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII, although similar, are distinct as to 
the proof required and the allocation of the parties' burden 
of proof. Instead, it held that "a finding of "sex 
discrimination in compensation" under one Act is 
tantamount to a finding of "pay discrimination on the basis 
of sex" under the other. Conduct that a jury finds to be 
"based on" sex, and not motivated by nondiscriminatory 
reasons, cannot later be found by a district court to lack an 
intent to discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 959. 




Section 2000e-16(c) of Title VII .. provides than an 
employment discrimination complaint against the federal 
government under Title VII must be filed "within thirty days 
of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC. 
And, it is a well recognized principle that waiver of 
sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but must be 
unequivocally expressed. United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U.S. 535 (1980). 
b. Irwin v. Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
1.· The plaintiff filed his complaint against the VA 44 
days after the EEOC notice was received at his attorney's 
office, but 29 days after the date on which the plaintiff 
claimed he received his letter. The EEOC notice expressly 
informed the plaintiff of his right to file a civil action within 
30 days of receipt of the notice. The plaintiff Claimed that 
the letter to his attorney arrived at the attorney's office 
while the attorney was out of the country so that the 
attorney did not actually learn of the EEOC's action until 
18 days after it arrived at the office. 
2. The Supreme Court held that since §2000e-16(c) 
only specifies that the EEOC notification be "received," 
receipt by the claimant's designated representative is 
sufficient. If Congress had intended to depart from the 
common and established practice of providing notification 
through counsel, it must do so expressly. The Court also 
endorsed the principle that notice to an attorney's office 
that is acknowledged by a representative of that office 
qualifies as notice to the client. 
3. The Court embraced the general rule that once 
Congress has made a waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
rule of equitable tolling is applicable to suits against the 
government in the same way that it is applicable to private 
suits. However, the plaintiff gained no help from this 
holding. The Court found that federal courts have typically 
permitted equitable tolling against private litigants only 
sparingly in situations where the claimant actively pursued 
judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the 
statutory period or where the complainant was induced or 
tricked by the adversary's misconduct into allowing the 
filing deadline to pass. This case involved only a "garden 
variety claim of excusable neglect." 
3. Concurrent Jurisdiction 
In Yellow Freight System, Inc., v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 
(1990), the United State Supreme Court held that because Title 
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VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to 
federal courts or ousts state courts of their jurisdiction, that is 
strong evidence that Congress did not intend to divest state courts 
of concurrent jurisdiction. As state courts have the inherent 
authority, and are competent, to adjudicate federal claims, the 
employee's timely filing in state court after receive of her "right to 
sue" letter from the EEOC was sufficient. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 626(c)(1) and 633(b), expressly grants concurrent jurisdiction 
to state courts. 
4. Damage Awards and Taxation 
In United States v. Burke, _ U.S. _, 112 S.Ct. 867 (1992), 
the Supreme Court held that back pay awards in settlement of 
Title VII claims are not "damages received on account of person 
injuries" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code's 
statutory exclusion of such damages from gross income. The 
Court reasoned that nothing in Title VII as it was then written 
purports to compensate the employee for any of the traditional 
harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, 
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential 
dam~ges. Because the Court found that Title VII's sole. remedial 
focus is the award of backwages, it does not redress tort-like 
personal injury within the meaning of the statutory exclusion from 
gross income. 
5. Retaliation/After-Acquired Evidence 
a. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation 
1. Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hospital, 936 
F.2d 870 (6thCir. 1991). 
The elements of ~ prima, facie case of retaliation 
are that the plaintiff was engaged in activity 
protected by Title VII, that the exercise of the 
plaintiff's rights was known by the employer, that 
the employer thereafter engaged in an adverse 
employment action, and that a causal connection 
·existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and 
the employer's adverse action. 
2. EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 
985 (6thCir. 1992). 
a. A female temporary custodian was denied a 
promotion to permanent status after she 
complained to her employer about a disparity in 
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pay between male and female temporary 
custodians. She told the employer she thought it 
was "breaking some sort of law" by that practice. 
b. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case of retaliation even 
though the refusal to promote occurred before she 
had instituted formal proceedings with the EEOC. 
The Court endorsed the principle that it is the 
assertion of statutory rights (e.g., nondiscrimination 
because of sex in compensation) that is the 
triggering factor for a claim of retaliation, not the 
filing of a formal complaint. Because the plaintiff 
alleged that the adverse employment actions 
occurred after her protest, she had put forth a 
prima facie case of retaliation. 
b. Effect of After-Acquired Evidence on Retaliation Claim 
1. Background 
a. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held 
that when an employer's adverse employment 
decision rests on both permissible and 
impermissible factors ("mixed motive"), and the-
impermissible ground was a "substantial" factor in 
the employment decision, the plaintiff has made out 
a prima facie case of disparate treatment or 
intentional discrimination. Nonetheless, the 
employer could avoid liability by proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate' 
reason, standing alone, would have induced it to 
make the same decision. 
b. Section 107(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
While preserving the burden-shifting rules of Price 
Waterhouse, makes significant changes in mixed-
motive cases. Even though a permissible factor(s) 
motivated the employment decision, if the plaintiff 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin was a motivating (not "substantial") 
factor for the employment decision, employer 
liability is established. The court may award 
attorneys' fees and costs as well as injunctive and 
declaratory relief. The burden then shifts to the 
employer to demonstrate that the legitimate 
reason(s), standing alone, would have induced it to 
make the same decision. If the employer does not 
meet this burden, the employer is subject to all of 
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the relief available under Title VII including 
damages (compensatory and punitive) and 
equitable (e.g., back pay, reinstatement, hiring and 
promotion). 
2. After-Acquired Evidence and Retaliatory 
Discharges. 
a. Background. 
1. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publishing Company, 9 F.3d 539 (1993), 
the Sixth Circuit Court held that the after-
acquired evidence doctrine "mandates 
judgment as a matter of law for an employer 
charged with discrimination if evidence of 
the employee's misconduct surfaces at 
some time after the termination of the 
employee and the employer can prove it 
would have fired the employee on the basis 
of the misconduct if it had known of it." Id. 
at 541. 
2. Similarly, in Milligan-Jensen v. 
Michigan Technological University, 975 
F.2d 302 (1992), the Sixth Circuit ruled that 
an employee who failed to include a OUI 
conviction on her employment application 
was precluded from recovering on her Title 
VII action based on allegations of sex 
discrimination and retaliation for filing an 
EEOC charge. The Court found that the 
employee suffered no legal damage by 
being fired because falsification of the 
application, if discovered during the 
employee's employment, would have 
resulted in the employee's termination. 
3. And, in Johnson v. Honeywell 
Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409 
(1992), an employee's misrepresentations 
as to her educational background on her 
employment application barred her recovery 
under the state's Title VII equivalent even if 
the employer discharged the employee for 
her opposition to violations of the law. 




Arguably, §107(a) allows the employee to 
recover, at a minimum, attorneys' fees and 
costs as well as to obtain injunctive and 
declaratory relief because the employeeis 
discharge was "motivated" by impermissible 
reasons despite the presents of the 
misconduct that would have, if known by the 
employer, caused the employer to terminate 
the employee. 
a. Assessed Against Defendant 
In Lilley v. BTM Corporation, 958 F.2d 746 (1992), the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the 
plaintiff was unsuccessful in pursuing an age 
discrimination· claim, his success in proving a retaliatory 
discharge claim was sufficient to render him a "prevailing 
party" eligible to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
Moreover, because the expenses the plaintiff incurred in 
pursuing the unsuccessful age discrimination claim were 
related to the retaliatory discharge claim on which he was 
successful, his expenses in pursuing the age 
discrimination claim were recoverable. See, generally, 
Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
b. Assessed Against Plaintiff 
In Noyes v. Channel Products, Inc., 935 F.2d 806 
(1991), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
district court's award of attorneys' fees against an 
unsuccessful plaintiff in·· a Title VII retaliatory discharge 
case was an abuse of discretion. The Court said that 
attorneys' fees should be awarded to defense counsel only 
in the most "egregious circumstances." Id. at 810. 
III. THE KENTUCKY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, K.R.S. CHAPTER 344. 
A. Facial Discrimination 
There are no new Kentucky cases to report. 
B. Disparate Treatme.nt or Intentional Discrimination 
1. Burden of Proof 
a. Kentucky's Civil Rights Act has been construed to 
be virtually identical to corresponding Title VII provisions. 
Consequently, the Kentucky courts have followed federal 
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case law when interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. 
See, Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Kentucky, 
586 S.W.2d 270(Ky.App. 1979). For example, the 
McDonnell Douglas framework for proving intentional 
discrimination (as modified by Burdine) has been applied 
to cases alleging intentional employment discrimination 
under KRS §344.040. Kentucky Center for the Arts v. 
Handley, 827 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1991). 
b. An unresolved question, however, is whether the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Hicks case will also 
become part of the Kentucky courts' analysis of the 
Kentucky Civil Rights Act. 
c. As the Kentucky Civil Rights Act goes beyond 
merely incorporating the antidiscrimination policies 
embodied in Title VII, see Meyers v. Chapman Printing 
Company, 840 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1992), the Hicks 
decision need not be adopted as further gloss on how a 
plaintiff establishes a case of intentional discrimination. 
2. Mixed Motive Cases of Intentional Discrimination 
a. The Kentucky Civil Rights Act was not amended 
when Congress adopted the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
Therefore, more differences now exist between the 
provisions of the state's law and the federal law than 
before. For example, in the Chapman case, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court adopted the Price Waterhouse rule than 
an employer can avoid liability in a mixed motive disparate 
treatment case by showing the legitimate reason, standing 
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision. 
However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act legislatively changed 
the Price Waterhouse the employer avoidance of liability 
rule. 
b. The question then arose in First Property 
Management Corporation v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 
185 (Ky. 1993), what effect did the changes in federal law 
have on the rule for mixed motive cases brought under 
Kentucky state law. The Kentucky Supreme Court stated 
that the rules for federal cases tried in equity without a jury 
are different from the rules for cases under the Kentucky 
Civil Rights Act which are claims at law. However, it then 
went on to hold that an employer is not free from liability 
simply because it offers proof that it would have 
discharged the employee anyway, even absent the lawfully 
impermissible reason. If the jury believes the 
impermissible reason did in fact contribute to the 
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discharge as one of the substantial motivating factors, 
employer liability attaches. 
3. Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban 
County Government, _ S.W.2d _, WL 83226 (Ky.App. 
1994); Kirkwood v. Courier Journal, 858 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 
1993); and Meyers v. Chapman Printing Company, 840 S.W.2d 
814 (Ky. 1992). 
These sexual harassment cases are reviewed in the 
material on "Harassment: Sexual and Otherwise" 
prepared Linda Scholle Cowan. 
C. Disparate Impact Discrimination. 
In Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, 828 S.W.2d 668 
(Ky.App. 1992), a black employee was disqualified from 
applying for promotion due to a prior felony conviction. 
The Court did not analyze the potential disparate impact 
such a facially neutral policy might have on a protected 
class. Instead, the Court summarily disposed of the 
potential disparate impact discrimination claim by stating 
that even if the employee could prove that black applicants 
were disqualified at a higher rate than whites, "we know of 
no established protected class involving persons with 
felony records, and we decline to create one." Id. at 672. 
D. Other Issues. 
1. Statute of Limitations and Continuing 
Violations. 
a. In Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, 828 
S.W.2d 668, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held 
that state law governs the substantive limitation 
period for federal civil rights action (one year - KRS 
413.140(1)(a»), federal law governs when the 
cause of action accrues and when the statute 
begins to run. 
b. The cause of action for a discreet act such 
as discriminatory discharge of a person accrues 
and the limitation period begins to run at the time of 
the discharge. The cause of action for a continuing 
violation such as discriminatory pay arises each 
time the employee is paid less than her/his 
counterpart. 
c. In Leonard the court found that even 
though the employee was told unequivocally that 
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he could never be promoted because of his felony 
conviction, each time he applied for promotion and 
was denied, a new, discrete act occurred and the 
statute of limitations began to run on that cause of 
action. 
2. Removal 
a. In Gafford v. General Electric, 997 F.2d 
150 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit was faced 
with .a challenge .to its. subject matter jurisdiction 
over an employment discrimination lawsuit under 
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act. 
b. The employee brought suit in Jefferson 
Circuit Court alleging the employer's failure to 
promote her was a violation of KRS §344.040. The 
employee sought unspecified amount of damages 
to compensate her for lost wages and retirement 
benefits, for mental and emotional anxiety and 
stress, and for court costs and attorney fees. The 
employer petitioned for removal in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Kentucky based 
on diversity of citizenship and satisfaction of the 
$50,000 amount in controversy requirement. 
c. The court held that when a plaintiff seeks to 
recover some unspecified amount that is not self-
evidently greater or less than the federal amount-
in-controversy, the defendant can have removal if it 
proves that it is "more likely than not" that the 
plaintiff's claims meet the federal amount-in-
controversy requirement. Id. at 158. 
3. Waiver 
a. In Kirkwood V. Courier-Journal, 858 
S.W.2d 194 (Ky.App. 1993), the court found that 
the employee's failure to use a mandatory 
grievance and arbitration procedure in her union's 
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude 
her from bringing race and sex discrimination 
charges under Kentucky's Civil Rights Statute. 
b. Although an informed individual may waive 
a statutory civil right by agreeing to submit a claim 
against the employer to binding arbitration, Gilmer 
V. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., _ U.S. _, 
111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991), a waiver may not be 
accomplished prospectively on behalf of an 
1-20 
individual by that employee's union or collective 
bargaining unit. 
4. Retaliation - A Prima Facie Case 
a. In Mountain Clay, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
of Kentucky, Commission on Human Rights, 
830 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.App. 1992), the court found 
that the employee had established prima facie case 
of retaliation when the employer filed a lawsuit 
seeking to enjoin the Human Rights Commission 
from holding a hearing on the employee's 
complaint, seeking to hold the employee liable 
personally for the employer's costs of defending 
against the complaint, and seeking to require the 
employee to post bond in a sufficient amount to 
cover those employer expenses. The circuit court 
dismissed the employer's suit as premature. 
b. The Commission found, and the court 
would not disturb the finding, that the employer 
filed the suit to expose the employee to fears of 
extreme financial hardship and to coerce her into 
dropping or foregoing her complaint. 
c. The court also refused to recognize a per 
se violation of due process when the Commission 
hears a case in which it has been named an 
adverse party. The court pointed out that if it 
accepted such an argument, an employer who is a 
defendant in a civil rights action could file suit 
naming the Commission as an adverse party and 
then argue that the Commission could not hear the 
action because it was so named. 
5. Attorney Fees 
a. In Meyers v. Chapman, 840 S.W.2d 814,. 
the Kentucky Supreme Court endorsed the trial 
court's determination of plaintiff's attorneys' fee 
award. The trial court arrived at the fee for 
prosecuting the plaintiff's two causes of action by 
determining the appropriate number of hours 
reasonably expended by each of the plaintiff' three 
attorneys. It multiplied that number by its finding of 
an appropriate hourly rate. The total sum was then 
reduced by 15% because of the "degree of 
success achieved" by plaintiff's attorneys. The jury 
had decided for the employee on her sexual 
harassment cause of action, but against her on her 
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gender-based discharge claim. The trial court 
arrived at the fee for the "attorney fee litigation" by 
calculating the appropriate number of hours, 
multiplying by a lesser rate than it approved for the 
principal litigation and then reduced the total by 
75% because it found that only some of the hours 
spent on the attorneys' fee litigation were 
necessitated by the defendant's attack. 
b. The court sustained the award of attorneys' 
fees even though they were substantially more 
than the plaintiff's total recovery. It found that if 
attorneys' fees were restricted to the size of the 
claim there might be no incentive to pursue 
worthwhile claims. 
c. The court rejected the argument that 
compensation should have been enhanced 
because the plaintiff's attorneys represented her on 
a contingency fee basis. 
IV. THE AGE DISCRIMiNATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967,29 U.S.C. 621 et 
seq. [hereinafter the ADEA]. 
A. Facial Discrimination. 
1. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that appointed state judges 
in Missouri who were subject to a state constitutional 
mandate compelling retirement at the age of 70 were not 
covered by the ADEA. They fell within the ADEA's 
exclusion for appointees "on a policymaking level." 
2. Section 321 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
a. This section extends the protection of the ADEA 
against employment discrimination to certain previously 
unprotected state officials: (a) members of an elected 
official's personal staff; (b) those appointed to serve the 
elected official on a policy making level; and (c) those 
appointed to serve the elected official as an immediate 
advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or 
legal powers of the office. 
b. The newly covered state employees have no trial 
right. Disputes are to be resolved through an EEOC 
administrative action with review by a Court of Appeals. 
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c. Elimination of the state employee exemptions 
overrides the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft. 
B. Disparate Treatment or Intentional Discrimination 
1. Availability of Disparate Treatment Theory 
In Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, _ U.S. _, 113 
S.Ct. 1701 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
disparate treatment theory is available to a employee 
under the ADEA. =~... -
2. Employer Liability Under Disparate Treatment Theory 
a. Employer liability depends on whether age actually 
motivated the employer's decision. Whether the employer 
relied on a formal, facially discriminatory policy based on 
age or was motivated by the employee's age on an ad 
hoc, informal basis, age must actually have played a role 
in the employer's decision-making process and had a 
determinative influence on its outcome. Id. at 1706. 
b. The Hazen Court held that an employee does not 
prove a violation of the ADEA merely by proving that the 
employee was discharged to prevent his pension benefits 
from vesting. The Court reasoned that age and years of 
service are "analytically distinct," so that an employer 
might take account of one while ignoring the other. 
Consequently, a decision based on years of service is not 
necessarily an impermissible age-based decision under 
the ADEA. [CAVEAT: The employer's action did violate the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §510.] 
C. Disparate Impact Discrimination 
1. In its Hazen decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly 
stated that it has never decided whether a disparate impact theory 
of liability is available under the ADEA and it would not do 50 in 
the context of the Hazen case. Hazen Paper Company v. 
Biggins, 113 S.Ct. at 1706. 
2. In Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867 (6thCir. 
1990) the Sixth Circuit recognized the availability of the theory of 
disparate impact discrimination under the ADEA. It said that to 
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing 
disparate impact, the employee must identify a specific 
employment practice used by the employer and then establish its 
adverse effect by offering statistical evidence. Once an age 
discrimination plaintiff does that, the defendant must articulate a 
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· legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, such as business necessity 
or job-relatedness, for its practice. If the employer does so, then 
the plaintiff must show either that the employer's proffered reason 
was a pretext for discrimination or that an alternative employment 
practice exists that would serve the employer's legitimate interests 
without such a disparate impact. 
D. Other Issues 
1. Collateral Estoppel - Administrative 
a. In Astoria Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991), the 
plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC referred 
his claim to the state agency responsible for such claims 
under state law. That agency found no probable cause to 
believe that the plaintiff had been terminated because of 
his age. That decision was upheld on administrative 
review. Instead of appealing the administrative agency's 
decision to state court, the plaintiff filed an ADEA suit in 
federal district court grounded on the same factual 
allegations considered in the state proceedings. 
b. The United States Supreme Court held that a 
judicially unrEwiewed state administrative finding has no 
preclusive effect on the age discrimination proceedings in 
federal court. 
2. Jurisdiction 
a. Sections 626 (c) (1 ) and 633(b) of the ADEA 
expressly grant concurrent jurisdiction to state courts. 
b. A federal employee complaining of. age 
discrimination does not have to seek relief from the 
employee's employing agency or the EEOC at all. A 
federal employee can present the merits of herlhis claim to 
a federal court in the first instance. 29 U.S.C. §633a(d). 
See, also Stevens v. Department of the Treasury, 500 
U.S. 1 (1991). 
3. Damages 
a. The § 7(b) of ADEA provides for liquidated 
damages in the case of a "willful" violation. 
b. In Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, 113 S.Ct. 
at 1708 - 1709, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the 
definition of "willful" it articulated in Trans Work Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), was applicable to 
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an informal disparate treatment case where age entered 
into the employment decision on an ad hoc, informal basis 
rather than because of a formal policy. 
c. A "willful" violation of the ADEA occurs if the 
employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the 
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. 
Hazen Paper Company v. Biggens, 113 S.Ct. at 1708. 
4. Waiver 
a. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the United States 
Supreme Court held that an age discrimination claim was 
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement in a securities registration application the 
plaintiff, a securities representative, had to fill out in order 
to register with the NYSE. 
b. The Gilmer court distinguished its earlier decision 
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
In Gardner-Denver, the issue was whether an employee 
whose grievance had been arbitrated in compliance with 
an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement 
was precluded from thereafter bringing a Title VII action 
based upon the same conduct. The Court held that the 
Title VII claim, an individual statutory claim, was not 
precluded by arbitration of the collective contract rights. 
Gilmer, in contrast, involved the issue of the enforceability 
of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. In Gardner-
Denver the employee had not agreed to arbitrate the 
statutory claims whereas the employee had so agreed in 
Gilmer. And, the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer was 
entered into "voluntarily" by the employee and not by his 
collective bargain representative. Finally, the Court found 
that the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] was at issue in 
Gilmer, but not in Garnder-Denver. The FAA, according 
to the Court, reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements." 
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
A. Title VII and Homosexual, Sexual Harassment v. 
Discrimination or Harassment Based on Sexual Orientation. 
1. Homosexual, Sexual Harassment 
a. Demands by a homosexual supervisor or co-worker 
are actionable as impermissible sexual harassment under 
Title VII. The earliest case recognizing the possibility of 
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such a cause of action is Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 
(D. D.C. 1977). The Barnes court said in dicta that 
homosexual advances might give rise to a claim of sexual 
harassment under Title VII, but bisexual advances would 
not. See, also Hensonv. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 
(11thCir. 1982); and Wright v. Methodist Youth 
Services, 511 F.Supp. 307 (N.D.III. 1981). 
b. However, there seems to be a presumption that the 
alleged perpetrator is heterosexual, see, e.g., French v. 
Mead Corp., 33 F.E.P. Cases 635 {S.D. Ohio 
1983),which can be overcome by showing that the alleged 
harasser has "homosexual proclivities," Joyner v. AAA 
. Cooper Transp., 597 F.Supp. 537 (M.D.Ala. 1983), aff'd, 
749 F.2d 721 (11thCir. 1984). 
2. Discrimination or Harassment Because of Sexual 
Orientation 
a. Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against 
homosexual employees, Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d .69 (8thCir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1089 (1990); transsexual employees, Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471· U.S. 1017 (1985)(plaintiff fired from her 
position as a pilot due to her change in sex from male to 
female); or employees perceived to be homosexual, Smith 
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
b. Title VII does not prohibit harassment, even of a 
sexual nature, of homosexual employees or those 
perceived to be homosexual employees, Polly v. Houston 
Lighting & Power Co., 803 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.Tex. 1992). 
B. State Statutes and Employment Discrimination Based on 
Sexual Orientation, See, Norris and Randon, "Sexual Orientation 
and the Workplace: Recent Developments in Discrimination and 
Harassment Law," 19 Employee Relations L.J. 233 (1993). 
1. Prohibitions Against Discrimination Based on Sexual 
Orientation. 
a. California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. specifically prohibit 
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation. 
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b. All of the state statutes define sexual orientation to 
include heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality. 
[New York is considering a statute that would also prohibit 
discrimination because of asexuality.] 
C. Perceived sexual orientation is protected in 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey and Wisconsin. 
d. California, Connecticut, and New Jersey have 
express • provisions that state . that affirmative action 
programs on the basis of sexual orientation are not 
required and none of the other states expressly requires 
the implementation of affirmative action plans. 
e. Except for New Jersey and Washington, there is a 
statutory exception for religious and charitable 
organizations. 
f. Massachusetts explicitly states that its statute is 
not an endorsement or approval of homosexuality or 
bisexuality. The statute does not legitimize marriage 
between homosexuals and does not require health 
insurance or other employee benefits for "partners" of 
homosexual employees. In addition to such proviSions, 
Connecticut's statute provides that its statute is not to be 
read to require the teaching of homosexuality or 
bisexuality in educational institutions. 
g. California and Vermont have prOVISions that 
maintain the orthodox classification of "marital status" and 
the definitions of "family or dependent" in an employment 
benefit plan. 
2. Prohibitions Against Prohibiting Discrimination Based 
on Sexual Orientation. ' 
Colorado has a statute that specifically prohibits any 
protection on the basis of sexual orientation. Oregon 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Dealing with state and federal administrative agencies 
occupies an increasingly larger percentage of the time of 
human resources professionals. 
B. The agencies most frequently encountered by such 
professionals are: 
1. Federal and state agencies enforcing civil rights 
statutes (e.g., Title VII, Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, 
and KRS Chapter 344). 
2. Federal and state agencies enforcing the wage and 
hour laws (Fair Labor Standards Act and KRS Chapter 
337) . 
3. The Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance, 
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources, enforcing the 
unemployment insurance laws (KRS Chapter 341). 
C. Knowing the formal and informal procedures of the 
agencies involved gives the human resources professional 
an advantage in successfully dealing with these agencies. 
II. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
A. Responding to charges filed with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
1. Title VII Charges. 
a. Governing law: Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) 
b. How charges are filed. 
(1) In writing and under oath or affirmation 
[42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)]. 
(2) On a form provided by EEOC. 
c. Time limit for filing charges - within 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice (except in "deferral" states such as 
Kentucky where one has 300 days to file the 
charge). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
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d. State filing requirement - In states such as 
Kentucky which has "deferral" status, no 
charge may be filed with EEOC "before the 
expiration of sixty days after proceedings 
have been commenced under the state or local 
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier 
terminated.. "42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(c). 
( 1) Thus in order to timely file an EEOC 
charge in Kentucky, the Charging Party 
must have filed with an appropriate state 
or lo~al agency within 240 days in order 
'that the' required 60 days for -state 
proceedings may have run prior to filing 
with EEOC. 
(2) Not necessary that the "filing" with the 
state or local agency be timely (180 days 
in Kentucky) in order to preserve the 
right to file with the EEOC. 
e. The investigation. 
(1) Normally by interrogatories, requests for 
documents, and sometimes on-site 
inspection of records and interviews of 
personnel. 
(a) Responding to interrogatories and 
requests for production. 
1 EEOC is entitled to information 
relevant to the charge but you 
should limit the information 
you provide to only that which 
is relevant. 
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a Restrict information 
provided to the narrowest 
department or entity at 
the level the unlawful 
action was taken (e. g . , 
if personnel decisions 
for a plant are made at 
that plant, information 
relating to company-wide 
practices outside the 
plant are probably not 
relevant to the charge). 
b Restrict document produc-
tion to those documents 
directly relevant to the 
claimed unlawful act 
e . g. , do not produce 
entire personnel files -
instead make EEOC tell 
you what specific 
documents they want. 
c Remember that everything 
you produce will be 
available to the Charging 
Party if he should later 
decide to bring a Title 
VII lawsuit. 
(b) Interviews of personnel. 
I Whether to allow interview of 
non-management personnel on 
working time - no requirement 
that you do so but it gives you 
more control. 







interview of any 
or supervisory 
3 You may be able to negotiate 
presence at interview of non-
management employees. 




while he is 
the 
on 
( c ) EEOC has subpoena power to coerce 
the production of information if 
necessary but it is reluctant to 
exercise that power. 
(d) The right way and the wrong way to 
say "no" to the investigator's 
demands for information. 
I Be firm but polite. 
2 Be prepared to compromise. 
3 Appear reasonable. 
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4 Require EEOC to put all 
requests in writing and respond 
to all requests in writing. 
f. The determination of probable cause. 
(1) A determination as to whether there is 
reasonable cause to believe the charge is 
true is supposed to be made after 
investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
(2) In theory, after 180 days from the filing 
of the charge, the EEOC ~s suppos~d to 
issue a right to sue notice to the 
Charging Party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1). 
(a) In practice, this is never done 
unless the Charging Party requests 
it. 
(b) In certain circumstances, the 
employer may want to consider 
requesting that the right to sue 
ietter be issued prior to a 
determination being made. 
(3) If the EEOC determines that there is not 
reasonable cause to believe the charge is 
true, it will dismiss the charge and 
issue a notice of right to sue to the 
Charging Party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
(4) If the EEOC determines that there is 
probable cause to believe the charge is 
true, it will attempt conciliation. 
g. Conciliation 
(1) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) provides that 
"[ i] f the Commission determines 
that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the charge is true, the Commission 
shall endeavor to eliminate any such 
alleged unlawful employment practice by 
informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion." 
(2) Since EEOC looks to a "make whole" 
remedy, conciliation is usually equated 
with capitulation. 
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(3) However, where the EEOC regards the 
charge as "weak", there is usually some 
opportunity for compromise. 
(4) 
(a) Neutral employment reference. 
(b) Backpay without reinstatement. 
(c) Reinstatement without backpay. 
If conciliation is 
conciliation -agreement 
and signed by the 
Employer and EEOC. 
successful, a 
wil1 be prepared 
Charging Party, 
(a) Although EEOC will assert that all 
of its provisions are "boiler-plate" 
and mandatory, they are not. 
(b) Make sure that the provisions of the 
agreement are clear and unambiguous. 
(c) Consider provisions whereby: 
1 Charging Party agrees to keep 
the terms of the agreement 
confidential. 
2 Charging Party agrees not to 
ever apply for employment with 
the Company. 
3 Charging Party 
employer from 
claims against 








(d) Some EEOC District Directors will 
not approve general releases, 
confidentiality clauses, etc., as a 
part of the formal conciliation 
agreement but will not object to a 
separate agreement containing 
provlslons between the Charging 
Party and the employer. 
h. The Right to Sue Notice. 
(1) Not issued if EEOC decides to file a suit 
on behalf of the Charging Party. 
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(a) Several years ago, it was very 
unusual for the EEOC to file suit on 
behalf of the Charging Party unless 
there were pattern and practice or 
class implications to the charge. 
(b) Currently, EEOC's policy is that 
there is a presumption in favor of 
such suits. 
(2) If EEOC does not file suit on behalf of 
the Charging Party, it will issue a Right 
-to Sue Notice to the Charging Party even 
where it has found no probable cause. 
(3) The Charging Party has 90 days from 
receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue to 
file a Title VII suit in the U.S. 
District Court or state court. 
(a) Receipt in the past could be proven 
by certified mail receipt form in 
the EEOC file. 
(b) Current practice is not to send 
notices certified mail. 
i. Responding to EEOC Charges. 
( 1 ) No response, other than answers to the 
EEOC interrogatories, is required. 
(2) Particularly if you have a strong 
defense, you will probably want to file 
wi th EEOC a position statement at some 
time prior to the probable cause 
determination being made. 
(a) Frequently, EEOC will solicit a 
position statement as a part of the 
interrogatories to the employer. 
(b) Position statement should address 
each and every allegation of the 
charge. 
j. Responding to a "cause" determination. 
(1) While there is no statutory or regulatory 
provision for appealing from a cause 
determination, it should be considered. 
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(a) It should be addressed to the 
District Director. 
(b) It should address both the facts and 
the law as to every basis cited for 
the probable cause determination. 
(c) Even if the appeal is denied or not 
even considered by the District 
Director, it will be the top 
document of the file which goes to 
EEOC's attorneys .to determine if 
EEOC will file suit on behalf of the 
Charging Party. 
2. Charges under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA). 
a. Governing law: Age 
Employment Act of 1967 
~). 
Discrimination in 
(29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
b. How charges are filed - same as Title VII. 
c. Time limit for filing charges - wi thin 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice (except in "deferral" states such as 
Kentucky, where one has 300 days to file the 
charge). 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). 
d. Time limit for filing suit in state or federal 
court: 
(1) Not before 60 days have elapsed since the 
filing of a charge with the EEOC (and in 
a deferral state, 60 days after a charge 
has been filed with the state agency). 
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) and 29 U.S.C. § 
633(b). 
(2) Probably not later than ninety (90) days 
after the receipt of a notice by EEOC 
that it has dismissed a charge or has 
otherwise terminated its proceedings. 29 
U.S.C. § 626(e). 
(a) But note that at least one court has 
held that despite the fact that the 
Civ.il Rights Act of 1991 deleted 
references to the two and three year 
statutes of limitation and created a 
90 day right to sue notice period, 
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the former limitations periods are 
still applicable. Simmons v. Al 
Smith Buick Co., 63 FEP 958 (E.D. 
N.C. 1993). 
(b) Also note that at least one court 
has held that, unlike Title VII, a 
right to sue notice is not a 
prerequisite to suit. Adams v. 
Burlington Northern R. R. Co., 63 FEP 
679 (D.C. Kansas 1993). 
ADEA does ~~ not require any 




( 1) However, in practice the EEOC tends to 
process an ADEA charge the same as a 
Title VII charge. 
(2) The EEOC may bring a civil action on 
behalf of the Charging Party if it 
chooses to do so. 
f. Employers should respond in the same fashion 
as to a Title VII charge. 
B. Responding to charges filed with the Kentucky Commission 
on Human Rights (KCHR) and the Lexington-Fayette Urban 
County Human Rights Commission (LFUCHRC). 
1. Governing law: 
a. KCHR - KRS Chapter 344 (Kentucky Civil Rights 
Act) and 104 KAR 1:020 et seq. 
b. LFUCHRC - KRS Chapter 344, Ordinance No. 166-
92, and the Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the LFUCHRC. 
2. How the Complaint (same as charge under Title VII) 
is filed. 
a. Written sworn complaint KRS 344.200; 104 KAR 
1:020, Section 1(2)(a) and (c). 
( 1) It is sufficient under Title VI I that 
charge merely be signed by a Charging 
Party who "declares under penalty of 
perjury" that the charge is true. 
~- .~~. '. --.:. _.~ 'it,. 
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(2) But under state law, it is necessary that 
the signature be notarized. 
3. Time limit for filing Complaint: Within 180 days 
of the alleged unlawful employment practice. KRS 
344.200(1); Section 2.010 3. of the Rules of 
Practice and Procedures of the LFUCHRC. 
4. Interrelationship of state and federal law. 
a. It is the common practice of both the state 
c. deferral agencies (KCHR and LFUCHRC) and the 
EEOC to dual file all complaints/charges with 
each other. 
b. If either of the state agencies elects to take 
jurisdiction and investigate a charge, the 
EEOC holds its investigation in abeyance until 
the conclusion of the state or local agency 
processing. 
(I) Typically, the EEOC simply adopts the 
disposition of the charge made by the 
KCHR or LFUCHRC. 
(2) Both the KCHR and LFUCHRC have work 
sharing agreements with EEOC under which 
the Kentucky agencies are reimbursed for 
investigating charges for the EEOC. 
(3) Accordingly, you will much more 
frequently be involved with the Kentucky 
agencies than EEOC. 
5. Procedure of the KCHR and LFUCHRC. 
a. From the filing of the charge through 
investigation, probable cause determination, 
and conciliation, there are only these two 
significant differences between the processing 
by the Kentucky agencies and the EEOC. 
(1) KRS 344.210(1) mandates that within 60 
days of the filing of the complaint, 
unless it has been dismissed or 
conciliated, the matter must be set for a 
hearing. 
(a) In the past, the mandate was ignored 
and waivers were obtained from the 
employer as to the setting of the 
matter for hearing. 
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(b) However, a recent case decided by 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
decided that KRS 344.210(1) was 
mandatory. 
(c) Consequently, all cases are now 
being set for hearing within 60 days 
of the complaint being filed 
however, cases are typically set for 
dates months in the future to give 
adequate time for investigation and 
conciliation. 
(2) Once conciliation has failed, the major 
difference in procedures appears - unlike 
the EEOC which either files suit in court 
on behalf of the Charging Party or issues 
an authorization to the Charging Party to 
file suit, the KCHR and the LFUCHRC 
conduct formal hearings, determine 
whether a violation has occurred, and 
direct remedies for such violations. 
b. Hearings before the KCHR and LFUCHRC. 
(1) Conducted under their own procedural 
regulations. 
(2) Conducted before hearing officers who may 
be Commissioners or outside persons 
(normally attorneys) hired to conduct the 
hearing. 
(3) The case for the Charging Party is 
normally presented by an attorney for the 
Commission. 
(4) At the conclusion of the hearing, parties 
are typically given the opportunity to 
present proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the hearing 
officers. 
(5) The hearing officers normally present 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to a full meeting of the 
Commission for adoption or modification 
and the issuance of an order. 
(6) Very important to present all facts 
favorable to the employer at the hearing 
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as no further evidence will be taken on 
appeal. 
(a) Either party may appeal the 
Commission's order to the Circuit 
Court of the county where the 
alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred. 
(b) On appeal, the Court's scope of 
review is extremely limited - "the 
findings of fact of the Commission 
shall be conclusive unless clearly 
erroneous. in view of the probative 
and substantial evidence on the 
whole record." KRS 344.240(2). 
c. Discovery by employers in preparation for 
hearings. 
(I) KRS 344.260 and 344.200(7) appear to 
provide for discovery by either party 
before the KCHR. 
(2) Neither Ordinance No. 166-92 nor the 
LFUCHRC's Rules of Practice and Procedure 
expressly provides for discovery by 
employers, but in practice employers have 
generally been allowed to take 
depositions. 
(3) Employers may, at least after a 
determination of cause has been made, 
obtain access to the investigative files 
of the KCHR and LFUCHRC under the 
Kentucky Open Records Act and of the EEOC 
under the federal Freedom of Information 
Act. 
C. General Observations. 
1. Proceedings before the EEOC, KCHR and the LFUCHRC 
are adversary proceedings and should be approached 
from that standpoint. 
a. Do not be mislead into thinking that the EEOC, 
KCHR, or the LFUCHRC or their staffs are 
simply objective fact-finders. 
b. Where there is any doubt at all, the staffs of 
those agencies will favor the Charging Party. 
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c. Accordingly, it is imperative that you present 
the employer I s side in its most favorable 
light - do not expect the agency staffs to 
solicit or present evidence favorable to the 
employer. 
2. The quality of due process that the employer will 
receive at hearings before the KCHR and the LFUCHRC 
is not high, and to the extent that the employer 
can steer the proceedings to the EEOC and thus 
ul timately to the federal courts rather than to 
hearings before the KCHR and the LFUCHRC, it will 
normally want to do so. 
3. Nothing is gained by alienating the staffs of the 
agencies. 
a. Be firm when you believe you are right, but -
b. Be courteous and polite to the staff members. 
c. Establish a personal rapport with them. 
III. WAGE AND HOUR CLAIMS 
A. The Agencies. 
1. Federal - Wage and Hour Division of the Employment 
Standards Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. 
2. Kentucky Division of Employment Standards & 
Mediation of the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. 
B. Governing Law. 
1. Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 
U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.). 
2. State - KRS Chapter 337. 
C. The administrative process. 
1. The investigation. 
a. Nearly always the result of an employee 
complaint. 
b. Request for payroll records. 
(1) Even though Kentucky employers are only 
required to keep wage and hour records 
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for one year (KRS 337.320), if they are 
retained, the Kentucky Labor Cabinet has 
the right to inspect them. Cabe v. 
Kitchen, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 96 (1967). 
(a) The Kentucky Division of Employment 
Standards & Mediation has taken the 
position it can inspect records five 
years old if it chooses. 
(b) Frequently Kentucky investigators 
are satisfied with auditing one or 
two years of records - this is an 
area where there is room for 
negotiation with the investigator. 
(2) The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
requires the retention of most wage and 
hour records for three years and federal 
investigators typically audit three 
years. 
(3) If an employer can in good faith assert 
that records beyond one year are in 
permanent storage and can be retrieved 
only with some difficulty, frequently the 
investigator will only ask for those 
records readily available. 
(4) To the extent that the employer can 
reduce the number of years audited, it 
has substantially reduced its potential 
liability. 
c. Come into compliance immediately the 
limitations periods run from the date a 
lawsuit is filed against the employer - not 
from the date the investigation commenced. 
2. Assessment against the employer if a violation is 
found. 
a. Request that the assessment be made in writing 
detailing the amounts due to each employee for 
specific time periods. 
b. Explore the possibilities of settlement. 
(1) Most wage & hour claims are settled. 
(2) Immediately after the assessment is the 
most opportune time to settle. 
J - 13 
(3) Pressures on the agency to settle: 
(a) Litigation is time-consuming - by 
the time the agency is prepared to 
file suit, much of the back wages 
may be cut off by the statutes of 
limitations. 
(b) The agency loses control of the 
process once it is recommended for 
litigation or hearing. 
(4) Pressures on theemployer:-
(a) Liquidated damages if case goes to 
trial and employer loses. 
(b) Expense of litigation. 
c. Possible settlement strategies: 
(1) Agree to pay the complaining employee all 
back wages but no one else. 
(2) Agree to pay current employees all or a 
portion of back wages due but not former 
employees (who the agency knows will be 
dif'ficult to locate anyway). 
(3) Agree to pay former employees only if 
they individually petition the agency for 
relief. 
3. If case cannot be settled at the time the 
assessment is made: 
a. Federal - the case will be submitted to the 
Solicitors of the U.S. Department of Labor by 
the Area Director with a recommendation for 
litigation. 
( 1) Employer may then try to 
solicitors that its legal 
position is correct or 
conv ince the 
or factual 
(2) Settle it with the solicitors prior to a 
suit being filed. 
b. State-
J -14 
(1) The Commissioner of Workplace Standards 
makes findings of fact which become a 
final order in fifteen days. 
(2) Either party suffering from these 
findings may petition for a fact-finding 
hearing to be conducted by the 
Commissioner or his authorized agent. 
( 3 ) An appeal may be taken to the circuit 
court from the determination of the 
Commissioner but no new evidence may be. 
taken and the scope of the court's review 
is very limited. 
(4) Accordingly, there is not much room for 
maneuver under the state proceedings once 
the matter passes the point of 
assessment. 
IV. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMS 
A. The Agency Division for Unemployment Insurance, 
Department for Employment Services, Kentucky Cabinet for 
Human Resources. 
B. Governing law - KRS Chapter 341 and 903 KAR 5:010 et seq. 
C. The administrative process. 
1. Claim by former employee is made at an unemployment 
insurance office. 
2. Notice of Claim is sent to former employer (Initial 
Claim for Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Form UI 
- 401). 
a. Form contains information provided by employee 
and elicits information from employer with 
regard to the circumstances of the termination 
of employment. 
b. If an employer receives this form, it means 
that the employer is believed to be the most 
recent employer of the claimant for whom the 
claimant has worked in each of ten weeks 
(whether or not consecutive) and that the 
employer will therefore be the one whose 
account will be charged with any benefits. 
c. If the employer has indicated he was separated 
for any reason other than lack of work, there 
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will be a fact-finding interview date and time 
on the form. 
d. Employer should complete the reverse side of 
the form, gl v1ng reason for discharge and 
indicating whether it will attend the fact-
finding interview. 
(1) If you intend to contest the payment of 
benefi ts, you should attend the fact-
finding interview if possible. 
(2) If you c-annot atterid--the-interview, you 
must ensure that the "Employer's 
Statement" on the form is completed in 
detail describing the reason for the 
discharge. 
3. Fact-Finding Interview. 
a. Not conducted under oath. 
b. Interviewer will ask claimant and employer to 
state their positions as to reasons for 
discharge. 
c. Not normally necessary to be represented by 
counsel at this stage. 
4. Notice of Determination. 
a. Form is mailed to both parties. 
b. Provides the initial determination as to 
eligibility for benefits. 
c. Appeal from Determination. 
(1) Either party may appeal the Determination 
by sending a letter to the Division's 
local office (address shown on the 
Determination) postmarked no later than 
15 days after the date of the 
Determination. 
(2) If such an appeal is filed, a hearing 
before a Referee will be scheduled. 
5. Referee Hearing. 
a. Both parties will receive a notice of the 
date, time, and place of hearing. 
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b. Telephone hearings. 
(1) Sometimes the 
Division sets 
telephone. 




(2) You need not, and usually should not, 
accept a telephone hearing. 
c. Subpoenas will be issued by the Division on 
behalf of either party to compel attendance of 
witnesses. 
d. Conduct of hearing. 
(1) In theory, the party having the burden of 
proof puts on its case first. 
(a) In practice, the employer always has 
to put on is case first. 
(b) In misconduct cases, the employer 
clearly has the burden of proof and 
the obligation of putting its case 
on first and being cross-examined by 
the claimant or his representative. 
(2) Following the employer's proof, the 
claimant will put on his proof followed 
by cross-examination by the employer or 
his representative: 
(3 ) If either side is unrepresented by 
counsel and incapable of putting on its 
proof, the Referee will elicit proof that 
appears appropriate. 
(4) Normally, at the close of proof, the 






should make a closing 
stating concisely why 
should be denied the 
(b) The appropriate sections of the 
statutes and a short summary of the 
proof that was developed should be 
cited showing why the employer's 
position is correct. 
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(5) It is important to remember that this 
hearing is your only opportunity to put 
on evidence and you must therefore give 
it your best effort. 
(a) Have witnesses present with first-
hand knowledge of the facts 
although Referees are not precluded 
from accepting hearsay evidence at 
hearings, it will not prevail 
against non-hearsay evidence 
introduced by the other side. 
(b) If witnesses are not going to be 
available on the hearing date, make 
a timely request for a change of 
hearing date. 
(c) Referee Hearings are tape-recorded. 
e. Subsequent to the hearing, the Referee will 
issue a Referee Decision 
6. Appeal of the Referee Decision to the Kentucky 
Unemployment Insurance Commission. 
a. Either party may appeal the Referee Decision 
to the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance 
Commission by sending a letter to the 
Commission, which letter must be filed with 
the Commission within fifteen days of the 
mailing date of the Referee Decision. 
b. The Commission will notify the parties of a 
date for the filing of written arguments by 
the parties (normally 10 days for the 
appellant and 7 days thereafter for the 
appellee) . 
c. It may, but seldom does, schedule oral 
arguments before it by the parties. 
d. The parties may request a copy of the tape-
recording of the Referee Hearing for their use 
in preparing their arguments. 
e. After reviewing the written and/or oral 
arguments of the parties, the Commission will 
issu~ its decision to the parties. 
7. Appeal of the decision of the Kentucky Unemployment 
Insurance Commission to the Circuit Court. 
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a. Either party may appeal the decision of the 
Commission to the Circuit Court of the county 
where the claimant was last employed. 
b. Such appeals are heard by the Circuit Court on 
the record in a summary fashion. 
c. Circuit Court will not reverse a decision of 
the Commission if it is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Whether to be represented by legal 
Unemployment Insurance proceedings. 
counsel in 
1. Prior to an amendment to KRS 341.470, corporate or 
partnership employers could not be represented in 
such proceedings by a non-attorney. 
2. However, KRS 341.470(3)(b) provides that corporate 
and partnership employers may be represented by an 
officer or manager of the corporation or 
partnership. 
3. Employers should carefully consider the use of 
legal counsel to represent them in such proceedings 
particularly where it appears that the claimant may 
file other claims, charges or lawsuits against the 
employer. 




of the unemployment insurance 
will not have res judicata or 
estoppel effect in subsequent 
in other forums. KRS 341.420(5). 
b. Even though the proceedings do not have a res 
judicata effect, the psychological effect of 
defeating the employer in the unemployment 
insurance proceedings may encourage the 
employee to file other claims, charges or 
lawsuits against the employer. 
c. Also note that statements made under oath in 
unemployment insurance proceedings may be used 
for impeachment of witnesses in subsequent 
proceedings. 
E. General Considerations. 
1. Always request a copy of the tape of Referee 
Hearings whether they are appealed or not. 
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a. It contains testimony under oath which may 
well be inconsistent with the testimony of the 
former employee in subsequent proceedings 
before other agencies or courts. 
b. The tapes are destroyed in approximately 60 
days if no appeal has been taken. 
2. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission 
prepares for sale at cost the Kentucky Unemployment 
Insurance Digest, a syllabus of Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Decisions, the latest having been 
prepared in 19~1.-
3. Definition of "misconduct". 
a. The general definition is provided by the case 
of Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck, Wis., 296 
N.W. 636 which has been adopted by the 
Kentucky courts: 
Conduct evincing such willful or 
wanton disregard of an employer's 
interests as found in deliberate 
violations or disregard of standards 
of behavior which the employer has 
the right to expect of the employee, 
or in carelessness· or negligence of 
such degree or recurrence as to 
manifest equal culpability, wrongful 
intent or evil design, or to show an 
intentional disregard of the 
employer's interests or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to 
his employer. 
b. The .Kentucky legislature has further defined 
"misconduct" by non-exclusive· example to 
include: 
Falsification of an employment 
application to obtain employment 
through subterfuge; knowing 
violation of a reasonable and 
uniformly enforced rule of an 
employer; unsatisfactory attendance, 
if the worker cannot show good cause 
for absence or tardiness; damaging 
the employer's property through 
gross negligence; refusing to obey 
reasonable instructions; reporting 
to work under the influence of 
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alcohol or drugs or consuming 
alcohol or drugs on employer's 
premises during working hours; 
conduct endangering safety of self 
or co-workers; and incarceration in 
jail following conviction of a 
misdemeanor or felony by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, which 
results in missing at least five (5) 
days work. 
- KRS 341.370(6). 
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HIV POSITIVE PERSONS AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASES: 
Employment and Workplace Considerations 
I. Introduction 
Throughout history! persons with certain communicable 
diseases have been discriminated against by the larger society. The 
Bible tells of the ostracism of lepers, and during more modern 
times, victims of tuberculosis and other contagious diseases were 
shunned and feared. In recent years, the discovery of the human 
immunodeficiency virus, which causes acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), has provoked a new wave of fear. Since the AIDS 
virus was first discovered in the United States in 1981, the public 
has become increasingly concerned with the spread of this deadly 
disease. Statistics show that in 1981, 164 people in the U.S. had 
died from AIDS; in 1993 the death-toll is estimated to be between 
53,000 and 76,000. 1 
In addition, although once believed to be a disease limited 
to male homosexuals, AIDS now infects an ever-increasing number of 
heterosexuals of both sexes. As of March, 1992, an estimated 12,881 
individuals (or approximately 25% of the total number infected) had 
acquired the virus through heterosexual contact. 2 
Because the disease is terminal and communicable, a fearful 
public has sometimes attempted to isolate the infected individual 
from society at large or to otherwise discriminate against AIDS 
sufferers. This outline will address legal issues as they relate to 
employment of persons infected with the HIV virus that causes AIDS 
and persons with other communicable diseases. 
lKrugel, Charles A. AIDS and the ADA: Maneuvering Through a 
Legal Minefield, July 1993 Labor Law Journal 408.' 
2 Id. at 409. 
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II. AIDS and HIV 
The cause of AIDS is the human T cell lymphotropic virus 
type III (often referred to as HIV or HTLV-III). A person infected 
with HIV but who is otherwise asymptomatic is sometimes referred to 
as being HIV-positive. Medical researchers believe that many 
persons are infected with HIV but develop antibodies and do not 
develop further complications. A minority of HIV-positive 
individuals (perhaps as few as 30%) develop AIDS-related complex 
(ARC), and a smaller number (estimated as low as 10%) develop AIDS. 
Persons with AIDS have a severely impaired immune system and are 
thus susceptible to a variety of other illnesses. There is 
presently no known cure for AIDS, although several treatments have 
had limited success in prolonging life and in delaying the onset of 
more serious complications. AIDS sufferers typically die within 
five years of diagnosis, not of AIDS itself, but of one or more of 
the many diseases which the victim's impaired immune system cannot 
overcome. The diseases that can result from AIDS include pneumonia, 
cancer and brain degeneration resulting in dementia. 
The AIDS virus is found in bodily fluids of infected 
individuals, including in blood, semen, feces, tears, saliva, human 
milk and urine. The principal means by which the virus is 
transmitted between individuals are: (1) sexual contact (2) sharing 
of contaminated needles (3) transfusions of infected blood or blood 
products (a cause now virtually eliminated in the United States 
through improved methods of testing the supply of blood or blood 
products) and (4) perinatal transmission from an infected mother to 
infant, either in utero or through breast feeding. 
Most medical experts, including the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), conclude that the disease cannot be transmitted 
casually, such as by shaking hands, sharing toilets or through 
food, and there is also believed to be a very low risk of 
transmission even where there is limited contact with bodily fluids 
of an infected individual, such as through mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation or human bites. Despite these findings, however, the 












ques tions and 
through dental 
fears regarding 
Blood tests can determine the presence of HIV in an infected 
individual. TypicallYr two types of tests are used. First r an 
inexpensive screening test determines whether blood infection is 
present. A more expensive r confirmatory test may then be used to 
verify the positive screening test result. A positive result 
indicates only that the individual has been exposed to the virus r 
and not that the individual will develop either ARC or AIDS. 
Moreover r the antibodies that cause a posi ti ve result on blood 
tests do not develop immediately upon exposure to the virus. An 
infected person may test negative for several months after 
exposure. 
III. Statutory Framework 
A. Federal law. At least five federal statutes have some 
degree of application to the issues posed by communicable diseases 
in the workplace. Two of them r the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
U.S.C. 701 et. seq.) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 
U.S.C. 12101 et. seq.) (ADA) apply directly to employment 
discrimination against individuals with a communicable disease. 
Although both of these statutes are designed to prevent 
discrimination in the workplace r they differ somewhat in their 
substantive provisions r and significantly in the scope of their 
applicability and available remedies. 
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This statute 
provides that " [n] 0 otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability ... shall r solely by reason of her or his disabilitYr be 
excluded from the participation inr be denied the benefits ofr or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal Financial Assistance .... " 
The scope of this Act limits its applicability to employers 
receiving federal monies. Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
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Act, an individual may bring a private right of action, and 
remedies include back pay and attorneys' fees. 
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. This 
statute was specifically designed to prevent employment 
discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability". 
A qualified individual is one "with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires." 
The ADA defines disability as one of the following (a) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of the individual; (b) having a record 
of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an 
impairment. The Act expressly states that an employer may not 
discriminate against an individual wi th a contagious disease unless 
the disease poses a "direct threat" to others. It is generally 
agreed (and at least one court has observed in dicta) that positive 
HIV status and AIDS-related conditions would be encompassed by the 
Act's definition of a contagious diseases. See Robbins v. Clark, 
946 F. 2d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Discrimination may exist when "reasonable accommodation" is 
not made. This includes: "(A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work 
schedules ... and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabili ties." Employers need not make reasonable accommodation if 
to do so would present an undue hardship to the employer, which is 
defined as requlrlng significant difficulty or expense, when 
considered in light of the size and financial condition of the 
employer, as well as other factors, and also takes into account 
whether the accommodation would disrupt the employer's business. 
Medical examinations are permitted under ADA only if they 
are administered to all employees, if they are required only after 
an employment offer has been made and before commencement of the 
employee's duties, and where the reasons for the examination are 
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job-related and consistent with business necessity. If exams are 
undertaken, the results must be kept in a separate confidential 
file. 
Because of lobbying efforts by the restaurant and 
hospitality industrYI the ADA permits discriminatory treatment of 
food handlers suffering from contagious diseases I provided the 
disease appears on a list to be compiled by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) of infectious and communicable 
diseases that are transmitted through the handling of food. Despite 
the exemption, the employer is to determine whether there is a 
reasonable accommodation that will eliminate the risk of 
transmission of the disease through food handling. If such an 
accommodation exists that will not pose an undue hardship on the 
employer, the employer must provide the accommodation. If no 
reasonable accommodation without undue hardship is possible l the 
employer may refuse to assign the person to a food handling job. 
Although this exemption was intended to afford some comfort to food 
service employers lit is unlikely that AIDS or HIV posi ti ve 
infection will appear on the list to be maintained by DHHS 1 in 
light of the generally accepted fact that these diseases are not 
transmitted through food. 
In contrast with the Rehabilitation Act, the scope of ADA is 
extremely broad. Any employer with 25 or more employees is covered; 
after July 26, 1994, any employer with 15 or more employees will be 
. covered. The ADA provides for recovery of attorneys' fees, as well 
as for compensatory and punitive damages. 
3. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 
1971, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461 (ERISA). Although a comprehensive 
discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of this outline l this 
statute includes prohibitions against discharging or otherwise 
discriminating against employees for the purpose of interfering 
with their right to claim benefits under an employee benefit plan. 
In a recent case, Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 
(W.D.Mo. 1984), a U.S. District Court awarded damages to an 
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employee who was discharged by the employer to avoid the economic 
consequences of the employee's medical condition (multiple 
sclerosis) to the employer's self - funded medical plan. AIDS is also 
an expensive medical condition, and cases have raised the issue of 
the rights of employers to limit benefits payable for AIDS-related 
expenses under medical benefit plans. These issues are discussed 
separately in Section VIII of this outline. 
4. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 651 
et. seq. <OSHA). Al though no reported decisions have as yet 
involved issues posed by AIDS as they relate to the protections 
afforded by OSHA I this statute could be used as the basis of a 
claim by uninfected persons whose assigned tasks place them in 
contact with infected co-workers or other individuals. As an 
employer considers whether a contagious employee poses a "direct 
threat" to others (as contemplated by ADA) it must also determine 
whether requiring the other employees to work with infected 
individuals is consistent with its duty to furnish a hazard-free 
workplace. OSHA also precludes employers from retaliation against 
employees who refuse to perform assigned tasks that the employees 
reasonably believe pose a danger. 
OSHA has also promulgated guidelines for reducing the risk 
to health care workers of exposure to blood-borne illnesses. These 
guidelines are discussed separately in Section VII B of this 
outline. 
5. Family and Medical Leave Act 29 U.S.C. 2601 et. seq. 
(FMLA) . This statute requires that employees receive up to 12 weeks 
of unpaid leave, either continuous or intermittent, under certain 
circumstances I including a serious health condition. The EEOC has 
not yet addressed the issue of whether reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA could require medical leave in excess of the maximum 
prescribed by the FMLA. Because of the serious nature of AIDS-
related illnesses I however, it is possible that in the absence of 
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a showing by the employer of undue hardship, leave beyond that 
mandated by FMLA could be required. 
B. State statutes. 
1. Handicap discrimination laws. Most states have 
statutes which prohibit discrimination against handicapped 
individuals. The definition of handicap and the level of protection 
afforded varies from state to state, and has resulted in disparate 
results when AIDS-based discrimination cases are decided. Some 
statutes specifically exempt discrimination against individuals 
with contagious diseases from the prohibited conduct. 
2. AIDS-specific statutes. Some states, including 
Kentucky, have enacted statues which specifically prohibit 
discrimination against persons infected with AIDS. The Kentucky law 
prohibi ting AIDS -based discrimination is included in the Equal 
Opportunities Act (K.R.S. 207.130 et. seq.) which, among other 
things, generally prohibits discrimination in employment because of 
a handicap. 
Under the Act, an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire, 
discharge or discriminate against any handicapped individual with 
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms and 
conditions of employment ... on the basis of the results of a human 
immunodeficiency virus-related test, unless the absence of human 
immunodeficiency virus infection is a bona fide occupational 
qualification of the job in question; nor shall any employer limit, 
segregate or classify handicapped individuals in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any handicapped individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise affect employee status ... on 
the basis of the results of a human immunodeficiency virus related 
test, unless the handicap or absence of human immunodeficiency 
virus infection, constitutes a bona fide and necessary reason for 
the limitation, segregation or classification." K.R.S. 207.150. 
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In addition, K.R.S. 207.135 specifically grants the 
protections of the anti-handicap discrimination statute (K.R.S. 
207.130 to 207.240) to persons with AIDS, AIDS-related complex 
(ARC), or human immunodeficiency virus. This section of the law 
prohibits any person from requiring an AIDS test as a condition of 
employment or continued employment unless the absence of the virus 
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job in 
question. The burden of proof as to the BFOQ is on the employer, 
who is required (i) to ascertain whether the employee is currently 
able to perform the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or 
whether the employee will pose a "significant risk" of transmitting 
the virus to others in the course of normal work activities and 
(ii) to establish that there is no means of reasonably 
accommodating the employee's AIDS status short of requiring the 
test. K.R.S. 207.135(2) (b). 
The statute further provides that if an employer asserts 
that an AIDS-infected individual is not otherwise qualified for the 
job, the employer has the burden of proving that no reasonable 
accommodation can be made to prevent the likelihood of exposure of 
others to a significant possibility of becoming infected. K.R.S. 
207.135(3) (c). Finally, the statute prohibits discrimination 
against licensed health care professionals on the basis that they 
treat or provide care to AIDS-infected individuals. K.R.S. 
207.135(d) . 
IV. Federal Case Law 
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
subject of AIDS and employment discrimination. Moreover, much of 
the case law pertaining to communicable diseases in employment 
developed prior to passage of the ADA, either under. the 
Rehabilitation Act or various state anti-discrimination statutes. 
In light of the comprehensive scope of ADA, however, practitioners 
should expect courts to grant at least as much protection to 
employees with communicab"le diseases in cases brought under ADA as 
has been afforded under these older statutes. 
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A. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. The leading 
case dealing with contagious disease in the workplace was decided 
under the Rehabilitation Act. In that case, School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh'g. den. 481 U.S. 1024 
(1987), the United States Supreme Court was presented wi th the case 
of an elementary school teacher who had been discharged after 
suffering a relapse of tuberculosis. The Court's determination 
centered on whether the teacher's continued presence In the 
workplace constituted a significant risk of passing the disease to 
others. The Court outlined four factors to be considered in such a 
determination. They are: (1) the nature of the risk (i.e., how the 
disease is transmitted); (2) the duration of the risk (how long the 
carrier is infectious); (3) the severity of the risk (the potential 
harm to others); and (4) the probabilities that the disease will be 
transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm. 
B. AIDS-Based Discrimination. Most of the reported 
decisions have found that it is illegal to discriminate against an 
employee on the basis of AIDS or HIV-positive status. An early 
federal case, Chalk v. United States District Court of Central 
California, 840 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) is typical. In that case, 
Chalk, a certified teacher of hearing-impaired students, was 
removed from his teaching assignment and offered an administrative 
position after having been diagnosed as having AIDS. In reversing 
the district court's finding in favor of the school board, the 
Ninth Circuit, basing its decision largely on Arline, issued an 
injunction allowing Chalk to return to the classroom. In its 
holding, the court observed that since the disease cannot be 
casually transmitted, the risk to the students was minimal. 
Similarly, in the now well-known case of Cain v. Hyatt, 734 
F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990), a federal district court found that 
Hyatt Legal Services had illegally discriminated against one of its 
regional partners by relieving him of his duties with~n a week of 
his being diagnosed with AIDS. The court, interpreting the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, found that there was no actual 
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risk of infection to others in the workplace. The plaintiff was 
awarded damages for mental anguish and humiliation, backpay, and 
punitive damages. 
C. No Discrimination Found. In a minority of decisions, 
courts have declined to find that AIDS was a handicap or that the 
employer's conduct was discriminatory. In Hilton v. Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co., 936 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff's 
employer refused to return him to his position after ARC-related 
illness forced absence from his job. He sued under the Texas Human 
Rights Act alleging discrimination. The Fifth Circuit found that 
the plaintiff was not a handicapped person under the Texas Act. In 
so doing, the court strictly construed the statute, noting that the 
physical conditions in the statute referred to physiological not 
pathological conditions. The court determined that AIDS was an 
"invisible, pathological" condition. The court also noted that the 
plaintiff's illness made him unable to perform the duties of his 
job. This last ground for the decision appears to be a sound one, 
and could alone have supported the decision. In light of ADA and 
the majority of cases which find that AIDS does constitute a 
disability, employers should likely not rely on the highly 
technical distinction as to physical condition drawn by the Hilton 
court. 
HIV testing was involved in another case where no 
discrimination was found. In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of 
Hospital District No. I, 909 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990), 
interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the defendant 
hospital fired the plaintiff for refusing to disclose the positive 
result of a private HIV test he had taken. The hospital 
successfully argued that it needed the results in order to 
undertake reasonable accommodation of the employee's condition. The 
court further determined that the plaintiff -employee's actions 
rendered him otherwise not qualified to perform his duties. This 




worker and thus, presumably, a higher risk of transmitting the 
infection to others. 
V. State Case Law. Most litigation related to AIDS- and 
communicable disease-based discrimination in the workplace has 
occurred at the state level. Many of those cases hold that 
employees with AIDS are handicapped persons for purposes of state 
anti-discrimination laws. 
A. AIDS-Based Discrimination. A typical state case is 
Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 261 Ca. Rptr. 
197 (Cal. App. 1989). In that case, the plaintiff, a three-year 
employee of Raytheon, was diagnosed as having AIDS and was 
hospi talized for several weeks. After receiving permission from his 
doctor to return to work, he sought to do so, but was required to 
submit to a physical examination. Through the examination, the 
employer I s medical advisor became aware of his condition and, after 
a thorough review of medical literature about the disease and its 
transmission, cleared the employee to return to work. Despite the 
medical findings, the employer delayed his return to his dutiesi 
eventually, the plaintiff developed Kaposi I s sarcoma, a cancer 
associated with AIDS. At that point, the employer refused 
reinstatement, citing as its reason the fact that he had AIDS and 
that co-workers would be exposed to the risk of contracting the 
disease from him. 
The employee filed complaints alleging discrimination based 
on physical handicap. The state administrative agency found that he 
had been discriminated against on this basis, and the employer 
appealed. The California Court of Appeals for the Second District 
found in the employee's favor, indicating that an employee with 
AIDS was suffering from a physical handicap and that the risk of 
transmission to co-workers had been exaggerated by the employer. 
B. positive HIV Status. Additional questions are presented 
when the employee does not have AIDS or, in fact, any symptoms, but 
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has merely tested positively for the HIV virus. Several state court 
opinions have discussed this issue, and reached differing 
conclusions. In Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390S.E. 2d 
814 (W.Va. 1990), an employee who advised his supervisor of HIV-
positive test results was subsequently discharged and filed a 
discrimination claim against the employer. The federal court 
receiving the complaint certified the question to the West Virginia 
Supreme Court as to whether an HIV-positive person was handicapped 
wi thin the West Virginia anti-discrimination statute. The state 
court found that HIV-positive status was a protected handicap under 
the statute even in the absence of symptoms. The court emphasized 
that the medical condition would have a strong negative impact on 
"socialization", which the court found to be a "major life 
function 11 • 
An opposite result was reached in Burgess v. Your House of 
Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E. 2d 134 (N.C. 1990). There, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the discharge of a restaurant cook 
who had tested positive for the HIV virus. The court in Burgess 
found that the language of the state statute was not intended to 
protect persons with HIV. It is important to note also that the 
North Carolina statute contained a communicable disease exemption, 
i.e., a provision that pe~itted discrimination against ~ersons 
with communicable diseases. Also, the qourt noted that the 
legislature had made subsequent modifications to the statute 
without adding a provision protecting HIV-positive individuals. (In 
1989, however, North Carolina enacted the Communicable Disease Law, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 130-A-148, which now protects HIV-positive 
individuals. ) 
Also of note is the fact that following the Court's· 
decision in Arline, the Department of Justice reversed an earlier 
analysis of the issue of whether an employee is disabled if the 
discrimination suffered was the result of fear of contagion. The 
department's more recent opinion indicates that the federal 
definition of "handicapped" would encompass asymptomatic carriers 
of HIV as well as sufferers of AIDS. See Application of 
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Rehabili tation Act's Section 504 to HIV - Infected Individuals, 
Memorandum of the u. S. Department of Jus tice, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 195, at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988). 
C. False Perception of HIV Infection. Yet another category 
of cases involves employees who have neither AIDS nor HIV, but who 
are falsely rumored or perceived to have AIDS or HIV. Courts are 
divided as to whether these individuals should be afforded the 
protection of state handicap anti-discrimination laws. In a typical· 
case, Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W. 2d 657 (Mich. 1992), an 
employer fired a waitress who was rumored to have AIDS. The 
employer first required her to submit medical evidence indicating 
she did not have the disease. She did so, but refused to return to 
work due to the humiliation she claimed to have suffered, and then 
filed a· complaint of discrimination. The court found for the 
employee, finding first that AIDS was a handicap under Michigan 
law, and then finding that it is the employer's conduct, "the 
employer's belief or intent - and not the employee's condition" 
that must be examined. Id. at 660. 
In contrast to Sanchez, the case of Rose City Oil v. 
Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 832 S.W. 2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1992) holds that employer conduct based on false perception of AIDS 
is not discriminatory. In that case the court found that the 
plaintiff had no condition that would be protected under the 
statute. 
No Kentucky cases have been reported in which the issue has 
been addressed. It is important to note that the Kentucky statute 
does not expressly address the issue of perceived, rather than 
actual, disabilities. HIV positive persons are specifically 
protected, however, even in the absence of symptoms. Moreover, 
under the ADA an individual is regarded as disabled even if he or 
she is only perceived to have an impairment, which is defined by 
regulation as a~ inability to perform a major life activity that 
the average person in the general population can perform, or can 
only perform wi th significant restrictions. See Regulations to 
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Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. part 1630 (1992) (hereinafter cited as 
"ADA Regulations") . 
VI. EmDlover Defenses to Discrimination Claims. In addition to 
asserting that the AIDS-related or other communicable disease is 
not a disability or handicap under applicable law, employers may 
defend against claims by asserting that reasonable accommodation 
cannot be made due to undue hardship, or that despite reasonable 
accommodation, the infected person poses a direct threat to others. 
A. Direct threat. The employer may discriminate against 
an individual with a communicable disease if that individual would 
pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. This has been 
defined to mean a significant risk of substantial harm to the 
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be reduced 
to an acceptable level or eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 
The fear of workplace transmission of AIDS is simply not 
supported by experience. Through August of 1991, the CDC had 
confirmed only 28 cases of AIDS through occupational transmission. 
This represents a total of less than 0.003% of all reported cases 
of AIDS. Moreover, there are no known cases of casual transmission 
of the disease in the workplace. Despi te the relatively small risk 
of transmission, however, the nature of tasks performed by health 
care workers involving contact wi th bodily fluids and tissues makes 
the fear of infection a reasonable one. For this reason, many of 
the cases interpreting whether a "direct threat" exists involve 
health care employment. 
The "direct threat" defense requires an employer to engage 
in a risk analysis. The EEOC has stated that the employer should 
consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the 
harm, the likelihood that the harm will occur, and the imminence of 
the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1630.2(r) (1992). This analysis 
is a departure from pre-ADA cases, in which employers were 
permitted to restrict a health care worker's activities when faced 
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with virtually any possibility of infection to others. In Estate of 
Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 592 A. 2d 1251 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), for example, a "no risk" standard was 
applied to permit the employer-hospital to ban a surgeon with AIDS 
from performing invasive procedures. This case could well have had 
a different outcome under the ADA, since the CDC has issued 
guidelines which suggest case-by-case study by a medical review 
board and the consistent use of certain prescribed safeguards by 
all health care workers. See generally, Prewi tt, R.B., "The Direct 
Threat Approach to the HIV-Positive Health Care Employee Under the 
ADA," 62 Miss. L.J. 719 (Spr. 1993). 
In general, the CDC guidelines attempt a determination of 
whether a given health care task renders others "exposure prone to 
transmission of infection by the health care worker." The 
guidelines, coupled with increasing knowledge about AIDS and the 
methods by which it is transmitted, have resulted in decisions more 
favorable to the employee than that rendered in Behringer. For 
example, in In re Westchester County Medical Center, No. 91-504-2 
(Dep't. HHS App. Bd. April 20, 1992), an administrative proceeding, 
an HIV-positive pharmacist was permitted to continue his regular 
duties- including preparation of intravenous materials - when the 
judge determined there was no significant risk of transmission of 
the disease. 
B. Reasonable accommodation.- Once a significant risk of 
transmission is determined to exist, the employer must examine 
whether the risk of infection to others can be negated by 
reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation initially 
invol ves analyzing the job's functions to determine which are 
considered essential and which are marginal. Reasonable 
accommodation may include restructuring the job, i.e., reallocating 
or redistributing nonessential job functions of the infected 
worker. It may also involve altering when or how essential 
functions of the job are performed, but does not require 
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elimination of essential job functions. 29 C.F.R. app. Sec. 
1630.2 (0) (1992). 
If the infected employee cannot be reasonably accommodated 
in his original position, the ADA appears to require that he or she 
be reassigned to another vacant position if no undue hardship to 
the employer would result. However, reassignment will not 
substitute for a less drastic form of accommodation. See Chalk v. 
United States, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the 
reassignment of a teacher with AIDS constituted illegal-
discrimination since the classroom position posed no significant 
risk of infection to others. A similar result was reached in the 
Westchester case discussed above. 
C. Undue hardship. An employer is not required to make 
accommodation if to do so would result in an undue hardship to it. 
In interpreting this part of the statute, courts are to look not 
only to the type of accommodation being sought, but also to the 
effect of the accommodation on the employer, the ability of other 
employees to perform their duties, and the impact on the employer's 
ability to conduct its business. ADA Regulations Sec. 
1630.2 (p) (2) (v). The analysis requires the court to determine first 
whether the disabled employee can perform the required job duties 
with an accommodation, and then whether the accommodation imposes 
an undue hardship on the employer. 
In Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987), a 
case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the court evaluated the 
means of accommodation proposed by the applicant, and then 
determined that those alternatives would be costly, potentially 
unsafe, and would often leave the individual without sufficient 
work to do. The court found the proposed accommodation to be an 
undue burden on the employer, and accommodation was therefore not 
required. Similarly, in Davis v. united States Postal Service, 675 
F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987), the court stated that the employer 
was not required to violate existing contracts in order to reassign 
a disabled employee who was otherwise unqualified for reassignment. 
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The amount of additional expense necessary to establish an 
undue hardship will be a function of the size and assets of the 
employer. Moreover, if additional funds to pay for the 
accommodation are available from another source (such as a 
government program, tax credi ts or from. the employee seeking 
accommodation), those resources will be taken into account in 
determining the employer's actual cost of the proposed 
accommodation. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2{p). 
Al though, as· in Dexler, the actual cost of accommodation 
will be considered in determining whether an undue hardship exists, 
an employer's concern over anticipated or future costs-including 
higher insurance costs - has not been recognized by courts. In State 
Div. of Human Rights ex reI. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E. 2d 
695 (N.Y. 1985), another pre-ADA case, an employer claimed that an 
obese employee would cost the employer more in future health care 
costs, citing studies that connected obesity with greater risk of 
health problems. The court rejected this argument $ stating that 
employment can be refused only when the condition is related to 
performing the job duties. Judicial guidance is not yet available 
on the issue of when an employer may find that the employee's 
anticipated absence from work constitutes an undue hardship, but in 
light of the McDermott decision and ADA regulations, the employer 
seeking to avoid Ii tigation should base its actions on current 
attendance patterns, rather than anticipated absences. 
A significant issue that has not yet been judicially 
determined is the right of an employer to take what might otherwise 
be discriminatory action against an employee with a communicable 
disease due to adverse public reaction to the presence of the 
employee in the workplace. This issue could arise in the context of 
retail (especially food service) businesses as well as in the 
health care area. Despite the medical evidence that AIDS is not 
transmitted casually or through food, customers may choose not to 
patronize establishments where an infected worker may handle their 
food or deliver their health care. Congress attempted to address 
this issue for restaurants by including the narrow food-handlers' 
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exemption in the ADA; however/ this portion of the statute will be 
of limited use to employers unless AIDS and related diseases are 
found to be transmittable through food - a finding that appears 
highly unlikely in light of currently available data. 
Can an employer suffering substantially reduced revenues 
claim that to continue to employ an infected individual in a 
customer-contact or food-handling position is an undue hardship? 
Regulations have already established that the irrational fears and 
prejudices of co-workers and resulting disruption of 'business will 
not constitute undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. 1630.15(d). In light of 
this regulation/ claiming undue hardship based on an unfounded 
public perception seems risky. A better course of action would be 
support for public education as to the methods by which these 
diseases are/ and are not/ transmitted. 
VII. Other Employment Issues 
A. HIV testing. An issue frequently raised in the area of 
health care employment is when/ if ever/ it is permissible to test 
employees for the presence of HIV. Calls for mandatory testing 
intensified recently when the infection of several dental patients 
by Dr. David Acer became front-page news. One of those patients, 
Kimberly Bergalis, is believed to be the first patient to have 
become infected with AIDS from a dentist. 
Following this publicity/ several pieces of federal 
legislation were proposed to require that health care workers be 
tested for the presence of the virus, and that the public be 
advised as to the test results. No mandatory testing or disclosure 
laws were enacted; however, an amendment by Senators Robert Dole 
and Orrin Hatch was passed by both houses and requires each state, 
as a condition to receiving federal public-health funds, to adopt 
CDC guidelines or a substitute measure, in its health care 
licensing laws. 
Virtually all professional medical associations and the CDC 
oppose mandatory testing/but support voluntary testing. The 
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primary opposition to mandatory testing is the extremely low 
incidence of transmission of HIV from health care worker to patient 
and the fact that adherence to the guidelines described above is 
believed to further reduce the risk. 
Employers who are contemplating a mandatory testing 
requirement will need to consider several key issues l including 
(for public employers) Fourth Amendment rights I the right to 
privacy I and state and federal discrimination policies. As a 
preliminary inquiry I the employer must establish a need for the 
testing l i.e' l that the job for which testing is a requirement 
interacts wi th others in such a way as to present a risk of 
transmission of blood-borne disease. 
If the employer can establish that such a risk exists l a 
court will likely require that it further establish that the risk 
cannot be eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels through 
adherence to established safety guidelines. This should be easier 
to establish for positions in the health care industry where the 
risk of exposure to blood and bodily fluids of others is high. 
1. Preventive Care Guidelines. Both the CDC and OSHA have 
issued guidelines intended to minimize the risk of transmission of 
blood-borne illnesses in the workplace. (It is interesting to note 
that although the threat of HIV has received wide publicitYI the 
hepatitis B virus (HBV) is more readily transmittable in the health 
. care arena than is HIV). For a description of these guidelines I see 
generally Huebner I "Mandatory Testing of Health Care Workers for 
AIDS: When positive Results Lead to Negative Consequences" I 37 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 339 (1992). These detailed recommendations are 
intended to be applied universally by health care workers and would 
reduce both the risk of transmission of infection from worker to 
patient and the risk of transmission from patient to worker. These 
guidelines can be especially helpful to health care employers who 
are faced with the issue of whether reasonable accommodation for 
HIV infection can be accomplished without undue risk of 
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transmission to others I and whether to undertake testing of 
employees in high risk areas. 
2 . Privacy Rights. In determining whether mandatory 
testing is appropriate l courts seem likely to apply a balancing 
test l weighing the employee's right to privacy and Fourth 
Amendment rights (if applicable) against the public safety issues 
presented. The right to privacy applies not only to the employer's 
right to require testing l but also to the subsequent disclosure of 
test results. 
In most cases where the court was presented wi th a challenge 
to mandatory testing based on the right of privacYI the right to 
test was upheld. In Plowman v. United States Department of Army I 
698 F. Supp. 627 {E.D.Va.1988)1 the Army tested a civilian employee 
without his consent and advised his supervisors of the result. The 
court found no violation of privacy rights. SimilarlYI in Local 
1812, American Federation of Government Employees v. Department of 
State l 662 F. Supp. 50 {D.D.C. 1987)1 no violation of a privacy 
right was found where the Department of State required HIV testing 
as part of a medical fitness program. In that easel the court also 
noted that although an individual may experience psychological 
difficulties as a result of receiving adverse test results l those 
concerns do not raise constitutional privacy issues. 
Other courts have recognized a privacy right, but have found 
it outweighed by the compelling state interest in protection of 
·uninfected persons. See, e.g' l Harris v. Thigpen I 727 F. Supp. 1564 
(M.D. Ala. 1990), regarding testing of prisoners l and Johnetta J. 
v. Municipal Courtl 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Courts appear more willing to find violation of a right of 
privacy when the issue is raised in the context of disseminating 
test results l rather than the employer's right to test at all. In 
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. wis. 1988), the court found 
that a prisoner had a right to privacy that precluded discussion of 
his test results with other prisoners and non-medical personnel. 
See also Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 {D.N.J. 
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1990); but see In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 595 A. 2d. 
1290 (Pa. Super Ct. 1991), where strictly controlled disclosure on 
a need-to-know basis did not violate privacy rights of an HIV-
positive physician. 
3. Fourth Amendment Considerations. Fo~rth amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure can also be a 
challenge to mandatory testing in the context of public employment. 
Blood testing has been found by the U. S. Supreme Court to be a 
personal search subject to Fourteenth Amendment protections. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In at least one case, 
these constitutional protections have been found to outweigh the 
need for mandatory HIV testing of employees, in light of the low 
risk of transmission of disease in the workplace context presented. 
Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. 
Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988). 
B. Protection of Workers. OSHA requires that employers 
provide employees with a workplace free of hazards that pose a risk 
of death or serious harm. While most AIDS litigation has focused on 
the infected employee and his or her rights to remain employed, 
OSHA I S provisions require employers to take appropriate precautions 
to assure the safety of all employees in the workplace. In the case 
of uninfected employees, this means adopting procedures that 
minimize the risk of infection by co-workers or others, such as 
patients in a health care setting. 
OSHA has promulgated guidelines to reduce the risk of 
transmission of AIDS and other blood-borne diseases. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 
1910.1030(d) (3). Under these guidelines, health care employers are 
required to implement a plan to control exposure to these diseases. 
The plan would include providing employees with protective 
equipment, sterilizing and disinfecting the workplace at 
appropriate intervalS, providing designated areas for disposal of 
potentially contaminated wastes, training workers in proper safety 
procedures and providing RBV vaccinations to employees free of 
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charge. Compliance with these guidelines will be monitored by OSHA 
through its inspection process and penalties for noncompliance may 
be assessed. 29 U.S.C. Sees. 657, 666 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
VIII. Limitation of Health Care Benefits of Infected Persons 
The rapidly increasing number of infected individuals and 
the relatively high cost of AIDS treatment (estimated at upwards of 
$85,000 in lifetime costs per victim) have led insurance companies 
-to attempt- to-reduce • their exposure to AIDS.,.related claims. Many 
private insurers now employ underwriting criteria such as blood 
tests or questionnaires intended to screen out persons who may 
develop AIDS or related diseases. 
Unlike private insurance companies, employers who provide or 
sponsor group health benefits to employees generally base their 
decision to insure an employee on his or her employment status with 
the employer, not on the likelihood that he or she will develop 
HIV infection. As employers have become increasingly concerned 
about the high cost of AIDS-related claims (especially since they 
have a lesser ability than insurance companies to keep the 
potential AIDS-claimant out of the insured pool) ,some have sought 
to control or limit these costs through reducing or limiting 
benefits for these claims. In several instances, litigation has 
resul ted over the issues of whether, and to what extent, health 
care benefits for AIDS can be limited. 
In many instances workplace-based health benefits are funded 
by the employer, plan participants, or some combination of the two, 
with little or no third party insurance protection. These self-
funded plans are governed not by insurance law but by the employee 
benefits regulatory framework of ERISA. 
In McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. den. sub. nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 
(1992), a five-year employee was diagnosed with AIDS. At the time 
of diagnosis his employer maintained a heal th benefi t plan that was 
provided through group health insurance purchased from an insurance 
company. The coverage had maximum lifetime benefit limits of $1 
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million. Seven months after the AIDS diagnosis, the employer 
replaced the insurance plan with a self-funded plan, which 
contained a lifetime benefits cap for AIDS of $5,000. No other 
benefit limitation for a specific disease or condition was 
implemented. The plaintiff brought sui t under an anti-
discrimination provision contained in Section 510 of ERISA. Summary 
judgment was granted for the employer, who argued that it had 
imposed the cap for cost containment, and the decision was affirmed 
by the Fifth Circuit. 
Similarly, in Owens v. Storehouse, Inc. , 984 F. 2d 394 
(11th Cir. 1993), the court upheld an employer's right to cap its 
AIDS-related coverage under a self-funded health benefit plan. The 
cap was imposed after five employees had been diagnosed with AIDS. 
In that case, the court specifically rejected that the employer's 
fiduciary duty under ERISA precluded establishment of the benefits 
cap, and also found that ERISA pre-empted state law that might have 
afforded the plaintiffs additional protection. 
It is important to note that both Greenburg and Owens were 
decided before the effectiveness of the ADA. Although early 
indications based on legislative history led commentators to 
suggest that benefit caps such as those upheld in Greenburg and 
Owen would still be permissible under ADA, EEOC regulations now 
prevent exclusions and limitations on benefits that are a 
subterfuge for disability-based discrimination. EEOC Regulations to 
Implement the Equal Emplovroent Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. 
1630.16 (f) (1993) . 
Several cases resulting in reinstatement of higher benefit 
limits have been settled since the adoption of these regulations. 
See, e.g., EEOC v. Connecticut Refining Co., EEOC Chg. Nos. 161-93-
0253, 0254 (3/9/94) and Estate of Kedinger v. IBEW Local 110, 63 
Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) Par. 42,783 (D.Minn. 1993). In light of the 
regulations and these settlements, employers who wish to justify 
benefit caps for AIDS should seek to maintain parity with benefits 
offered for other catastrophic diseases. 
IX. Summary 
How can an employer meet its fair employment obligations 
when faced with the possibility of an applicant or employee with a 
serious communicable disease? First, employers should adopt a 
policy for the handling of applicants and employees with infectious 
diseases that complies with applicable laws and is consistent with 
the approach the employer wishes to take on this issue. Also a 
wri t ten job description should be developed for each posi tion, 
clearly setting forth the necessary qualifications, including any 
that could be affected by an individual's infectious status. 
Essential and non-essential job functions should be clearly 
distinguished. 
During the recruitment process, it is not advisable to ask 
applicants generally whether they have a disabilitYi however, the 
employer could provide the applicant with the job description and 
advise him or her that the employer wishes to make reasonable 
accommodation for disabled applicants and employees as required by 
law. The application should ask whether the applicant has any 
disabilities that would require accommodation in order to perform 
the job's required duties. Based on the applicant's response, the 
employer should evaluate whether reasonable accommodation is 
possible, or whether it would pose an undue hardship. 
Applicants who will be otherwise qualified with or without 
reasonable accommodation must be evaluated on the same basis as 
non-disabled individuals throughout the remainder of the hiring 
process. If an applicant has been offered employment, a medical 
exam may be required, but only if it is job-related and serves a 
business necessity. Results must be kept confidential and in a 
separate file. 
Health care employers have a special responsibility to 
also evaluate whether the nature of the job's duties will pose an 
undue risk to others of transmitting a serious communicable 
disease. Those employers should determine the extent to which they 
believe that testing for the presence of infection is necessary to 
assure that no undue risk exists. If testing is undertaken, the 
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results should be kept confidential and disclosed only on a need-
to -know basis consistent with the employer I s responsibility to 
others, such as patients or co -workers. Employers whose work 
involves food handling will want to determine whether the 
corrununicable disease exemption from the ADA I S provisions will apply 
to the disability presented. 
Once an employee is on the job, if his or her disability 
status changes, or medical condition worsens, the employer must 
. evaluate anew whether reasonable aCCOrn:tfiodation can be made. In some 
instances, this could involve decreased responsibilities and 
reassignment to a completely different job. 
In light of recent regulation and until additional judicial 
guidance is available, health benefit plans should be evaluated to 
determine whether the benefits offered are non-discriminatory. At 
a minimum, employers should avoid singling out one disease or 
disabili ty for coverage limi ts that differ substantially from other 
types of illnesses. 
Finally, because in the case of contagious diseases such as 
AIDS any discriminatory treatment for the disabled employee must be 
based on the nature of the disability itself, not on co-workers 
fears or perceptions, the employer may want to consider ongoing, 
pro-active educational programs for its workforce, including 
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A. The Need For Action 
Prior to 1980, the thought of developing strategies, utilizing 
resources, or attending seminars in preparation for violence in the 
American workplace, would probably have seemed a waste of time and 
effort. Our presence here today is a reflection of the fact that 
the nature of what was once thought of as sacrosanct -- the 
American workplace -- has undergone a dramatic transformation over 
the last decade. 
Employers' concern and awareness of this issue is growing 
across the country. Some, however, even in view of the escalating 
violence seen regularly on the evening news, still harbor an "it 
couldn't happen in our organization" attitude. In an effort to 
create a sense of reality for anyone who consciously or 
unconsciously shares this minority view, let's begin with some 
troubling statistics. 
Not a month goes by without a violent incident in the American 
workplace. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health reports that homicides are the key job safety issue to be 
dealt with in the 1990 's, with a current average rate of 15 
workplace murders each week in the United States. Violence is the 
leading cause of occupational fatalities among all workers and the 
leading cause of death for women. The Institute reports that 
homicides account for 12% of the workplace deaths, and that about 
41% of the women killed on the job in the last decade were homicide 
victims. 
Today, more than 1000 Americans are murdered on the job each 
year. This is 32% more than the annual average in 1980. More than 
2 million employees suffer physical attacks on the job each year 
and more than 6 million are harassed or threatened in some way. 
The human devastation represented by these statistics are 
shared with us regularly by the media. For example: 
* An unemployed man with a shot gun and pistol opened fire 
killing four and wounding four in a California 
unemployment office. 
* An employee of a marketing company shot himself and a co-
worker in a suburb of Maryland. 
* A custodian doused a company bookkeeper and set her on 
fire because his paycheck was late. 
lThe author acknowledges the contributions of Lisa May Evans, Law Clerk, 
Dinsmore & Shohl, who assisted in the preparation of this outline. 
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* A Federal Express pilot attacked three co-workers in 
flight in the cockpit of a DC-10. 
* A purchasing manager in Chicago stabbed his boss to death 
over a disagreement about how paperwork should be 
handled. 
* A disgruntled technician who had quit his job came back 
to the lab where he worked with a 9mm Glock semi-
automatic pistol. By the time he had finished shooting, 
two were dead and two were injured. 
Workplace violence is a non-discriminating·phenomenon. The 
potential for violence exists in any type of organization from a 
high-tech fiber optics laboratory to a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant. 
In a survey conducted by the Society for Human Resource 
Management, of the 479 American companies polled, 67% reported that 
there had been incidents of violence in their workplace. The 
following is a list of other interesting statistics from the study: 
TYPE OF INCIDENT 
75% Fist fights, altercations 
17% Shootings 
8% Stabbings 
6% Sexual Assaults 
TARGET OF ATTACK 
54% Employees by employees 
13% Supervisors by employees 
7% Employees by customers 
REASON FOR ATTACK 
38% Personality conflicts 
15% Family problems 
10% Drug or alcohol abuse 
8% Non specific stress 
7% Firing/layoffs 
L - 2 
2% Violent criminal history 
Source: The Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, VA 
B. Factors Influencing the Increase of Workplace Violence. 
A TIME/CNN poll in April of this year reported that 30% of 
Americans see workplace violence as a growing problem, 18% have 
witnessed violence at work, and another 18% are worried about 
becoming victims themselves. The effect of these real fears on 
productivity and other areas can not be overstated. 
Experts state that various factors are influencing the 
increase in workplace violence in America. Many of today's workers 
feel powerless, demoralized, and under-valued, and as a result, 
become very violent and angry when confronted with increasingly 
stressful situations. According to James Fox, the Dean of the 
College of Criminal Justice of Northeastern University, ". . . more 
and more ex-employees are angry and are taking out their anger in 
a violent way. U 
While the obvious influence of increasing violence in society 
as a whole is yet another factor, experts also blame the fact that 
work environments have become harsher, the rate of layoffs has 
increased, and workers often feel that they are not valued and have 
an ongoing sense of insecurity in relation to their jobs. Experts 
state that because many workers gain their self-esteem through 
work, they naturally feel threatened when their jobs are in 
jeopardy. Employers need to understand that, in this situation, 
employees feel cornered and much like frightened animals. As a 
result, they may feel that the only alternative is to lash out at 
the tormentor. 
A recent article in the Occupational Safety and Health 
Reporter stated that, U[e]mployees are about twice as likely to be 
attacked in the workplace by customers as by co-workers, with 
nearly 68% of such violence attributed to clients, patients, and 
other strangers." The article contained the results of a report 
issued by the Northwest National Life Insurance Company. 
Several surveys also suggest that the increased use of drugs 
and alcohol are viewed as contributing factors in the rise of 
workplace violence. The availability of guns and pervasiveness of 
violence in the media have also been considered to be factors, 
though to a lesser degree than drugs and alcohol. 
The real point is that no one knows who is or will become, 
under varying circumstances, the volatile employee. A naive belief 
that it cannot or will not happen at your place of business only 
serves to create a false sense of security which will potentially 
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jeopardize your safety and the safety of others on your premises. 
The issue remains that the time to plan for the violent event is 
now, before confronted by a volatile employee. 
In an effort to combat the problem of increasing workplace 
violence, a report from the National Safe Workplace Institute (a 
non-profit research, education and service organization located in 
Chicago, Illinois), recommended that employers implement 
"responsive" policies and procedures. The report also stated that 
most employers wait for a violent event before seriously addressing 
the problem of workplace violence; and most have been slow to view 
workplace violence as a separate issue, and instead, lump it with 
other human resource or security matters. 
In businesses and organizations all across America, private as 
well as state and federal government agencies have begun to take 
action to address this issue. While no one has all of the answers, 
experts have been busy designing comprehensive plans and strategies 
to reduce employer exposure from potential violence and potential 
law suits. The United States Surgeon General, Dr. M. Joycelyn 
Elders, has outlined steps employers can take to create work 
environments that foster more harmonious relationships between 
employees. This is in the wake of state court decisions holding 
employers liable, in tort, for failure to protect their employees, 
customers, clients, and others lawfully on their premises from 
known dangers. 
While the threat to human life and safety is the paramount 
concern to be addressed in any plan to reduce workplace violence, 
other costs, in the form of lost productivity, health care costs, 
lawsuits, higher worker's compensation premiums and other expenses 
can also be substantial. The National Safe Workplace Institute 
estimates that workplace violence cost employers 4.2 billion in 
1992. Therefore, employers are being directed to plan for 
workplace violence in the same way they plan for changes in the 
market or future growth. The overall plan should be a forward 
looking, calculated and thorough analysis of the individual 
workplace and the organizational culture, as well as the 
characteristics of the individuals routinely on the premises. 
C. Presentation Objectives 
While no plan of action can be developed to eliminate 
workplace violence, the first step in any plan must include an 
understanding of the risks, responsibilities and liabilities. 
The objectives of this presentation will be to: 
* Discuss the state of the law regarding employer liability 
for workplace violence. This will include a discussion 
of the limited case law and statutory law in this region 
and trends which are developing nationwide to expand 
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employer liability for injuries arising out of violent 
incidents in the workplace. 
* Summarize the information available to help employers 
identify potentially violent employees and potentially 
dangerous environments. 
* Present an overview of strategies employers can use to 
reduce the risk of workplace violence. 
* Discuss ways to develop a response plan for handling 
crisis situations. 
II. LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO 
REDUCING THE RISK OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE 
Because crime is becoming more foreseeable, the duty to 
protect against it is being placed on employers more and more often 
as laws continue to expand in favor of employees across the 
country. Just as the sexual harassment laws have emerged to place 
a greater responsibility on employers for the acts of employees, 
courts are beginning to erode generally accepted principles which 
had, in the past, served to limit employer liability. 
While in general, the legal impetus for this change is 
beginning in the courts, many state statutes are also being used to 
place additional duties upon employers. For instance, in 1991, 
California adopted a law which requires employers to respond to 
known dangers in the workplace. While the law was not necessarily 
intended to apply to workplace violence, it is hard to avoid the 
possibility of it being used by a plaintiff, where there is 
evidence that the employer knew of a risk and failed to take 
action. 
As it stands, employers must consider a wide range of legal 
consequences in making hiring, disciplinary and termination 
decisions. In developing programs to deal with workplace violence, 
employers often find themselves in a "Catch-22" position. They 
face potential lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Title VII or other anti-discrimination legislation, based on whom 
they do not hire, and they face potential liability for negligent 
hiring, retention or supervision or other laws if the person they 
do hire subsequently becomes involved in a violent incident. 
The issue often boils down to the question of "which way to 
you want to be sued?" The fact of the matter is that the tension 
between anti-discrimination laws, privacy laws; and the employer's 
obligation to provide a safe work environment must be carefully 
balanced. In the end, the safety of an employer's workers, 
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customers, and others lawfully on the premises must be the primary 
concern, above and beyond any other laws. 
A. The Americans With Disabilities Act and Other 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), which was 
enacted in 1990 and took effect in 1992, limits the degree to which 
an employer can refuse to hire, discipline or terminate a 
potentially threatening employee. Under the ADA, an individual 
with a disability is one who has a mental or physical impairment 
thatsubstantiallyClimitsone<or more inajor·life activities, has a 
record of such impairment, or is regarded . as having such an 
impairment. A mental impairment is defined as "[ a] ny mental or 
psychological disorder". 
The EEOC issued a Technical Assistance Manual to assist 
employers in determining their rights and responsibilities under 
the ADA. According to the Manual, ". . . personali ty traits, such 
as poor judgment, quick temper, or irresponsible behavior, are not 
themselves impairments." The Manual further states that, 
"[s]tress" and "depression" are conditions that mayor 
may not be considered impairments, depending on whether 
these conditions result from a documented physiological 
or mental disorder. 
* * * 
For examDle: A person suffering from general "stress" 
because of job or personal life pressures would not be 
cons idered to have an impairment. However, if this 
person is diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having an 
identifiable stress disorder s/he would have an 
impairment that may be a disability. 
While formal diagnosis of a mental disorder usually triggers 
ADA protection, such protection can also be available where there 
is a perception that a person has a mental disability, absent any 
diagnosis. For example, if an employer regards an employee as 
being unstable or paranoid, or in some way limits the person based 
on unsubstantiated fears, the employer may be liable for 
discrimination under the ADA. Again, making appropriate decisions, 
in light of this piece of legislation, creates quite a "Catch-22" 
for employers, since any violations of the Act, even for alleged 
safety reasons, subjects employers to significant liability, 
including punitive damages. 
There are key issues to understand in order to be able to make 
an accurate assessment of what is allowed under the ADA and the 
rights that employers have as they make key employment decisions. 
First, in spite of having a qualifying mental disorder, an employee 
has to be otherwise qualified for the job. An employer is not 
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required to hire or retain an individual who is not qualified to 
perform the job. In establishing qualifications, the individual 
has to be able to perform all of the non-discriminatory standards 
and requirements of the job. An employer's standards that require 
all applicants to be able to tolerate normal stress, come to work 
on time, obey supervisors' orders, and get along with people, for 
example, are acceptable as non-discriminatory standards under the 
ADA. 
Secondly, the employer has to be able to make a reasonable 
accommodation for the disability, without having to suffer undue 
hardship, substantial cost or undue disruption of the workplace. 
Generally, it is the duty of the individual with the disability to 
request a reasonable accommodation. However, it is not the 
employer's obligation to implement the accommodation requested. A 
recent federal decision held that the Act does not require an 
employer to implement the best possible accommodation. The Act 
only requires that any accommodation made be reasonable and 
effective in light of the circumstances. 
Reasonable accommodations have to be able to be made without 
undue hardship, excessive cost, or undue disruption of the 
workplace. An undue hardship is an action that requires 
"significant difficulty or expense" in relation to the size of the 
employer, the resources available and the nature of the operation. 
The ADA has another provision, the direct threat provlslon, 
which can be used where an employer has reliable medical data upon 
which to believe that the employee's presence in the workplace 
creates a risk of substantial harm to others. However, even under 
these circumstances, the employer must first determine whether a 
reasonable accommodation can be made to reduce the risk. If so, 
the employer has a duty to make such an accommodation. If no 
reasonable accommodation can be made, the employer has no duty to 
hire or retain the employee. 
To date, there have been no reported ADA challenges to 
employment decisions involving potentially violent employees. 
However, as more and more employers begin to understand their duty 
to carefully screen and monitor workplace behavior to protect 
themselves from liability, this area will probably become more 
litigated in the future. 
In addition to ADA prohibitions, other anti-discrimination 
legislation on both the state and federal levels also restrict what 
information may be sought and used for employment decisions. 
Particularly, many states limit access to criminal records. Some 
states only allow the use of criminal convictions where there is a 
direct relationship between the crime committed and the employment 
position being sought. 
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B. Privacy Considerations 
In order to make informed decisions about a prospective 
employee, employers need access to as much information as possible 
about the personal, professional and medical history of the 
individual. An employer's abili ty to obtain information about 
applicants has become hindered by prior employers' hesitancy to 
provide information other than their rank and file due to fear of 
defamation or invasion of privacy law suits. 
Since legal liability is beginning to flow from hiring 
decisions, obtaining information is a key part of the process 
employersmust undergo to learn as. much about prospective employees 
as reasonably possible. Employers, however, need to be mindful of 
their legal limitations in this area. 
In regard to medical records, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that there is a "limited privacy interest" in the confidentiality 
of a patient's medical records. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977). Neither Ohio nor Kentucky laws clearly define the extent 
of this right. In both states, statutor£ law limits the extent to 
which physicians may disclose information to third parties. 
Ohio law has gone as far as to allow third parties who induce 
the disclosure of confidential medical information to be liable in 
damages. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 
793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). More recently, a Magistrate Judge with the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held 
that the confidentiality of medical records was protected by the 
doctor-patient privilege and the United States Constitution. The 
Magistrate Judge sanctioned the defense attorneys in the case who 
obtained the plaintiff's medical record for the hospital it 
represented. The decision also held that a health-care provider 
can not reveal medical information absent a patient's 
authorization. 
There are, however, some limited circumstances under which an 
employer can gain access to medical records. First, after an offer 
of employment is made, an employer can require an employee to 
submi t to a medical examination if there is a question as to 
whether the employee is "fit for duty" (if such examinations are 
required of all applicants). Such examinations can also be 
required after employment, where the employee's performance is 
perceived as creating a threat to his or her safety, or the safety 
of others. (Keeping in mind that reasonable accommodation may have 
to be made for any disability which qualifies under the ADA.) The 
examining physician in this situation, in most states, cannot 
disclose any information beyond whether the employee is fit for 
duty. 
Most states also have an exception to the general right of 
privacy in medical records which allows a physician to disclose 
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privileged information when it is necessary to protect the 
individual or public welfare. For instance, where a physician 
knows that a public transportation employee is currently using 
drugs or alcohol, he or she has a duty to report such information. 
III. LEGAL ISSUES RESULTING FROM 
VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE. 
A. Negligence Theories 
A wide range of theories areevoi~ing to hold employers liable 
for injuries resulting from violent workplace incidents across the 
country. While Ohio and Kentucky laws have not gone as far in 
expanding employer liability for workplace violence as other 
states, a discussion of recent trends from these other states will 
help give an indication of potential future liability. 
Under the negligent hiring, superv~s~on and retention 
theories, an employer may be found vicariously liable for injuries 
caused by violent or criminal conduct of its employees, both within 
and outside of the scope of employment, where the employer knows or 
should know that the employee poses a risk of harm to others. 
Generally, employers have a common law duty to exercise reasonable 
care, in view of the circumstances, in relation to employees or 
prospective employees who may present a threat of injury. If 
successful under these theories, victims can hold employers liable 
for substantial compensation and punitive damages, including lost 
earnings, lost benefits, reimbursement for medical expenses, etc. 
Across the country, jury awards and settlements have been 
substantial, with one District of Columbia company settling for 16 
million, and a 3.5 and 2.5 million dollar jury award in two New 
York cases. Red v. Product Dev. Corp., No. 89-1119 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
1990) (unpublished opinion); Smith v. Nat'l R.R. Passen. Corp., 856 
F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1988); Haddock v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478 
(1990). 
Interestingly enough, Kentucky courts were among the first to 
recognize a cause of action for negligent hiring. Ballard's 
Administratrix v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 128 Ky. 826, 
110 S.W. 296 (1908). Under the theory of negligent hiring, the 
employer is held liable for the conduct of his or her employees, 
even when they may be acting outside the scope of their authority. 
For example, where the employer is found in breach of a duty to the 
injured party by hiring an individual who later becomes violent, 
where the employer knew or could have determined by reasonable 
investigation that the individual posed a threat of harm, most 
courts will award damages to the injured party. 
More and more courts are beginning to allow individuals to 
bring actions under this theory, even in cases where the worker's 
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compensation laws should apply. For example, a Kentucky court has 
held that an employer could be liable for negligent hiring where a 
worker injured a co-worker. Ballard's Admix., 128 Ky. 826, 110 S.W. 
296. 
Similarly, while not discussing the issue within the context 
of workplace violence, the Ohio Supreme Court has hinted at the 
possibility of extending liability for acts outside the scope of 
employment, where the employer knew of the potential threat to 
third parties. In the Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St. 3d 
486 (1991), the court stated that: 
An employer has a duty to provide its employees with a 
safe work environment and, thus, may be independently 
liable for failing to take corrective action against an 
employee who poses a threat of harm to fellow employees, 
even where the employee's actions do not serve or advance 
the employer's business goals. 
The court's statement in this case represents a significant 
change from past Ohio law which held that in order for an employer 
to be liable for the acts of an employee, the employee had to be 
acting within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the 
employer's business. While the Ohio court's decision involved 
sexual harassment, there is no logical reason why the same 
rationale could not be made applicable in a case of workplace 
violence. 
When it comes to protecting employees from injury by third 
parties, there is authority in Kentucky that indicates that a court 
could hold an employer liable under extraordinary circumstances. 
In Thoni Oil Benzol Gas Stations, Inc. v Johnson, 488 S.W.2d 355 
(Ct. App. Ky. 1972), the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that 
while, 
" [a] bsent extraordinary circumstances an employer has no 
duty to anticipate injury to an employee through the 
criminal acts of third persons [w]hen the 
conditions of employment are such that they invite attack 
upon employees by creating highly unusual and 
unreasonable exposure to danger without the employment of 
reasonable protective measures, there is justification 
for imposing liability upon the employer when injury 
results." 
Finally, in a recent Minnesota case, a female employee 
informed her supervisor that she had been threatened by a male co-
worker. The company delayed firing the co-worker, even though 
management knew that he had been convicted of a violent crime 
before. The man eventually killed the female worker and her estate 
was allowed to sue under the theory of negligent hiring. 
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Negligent retention is where an employer retains an employee 
whom the employer knows is unfit and fails to take any corrective 
or protective action. A classic example of the potential for 
exposure under this theory was presented in a recent case involving 
a Cincinnati Metro Bus driver. The driver had several arrests for 
DUI while driving his personal car. Cincinnati Metro initially 
stated it could not terminate him for offenses incurred while 
driving his personal vehicle. Later, perhaps after a conference 
with their attorney, they changed their position. Potentially, 
Cincinnati Metro could have been liable under the theory of 
negligent retention if the driver injured third parties while 
operating a bus under the influence of alcohol. 
Negligent supervision is harder to define since the need for 
supervision arises because of past incidents known either at the 
time of hire or after employment. It is usually added to a claim 
of negligent hiring and/or negligent retention to increase damages. 
Under this theory, employers are held liable for negligently 
supervising unsafe or dangerous employees, where they have failed 
.to respond to complaints about an employee's behavior, or have 
assigned employees with kno\vn or suspected tendencies to certain 
jobs. 
For instance, in one recent Ohio case, a construction worker 
raped a nine-year old girl. The plaintiffs, in addition to their 
claim of negligent hiring, claimed that the general contractor was 
liable for not supervising the contractor whom he knew was alone 
with the girl in an empty apartment building. Peters v. Ashtabula 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 89 Ohio App. 3d 458, 626 N.E.2d 
1008 (1993). 
While there is very little case law on this issue in this 
area, there has been a cause of action allowed for negligent 
security in some states. This liability is created where the 
employer was aware of a potentially dangerous situation and failed 
to provide adequate security to protect its patrons, customers, or 
others lawfully entering its premises from the potential threat. 
Again, while this theory has not been substantially litigated in 
Ohio or Kentucky, the increase of violence may lead to the creation 
of a duty on the part of those who are aware of past incidents of 
violence in a particular circumstance, or on certain premises, to 
protect others from that potential threat. The Kentucky courts have 
alluded to the possibility of allowing such claims to be brought 
under extraordinary circumstances. See, Thoni Oil Benzol Gas 
Stations, Inc. v Johnson, 488 S.W.2d 355 (Ct. App. Ky. 1972). 
Finally, negligent failure to warn is another tort which would 
allow an employer to be found liable for negligently failing to 
warn employees or supervisors of an individual's suspected 
dangerous propensities. This theory may also allow a former 
employer who fails to disclose an employee's violent or similar 
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misbehavior to prospective employers during reference checks to be 
liable for negligent failure to warn. 
Both the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have held employers liable for negligently failing to warn 
employees of unusual risks of violence. The Second Circuit held 
Amtrack liable where its management had knowledge of an employee's 
past violent tendencies and failed to discipline him or notify his 
supervisor. Smith v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 856 F.2d 467 
(2d Cir. 1990). The employee eventually shot his supervisor in 
another incident after he was reprimanded for taking an 
unauthorized break. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that an 
employer has a duty to inform employees of all perils which he 
knows or should reasonably know. McCalman v. Illinois C.R. Co., 
215 F. 465 (6th Cir. 1914). 
Based on the evolution of these theories, it seems that the 
employer's duties include informing employees of any threat by 
other employees, customers or clients, as well as taking 
appropriate precautions to protect them from injury. 
B. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
The "General Duty" Clause of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act requires that employers provide a place of employment 
that is free from "recognized hazards" likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to workers. In an effort to address the 
increasing incidents of violence in the American workplace, OSHA 
laid out its policy on workplace violence in a May 1992 memo that 
stated that employers could be cited, under the General Duty 
Clause, for failing to adequately protect employees from acts of 
violence in the workplace. 
The first of these citations went to a Chicago psychiatric 
hospital in September of 1993. The workers at the hospital 
suffered from various physical injuries including fractures, bites, 
torn cartilage and head injuries. The patients included gang 
members and others who had histories of acting out in violent ways 
or in psychotic rages. OSHA proposed a $5,000 fine against the 
hospital for exposing workers to serious physical injury during 
"seclusion/restraint" incidents. 
OSHA has also issued citations to one organization for "not 
protecting its workers who drive vans and buses to shuttle 
developmentally disabled adults and children to and from homes and 
their work or school," since this exposed them to, "the hazard of 
being assaulted by passengers," according to a recent BNA report. 
The report also noted that another organization was cited for 
having staff work alone at night in one of its group homes, since 
this exposed the workers to assaults by residents. 
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The BNA reports also indicated that according to one OSHA 
official, only "recognized" dangers will be cited by OSHA. 
"Criminal acts of violence that are not 'recognized' as part of the 
nature of doing business and are 'random antisocial acts which may 
occur anywhere' would not subject the employer to a 
citation .... " 
C. Worker's Compensation as a Limit to Liability. 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior in Ohio, an employer 
can be liable for the intentional, malicious acts of an employee 
performed within the scope of employment. Weibold Studio, Inc. v. 
Old World Restorations, Inc., 19 Ohio App.3d 246, 484 N.E.2d 280 
(1986). Traditionally, in order for the doctrine to apply, the 
employee must have been acting in furtherance of the business of 
the employer. In Kentucky, the courts have limited this doctrine 
and held that even if the employee is acting within the scope of 
employment: 
[T]he well-settled-rule in Kentucky is that 'it is not 
within the scope of a servant's employment to commit an 
assault upon a third person and the master is not liable 
for such an assault, though committed while the servant 
was about his master's business.'" 
Flechsig v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (citing 
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Harder's Admin'x, 281 Ky. 345, 136 
S.W.2d 42, 45 (1940». 
The doctrine of respondeat superior was developed to allow 
innocent third parties to recover from employers, who were 
perceived to have "set things in motion" by hiring the employee, 
without having to prove any negligence on the part of the employer. 
Generally, as workplace violence continues to grow, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior liability is expanding to allow both employees 
and third parties to bring actions where. the employer is found to 
have known or been able to determine with reasonable investigation, 
that an employee had violent tendencies. As discussed earlier, the 
Kerans decision may have put the final blow on the doctrine as a 
means of limiting employers' liability for intentional injuries 
caused by their employees. 
Because both Ohio and Kentucky have worker's compensation 
statutes which govern injuries arising out of the employment 
relationship, the doctrine of respondeat superior would usually 
only come into play for injuries by employees to non-employees. 
However, there are certain situations not covered under worker's 
~... compensation such as supervisor assaults on employees, personal 
disputes that are not connected to employment, or injuries to 
employees from intoxication or self-inflicted violence. Because 
the Ohio and Kentucky statues require the employee's injury to have 
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occurred within the scope of employment, certain employee injuries 
may fail outside the scope of those provisions. 
IV. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL OFFENDERS 
Experts say that in almost every case of workplace violence, 
the individual had given multiple clues to multiple people. 
Learning to identify those signs is a key to reducing the risk of 
harm from workplace violence. 
Applicant screening is the first chance that aricemplbyer·has 
to identify a potentially volatile employee. This is also the 
potential basis for future claims of negligent hiring. But, as 
discussed earlier, applicant screening also poses many challenges, 
as concerns for liability under discrimination laws and privacy 
laws also have to be weighed. Studies show that up to 42% of job 
applicants are untruthful on their applications, so verification of 
the job applications can be an important first step for identifying 
potential offenders. Failure to follow through in an investigation 
can be deadly. For instance, the United States Postal Service 
failed to follow up on a special designation on the military 
discharge of a postal worker who killed four workers in Michigan in 
1991. Had it done so, it would have found that the worker had run 
over another officer's car with a tank in a fit of anger. 
Another method often used to identify potentially volatile 
employees are psychological tests. According to experts, however, 
psychological tests are not good predictors of a volatile employee. 
They are rarely done at the time when the potential offender 
reaches the point of becoming violent. A seemingly normal 
individual can become violent after he loses his wife, is 
humiliated by a co-worker, and then discharged for insubordination. 
It is difficult, if not impossible to determine in advance, at 
what point an individual will "lose it." On the other hand, 
experts studying workplace violence have developed a profile of a 
violent employee. 
Offenders tend to be: 
* Male 
* 35 years of age or older 
* White 
* few interests outside of work 
* a fascination with guns or the military 
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* a history of family problems 
* possible history of violence 
* a tendency to hold grudges and blame others for 
problems 
* drug and or alcohol abuse 
* has violent influence on the work force 
* chronic~lly discontented 
* has an unstable work record 
* often violates company policies 
* withdrawn, loner 
These profiles have also sparked controversy. Jess Kraus, a 
UCLA epidemiologist who served on a federal panel on workplace 
violence, was quoted in a recent TIME Magazine article as saying, 
"relying on profiles carries a two-fold risk: that people will be 
wrongly tagged as dangerous simply because they match the list, and 
others will be mistakenly disregarded because they don't." 
According to Kraus, more accurate predictors are paranoid behavior, 
depression or suicidal tendencies, and the filing of unreasonable 
grievances and lawsuits. 
Experts also note some behavioral tendencies that give clues 











or express warnings 
happen, should be 
that 
taken 
Physical ac.ts of intimidation or harassment of other 
workers. 
Attempting to gain access to unauthorized areas. 
Bizarre thoughts, paranoia, or indications that the 
individual's perception is skewed, or where the 
individual demonstrates a perception that he or she has 
been unjustly denied an entitlement or humiliated by a 
seemingly insignificant act. 
An individual focuses on a specific target of revenge or 
an escalating grudge against another employee or 
supervisor. 
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V. DEVELOPING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE 
RISK OF A VIOLENT INCIDENT 
Experts and consultants recommend several options to employers 
as a way to reduce the risk of workplace violence. While most 
acknowledge that workplace violence cannot be eliminated, since 
many of the factors contributing to the epidemic are not within the 
control of the employer, there are programs both preventive and 
remedial which can be implemented to assist both before and after 
an incident in the workplace. While strategies differ among the 
experts, most, if not all, agree that workplace violence . is 
predictable, since the offender always leaves a trail.of clues~· 
In implementing any preventive workplace violence program, 
employers should consult with human resource personnel, security, 
upper management, supervisory staff and legal counsel. The bottom 
line is that it is easier to deny employment to someone than to 
fire someone. There is also a greater risk in terminating 
employment and greater defenses to denying employment. The more 
potentially violent employees screened out in the interview 
process, the less risk of a violent outburst by an employee. 
There are steps employers can take before a violent incident 
occurs: 
1. Screening of applicants. Employers may want to engage in a 
more thorough screening of applicants for employment by 
reference checking, testing, and complete interviewing. 
( a) Interviews: Conduct in-depth interviews with applicants. 
Questions should be consistently asked of all applicants or 
those applying for certain positions, and carefully phrased to 
avoid potential discrimination charges. While individuals may 
not voluntarily supply information on applications or during 
interviews, they may be more likely to respond to direct 
questions. Ask applicants questions such as: Have you ever 
been disciplined or discharged for theft or a related offense? 
Have you ever been disciplined or discharged for fighting, 
assaul t or related behavior? Have you ever been discharged or 
disciplined for insubordination or for violating safety rules? 
While knowledge of a mental illness alone cannot be used as a 
basis for denying an applicant, specific questions relating to 
past behavior or reactions to situations specific to the job 
can be used. 
(b) Application forms: Should satisfy state and federal 
equal employment opportunity requirements. Require applicants 
to sign the form indicating that the information is accurate 
and truthful. 
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(c) Background investigation: Obtain the applicant's signed 
agreement to allow the employer to perform a background 
investigation. If the employer can verify the job-related 
need for obtaining an applicant's criminal conviction record, 
such information should be requested. 
(d) Verify references and past employment: Gather as much 
information as possible from prior employers and obtain copies 
of required and/or claimed licenses and credentials. 
Employers might note that courts are beginning to look at the 
documentation of the. screening process in evaluating negligent 
hiring claims. Courts are· beginning to find liability for 
seemingly small oversights. 
2. Comprehensive written plan for dealing with emergency 
situations. This plan should include such things as charts of 
company officials to be contacted in the event of an 
emergency; evacuation plans; telephone numbers for building 
security, medical staff, and local hospitals; appointment of 
employees on each floor to coordinate activities in case of 
emergency. 
(a) Emergency training: Emergency training should be 
conducted with at least two employees per department, floor 
level, or other physical division. Training two individuals 
increases the likelihood of always having someone on site with 
necessary training. Training should include evacuation plans 
and procedures for fires, bomb threats, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, violent employees or other persons, or other 
potentj.ally violent circumstances. Training can be conducted 
either by company or building security, or fire/police 
department representatives. Employers may also want to have 
key employees trained in CPR. 
(b) Checklist: A checklist can be devised and made available 
to all employees on how to handle situations such as bomb 
threats or menacing phone calls or visitors. 
3. Emergency Procedure for Employees. Educate all employees on 
emergency procedures and who they are to contact providing 
names and phone numbers. 
4. Referral Policy. On-site Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) 
should be prepared to provide necessary support after a 
crisis. If an employer does not have an EAP, then local 
agencies or counselors should be identified and used as 
contacts in the event of a crisis. Depending upon the 
particular situation, employees can either be referred to the 
agency or counselor(s), or support professionals can provide 
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on-site services. If a violent event does occur, professional 
emotional support must be readily and immediately available. 
5. Employee Assistance Programs. EAP's can play critical roles 
in prevention and crisis management. EAP' s can provide Human 
Resource professionals trained in crisis management and can 
assist in preventive training and follow-up counseling. 
Noting the strong relationship between job stress and 
workplace harassment and violence, Surgeon General M. Joycelyn 
Elders urged employers to educate their employees on how to 
resolve conflicts as a way to curb the growing epidemic of 
violence. She recommended education and conflict resolution 
programs as among some strategies that employers might use to 
reduce workplace violence. Employers need to be aware that 
there are some situations in which confidential information 
obtained through an EAP is required to be disclosed. These 
include when employers or physicians learn of an employee or 
client's potentially dangerous behavior that may endanger 
others. (See Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of 
California) Legal counsel should be contacted to clarify the 
employer's responsibilities in this area. 
6. Policies against harassment. Clearly communicate written 
policy against harassment including enforcement and 
disciplinary action for violations. Zero tolerance. 
7. Train supervisors. Indications of a troubled employee 
can be hard to detect. Supervisors need special training 
in order to be skilled and knowledgeable in this area. 
Incidents of previous violence, etc., should signal the 
need for additional observation of the employee. 
8. First line supervisors. Usually the first line supervisors 
are the primary target of workplace violence and are the 
agents of the employee who are in the best position to 
deal most frequently with employees. Therefore, their 
ability to handle confrontations, stress, and conflicts 
can gravely impact the degree to which a small incident 
can grow into one leading to workplace violence. 
9. Tiahten security proarams. Create a safe workplace with 
prohibitions on weapons and tight disciplinary action for 
violations. Clearly communicate these policies with all 
employees on a routine basis. 
10. Grievance Procedures. Strong grievance procedures need to be 
in place to deal with problems and allow employees to express 
their views. Discuss. ways to eliminate concerns. Solicit 
employee involvement in the development of creative solutions 
so that the employee feels empowered and listened to. 
L -18 
Employers need to allow some constructive way to channel 
concerns, along with access to greater resources, so that an 
employee is not left with one person to deal with who can 
frustrate their objectives and make them feel disempowered. 
11. Work Environment. Part of the reason the workplace has 
become so hostile is because of the negative way that 
employees perceive they are being treated. As employers 
downsize and place greater demands on fewer employees, 
they should also be mindful of a need to offer additional 
compensation in the form of money or perks or special 
privileges to make the employees feel more appreciated. 
12. Handling Terminations. Offer outplacement service. The 
economy is bad and employers need to make employees feel that 
there is hope for future employment, as a way to defuse 
potential feelings of frustration and hopelessness, which are 
often precursors to acts of violence. 
HOW TO HANDLE THREATS 
Employers should establish procedures for employees to follow 
in circumstances such as bomb scares, employees or others with 
weapons, or verbal threats of violence. 
A checklist can be developed for threats received over the 
phone. Most threatening situations, especially those of immediate 
threats, will need intervention from trained professionals such as 
the company or building security police, or the local police 
department. 
All employees should know who to contact and under what 
circumstances. 
IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS 
In the event of a crisis in the workplace, it is recommended 
that: 
1. Employers keep employees informed of what is happening in 
order to reassure and provide needed support. Communications 
should be immediate, as thorough as possible, and ongoing. 
Management needs to remain visible and supportive. 
2. Human Resources representatives need to be especially 
sensitive to employee concerns. Depending upon the incident, 
Human Resources may need to assist in grief counseling, 
communicating with families that may be involved, and 
providing appropriate referral services. 
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3. Establish peer-support group to enable employees to counsel 
each other. 
4. Identify employees that may be especially debilitated due to 
a crisis in the workplace and ensure they receive necessary 
emotional support. Such employees may be either directly 
affected by the crisis or just recovering from an unrelated 
trauma. 
By taking these basic steps, employers may lessen the 
likelihood of violence occurring in the workplace or at least 
decrease the possibility of serious harm to a number of employees 
.. and third parties . Unfortunately, however, violent episodes are 
often unpredictable. The key then is to be prepared for the 
possibility of violence in the workplace with the realization that 
no company, no manager, and no employee is immune from this very 
real problem .. 
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WRONGFUL TERMINATION - SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS 
by 
MARVIN L. COAN 
Hummel & Coan 
The Seventeenth Floor 
Kentucky Home Life Building 
239 South Fifth Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3268 
(502) 585-3084 
I. "SELECTING" THE RIGHT PLAINTIFF 
A. You must have a plaintiff whom the judge and jury will like in order to secure 
a favorable verdict, unless the facts are so overwhelmingly in your favor that 
you cannot help but prevail. Such is not usually the case when it comes to 
going to trial, as most of those type cases tend to be settled. 
B. Make sure the plaintiff will have a sufficient amount of damages to justify 
filing suit and possible trial. For example, a minimum-wage plaintiff who 
works at a fast food restaurant is probably not a good plaintiff in most situa-
tions since the person can easily get another comparable job within a matter of 
days within that industry. 
C. DO NOT take a case involving a wrongful termination thinking that it will be 
easily settled. These type cases are vigorously defended, as most employers 
do not want to send out any signal that they are easy marks in this type of 
litigation. 
ll. IMPORTANT POINTERS 
A. Always request a jury trial in your Complaint because employers are con-
cerned about the prospects of having to justify their actions to a jury. In these 
type of cases, it is almost malpraotice not to seek a jury trial unless the judge 
is so obviously oriented to this type of litigation, which would be a rare situa-
tion. 
B. If the employer does not try to take plaintiffs deposition prior to expiration of 
30 days after service of the summons, always file a notice to take the deposi-
tions of all key defendant employer personnel involved in the termination 
decision of plaintiff. Under Rule 30.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the defendant employer may notice plaintiffs deposition first. Only in 
rare circumstances outlined in Rule 30.02(2) may the plaintiff obtain permis-
sion to take a deposition within the period prior to 30 days from service of 
summons. 
M - 5 
C. Always schedule the depositions of all key defendant employer personnel 
involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff on the same day, one right after 
the other, so there can be no coordination of the reasons for the contested 
termination. Hopefully, by taking these depositions in this manner, some of 
the defendant's own witnesses will create factual disputes that will be helpful 
in overcoming any motion for summary judgment. See Steelvest. Inc .. et al. 
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (1991). 
D. When your client's deposition is to be taken, spend a great deal of time with 
the person going over all documents, including the allegations in the Com-
plaint. Make sure there is a thorough practice deposition with all of the hard 
questions asked. This will enable the plaintiff to do a good job at the deposi-
tion, which is very critical to the success of the case. Often the defense attor-
ney will form an opinion about whether the plaintiff will be a bad or good trial 
witness and whether there will be a lot of good ammunition for impeachment 
at trial based upon how plaintiffs deposition turns out. 
ID. THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
A. Contracts for permanent employment are very difficult to prove unless there is 
written documentation and there is strong evidence that the employee provided 
sufficient consideration for such a promise. Other jurisdictions have in some 
rare instances found there was a contract for permanent employment in situa-
tions where a plaintiff gives up stock ownership or where they have been 
seriously injured while working on the job. For the most part, these type of 
cases should be avoided. 
B. A contract for a fixed term of a year may be oral or in writing with the writ-
ten contractual agreement often being able to be proved through something as 
simple as a letter at the time of hire expressing plaintiffs salary in an annual 
sum. See Humana. Inc. v. Fairchild, Ky., 603 S.W.2d 918 (Ct.App. 1980); 
Putnam v. Producers' Livestock Marketing Ass'n, Ky., 75 S.W.2d 1075 
(Ct.App. 1934). These type of documents are very valuable and would clearly 
enable you and your client to get to a jury for a determination. However, see 
Judge Heyburn's new decision in McNutt v. Mediplex of Kentucky, Inc., 836 
F.Supp. 419 (W.n.Ky. 1993). 
C. Promissory estoppel may also be used as a theory with it being most likely to 
be successful in the situation where a plaintiff gives up a job and moves with 
family from one state to another. This is not to say you cannot use that theory 
simply where a move occurs within the same locale, but in that type of situa-
tion the theory would appear to be stronger if the plaintiff is giving up a good 
job with superior salary and benefits, as well as a significant amount of tenure 
or potential for advancement. While Kentucky apparently has no employment 
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cases directly on point known to this author using such a theory, the theory 
has been used recently in other type matters. See Lichtefeld-Massaro v. R. J. 
Manteuffel, Ky., 806 S.W.2d 42 (Ct.App. 1991); McCarthy v. Louisville 
Cartage Co .. Inc., Ky., 796 S.W.2d 10 (Ct.App. 1991). 
D. Any and all claims involving wrongful termination premised upon the employ-
er's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing do not have 
much prospect for success in Kentucky, although other jurisdictions have 
recognized these type of claims. See Webster v. Allstate, 689 F.Supp. 689 
(D.C.W.D.Ky. 1987); Harvey v. ITW. Inc., 672 F.Supp. 973 (D.C.W.D.Ky. 
1986). 
E. The parties may enter a contract which is terminable only for cause provided 
that there is specific proof that was their intent. See Shah v. American Syn-
thetic Rubber Co., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489 (1983). 
F. Oral promises of employment will under certain circumstances enable a plain-
tiff to get the case to a jury for a determination. See Hammond v. Heritage 
Communications. Inc., Ky., 756 S.W.2d 152 (CLApp. 1988). However, in 
these type of cases, defense of the statute of frauds under KRS 371.010 will be 
raised and must be considered in advance to avoid summary judgment. See 
Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 468, 470-471 (Ct.App. 1987). 
G. A plaintiff may be ab1e"under certain limited circumstances to use an Employ-
ee Handbook or Policy and Procedure Manual as a means of pursuing a claim 
for wrongful termination. Unfortunately, the leading case in Kentucky is not 
favorable. See Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky., 738 S.W.2d 824 (CLApp. 
1987). You should always look at such documents when the employee comes 
to your office to discuss the potential case. Look thoroughly to see whether or 
not there is clear language in the document explaining that it is not a· contract 
and that all employees are terminable at will. You should also look carefully 
at any section dealing with discipline and termination in order to see if there is 
a progressive discipline scheme which is followed or noL In certain circum-
stances an employer may have a progressive discipline scheme, but will also 
reserve unto itself the right to deviate from it and terminate the employee for 
any reason it deems appropriate. These are very tough cases, but under some 
limited circumstances where the employer may have the established custom of 
following a progressive discipline system and the handbook or manual requires 
it to be done, a judge may allow the case to go before the jury for a determi-
nation. 
H. An employee may, of course, pursue a wrongful termination claim based upon 
a termination that violates public policy as set forth in the Constitution or a 
statute. The landmark case in this area, which is a must to understand this 
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theory, is Firestone v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Sup.Ct, 1984). Basically, 
in Firestone the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that an employee cannot 
be terminated for pursuing a workmen's compensation claim, as that right was 
protected by statute and is a clearly-articulated public policy which must be 
followed. The cause of action was premised upon a combination of KRS 
446.070 and the violation of public policy expressed in the statute. However, 
please note in this decision that if you premise your claim on a statute setting 
forth a public policy which provides its own remedy, you must use that statute 
exclusively and not the procedure via KRS 446.070 set forth in Firestone. 
There are many public policies that can be found within the KRS. For exam-
ple, see KRS 61.102 (whistleblowers), KRS 337.015 (leave of absence to em-
ployee that adopts child under age of seven), KRS 427.140 (garnishments), and 
KRS 29A.l60 (jury service). 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court appears to be "in the middle" within all 
jurisdictions throughout the country when it comes to protecting plaintiffs in 
wrongful termination litigation, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has appeared to 
be somewhat more sympathetic. See Willoughby v. Gencorp. Inc., Ky., 809 
S.W.2d 858 (Ct.App. 1990); Ovemite Transport Co. v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 
129 (Ct.App. 1990). 
B. It will be very important to instruct your client to keep a good and detailed 
record of all efforts made to secure other employment after termination since 
the plaintiff does have the burden to mitigate damages (i.e., where applied, 
copies of applications, with whom he spoke, etc.). It appears as though the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in most situations will find this question of mitiga-
tion of damages to be a "classic jury question." See Lewis v. Bledsoe, 798 
S.W.2d 459 (Sup.Ct. 1990). 
C. From an evidentiary standpoint, the Court of Appeals in Willoughby, supra, at· 
862, ruled that the trial Court erred in excluding the testimony of two other 
workers who alleged that they were harassed and treated wrongfully after they 
sustained a work-related injury and sought benefits. This could be a very 
crucial piece of evidence in terms of getting your case to the jury so similar 
employer practices must be considered and proved. 
D. Make sure you think about whether your claim is premised as a breach of 
contract action or a tort claim which was brought out as a subject of interest to 
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Lewis, supra, although the parties did not 
preserve the issue for appeal. Certainly, if you are using solely a contract 
claim theory, there can be no claim for punitive damages as a result of a 
breach of contract. See KRS 411.184(4). On the other hand, if there is a tort 
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claim theory, you may be able to seek and prove punitive damages provided 
that you specifically comply with KRS 411.184 in terms of both the allegations 
in your Complaint and the proof at trial. You will also need to consider KRS 
411.186 in this regard. 
E. Consider carefully how your jury instructions are worded, as it could make an 
important difference in how the jury understands what they may do for the 
plaintiff during deliberations. See First Property Management v. Zarebidaki, 
Ky., 867 S.W.2d 185 (1994); Overnite Transport Co., supra, at 132-133. 
F. BEWARE of res judicata being applied from any Unemployment Insurance 
decision which is affirmed by a Circuit Court. This may prevent a successful 
wrongful termination action thereafter. 
G. An excellent reference to use, which is relatively inexpensive, is the two-vol-
ume set, Unjust Dismissal by Larson & Borowsky, from Matthew Bender. 
This is updated yearly. Also, you may want to join the National Employment 
Lawyers Association, which has its national office at 535. Pacific Avenue, San 
Francisco, California 94133, (415) 397-6335. 
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Mter-Acquired Evidence of Employee 
Misconduct: Affirmative Defense or 
Limitation on Remedies? 
W hat can·an employer do with evidence of em-
ployee misconduct dis-
covered long after· a 
challenged employment decision was . 
made? Can it be used as an affirmative 
defense? Does it limit a plaintifrs dam-
ages? Or is it completely irrelevant? 
While employers are often ecstatic 
when evidence such as resume fraud 
or work-related misconduct is un-
covered during the course of litigation, 
their attorneys would be well-advised 
to temper this enthusiasm. In the 11th 
Circuit, such evidence may only limit 
plaintifrs remedies, rather than sup-
port dismissal of the suit. 
The Summers Rule 
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700 
(10th Cir. 1988), is the seminal case 
regarding an employer's use of "after-
acquired evidence," or evidence discov-
ered after commencement of an em-
ployment discrimination action. Sum-
lDers brought a suit alleging age and 
religious discrimination after his dis-
missal based upon insubordination and 
poor interpersonal skills. During dis-
covery, and over four years after his 
disch!lrge, State Farm discovered that 
Summers had falsified company re-
cords in 150 separate instances. In its 
motion for summary judgment, State 
Farm argued that Summers would have 
been fired for these falsifications im-
mediately upon discovery regardless 
of any other alleged illegal motivation. 
Although the after-acquired evidence 
could not have been a "cause" for the 
termination, the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that it was highly rele-
. vant to plaintifrs claim of injury and 
precluded the plaintifffrom recovering 
any relief. The court then made the 
following statement,· which has heen 
However after-
acquired ev ide nee is 
used, it is important 
that the employer 
demonstrate that in 
preVlOUS cases 
termination resulted 
for the same 
infraction 
by Elizabeth Pryor Johnson 
quoted approvingly by a .number of 
courts:1 
To argue . • . that this after-acquired evi-
dence should be ignored is utterly unrealis-
tic. The present case is akin to the hypo-
thetical wherein a company doctor is fired 
because of his age, race, religion, and sex 
and the company, in defending a ciVil rights 
action, thereafter discovers that the dis-
charged employee was not a "doctor!' In our 
view, the masquerading doctor would be 
entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no 
better position. 
Id. at 708 (footnote omitted). The 10th 
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of State Farm be-
cause the plaintiff suffered no legal 
damage as a matter of law. 
Since Summers, after-acquired evi-
dence has been used by the courts2 in 
two ways: 1) as an_ affirmative defense 
to liability,3 and 2) as a limitation upon 
plaintiffs remedy.4 The 11th Circuit 




The court of appeals for the 11th 
Circuit squarely addressed the Sum-
mers issue in Wallace v. Dunn Con-
struction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 
1992). Plaintiff Neil sued her former 
employer for causes of action under the 
Equal Pay ActS and Title VII. During 
her deposition, Neil admitted that she 
had pled guilty to possession of cocliine 
and marijuana, despite the fact that 
she had checked the "no" box on her 
employment application after the ques-
tion: "Have you ever been convicted of 
a crime?" 
After discovering this evidence, the 
defendant filed a motio~ for partial 
summary judgment on the ground that 
the after-acquired evidence of Neil's 
convictions and application fraud con-
stituted legitimate grounds for termi-
nation irrespective of any alleged ille-
gal motives. Neil countered that mo-
tion with evidence that other people 
who had lied on their employment 
applications had retained their jobs. 
The district court denied the defen-
dant's motion on the ground that, inter 
alia, a material issue of fact existed as 
to whether Neil would have been hired 
had she responded truthfully in the 
application. 
On appeal, a divided panel of the 
11th Circuit rejected the Summers ap-
proach to the extent the defendant 
employer relied on it as an affirmative 
defense to Title VII liability. Calling 
the Summers rule "antithetical to tbe 
principal purpose of Title VII:' the 
court reasoned that it ''iI:tvites employ-
ers to establish ludicrously low thresh-
olds for 'legitimate' termination" and 
might encourage "rummaging through 
an unlawfully-discharged employee's 
background for flaws." As the court_ 
saw it, "the law governing after-
acquired evidence should not ignore 
the time lapse between the unlawful 
act and the discovery of a legitimate 
motive." [d. at 1180-81. 
This holding should come as no sur-
prise. The 11th Circuit has rejected 
. several previous attempts to rational-
ize adverse employment decisions with 
information unknown to the decision-
maker at the time the decision was 
made. See Joshi v. Florida State Univ. 
Health Ctr., 763 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th 
eir.) (noting that the applicant's quali-
fications were not considered at all in 
that case, and therefore the defendant 
could not rely on the superior qualifica-
tions of other candidates to explain its 
hiring decision), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
948 (1985); Eastland p. Tennessee Val-
ley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 626, modified, 
714 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(rejecting the defendant's attempt to 
justify its hiring decision on the ground 
the applicant chosen had superior quali-
fications because the decisionmaker 
was unaware of those qualifications 
prior to hiring decision), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1066 (1984). 
Although the 11th Circuit's holding 
has some logical appeal in that the 
relevant motive issue ought to be what 
the employer actually knew at the time 
of its decision, the opinion does not 
reflect the current trend in the caselaw 
on the issue. Most courts in other 
jurisdiction.s have granted summary 
judgment when presented with undis-
puted facts showing that either the 
employee would never have been hired 
or termi~ation would have resulted6 
upon discovery of the evidence of mis-
conduct.7 
A Glimmer of 
Hope for Employers 
The 11th Circuit did, however, em-
brace the Summers approach to the 
extent it impacts upon the relief avail-
able to a successful Title VII plaintiff. 
In what the dissent called the creation 
of "an enormously complicated body of 
law," the court discussed the Summers 
impact upon the remedies available 
under Title VII and the Equ(ll Pay 
Act.8 
The court explained that if the after-
a·cquired evidence would have caused 
the plaintiffs discharge, then reinstate-
ment, front pay, and injunctive relief 
would not be appropriate because such 
remedies would go beyond the make-
whole relief available under Title VI1.9 
The determination of backpay, how-
ever, is more complicated. The 11th 
backpay period. 
Circuit rejected the argument that the Resume Fraud 
backpay period should end on the date V. Work Misconduct 
of discovery of the after-acquired evi- Judge Godbold filed a dissenting opin-
dence, and concluded that, to termi- ion in Dunn and stated that he would 
nate the backpay period, the employer have upheld summary judgment for 
must prove that it would have discov- the employer on the grounds that plain-
ered the evidence prior to what other- tiff lacked standing to maintain the 
wise would be the end of the backpay suit.ll More interestingly for employ-
period in the absence of the challenged ment lawyers, however, Judge Godbold 
employment decision and the litiga- also distinguished a resum~ fraud case 
tion. tO This conclusion provides yet (the Dunn facts) from a case in which 
more incentive for employers to con- the employee is properly hired, and the 
duct aggressive independent investiga- employer discovers work misconduct 
tions to verify information given in' after the suit is filed (the Summers 
resumes and employment applications. facts). Thus, Dunn may not be applica-
Of course, in the case of post-hiring ble in the latter situation. 
employee misconduct, it will be ex- The majority of cases applying Sum-
tremely difficult to prove that such mers involve resum~ fraud. There are, 
evidence would have been discovered accordingly, relatively few decisions 
absent the termination, because it is applying Summers when an employee 
the termination itself (and resulting has been properly hired, is discharged 
litigation) which normally brings such for an alleged illegal motive, and the 
matters to light. To that end, the 11th employer subsequently discovers work 
Circuit may have created a virtually misconduct unrelated to the proffered 
insurmountable evidentiary hurdle for reasons for discharge. For now, em-
employers to overcome in halting the ployers and counsel will have to be 
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guided by the resume fraud decisions. 
'JYpically, in resume fraud cases, the 
employer makes alternative arguments: 
First, had the employer known of the 
misrepresentation, it never would have 
hired the plaintiff; and second, regard-
less of its hiring decision, the misrepre-
sentation itself would have constituted 
sufficient grounds for dismissaL The 
first inquiry is inherently speculative, 
which probably explains why courts 
are more comfortable relying upon the 
second argument. The courts which 
have addressed this second argument 
have generally granted summary judg-
ment for the employer when there are 
undisputed facts demonstrating that 
the employee would have been fired 
had the misconduct been known. Un-
der this line of cases, summary judg-
ment is appropriate when the mis-
representation or omission was 
material, directly related to the qualifi-
cations for the job, and relied upon by 
the employer in making the hiring 
decision.12 
However after-acquired evidence is 
used-as an affirmative defense or as 
a limitation upon remedies-it is im-
portant that the employer demonstrate 
that in previous cases termination re-
sulted for the same infraction.13 If the 
employee can show that another em-
ployee received less severe discipline 
for the same misconduct, or that the 
employer did not follow its own policies 
consistently, then the discharged em-
ployee has created a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judg-
ment.1. 
Evidence to support the employer's 
summary judgment motion should in-
cIud~ when possible: 1) Copies of per-
sonnel handbooks and policy manuals 
clearly stating that the employee's mis-
conduct directly violated company pol-
icy and would have resulted in im-
mediate termination;15 2) an affidavit 
from the personnel director stating 
that plaintiff would have been fired 
immediately had the employer known 
of the misconduct; and 3) any instances 
in which employees have been termi-
nated ··under similar circumstances. 
Deposition testimony from the plaintiff 
that the plaintiff was aware of the 
company policy prohibiting the miscon-
duct and understood the significance 
and the likely adverse consequences 
had the employer been aware of it, 
would also be helpful.16 Employers who 
are not relying upon violations of spe-
cific company policies and cannot prof-
fer any evidence of terminations made 
under similar circumstances are un-
likely to prevail on summary judg-
ment.n 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
How after-acquired evidence will be 
treated in a mixed-motive case brought 
under the Civil Rights Act of 199118 
has not been definitively resolved. The 
EEOC takes the position that after-
acquired evidence cases should not be 
analyzed as mixed-motive cases, be-
cause the latter analyze the employer's 
liability, and the former, the employer's 
remedy only.19 The 11th Circuit has 
indicated that it would take a similar 
position. Although Dunn was brought 
under Title VII prior to its amendment, 
the court stated that its analysis was 
"fully consistent" with the mixed-
motive provisions of §107 of the act.20 
In the 11th Circuit, therefore, employ-
ers will probably face the same eviden-
tiary hurdles in cases brought under 
the new Civil Rights Act when in-
voking the after-acquired evidence 
defense as. the defendant faced in 
Dunn. 
Conclusion 
The 11th Circuit has not yet ad-
dressed the issue of how Summers 
should be applied in the case of a 
properly hired employee when evidence 
of misconduct is discovered after litiga-
tion commences. Although the recent 
trend in the caselaw is to grant sum-
mary judgment when there is no issue 
of fact that the employee would have 
been fired had the employer known of 
the misconduct, the decision in Dunn 
suggests a contrary result. It appears. 
more likely that the 11th Circuit will 
continue to hold that Summers' use-
fulness lies only in its limitation upon 
plaintifrs remedies. Nonetheless, until 
such time as the court of appeals is 
presented with this specific issue, and 
given the strength of the caselaw in 
other jurisdictions and the vehemence 
of the dissent filed'in Dunn, attorneys 
representing employers should consider 
asserting the Summers rule as a basis 
for summary judgment in cases where 
the employer discovers, after commence-
ment of the litigation, that a properly 
hired employee has engaged in miscon-
duct sufficient to warrant termination, 
though that misconduct was not known 
to the employer at the lime of the 
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termination. 0 
1 E.g" Washington v. Lake County, 762 
F. Supp. 199,202 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 969 
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Churchman v. 
Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D. 
Kan.1991). 
2 The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission takes the position that after-
acquired evidence of employee misconduct 
is not a complete defense to liability and 
may be used, therefore, only to limit dam-
ages to the period between the unlawful 
termination and the date termination would 
have resulted for a nondiscriminatory rea-
son. EEOC General Counsel Memorandum 
on Civil Rights Act of 1991, dated Feb. 22, 
1993,34 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) atE-I. 
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. 
Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); 
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 
(7th Cir. 1992); Agbor v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 60 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 
1142 (0. Utah 1993); O'Day v. McDonnell 
Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 
1468-69 (0. Ariz. 1992); Guzman v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 53 FAIR EMPL. PHAc. CAS. 
(BNA) 1419 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Mas-
sachusetts statute). 
4 See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 
968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); Smith v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 FAIR 
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1225 (S.D. N.Y. 
1993) (denying summary judgment; jury 
may consider misconduct in assessing dam-
ages). 
5 Efforts to invoke the Summers defense 
in Equal Pay Act and sexual harassment 
suits have met with little success. See, e.g., 
Boyd v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prod., Inc., 
No. Civ. A. 91-0083-H, 1992 WESTLAW 
404398 (W.O. Va. Dec. 11, 1992) (rejecting 
Summers' applicability to plaintifrs ability 
to recover unpaid equal wages and liqui-
dated damages in Equal Pay Act claim); 
Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 FAIR 
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1047 (D. Utah 1990) 
(refusing to consider Summers in sexual 
harassment suit, noting that being qualified 
for the job is not an element of the cause of 
action). 
e Employers· should take care to note 
they must prove they would have fired the 
employee, not simply that they could have 
done so. E.g., Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 
F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992). 
7 See supra note 3. 
S It should be noted, however, that the 
c01,lrt's statement that "the effect of after-
acquired evidence on Title VII remedies is 
best decided on a case-by-case basis," Dunn, 
968 F.2d at 1181, is sure to promote further 
confusion in this area. 
9 Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1181-82. 
1Q The 11th Circuit's creation of an addi-
tional evidentiary burden for employers to 
overcome in order to halt the backpay 
period goes beyond even the EEOC's posi-
tion. The EEOC has taken the position that 
the backpay period ends upon the date of 
discovery of the misconduct. See supra note 
2. 
11 Judge Godbold also participated in the 
Sixth Circuit decision holding that Sum-
mers could be used as a complete defense. 
See Johnson u. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 
955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J., 
sitting by designation) (even assuming vio-
lation of state civil rights act, resume fraud 
barred any entitlement to relieO. The Dunn 
court explicitly rejected the standing argu-
ment. Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.10. 
12 Johnson u. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 
955 F.2d at 414. 
13 E.g., Churchman u. Pinkerton's, Inc., 
756 F. Supp. at 518. 
14 See, e.g., DeVoe u. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 
F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (D. Kan. 1992); Grzenia 
u.Interspec,Inc., No. 91C 290, 1991 WEST· 
LAW 222105, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1991); 
Punahele u. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. 
Supp. 487, 490·91 (D. Colo. 1991). 
]5 Kristufek u. Hussmann·Foodseruice Co., 
. 61 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. {BNA) 72 (7th Cir. 
-~ 1993), illustrates the danger of having an 
employment policy which provides only that 
a particular act of misconduct "may be" 
grounds for dismissal as opposed to "will 
be" grounds for dismissal. 
16 See Churchman u. Pinkerton's, Inc., 
756 F. Supp. at 520·21. 
17 See Mackey v. Board of Pensions, No. 
91C 5739, 1993 WESTLAW 11674 (Jan. 15, 
1993). 
18 Pub. L. No. 102·166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991). 
]9 See su.pra note 2. 
20 Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1184 n.17. 
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Resume Fraud as a Defense to 
Bias Claims 
by Gregory A. Hearing 
In the last several months, several signifi-
cant court decisions have come down regard-
ing the significance of the discovery of re-
sume fraud in bias claims_ In addition, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) recently issued a policy memo-
randum which adopted the holdings of 
recent cases with regard to an employer's 
discovery of after-the-fact evidence in bias 
claims. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided two cases on this issue in July and 
August. In the first case, Washington v. Lake 
County, No. 91-1819 (7th Cir. 1992), the 
court announced the standard it will apply 
in these types of cases. Factually, Eddie 
Washington, a jailor at the Lake County Il-
linois Sheriffs Department who was fired 
in 1987 filed suit, alleging that he was ter-
minated due to his race. During the pen-
dency of the suit, the Lake County Sheriffs 
Office determined that Washington falsified 
his employment application by concealing 
two criminal convictions. The district court 
for the Northern District of Illinois held that 
even if Washington was the victim of race 
bias, he was not entitled to relief because 
Washington lied on his employment applica-
tion. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit announced 
that a routine policy of rejectingbias claims 
under a "would-not- have-been-hired" theory 
is misguided. Instead, the court stated that 
"the appropriate issue in an employment dis-
crimination case where the plaintiff lied on 
his application and was later fired for an 
unrelated reason, is whether the employer, 
acting in a race-neutral fashion, would have 
fired the employee upon discovery of the mis-
representation, not whether the employee 
would have hired the employee had it known 
the truth." The court said that the proper 
inquiry is whether Washington was treated 
differently than similarly situated employ-
ees because of his race. The court placed the 
burden on the employee in such cases to 
show that he would not have been fired in 
a resume fraud situation. The court deter-
mined that Washington did not produce 
such evidence and dismissed his claim. 
In a decision following closely upon the 
heels of Washington, the Seventh Circuit fur-
ther refined its earlier pronouncement on 
the significance of resume fraud in bias 
claims. In Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., Nos. 90-
1127 and 92-1730 (7th Cir. 1992), the court 
held that employers must offer proof that 
they would have fired an employee for a 
resume fraud so that employers cannot 
avoid "Title VII liability by pointing to mi-
nor rule violations which may technically 
subject the employee to dismissal, but would 
not, in fact, result in discharge." 
The facts of the Reed case showed that 
EliusReed was hired by AMAX Coal Com-
pany after submitting an application in 
which Reed failed to disclose a felony con-
viction. The job application contained a pro-
vision that falsification on the application 
was grounds for dismissal. Reed was subse-
quently dismissed in 1982 for sleeping on 
the job. Reed believed that he was dismissed 
because of his race and filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Illinois Department 
of Human Rights. During the pendency of 
his charge, AMAX discovered Reed's falsifi-
cation. Reed's charge was rejected and he 
filed suit in federal district court. The dis-
trict court entered judgment for AMAX on 
the ground that Reed had lied on his job 
application, finding that was grounds for dis-
missaL On appeal, the Seventh Circuit said 
that the type of proof the court would re-
quire from an" employer claiming that it 
would fire an employee for resume fraud is 
proof that other ~mployees were fired in simi-
lar circumstances in the past. The obvious 
problem with this requirement is that if the 
employee is the first to have lied on the 
application and been caught, then the em-
ployer has no past history to rely upon as 
proof. 
In another recent case involving this is-
sue, the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado granted judgment in fa-
vor of an employer in a, sex and national 
origin bias claim. In Bonger v. American 
Water Works, No. 90-C-1592 (D.C. Colo. 
1992), American Water Works learned for 
the first time that Bonger did not have a 
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college degree while Bonger's lawsuit for sex 
and national original discrimination was 
pending. In 1988, Bonger, a hispanic 
woman, applied for the position of Director 
of Human Resources at American. On her 
application, she represented that she had a 
college degree. Two years later, Bonger was 
fired for allegedly poor performance. Bonger 
sued alleging sex and national origin dis-
crimination, but during the pendency of ac-
tion, American discovered that Bonger did 
not have a college degree. American submit-
ted an affidavit insisting that it would have 
fired Bonger for misrepresenting that she 
had a college degree and has consistently 
had a policy that resume fraud was grounds 
for termination. The district court deter-
mined that American sQowed that it would 
have fired Bonger had it known of her re-
sume fraud either before or at the time of 
her termination and therefore granted Ameri-
can's motion for summary judgment. 
Not to be outdone by the recent case law, 
the EEOC, on July 7, 1992, adopted a gui-
dance memorandum which included a sec-
tion setting forth its policy on the effect of 
discovery of after-the-fact evidence in bias 
cases. The EEOC memorandum states: 
If the employer produces proof of a justifi-
cation discovered after-the-fact that would 
have induced .it to take the same action, the 
employer will be shielded from an order 
requiring it to reinstate the complainant· 
or to pay the portion of back pay accruing 
after the date that the legitimate oasis for 
the adverse action was discovered, and the 
portion of compensatory damages (in 
charges based on post-1991 Act conduct) 
that would cover losses arising after that 
date. If the date of the discovery is un-
known, then an appropriate percentage re-
duction should be made, based on an as-
sessment of the approximate date of the 
discovery. Thus, if a complainant is termi-
nated for discriminatory reasons, but the 
employer has an absolute policy of firing 
anyone who commits theft, then the em-
ployer would not be required to reinstate 
the charging party or to pay compensatory 
damages for Injuries arising after the date 
that the theft was discovered, or back pay 
accruing after that date. 
A copy of the EEOC Guidance Memoran-
dum can be found at 131 DLR (BNA) E1-
E19. 
Although the EEOC guidance memoran-
dum would cut off the amount of pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary damages, the memoran-
dum points out" that if an employer's sole 
motivation was discriminatory and that it 
acted with malice or with reckless indiffer-
ence to the claimant's rights, after-the-fact 
evidence would not operate to shield the em-
ployer from having to pay punitive damages 
to the claimant. 
The Eleventh Circuit recently spoke on 
this issue in Wallace v. Dunn Construction 
Co., Inc., No. 91-7406 (1992 WL 180276) 
(11th Cir. 1992). In Wallace, one ofthe plain-
tiffs, who was suing DU:nn for, inter alia, sex 
harassment under Title VII, lied on her em-
ployment application by failing to disclose 
criminal convictions. Dunn discovered this 
evidence after deposing the plaintiff. Dunn 
moved for-partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that the after acquired evidence of 
the plaintiffs application fraud was a legiti-
mate cause for her termination, irrespective 
of any unlawful bias. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama denied the motion and Dunn took an 
interlocutory appeal. 
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed but set 
forth certain limitations as to the extent of 
the significance of after acquired evidence. 
The court held that the plaintiff could not 
be awarded any prospective relief such as 
front pay, reinstatement, or injunctive relief 
_ but could be awarded backpay unless. Dunn 
could show that it would have discovered . 
the application fraud prior to the end of the 
backpay period. The court specifically re-
jected the argument that backpay should be 
cut off on the day that Dunn actually discov-
covered the application fraud. The court re-
jected that approach on the ground that a 
bias victim should never be placed in a 
worse position than if she was not in a pro-
tected class because, without the lawsuit, 
the employer would not have discovered the 
fraud. The court said to hold otherwise 
would have the effect of providing the em-
ployer a windfall. Nevertheless, the court 
stated that the after acquired evidence 
should have the result of reducing the attor-
neys' fee award if the plaintiff prevails. 
No indication was given in the opinion as 
to whether the Wallace court considered the 
EEOC policy memorandum on this subject 
even though it was issued approximately 
one month before the court's opinion was 
issued. It is therefore unknown what effect, 
if any, the EEOC's policy memorandum will 
have on cases in this jurisdiction. 
Gregory A. Hearing is an attorney with· the 
Tampa law firm of Thompson, Sizemore & 
Gonzalez, P .A" representing management in 
the area of labor and employment law. Mr. 
Hearing is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the 
University of the South and received his ju-
ris doctorate from the Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law with honors. He is a 
member of the Labor and Employment Law 
Section of The Florida Bar. 
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HYPOTHETICAL # 1 
Company A is a company incorporated and with its 
principal place of business in New York. Company A does business 
and has employees in every state in the nation. Employee B is a 
former employee for Company A in the state of Florida. Employee B 
has an agreement with Company A that provides that an employee will 
be gi ve~ an opportunity to improve any unsatisfactory performance .• 
The agreement specifically provides, however, that Company A 
reserves the right to terminate an employee immediately in the case 
of fraud, dishonesty, or falsification of company records. The 
agreement also provides for an internal appeal process, but without 
right to counsel, access to documents, and sworn testimony. 
Company A had reason to suspect that Employee B was 
falsifying information on company documents and engaging in other 
fraudulent practices. After an internal investigation, Company A 
terminated Employee B without warning for falsifying company 
documents, dishonesty, and fraud. B filed suit in state court 
against A alleging breach of his employment contract, violations of 
ERISA, RICO violations, defamation, and tortious interference. In 
addition to Company A, Employee B named his immediate supervisor, 




are state cTaims 
joinder? 
Although there are some federal claims, there 
against nondiverse defendants. Fraudulent 
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2 • Mediation. 
3. Counterclaims. 
4. Counsel for B begins to informally contact non-management 
employees of A, as well as individual customers. 
5. Employee B applies for unemployment compensation on the 
basis that there has been no misconduct in connection with his 
work. During the hearing, the hearing officer will not allow 
Company A to testify from the records regarding instances of 
dishonesty, fraud, and falsification of company documents and 
grants B his unemployment compensation. Does the unemployment 
decision have any collateral estoppel or res jUdicata effect on 
this lawsuit? Should the employer appeal the unemployment 
compensation award? 
6. Employee B serveS Company A and the individual defendants 
with voluminous discovery requests seeking nationwide discovery of 
information about other employees. How should Company A respond? 
7. There is an ongoing investigation of B by an independent 
state regulatory agency. How should the parties react? 
·S. Motion practice. 
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HYPOTHETICAL # 2 
HYPOTHETICAL 
You are counsel for a MegaCorp, a large national corporation 
with branches in every state. On returning from vacation one 
Monday, you are met by the usual pile of mail, along with several 
frantic phone messages from the Human Resources Manager for one of 
the local branches in your territory. When you return her call, 
she tells you that she has spent the last week dealing with a 
highly sensitive situation involving allegations of sexual 
harassment. 
It seems a female employee has made a very serious charge 
against one of her coworkers,. John Groper (who is not her supervi-
sor) • She claims that when she first began working in a small 
local office with Groper over a year ago, he cornered her in a room 
and tried to force himself on her. The attack was only stopped 
when· Groper overheard a customer enter an outer office. The female 
employee never reported the incident because she thought the 
situation would improve, she says. 
The atmosphere did not improve, however I and the female 
employee also alleges that throughout the last year, she has had to 
endure frequent remarks of a sexual nature from Groper. For his 
part, Groper vigorously denies every allegation, asserting that the 
female employee was motivated by jealousy of his better work 
performance and a desire to be transferred to a more prestigious 
location. Groper adds that he believes MegaCorp is on a crusade to 
fire him based on unsubstantiated allegations. "You'll hear from 
my lawyer," he tells the human resources manager. The human 
resources manager needs your advice. 
1. At this early stage, what is your first move? 
2. If you separate the two employees, whom should you 
transfer? How do you handle the move? 
On your advice, MegaCorp beglns an investigation of Groper. 
No one can corroborate the attack (the customer is nowhere to be 
found), but two other coworkers report that Groper made sexual 
comments at work and inquired into their sex lives in a manner that 
made them uncomfortable. One employee from another office alleges 
that Groper "pulled" her onto his lap at a social event and touched 
her inappropriately. A witness at that event suggests that the 
woman voluntarily sat in Groper's lap. Groper has retained 
counsel, who threatens to sue MegaCorp and any person associated 
with the case if he is discharged. 
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3. What is your next move? Groper's employment 
contract maintains employment at will. Do you 
discharge Groper? 
4. During the investigation of the accusation, it comes 
to light that the accuser has filed two other 
allegations of sexual misconduct, one against her 
child's daycare provider and another against her 
chiropractor. Does this affect your course of 
action? 
5. Groper's counsel asks for the names of his accusers 
and documents relating to their accusations. He 
maintains that without access to these documents a 
discharge would be manifestly unfair and "violate 
due process." What, if anything, do you reveal to 
Groper's lawyer? 
The human resources manager recommends that Groper be 
discharged. Meanwhile, Groper sues the first accuser for defama-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
6. MegaCorp has a policy of indemnifying employees sued 
for actions in the course of their employment. Do 
you pay for the accuser's defense of Groper's 
lawsuit? If so, should you also pay for her pur-
suit of a counterclaim against Groper? 
7. Are there conflict of interest problems here? Who 
should MegaCorp retain to represent the accuser? 
8. Assume the accuser complains that she has been 
treated unfairly in the investigation and in her 
transfer to a new job and hints about going to the 
EEOC. Does this affect the answers to the last two 
questions? 
MegaCorp receives a subpoena for all documents, notes, tapes, 
etc. relating to the investigation, including the personnel file of 
the accuser. Meanwhile, Groper's lawyer accuses MegaCorp of being 
"scum" and threatens to go to the press to expose how his client 
has been railroaded. The employees involved express their concern 
for their own privacy. 
9. How do you respond to the subpoena? How do you 
protect the privacy of the individuals involved? 
10. What other measures would you pursue to protect the 
confidentiality of the documents released in re-
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sponse to the subpoena? How would a "gag order" 
help or hinder MegaCorp? 
The human resource manager is concerned, as you are, that when 
Groper's discharge is final, he will sue MegaCorp. 
11. What actions can you take now to fend off further 
litigation? 
12. Groper has threatened to sue each and every manager 
involved in the· investigation. Do you have an 
obligation to notify employees that they may be the 
subjects of future litigation? 
13. In planning to defend an action by Groper for 
defamation, breach of contract, wrongful discharge 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
what is your theory of the case? What legal theo-
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I. IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT. 
A. RELEVANT RULE* 
Rule 1.13 organization As Client. 
(a) A lawyer employed or retained 
organization represents the organization 
through its duly authorized constituents. 
by an 
acting 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an 
officer, employee or other person associated with 
the organization is engaged in action, intends to 
act or refuses to act in a manner related to 
representation that is a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of 
law which reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, and is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary and in the 
best interest of the organization. In determining 
how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due 
consideration of the seriousness of the violation 
and its consequences, the scope and nature of the 
lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the 
organization and the apparent motivation of the 
person involved, the policies of the organization 
concerning such matters and any other relevant 
considerations. Any measures taken shall be 
designed to minimize disruption of the organization 
and the risk of revealing information relating to 
the representation to persons outside the 
organization. Such measures may include among 
others: 
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on 
the matter be sought for presentation to 
appropriate authority in the organization; and 
(3) referring the matter to higher authority 
in the organization including, if warranted by 
the seriousness of the matter, referral to the 
highest authority that can act in behalf of 
the organization as determined by applicable 
law. 
* "Rule" refers to both KBA Rules of Professional Conduct and 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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(c) If, despite the lawyers efforts in accordance 
with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can 
act on behalf of the organization insists upon 
action, or a refusal to act, that is a clear 
violation of law and is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16. 
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity 
of a client when it is apparent that the 
organization's interests are adverse to those 
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also 
represent any of its directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other 
consti tuents, subject to the provisions of Rule 
1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual 
representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the 
organization other than the individual who is to be 
represented, or by the shareholders. 
The comment accompanying Rule 1.13 anticipates potential 
conflict between the interests of the corporate client and the 
interests of its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and 
other constituents. Such conflicts create unique problems for 
counsel representing the corporate entity, which can only act 
through these constituents. Thus, in order to properly and 
ethically represent the corporate client, i.e. the employer, 
counsel will necessarily engage in contact, investigation and 
advice with persons who may have or develop adverse interests 
during the course and scope of the representation. 
The Comment clearly indicates that at such times, the lawyer 
must advise any individual constituent whose interest the lawyer 
finds adverse to that organization that the conflict exists, that 
the lawyer does not represent the individual constituent and that 
constituent may wish to seek independent counsel. Most 
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importantly, both the constituent and the counsel must realize and 
acknowledge - and act accordingly - that discussions between them 
may not be privileged. 
The parameters and prescriptions of Rule 1.13 are not limited 
to formally incorporated businesses. The Rule refers to 
"organizations," which can include partnerships, joint ventures, 
'franchisees, unions, trade associations, and other distinct 
separate entities. 1 
The difficulty of the Rule is demonstrated by Oliver v. 
Kalamazoo Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 766 (W.O. Mich. 1972) 
wherein the Court imposed a duty on the attorney representing a 
school board to maintain confidentiality as to individual members 
who "are the only available conduit of information between the 
client corporate body entity and the attorney." 
II. CONTACT WITH CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN ADVERSE 
CORPORATE PARTY 
A. RELEVANT RULE 
Rule 4.2 Communication With Person Represented by Counsel 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about. the subject of the 
representation with a party the lawyer knows 
to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of 
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do 
so. 
Comment [2] to the Rule states as follows: 
In the case of an organization, the Rule prohibits 
communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the 
matter in representation with persons having a managerial 
responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with 
any other person whose act or omission in connection with 
that matter may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose 
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the 
organization. If an agent or employee of the 
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organization is represented in the matter by his or her 
own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a 
communication will be sufficient for purposes of this 
Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). 
B. ABA FORMAL OPINION 91-359, MARCH 22, 1991 
1. EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN 
ADVERSE CORPORATE PARTY DOES NOT VIOLATE RULE 4.2 
The Comment to Rule 4.2 separates the inquiry as to a present 
employee into three categories: (a) an employee who has a 
managerial responsibility on behalf of the employer-corporation, 
(b) an employee who is one whose act or omission in connection with 
the matter that is the subject of the potential communicating 
lawyer's representation may be imputed to the corporation, or (c) 
an employee whose statement may constitute an admission by the 
corporation. 2 However, neither the text of Rule 4.2 nor its 
Comment mention former employees. Thus, given that "the effect of 
the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information about one's 
case," the Opinion held that Rule 4.2 should be strictly construed 
so as not to cover former employees. 3 Al though "the concerns 
reflected in the Comment to Rule 4.2 may survive the termination of 
the employment relationship,,,4 by delineating categories of corp-
orate employees who may not be the subject of ex parte 
communication, the Comment to Rule 4.2 "clearly implies that 
communication with all other employees on 'the matter of 
representation' is permissible without consent."s 
The Opinion cautioned, however, that an attorney considering 
contacting a former. employee of an adverse corporate party must not 
"seek to induce" the employee to violate the corporate 
attorney-client privilege. 6 In addition, the contacting attorney 
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must observe other applicable rules. As examples, the Committee 
cited Rule 4.1 (truthfulness in statements) and Rule 4.3 (contact 
with unrepresented persons).7 
2. APPLICABILITY OF THE ABA OPINION 
The scope of Rule 4.2 has been the subject of conflicts among 
the courts and, as the ABA noted, judicial interpretation of Rule 
4.2 varies. 8 The ABA's position is not binding on the courts and 
thus attorneys wishing' to contact former employees of adverse 
corporate parties should check the interpretation of the Rule in 
their jurisdiction. For example, in Porter v. Arco Metals, Div. of 
Atlantic Richfield, 642 F.Supp. 1116 (D.Mont. 1986), the Court 
prohibited contact with "present or former employees with 
managerial responsibilities concerning the matter in litigation." 
The responsibility for knowing which employees are covered by the 
Rule rests squarely on the contacting attorney.9 
"Whether an employee falls into any of [the] three categories 
is inevitably an issue affected by a host of factors . . These 
include at least the terms of the relevant statutory and common law 
of the state of the corporation's incorporation; applicable rules 
of evidence in the relevant jurisdiction; and relevant corporate 
documents affecting employees' duties and responsibilities. 10 As 
the Committee points out, attorneys should also be aware that the 
Comment to Rule 4.2 covers non-employees (e.g. independent con-
tractors) insofar as their statements may bind the corporation. 11 
C. KBA ETHICS OPINIONS KBA E-65 AND E-213 12 
Opinions of the Kentucky Bar Association clearly indicate that 
a lawyer representing a party adverse to a corporation or 
N - 6 
--------------------------------------------- -
governmental entity may not contact any employee "having access to 
confidential matters" of the entity without prior consent of 
opposing counsel. D 
KBA E-213 states that the attorney may contact "employees who 
are not managing agents and hourly wage earners who have no access 
to privileged or confidential information." However, the text of 
the opinion states as follows: 
"If any attorney can independently determine 
that a management employee or hourly wage 
earner does not have any access to privileged 
or confidential information, they may be 
contacted by an adversary attorney." 
Where such an independent determination cannot be made, 
however, KBA E-213 requires an inquiry through the appropriate 
officials of the corporation. Since the corporation would be 
represented by counsel, the appropriate inquiry should be directed 
to counsel. 
The opinion offers no further guidance on counsel's ability to 
"independently determine" whether an employee would have access to 
privileged or confidential information. Clearly, the attorney 
risking contact with the employee to determine whether such access 
exists risks inadvertent or unintentional violation of the Rule. 
D. SHONEY'S, INC. V. LEWIS 
The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 4.2 in 
its January, 1994 decision in Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 93-CA-
286-0A (January 31, 1994). There, the Court ruled that meetings 
between Plaintiff's counsel and two employees - a general manager 
and a relief manager - without consent from or notice to opposing 
counsel violated the Rule. The contacts occurred following actual 
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notice to plaintiff's counsel that the defendant employer was 
represented. 
The Court relied upon the following Comment to the Rule in 
finding the violation: 
(2) In the case of an organization, this Rule 
prohibits communications by a lawyer fo·r one 
party concerning the matter in representation 
with persons having a managerial responsibil-
ity on behalf of the organization, and with 
any other persons whose act or omission in 
connection with that matter may be imputed to 
the organization for purpose of civil or 
criminal liability or whose statement may 
consti tute an admission on the part of the 
organization. 
SCR 3.130 Rule 4.2, comment 2 (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
The Court concluded that the "senior managerial" employees involved 
"are precisely within the group of persons provided for in the 
comment." 
In fashioning a remedy for the violation of the Rule, the 
Court both disqualified Plaintiff's counsel and suppressed the 
evidence gathered in violation of the Rule stating: 
"Wi th respect 
obtained, the 
suppression ... 14 
to the statements wrongfully 
only satisfactory remedy is 
E. ONE STATE-THREE STANDARDS 
1. CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED 
In Public Serv. Elec. & Gas v. Associated Elec. and Gas 
Insurance Services, 745 F.Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990), the defendant 
insurance company sought to interview former employees of the 
plaintiff in order to determine the extent of its liability for 
environmental clean-up costs at plaintiff's coal gasification 
sites. The district court broadly interpreted Comment 2 as 
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extending to "any individual whose acts or omissions 'may' be 
imputed to the organization,,15 and held that Rule 4.2 prohibits 
informal contact with an adverse corporate party's former 
employees. 
As the court observed, "The Rule, as described in the comment 
protects the organizations [sic] interest in the acts and 
omissions" that may be imputed to the corporation and is not 
limited to statements .16 Thus , although a former employee's 
statements made during an informal conference will not themselves 
be imputable to the corporation17 , a former employee could testify 
to actions taken during his employment that could be imputed to the 
corporation .18 For this reason, "the harm caused by [imputable 
acts] is the same whether the witness is a present or former 
employee. ,,19 
In contrast to the ABA opinion, the P.S.&G. court felt that 
the twin policy goals of Rule 4.2, (1) to protect the corporate 
attorney-client relationship and (2) to prevent trained lawyers 
from extracting "damaging concessions from the unshielded 
layman, ,,20 outweighed the need for liberal discovery. 
The P.S.&G. court did not limit its ban on informal contacts 
to only those situations where the contacting attorney can 
determine that the corporate party may incur liability as a result 
of ex parte communications with former employees. Rather, the 
court held that such an approach is unwieldy and should be aban-
doned in favor of a blanket ban against all ex parte contacts with 
former employees. 
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2. CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES ALLOWED 
In Curley v. Cumberland Farms Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 
1990), plaintiffs, employees at defendant's chain of convenience 
stores, alleged that employee interrogations to recover store 
losses were conducted in such a manner as to constitute a pattern 
of extortion under state and federal RICO laws. Plaintiffs sought 
to interview 80 of defendant's former "Loss Prevention Specialists" 
(employees authorized to conduct interrogations), none of whom were 
known to have had direct contact with the plaintiffs, but could 
provide information relative to plaintiffs' claims. Defendants 
sought a protective order to prevent plaintiffs' attorney's contact 
with defendant's former employees. 
The court first determined that the former loss prevention 
specialists were not management-level employees. 21 Second, the 
court s~rmised that the actions taken by the 80 former employees 
were unlikely to be imputed to the corporation because none were 
known to have had contact with the plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs' 
claims were not based on an imputation theory. Rather, plaintiffs 
contended that any information received by the former loss 
prevention specialists would constitute mere evidence of an alleged 
unlawful management-level policy. For this reason, the court found 
that the former loss prevention specialists were comparable to 
"witnesses to an accident who did not participate in the 
accident. ,,22 
Although it was conceivable that actions taken by some of the 
80 former loss prevention specialists could be imputed to the 
corporation, this was largely because lack of information prevented 
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the plaintiffs from discovering the extent of the former employees' 
relevant knowledge. Under these circumstances, the court found a 
broad interpretation of Rule 4.2 would unduly infringe on the 
"truth-finding process" and "extract an enormous price unwarranted 
by the ethical concerns. ,,23 The court thus declined to follow 
P.S.&G., and held: 
[I]informal interviews of former nonmanagerial 
employees of a corporate defendant are not ethically 
prohibited by RPC 4.2 unless the person's act or omission 
is believed to be so central and obvious to a 
determination of corporate liability that the person's 
conduct may be imputed to the corporation. . . . If it 
is not reasonably likely that the person may be a central 
actor for liability purposes, nothing in RPC 4.2 
precludes informal contact with such a former 
employee. 24 
As concerns admissions, the court concluded that statements 
made by former loss prevention specialists would not constitute 
admissions under FRE 80l(d) (2) (D) (statements made by employees 
during the existence of the relationship) nor FRE 80l(d)(2)(E) 
(statements made by co-conspirators during the course of the 
conspiracy) and thus were not prohibited. 
3. CONTACT WITH "ALTER EGOS" ALLOWED 
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, adopted a 
third approach to regulate ex parte contact with a corporate 
party's current employees. In New Jersey v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 589 
A.2d 180 (1991), the court specifically rejected "bright line" 
extremes prohibiting all ex parte interviews with employees. 
Instead, the court held that ex parte contact could not be made 
wi th any corporate employee whose acts or omissions would be 
binding on the corporation or imputed to the corporation for 
purposes of its liability, as well as any employees who are imple-
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menting the advice of corporate counsel. Consequently, it rejected 
both the "bright line" prohibition in P.S.&G., and the so-called 
"control group" test utilized in Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc. 
The court cited and effectively adopted the approach utilized by 
the New York Court of Appeals in Niesig v. Team I, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1990). 
III. INTERVIEWING CLIENTS' EMPLOYEES 
A. RELEVANT RULES 
Rule 1.13: Organization As Client 
* * * * * 
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity 
of a client when it is apparent that the organiza-
tion's interests are adverse to those constituents 
with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
Rule 4.3: Dealing With Unrepresented Person 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply 
that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person 
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding. 
Rule 4.4: Respect For Rights Of Third Persons 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly 
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay or burden a third person, or knowingly 
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal 
rights of such a person. 
These Rules clearly guide counsel when representation of the 
organizational client calls on counsel to engage in contacts with 
that organization's employees. The lawyer must specifically advise 
the employee that counsel represents the employer, and, where 
necessary, advise the employee that the interests of the employer 
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are adverse and that the employee should consider obtaining 
counsel. 
Rule 4.4 prohibits violating the "legal rights" of persons. 
The Comment states that while it is impracticable to catalogue all 
such rights, "they include legal restrictions on methods of 
obtaining evidence from third persons." Clearly, rights enjoyed by 
persons pursuant to the Rules of Civil- Procedure would become 
relevant. 
B. Johnnies Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770 (1964). 
The National Labor Relations Act imposes additional affirma-
ti ve duties on counsel when interviewing or interrogating employees 
of a client. Where that client is unionized, or even subject to 
a unionization effort, the Act places special restrictions on 
interviews of employees who enjoy rights under the Act. 
Specifically, when investigating a labor related matter, the 
specific purpose of the questioning must be communicated to the 
employee. In addition, the employee must be given assurances of no 
reprisals regardless of whether. the information provided, if any, 
ultimately proves harmful to the employer. The investigation must 
be conducted in an atmosphere free from anti-union animus, must 
occur in a non-coercive fashion. The questioning must only be 
relevant to the specific issue involved in the instant matter, and 
cannot include the probing of the employee's subjective state of 
mind. Finally, the investigation must be entirely voluntary on the 
part of the employee. 
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IV. EX PARTE CONTACT WITH NLRB OFFICIALS 
NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Part 
102, Subpart P, prohibit ex parte communications with the Regional 
Director, members of the Board, administrative law judges, hearing 
officers and support staff involved in preparing decisions in the 
following situations: 
1. After a formal hearing is opened on a pre-election 
or post-election petition filed under 9(c)(1) or 9(e) of the NLRA. 
(102.128(a-b». 
2. After a decision is issued on unit clarification, 
certification amendments or post-election proceedings in which no 
formal hearing was held. (102.128(c». 
3. After a hearing on a jurisdictional strike is opened 
pursuant to section 10(k) of the NLRA. (102.128(d». 
4. After a complaint or notice of hearing is issued in 
an unfair labor practice proceeding or after it is known that a 
complaint or notice will be issued, whichever occurs first. 
(102.128(e» 
5. By specific Board order in any proceeding. 
(102.128(f». 
Communications not prohibited by the rule include those 
authorized by Board rule (102.130(a», questions about the status 
of a proceeding (102.130(b», communications that the parties agree 
may be made ex parte (102.130(c», settlement proposals 
(102.130(d», and general communications not specifically related 
to the on-the-record proceedings (102.130(e». 
The NLRB prohibition against ex parte communication applies to 
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any "interested person" (102.126, 102.127(a», and also prohibits 
knowingly causing others to violate the rule. (102.126, 102.131). 
Violation of the rule against ex parte communication can cause 
the offending party's claim to be "dismissed, denied, disregarded, 
or otherwise adversely affected." (102.133(a». In addition, an 
attorney's privilege to practice before the Board can be revoked 
or suspended. (102.133(b». 
V. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS 
A. RELEVANT STATUTES 
1. § 203 (b,c,f) of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §433 (b,c,f) (1982): 
* * * * * 
(b) Every person who pursuant to any agreement or 
arrangement with an employer undertakes activities where 
an object thereof is, directly or indirectly --
(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not 
to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner 
of exercising, the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing; or 
(2) to supply an employer with information 
concerning the activities of employees or a labor 
organization in connection with a labor dispute 
involving such employer, except information for use 
solely in conjunction with an administrative or 
arbitral proceeding or criminal or civil judicial 
proceeding; . 
shall file within thirty days after entering into such 
agreement or arrangement a report with the Secretary, 
signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding 
principal officers, containing the name under which such 
person is engaged and doing business and the address of 
its principal office, and a detailed statement of the 
terms and conditions of such agreement or arrangement. 
Every such person shall file annually, with respect to 
each fiscal year during which payments were made as a 
resul t of such an agreement or arrangement, a report with 
the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or 
corresponding principal officers, containing a statement 
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(A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account 
of labor relations advice or services, designating the 
sources thereof, and (B) of its disbursements of any 
kind, in connection with such services and the purposes 
thereof. In each such case such information shall be set 
forth in such categories as the Secretary may prescribe. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
require any employer or other person to file a report 
covering the services of such person by reason of his 
giving or agreeing to give advice to such employer or 
representing or agreeing to represent such employer 
before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of 
arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in col-
lective bargaining on behalf of such employer with 
respect to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of 
employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any 
question arising thereunder. 
* * * * * 
(f) Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed as an amendment to, or modification of the 
rights protected by, section 158(c) of this title. 
2. § 204 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §434 (1982): 
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to 
require an attorney who is a member in good standing of 
the bar in any State, to include in any report required 
to be filed pursuant to the provisions of this Act any 
information which was lawfully communicated to such 
attorney by any of his clients in the course of a 
legitimate attorney-client relationship. 
B. WHO MUST DISCLOSE: PERSUADERS VS. ADVISORS 
In International Union UAW v. Dole, 869 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), attorneys formulated a personnel policy for their client, 
Kawasaki Motor Corp., designed to discourage unionization. The UAW 
claimed that the law firm's preparation of the policy constituted 
persuader activity under the LMRDA and thus reporting was required. 
The court held that the policy formulation fell within the 203(c) 
exception for advice. In its holding, the court adopted the 
Secretary of Labor's position that: 
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(1) If an arrangement can be properly characterized as 
advice then the services fall under §203 (c) regardless of 
whether "the object" of the service performed involves 
employee persuasion. 25 
(2) "'An activity is characterized as advice if it is 
submitted orally or in written form to the employer for his 
use, and the employer is free to accept or reject the oral or 
written material submitted to him.' ,,26 
C. WHAT MUST BE DISCLOSED 
In Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211 
(6thCir. 1985), attorneys who made anti-union speeches to a 
client's non-union employees prior to election were "persuaders" 
for the purposes of §203(b) and thus required to comply with the 
reporting provisions. 
Appellants stipulated that they had acted as persuaders but 
argued: (a) that the persuader-attorneys had identified themselves 
as representatives of management and thus the goal of§203(b) to 
publicize persuader activities is not furthered by subjecting the 
firm to the reporting requirements; (b) under §203(c), the firm is 
not obligated to disclose other clients for whom it performs no 
persuader activities; (c) information required by the annual report 
is protected by the broad attorney-client privilege delineated in 
§204j (d) the disclosure requirements are unconstitutional. 
The Sixth Circuit rejected each of these arguments reasoning 
that the goal of §203(b) is not limited simply to publication of 
persuader activities. "Rather, Congress determined that persuasion 
itself was a suspect activity and concluded that the possible evil 
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could best be remedied through disclosure. I t was hoped that 
persuasive activity would be curbed by subjecting persuaders to 
glaring publicity. ,,27 (Cf. Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964 
(8th Cir. 1985». Furthermore, "[T]he purpose of section 203(c) is 
to clarify what is implicitly in section 203(b) -- that attorneys 
engaged in the usual practice of labor law are not obligated to 
C report under section 203 (b) . ,,28 However, once an attorney "crosses 
the boundary between the practice of labor law and persuasion, he 
is subj ect to the extensive reporting requirements. ,,29 (Cf. Rose 
Law Firm) (S203(c) is a limitation of the content of the report 
which is unaffected by the activity giving rise to the duty to 
report) .30 
The Court further held that the attorney-client privilege 
protected by S204 is identical to the common law attorney-client 
privilege and thus exempts only communications from the reporting 
requirements and does not protect against the disclosure of the 
facts required by S203(b).31 (Cf. Rose Law Firm) (attorney-
persuaders not required to report advice given clients if the 
clients themselves would not be subject to the reporting 
requirements) .32 
Finally, the court held that the governmental interest in 
"maintaining harmonious labor relations" is compelling and 
outweighs the moderate chill on First Amendment rights occasioned 
by the reporting requirements of S203(b) .33 (Cf. Rose Law Firm) 
(statute should be construed 
consti tutional rights). 34 
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to avoid infringement of 
VI. ADVISING MANAGEMENT DURING UNION ORGANIZATIONAL/ DECERTIFICA-
TION ELECTIONS 
A. THE UNION VIEW 
"While employers are, of course, entitled to legal advice 
and counsel, the range of attorney services has deviated far beyond 
the mere provision of legal representation. Attorneys now operate 
as strategists_for employer _ 'yoteno' campaigns and often observe 
neither the law nor professional ethics in so doing. Lawyers also 
conduct seminars where they teach not only election strategies but 
also how an employer can encourage and campaign in deauthorization 
and decertification elections. Under the law, employer prompting 
of these efforts is prohibited, but attorneys have nevertheless 
taught employers how to do so without being discovered." Address by 
Jules Bernstein of the Washington, D.C. firm, Connerton, Bernstein 
& Katz. 35 
B. THE MANAGEMENT VIEW 
"Employers need effective counsel in order to comply with 
the complex provisions of the NLRA." Note, Liability of Labor 
Relations Consultants for Advising Unfair Labor Practices, 1983 
Harv . L . Rev. 529 , 54 a . An employer's right to counsel is a 
"precious right and is to be preserved and given effect." NLRB v. 
Guild Indus. Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1963). In St. 
Francis Hospital, 263 NLRB 834 (1982), the Administrative Law Judge 
observed that any improper intrusion on an employer's right to 
counsel would result in the "commission of more, rather than fewer, 
unfair labor practices by uninformed parties." Id. at 848. 
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C. BOARD REACTION 
1. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY 
The Board has authority to promulgate rules governing the 
discipline of attorneys practicing before it. (See e.g., NLRB Rules 
and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Rule 102.133(b) 
("Board may censure, suspend, or revoke the privilege of practice 
before the Agency of any person who knowingly and willfully makes 
or solicits the making of a prohibited ex parte communication") and 
Rule 102.66(d)(2) ("misconduct of an aggravated character, when 
engaged in by an attorney [at a hearing or before an agent of the 
Board] shall be grounds for suspension or disbarment by the Board 
from further practice before it"». 
However, despite the high profile of attorneys and 
professional consulting services providing employers with advice in 
labor relations, the Board has yet to formulate a rule, or a 
policy, for dealing with such practices. 36 As the above cited 
rules indicate, the Board has confined its disciplinary authority 
"to conduct which either takes place at the hearing or is closely 
connected with it. ,,37 
2. RECOURSE UNDER THE NLRA 
The Board's authority under the NLRA is remedial, not 
puni ti ve . 38 As a result, the Board's ability to deal with 
attorney's who advise management who commit unfair labor practices 
is severely limited. Absent repeated, willful violations, the 
Board is hard-pressed to characterize any limitations imposed on 
attorneys under the NLRA as remedial. 39 Of course, the prospect 
of a bargaining order has a significant deterrent effect on pre-
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election misconduct.4~ 
Naming employer's counsel in a complaint is a maneuver which 
should be given careful thought by the Board and charging party. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has described this as an 
"intimidatory and coercive" restraint on the attorney-client 
relationship.41 
The Board will hold outside consultants responsible for the 
unfair labor practices committed by them.42 In one case, the Board 
has entered into an unpublished settlement agreement with a 
consulting firm by which the firm agreed to cease and desist from 
interfering with the rights of workers to join a particular union 
"or any other labor organization. ,,43 To date, the majority of 
cases naming consultants as codefendants for violations of the Act 
involve situations where the consultant directly contacted employ-
ees and had a past history of engaging in such unlawful conduct. 
In NLRB v. Selvin, 527 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1975), the court 
enforced the Board's order that the consultant-bargaining agent 
bargain in good faith. The same consultant had been involved in 
approximately nine cases, working as a bargaining agent for various 
employers, before she was actually named as a party and subjected 
to a Board order. 44 
In St. Francis Fed. of Nurses & Hlth. Pro. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 
844 (D.C. Cir. 1984), management employed a consulting firm for 
advice on how to resist an organizational effort on the part of its 
non-unionized nurses. The firm did not directly contact employees 
but advised supervisory personnel how to lawfully approach 
employees and persuade them to vote against unionization. The union 
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sought to hold the consulting firm directly responsible for unfair 
labor practices committed by hospital supervisors at the firm's 
direction. 
The federal court upheld the Board's determination that the 
consulting firm could not be held liable under the Act for acts 
committed by the hospital supervisors. However, it was not the 
court's determination that a consulting firm can never be directly 
responsible for violation of the Act. Rather, it was found that 
the firm did not advise the supervisors to commit unlawful acts of 
interrogation. 
a. Agency Theory 
In Bill Scott Oldsmobile, 282 NLRB 1073 (1987), an employer 
was held to have violated §8(a)(1) when its attorney interrogated 
several employees in preparation for an unfair labor practice 
hearing concerning unlawful discharges. Although the attorney told 
each employee that there would be no reprisals for information 
provided, the attorney failed to inform several employees of the 
purpose of the interview and to ensure that participation in the 
interview was voluntary. 45 The Board issued a cease and desist 
order directing management to refrain from interrogating employees 
without first informing them of the purpose and voluntary nature of 
the interview. (Cf. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (employer can compel employee to submit to 
limited, pre-arbitration interview as long as the interview does 
not pry into protected union activities)). 





D. BAR DISCIPLINE 
Rule 1.2(d) and (e) Scope of Representation 
* * * * * 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, 
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with 
a client and may counselor assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, 
meaning or application of the law. 
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects 
assistance not permitted by the rules of professional 
conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the 
client regarding the relevant limitations of the lawyer's 
conduct. 
Comment: Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions --
[6] A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the 
actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's 
conduct. The fact that a client uses advice in a course of action 
that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer 
a party to the course of action. However, a lawyer may not 
knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. There 
is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal 
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which 
a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. 
[7] When the client's course of action has already begun and 
is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. 
The lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing, 
except where permitted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is 
required to avoid furthering the purpose, for example, by sug-
gesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue 
assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes 
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is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. 
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Mayan attorney contact an opposing party to obtain information 
relating to a pending controversy, without the consent of opposing 
counsel? 
No. 
Canon 9.22; DR 7-104 
_ OpInfDn: (May 1973) 
Defendant's attorney gave notice to take depositions of three plalntllIs. On 
the day of the scheduled deposition, the plalntlfi's attorney, upon being advised of an 
Illness to one of the plaintiffs by the wife of such plalntllI, who was also a.party to the 
action, notified the chief counsel for the defendants approximately two hours before 
the scheduled depositions. The chief coun~l preferred to take all three plaintiffs' 
depositions at the same time, so he agreed to postpone the depositions and to notIfY 
his co-counsel of such a decision. . 
In rel1a:nce upon the agreement with the defendant's chief counsel, the 
plalntllIs' attorney did not appear for the depositions, nor did either of the-plaintiffs. 
The defendant's co-counsel had been advised at least one hour before the scheduled 
deposItions that they would not be taken. 
Defendant's co-counsel, with one of the defendants, then searched out the 
plalntllIs and Inquired of the nature of the illness and attempted to determine whether 
or not In fact the plaintiff was ill or was tending to other business. No leave of court 
was obtained and no effort was made to contact the plaintiffs' attorney prior to 
contacting the plaintiff. 
The defendant's co-counsel Interrogated the plaintiff concerning the advice 
he had received from the plaintiffs attorney about attending the deposition and 
communications between them about the deposition. Defendant's co-counsel later 
testified as a witness In support of his motion to dismiss the case and for an affinnative 
award of counsel fees and expenses for attending the deposition. 
The issue arises as to whether or not it was proper to communicate with an 
adverse party pending litigation without the consent of his counsel. 
Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics holds: 
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of contro-
versy with a party represented by counsel. .. but should deal only with his 
counsel. 
And. DR 7-104 states: 
(a) During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not... 
(1) Communicate 01' cause another to communicate on the subject of 
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representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer 
in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer 
representing such other party or Is authorized by law to do so. 
Through the years. the ABA has dealt with Canon 9 in numerous situations. 
In ABA Fonnal Opinion 187 (193"8). the Committee held: 
It is clear from the earlier opinions of this Committee that Canon 9 Is 
to be construed lIteraI1y and does not allow a communication with an 
opposing party. without the consent of his counsel. though his purpose be 
merely to investigate the facts. 
It Is evident from reading the earlier opinions and later ones that this Is the 
clear intent of the Canon. ABA Informal Decision C-426. Issued March 16. 1961. held 
that the materiality or the Immateriality of the Information which the attorney might 
obtain from the adverse party in a statement would have no bearing on the question' 
of ethics involved. And. later in ABA Informal Decision C-517. issued February 15. 
1962. the Committee again held for Its strict application and listed but two exceptions 
to such application: (1) If the attorney for the other party consents to the contact, then 
contact will be proper, and (2) If Information vital to the settlement of the case Is not 
communicated by the other attorney to his client. 
Despite the increased liberality of the Civil Rules and fonns of discovery. the 
rules do not contemplate discovery of privileged information between attorney and 
client. While it is the duty of an attorney to represent his client zealously. It is also his 
duty to represent him within the bounds of the law. 
IUs also proper to note that Canon 22 provides that the conduct of the lawyer 
before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and 
fairness. Clearly this includes trust in one's opposing counsel and acceptance in good 
faith of what he conveys to you. The results of gross mistrust in the legal profession 
are Immeasurable. . 
The reasons for the prohibition upon communications are clear and 
convincing. They arise out of the nature of the relation of attorney and client and are 
Imperative to the rights and interests of the adverse party and his attorney. To 
preserve the proper functioning of the legal system. as well as to shield an adverse 
party from improper approaches. the Canons and Disciplinary Rules are to be strictly 
applied. . 
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Maya lawyer who has a sult pending against a corporation or 
governmental entity contact the Prcsident. General Manager. or 
other employee having access to confidential matters without prior 
consent of the other lawyer? 
No. 
Maya lawyer who is presently suing a corporation or governmental 
entity contact employees who are not managing agents 
and hourly wage earners that have no access to privileged or 
confidential information? 
Yes. 
Opinion KBA 65; DR 7-104 
OptniDn: (March 1979) 
The general proposition of communicating with one of adverse interest Is set 
out In DR 7 -104(A)(l). which simply states that an attorney shall not communicate on 
the subject of the representation with the party he knows to be represented by a lawyer 
unless he has prior consent of the lawyer representing the other party. The general 
application of DR 7-104 is set out In Opinion KBA E-65. 
The question before us today Is to what extent this restrictive communica-
tion applies to employees of a corporation. Beyond a doubt, the restriction would apply 
to any corporate officer. member of the Board of Directors or any management 
employee with access to any privileged or confidential Information of the corporation. 
If any attorney can Independently determine that a management employee or hourly 
wage earner does not have any access to privileged or confidential information. they 
may be contacted by an adversary attorney. 
If an opposing attorney cannot truly find out the relationship of any 
employee with the employer corporation and whether or not the employee has any 
access to privileged or confidential information. It will be necessary to inquire through 
the proper officials of the corporation. Since the proper officials of the corporation are 
represented by an attorney. the proper individual to contact before questioning any 
doubtful employee would be the opposing attorney for the corporation or governmen-
tal agency. 
To paraphrase Canon 7 of the Code. even though a lawyer has a duty to 
represent his client zealously. It must be within the bounds of the law. The Rules of 
Civil Procedure prOvide for discovery of relevant information from any employees of 
any corporation. Therefore. If there Is any question concerning the relationship of an 
employee to the corporation or governmental entity. It Is necessary to contact the 
attorney of the corporation before taking any statements from the employee or from 
ques tlonlng any employee of the adversary corporation. 
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Employment Litigation: Insurance 
coverage and Ethical lSsueS 
The insurance defense lawyer representing insurers and 
insureds in employment-related matters is subject to the same 
rules of professional ethics as are all other lawyers; 
however, the mlique r",lat iQnship of counsel, insurer, insured 
and often, insured'", employees I presents soms special problems 
in the application of those rules in insurance litigation. 
This outline discu.8ses the current ethical rules and how they 
apply in insurance related rttaL:ters. 
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1986) ("Model 
Code") and the W:.d",l R\\les of I?rofessional Conduct (1983) 
("Model Rules"), loI'bich has superseded the Model Code in most 
states, provide the genel'al principles for resolution of 
ethical issues. 'rhe typiG"l ethical dilemma faced by an 
insurance defense lawyer. comes from multiple party 
representation: an attorney representing multiple clients who 
are co-plaintiffs OJ::' Go-defendants in the same litigation (the 
problem being adverse intel:ests which lead to a confllet of 
interest for the attorney in question.) Courts will often 
permit this multiple repr-esentation to occur, partly because 
the potential for conflicting loyalties is less compared to 
the benefits of multiple representation. 
However, the duty of undivided loyalty that an attorney owes 
his or h",r client can be compromised in this type of 
situation. The Model Code and Model Rules are sensitive to 
this duty and provide some guidailce concerning this potential 
conflict. However', nejt:her give specific guidance when a 
conflict of inter'est exists between an insurer and insured. 
Ethical Consideral:ion 5- 17 in the Model Code identifies the 
insurer/insured situation as a, typical problem, which requir",s 
a caee-by-case analysis to determine the "chance of adverse 
effect" of differing intE'n:ests On the lawyer's judgment. 
Canon 5, the conD ict of. interest canon of the Model Code and 
Rule 1.7 "Conflict of IntE)):est: Genel'al Rule", of the Model 
Rules set forth the duty of. undivided loyalty and address the 
conflicts that arise from simUltaneous representation of 
multiple clients, c~noll 4. of the Model Code sets forth the 
duty to preserve cl ient cont idenceS . Carlon 9 dictates the 
avoidance of the appearance (If impropriety. 
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A. 
The Model Code specificall1' addresses concurrent adverse 
representation conflicts in its Disciplinary Rules, at DR 
5-105, which provides, in pertinent part: 
(Al A lawyer' shall decline proffered 
employment if the exercise of his 
independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely 
to he adversely affected by the 
acceptance of the proffered employment, 
or it would be likely to involve him in 
representing differing interests, except 
to the extent: permitted under DR 5-
105 (C) . 
(B) A lawyer fihall not continue multiple 
employment. if the exerc:ise of his 
independent pLote£sional judgment in 
behalf of a cl ien.t will be or is likely 
to be adversely affected by his 
representation of another client, or it 
would be likely to involve him in 
representing differing interests, except 
to the extent pennitted under DR 5-
105(C) . 
(e) In the situations covered by DR 5-
105 (1'.) and (BJ, a lawyer may represent 
multiple cli€nts if it is obvious that he 
can adequately repn:.sent the interest of 
each and if ~ach consents to the 
representation after full disclosure of 
the, possible effect of such 
representation on the exercise of the 
lawyer's irldependent professional 
judgment on behalf of each. 
Disqualification is therefore called for, absent common client 
interests and client consent, if representation would either 
result in the representation of "differing interests" or an 
adverse effect on an i,~torney' s judgment on behalf of a 
client. The Mode). Code defines the term "differing interests" 
to "include eve1.-Y interest that will adversely affect either 
the judsment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether 
'it be a conflictl.!)g, inconsistent, diverse, or other 
interest." Mode Code, Definitions. 
The Code also provide's a number Of Ethical Considerations that 
provide guidance for th(! insurance defense counsel. 
The first of the ecthi.cal representations stated under Canon 5 
provides for the duty oj' loyalty: 























BC 5-1 The professional judgment of a lawyer should be 
exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the 
benefit of his client: and f!"ee of compromising influences and 
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interest of 
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be 
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client. 
The following ethical considerations apply specifically to 
rep!"esentation of multiple parties and are provided below, in 
pertinent part: 
BC 5-14 Maintaining the independence of 
professional judgment required of a lawyer 
precludes his acceptance of continuation of 
employment. that wi.ll adversely affect hl.s 
judgment on behalf of ()r dilute his loyalty to 
a client. This problem arises whenever a 
lawyer is asked to represent two or more 
clients who may bave differing interests, 
whether such interests be conflicting, 
inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discprdant. 
EC 5-15 If a lawyer is requested to 
undertake o~· to continue representation of 
multiple clients having potentially differing 
interests, he must weigh carefully the 
possibility that. hip judgment may be impaired 
or hi s loyal';:y divided if he accepts or 
continues the employment. He should resolve 
all doubts against the propriety of the 
representation. A lawyer should never 
represent in litigation multiple clients with 
differing interests; and there are few 
situations in which he would be justified in 
representing in li tigation mult: iple clients 
with potentially differing interests ... 
Ee 5-16 In those instances in which a lawyer 
is justified in ~epresenting two or more 
clients havi.ng differing interests, it is 
nevertheless essent iiil that each client be 
given the oppo:rtunity t.o evaluate the need for 
representation freE' of any potential conflict 
and to obtai.n other counsel if the client so 
desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent 
mult.iple clients,· t.he lawyer should explain 
fully to each client the implicat.ions of the 
common repl:'9sentation and should accept or 
continue employment. only if the clients 
consent. If there are present other 
circuffistanceJs t.hat might cause any of the 
mUltiple clients to question the undivided 
loyal ty of t.he lawYGr, the lawyer should also 
advise all clien~s of those circumstances. 
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Be 5-17 Typically recurring situations 
involving pot.entially differing interests are 
those in which a lav/er is asked to represent 
• •. an insuTed and in:mrer Whether a 
lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of multiple clients in these and 
similar sit.uations de !;lend upon an analysis Of 
each case. In certain circumstances, there 
may exist little ChaliCE! of the judgment of the 
lawyer being adveraely affected by the slight 
possibility that the interest will become 
actually differing; ill other circumstances, 
the chance of adverEe effect upon.the-lawyer's 
judgment is not unl.ikely. 
:a • ~..Q9~LRI,!.ls:l.$u~.Lg I;Q.~§1>.iQn<Jl_C;.Qllgu ct~ 
The Model Rules, like the Model Code specifically provide 
a standard fol.- attorneys to reference concerning 
concurrent adVerse representation. 





lawyer shall not represent a 
if thE) revresental::i.on of that 
\\'111 be directly adverse to 
client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonable believes 
the representation will not 
adven,ely aff<?ct the relationship 
with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after 
con5ultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if tll6 representation of that 
clierlt may be materially limited by the 
lawyer'l> responsibilities to another 
client or to a t.hird person, or by the 
lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) the Lal'lyer reasonably 
the ::::ep!~et'entat:lon will 
adver:;ely affected; and 
believes 
not be 
(2) the client consents after 
cooBuL taticn. When representation 
of multiple clients in a single 
matter is undertaken, the 
consultation Shall include 
e):planat;>'Qr" of the implications of 




















the COlThllOn representation and the 
advantagefl and risks involved. 
The term "differing interests" is not used in the Model 
Rules. Instead, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney 
from representing int.,rests that are "directly adverse" 
or accepting employment when "r'epresentation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to anothe;t' client." 
However, when a lawyer reasonably believes that the 
representation will be adversely aftectad is not clear .. 
According to the comments, to Model Rule 1.7, this 
reasonable belief exists when a "disinterested lawyer 
would conclude that the client should not agree to the 
representation under the circumstances." In addition, 
the Model Rules list the following facts to be considered 
in determining whetller representation of one client will 
have a "directly adveJ:se" affect on another client: (a) 
duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with 
the client or client: involved; (b) the functions being 
performed by the la-I'Iyer; (e) the likelihood that actual 
conflict will arise; and (d) the likely prejudice to the 
client. Mode Rules. Rule 1.7 Comment. 
Conflicts of interest pot~ntially affecting the representation 
are inherent in situations in whiCh an insurance carrier has 
agreed to provide a defenSE! for its insured. Analysis of any 
conflict sitl.lat.ion must be'gin with the question of client 
identity. 
A. 
ABA Formal Opinion 2B2, issued in 1950, states that a 
lawyer may et.hicalli' undert.ake the dual representation of 
the insurer and the insured in the defense of a third 
party action aga:inst the insured, based on the 
commonality of interest: 
From an analysis of their respective undertakings in the 
insurance contract it is evident at' the outset that a 
community of interest exists between the company and the 
insured gro~Ting out of the contract of insurance with 
respect to any action brought by a third person against 
the insured withill t.he policy limitations. The Company 
and the inell:red ilr", virtually one in their common 
interest. ' 
Some authorities and many practitioners hold that in the 
typical liability Hituation, the lawyer provided by the 
carrier repl'e8ents both insured and insurer and the 
N - 39 
B. 
lawyeI" is ethically obligated to pI"otect the interest of 
each. See JilQ.9.;?.rd_-Y,-,_rili1D1Qy~rlL~g.lli'lty co., 164 Cal. 
App. 3d 602, 609, 210 Cap Rptr. 578, 582 (1985). 
Although both insurer and insured will sha);"8 the goal of 
defeating the claim, they still may have different 
interests with rr,cspect to trial tactics and/or 
settlement. When the interest of the insurer and the 
insured diff0r, the p~'evailing view is that the insurance 
defense lawyer's duty of undivided loyalt.y is owed to the 
insured. Et.hical consideration 5-1 explicitly states the 
lawyer's obligation under Canon 5 of the Model Codes is 
to serve t.he client with undiluted loyalty. The Comment 
to Model Rule 1,7, states: "Loyalty is an essential 
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client". 
Therefore, if differing interests of the insurers and the 
insured arise, then the lawyer's ethical duty of 
undivided lo>ralty to the client is o\l'sd to only the 
insured. See e. g, §1;i.,Q.l'lp_n_v. W~J;:_er!}_JLh:'!LW.9..lJ£Ul~ Co., 
682 P.2d 725, 736 (Mont. 1984). ABA Formal Opinion 1476 
(1981) statefJ: "when a liability insurer retains a lawyer 
to defend an ;i.nsured, the insured is the lawyer's 
client." 
Hmlever, thil!' situa.tion is still not free from 
difficulty. The situation is still one in which the 
lawyer is being compensated by a third party (the 
insure!:) and must analyze his or her ability to put aside 
any loyal ties he or she TIlay feel t.o the company. In this 
situation, 1'.ule 1. '} (b), provided above, would still 
apply, becallse thE! lal<.-)'er may feel loyalty to the 
insurance company, Which mar lawyer must reasonably 
believe that the representatlon will not be adversely 
affected and the client must consent after full 
disclosure. 
£-auS~;;L,.Q1'JgJ;.~n.ti~;L_';_Q.J.JDj.ct Jii.t.ll<l..tionlL __ ':Wvol.Ying tb& 
I ml1!J:_~J a l!.1! .. ;In.F'_llXl1lQ-,. 
There is no presumpti.on of a conflict situation simply 
because multiple plaintiffs or defendants are represented 
by the same attonlt"y; actual evidence of a conflict is 
required before the queAtion of disqualification of 
counsel arises, In £.b.'iLIJ:e.LMJ.1.J;."-._.In~. Co., 160 Ill. App. 
3d 146, 155, 513 N.!!:, 2d 490, 496 (1987), the lllinois 
Appellate Court for the Fifth District: explained that 
"(A) conflict cannot be inferred merely because an 
insurance company is asserting noncoverage in a separate 
suit." Rather; the "test is whether or not there are 
conflicting interests based upon the allegations found in 
the complaint", Sele also Ka.rt:.fgrci]\.Qki.Q.QI1L.i'nd JndemlJit~ 
QQ..~_.Y~ • .E.Q.!l.tgX, S2E So2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988). 


























Therefore, conflictl; of interest arise when there is a 
factual question which will decide whether the insured is 
covered by the policy. ThEl insurer has an interest in 
resol ving the factual questions against coverage ( even 
though this result [nay undermine the insured's defense. 
The followin9 are typical situations that may give rise 
to a conflict of interest: 
1. 
In cases where cove~·age may be at issue, the 
insurer will mak~ a "reservation of rights", where 
it will provide a defense to the claim raised, but 
may not indemnify. In this situation, the insurer 
must both (1) notify the insured that it is 
undertaking the defense, subject to a reservation 
of rights, promptly after the potential Coverage 
conflict has been discovered and (2) specifically 
outline the ax~ct nature of the coverage conflict. 
Not:. to do so, will prejudi.ce the insured and may 
subject the ~nsurer to li.ability. See e.g., 
S~:j.~mL.Y_.--.'dgJ'J.lj;'~·J;ILCfj~J.L<ll.ty __ .a.mLSJL~....Q.CL..., 33 (i F. 2d 
14 (8th eir. 1964); ~Ll'a).ll,JrS'_J;".Q.\lrY_l_ns. Co LL......Y:~ 
H..i!k':L.f~.l9.in~'@1:..:i,JJ9_~Q..Q~, B04 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir. 
19 B6) . 
In cases where the inaurer provides for the 
insured's defense while asserting a reservation of 
rights, some courts may require the insurer to pay 
for ind~pendent cOllnsel to repreaent the insured so 
<IS to avoid allY confl icts of interest. The most 
often c;ited a,lS" for this approach is B.ill1 ~_Q 
t'~..J"g@J:..?J,--_{:rJ;;illJ._lJl1iQ!L.v:~---..ClliJ:Ij.JLI nsu r iU1.Q.a_:[llQ • 
208 Cal. Rpt:r 494 (4th Dist. 19B4), where the 
insurer ncltified the insured that it 'Was retaining 
counsel to defend the insured, but was doing so 
under 11 reserlation of rights. The California 
Court of Appeills stated that "A conflict arises 
once the insurel: takes the view a coverage issue is 
present." 208 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
HO~lever, most courts taking this approach will not 
order such an action simply because the insurer has 
asserted 11 res·ervation of rights. The grounds for 
contesting coverage must rely on the assertion of 
factual or legal theories that conflict with 
positions asserted bi' the insured. In l!i..9.Qee v . 
.s.lJ'p~j;JJ;!X.J;9...w;-.1_,·176 Cal App 3d 221,221 Cal. Rptr. 
421, (4th ·Dist. 1985), where the basis for the 
reservation oj: l'ights was a coverage issue, M9.Q.rua 
held that the rese·rvation of rights did not ipso 
facto create c\ conflict of interest between the 
il1surel- and the insured that required 
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di~quaU.ficati(ln of the insurer-designated counsel.. 
221 Cal. Rptr. at 423. McGee limited the Cumis 
rule to apply only where the reservation·of rights 
is "based on the nature of the insured's conduct, 
which as dev€loped at trial would affect the 
determination of coverage." 221 Cal. Rptr., 423-
24. See alsc .. ~tc~.t~1.i~.r~ and---.r;g.1D,laUY....J~Q.'-'_-Y ... 
.e1!p_E;l.lli.r._c.Q\J.rt, 216 Cal. App 3d 1222, 265 Cal Rptr. 
372, 374 n3 (1~89). 
Also, in. 19.~Ln!J1,gXaL.l!Qill'i.......l.T)£!_:"-y--,-..Qbio_c.g.§Jlli.l.f;,~ 
Xn§li~9_DQ~_£~, SJ2 F.2d 1037 (7th eir. 1987), the 
court held tha~ under Illinois law, the insurer's 
conducting the defense under a reservation of 
rights did not creat.e a conflict of interest. Tews 
arose in the context of th .. ins-urer's action for a 
declarator~{ judgment on the insurer's duty to pay 
the fees and costs DE independent counsel in 
defending a third party suit, as well as the 
insurer's rigbt to control the third party 
litigat:io'll. The court held th~t the insurer's 
denial of coverage of any of the claims in the 
third pa rty complaint did not give ri se to a 
conflict of interest. It also stated; "we will not 
anticipate that counsel selected by Ohio (the 
insurer) at its expense w.ill violate the strict 
fiduciary duty owed to Tews and Ohio. 832 F. 2d at 
1039. 
r;;.tgimlLf..QL@I]]i'!.5L~_~.Jn_.~xc.~p-9.L'p_Q,lli.Y--lirni~_ ... 
Another difficult cor-fliet situation arises when 
damages in excess DE policy limits are claimed 
against t.he in:o;ured. In !>y'~.iJ;:.k..Y.... __ l9'.91.Q.Qill, 258 Cal. 
App. 2d, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968), the "classic" 
case with regard to ethical obligations of the. 
insurance dei<;l1se lawyer resulted. There, the 
policy limits were $10,000 and the defense lawyer 
rej ected a settlement offer Of $12,500, despite the 
insured'~ oEEer to pay the additional $2,500. The 
case went to trial and resulted in a judgment 
against the insured for $225,000. The insured 
succe;;sfully sued the la\f,yer who had rElpresented 
beth the insJ.:red and the insurer. 
In a si.t.uation where the set.tlement offer is in 
excess of the policy limits, and there is a 
rsasonablec possj,bi J i t.y of winning t.he case, the 
insurer wi::" 1 ~lant to proceed to trial and a 
conflict may result for the lawyer. If the case is 
won, the ins·J.rer has saved the amount of the 
settlement; if lost, the insurer's liability is 
locked in at t.he policy limit. Hovlever, for the 














policy linuts is a serious risk. The insured could 
become liable t'Ol" payment of whatever is over the 
policy limits. See Wur,nicke, T.MUt~l Trian.sJ&t 
~.t...an(ti'll:.dI;1~_Q.L~E.t.hiG$!l rru;>Lefl~.ati.Qn by the. 
.J1lliUL~JLJ)~f~ruH?,--"l;&~, 31 Fo£--.th~---.J2§'fen~ 2 
(1989) . 
~t1J~.rum.LJ.§.§-'J.~~ 
An insured may contract away his or her rights to 
be part of a settlement and the following situation 
might reSult. III llitc!:ID.llLY~..fu!.QgiDa, 533 So. 2d 
194 (Ala. 1988), a lawyer was sued for legal 
malpractice after he had settled a medical 
malpractice claim against an insured doctor without 
the knOwledge or. consent of the doctor. Although 
the settlement was within policy limits, and cost 
the doctor no defense or other financial costs, the 
doctor claimed that his reputation was injured. 
Although the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that 
the ins.:ured alone was the lawyer's client, the 
court found that the lawyer had not breaChed his 
duty of loyalty to the client. The court relied on 
the tel.lr.s of the insurance contract, which gave the 
insun~r exclusive control over settlement. In New 
York, as well, if the policy provides the insurance 
company t.lle absolute right to settle the action, 
counsel can settle the c:ase without the insured's 
consent. EJ'lttP~tl.Y __ ~122Jllon, 517 N.Y.S.2d 632, 
633-34 IN.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
But see lV;:.\iD.1L.Y......_J:~:.Q~rlWr 735 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987':, where a Missouri court held that 
the att.orneys ~lho settled a case without the 
insured'fE consent breached their duty to the 
insured as his i'lt.torney. The court reasoned that 
[T)he obligations of an attorney to 
his client 'are in nO way abridged 
by the fac:t Lhat an insurer el'rtploys 
him to repr'esent an insu:r:ed.' '" 
The attor.ney mles the insured the 
same obligation of good faith and 
fidelity as if the insured had 
retained t.h~· attorney personally and 
at his own expense. 735 S,W.2d at 
73,. 
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit 
gl:OUp set tlementE; in civil cases without disclosure 
to and the CO:lsent and participation of each 
client. 
Mode Coj~ DR 5-106(A) states: 
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(A) lawyer who r-epr-esents two or 
more clients shall not make or 
participate in the making of an 
aggregate settlement of the clainw 
of or against his clients, unless 
each client has consented to the 
settlement after being advised ot 
thf~ existence and nature of all 
cl,lims involved in the proposed 
settlement, of the total amount of 
the settlement, and of the 
par.ticipation of each person in the 
settlemen,:. 
Model Rule 1.8(6) provides: 
A Lawyer who represents two or more 
clients shall not participate in 
maldI1g an aggregate settlement of 
the claims of or against the 
clients. . . . unless each client 
consents after consultation, 
including disclosure of the 
existence ... od the nature of al.l the 
claims or pleas involved and of the 
participation of each person in the 
settlement. 
If anything is te· be learn",d from examining the conflicting 
rulings of courts on multiple representation questions, it is 
that conflicts of intereflt should be avoided, if possible, and 




Timely identification of potential conflicts can protect 
an attorney trom the need to withdraw as counselor from 
possible disqua~ifjcation. There are options available 
to deal with the conflicts. such as client consent, but 
the attorney mu~t make an early identification of the 
issues, in crd",r to take advantage of the options 
available. 
Cl.t~J1L.~.QDRStl1L 
The insured mJlet be info:nned of an actual or potential 
con'fHct of intel:est. In T9mg~\l!L.Y ......... Arn~ll~ Mut. ln~ 
Co--,-, 517 A.2n 1053, 10S5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), the 
Appellate Cou::-t of Connecticut held that when a conflict 
problem arif;es, it is the "attorney's duty to withdraw 









from the repl:esentaLiml or to disclose the conflict of 
interest." 
Represerltation :in conflict situations is permitted by 
both the llfodel Rules and the Jliodel Code, but only when 
there is both fully counseled client consent and a 
reasonable belief on the part of the lawyer that the 
conflict is not insunnountable. In some cases, client 
consent will therefore suffice and in other cases, it 
will not and should not even be sought. 
However, a stand8.rd reservation of rights notice may not 
be sufficient: to gi '''e the insured notice Of the' specific 
conflict U'lat may e:<ist. In T~~s;.JL.E.arj)).!;t:t:JLJnc. 90 .. y. 
N~il;:~, 744 S.W.2d GOl (1987), McGuire, an insured 
driver, was involved in an accident that occurred while 
he was drivillg a company vehicle in the course of his 
employment. The comp.my sent a non-waiver reservation of 
rights letter to McGUire, who signed it. Subsequent to 
that t the i.nsurance company took a statement from 
McGuire, which \~as the basis for its de!ense of non-
coverage against 11(;Gu ir~. The insurance company then 
sent a letter informing McGuire that the policy limit 
might not cover him, but that it would defend him in the 
lawsuit Idttwut waiving any of its rights and that 
McGuire ~}as at liberty to engage counsel of his own 
choice at hh: own expense. Judgment was rendered against 
McGuire and Texas Farmers refused to satisfy the 
judgment. H(;Guire., rgued that Texas Farmers was estopped 
f);om denying cO-vel'age because the insurance company 
failed to advise 11cGuire of the specific conflict before 
it secured a Eecond statement from him. 
The Texas Court of Appeals agreed with McGuire, but the 
Texas Supreroe CQUrt reversed. 'l'he court held that the 
doctrine of estoppe.l could not be used to create coverage 
when none existed by the terms Of the policy. However, 
the lawyer f.or both the insurer and insured wail still 
subject to disciplinary action, because of inadequate 
discloe;-ure and consent:. 
In American Bar Association (ABA) Informal Opinion 1476 
(August 11, 19811, the ABA Committee advised on 
disclosure and conS'3nt in an employment-related insurance 
defense mattel:;, 
In the actioll, tile plaintiff alleged that he had 
sustained injury as a result of a tort inflicted by the 
employee in thi" C~lurse of employment. The employ,;;,r 
maintained liability insurance, and the insurance 
extended to e:nployees acting within· the scope of 
employment. The employer and employee knew from the 
outset that the la1<:yer vias assigned to represent both of 
them. The lasurance company did not raise (lny questions 
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of coverage applicabilit.y. Neither the insurance company 
nor the lawyer caud ouod or advised the employee at the 
outset that Eacts could exist to create conflicting or 
di vergent interest between employee and employer or 
between employee and insurance company or that 
information gained by the lawyer during the 
representation and affecting insurance coverage might be 
gi ven to the insurance company. In the course of a 
conversation with the lalA'Yer, the employee related facts 
indicating tbat the employee may have acted outside the 
scope of his elnployment and that, under the terms of the 
insurance contract, the employee, may not be entitled to 
the protection of the employer's liability insurance. 
The· employee made the disclosures in th<l belief that he 
was doing so in a lawyer-client relationship, and 
apparently without understanding the implications of the 
circumstances he related to the lawyer. The lawyer 
learned ·similar but more limited information when 
interviewing another ~Iitness. The lawyer believed that 
the insurance company may have a contractua.l right to 
deny protection to the employee "because of scope of 
employment circumstances. It is also possible that the 
employer could invoJ(e scope of employment c.i.rcumstances 
to defend ag~inst his own liabilities to the plaintiff. 
The Committe.., advised that the lawyer should not reveal 
to the insurance company the information gained by the 
lawyer from either the employee or the witness, when the 
revelation migl.1t result in denial of insurance protection 
to the emploY€ie, without: the employee's consent, after 
full disclosure of the consequences of such revelation. 
The Committee recognized that when a lIability insurer 
retains a lawyer to def.end an insured, the insured is the 
lawyer's client. ABA Informal Opinions 728 (1963), 822 
(1965) and 7e3 (1965)"" The Committee stated that "Among 
a lawyer' 8 to:t"ernost professional l:'esponsibilities are 
fidelity to a client and preservation of confidences and 
secrets of a clients. T'hese responsibilities exist even 
if a person other than the client is paying the lawyer's 
fee. " 
With the history of the Hodel Code and now the adoption of the 
Model Rules, the attor:ney i.s given much more latitude in 
determining whether its repl-esentation of both the insured and 
the insurer is p):..:,per, howe'Jer { the insurance defense case 
should always be studiE,d carefully. Attorneys in multiple 
party rl?presentat ion si tuations should always take care to 
identify any possible conflicts· as early in their 
representation of clients as possible and act quickly to 
resolve the possible conflict as soon as evidence of it 






















arises. Acting in good faith compliance with the ethical 
rules will always plac~ the attorney in the best possible 
position to defend against disqualification motions or 
subsequent malpractice <"<etions. 



















AITORNEY EX PARTE INTERVIEW 
OF THE FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN 
OPPOSING PARTY: 
A TWO-HAT PERSPECTIVE 
By Kathleen ChancIer and Wendy Chemer Maneval 
Today, despite numerous cases and commentaries on the subject, the 
ethical and legal responsibilities of attorneys regarding ex parte 
contracts with former employees of an opposing party remain unclear. 
Litigators of both the plaintiffs and defense bars grapple with both sides 
of this problem. They frequently wear both "hats" (sometimes, eVen in 
the same case): the hat of counsel seeking information ex parte from 
former employees of an opposing party and the hat of counsel for the 
fonner employer seeking to block any damaging information provided 
in such contacts. 
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HAT 1: Counsel Seeking Information from Former Employee. 
[ . Your client is woman who has sued her company for sexual discrimination. 
I . You have heard that a number of your client's former co-workers (some managers, some clerical 
I workers), have left employment with the defendant. Your client tells you that these witnesses have 
information pertinent to her case. In order to access this information, must you (a) prepare a notice of 
deposition, coordinate the schedules of all counsel involved, incur the expense of hiring a court 
stenographer, prepare in depth for a full deposition, participate in a formal deposition, and review the 
transcript or can you (B) pick up the phone and call the witness. 
HAT 2: Counsel of Former Employer 
Now, change hats. You represent the company that is a defendant in a sexual discrimination case. You 
get a call from the corporate personnel manager who informs you that she just leamed that the plaintiff'S 
attorney has been calling around and conducting ex parte interviews with various former employees, 
many of whom have material evidence in the case. She is afraid that they will disclose damaging 
confidential information or change their stories after talking with the plaintiffs attorney. Do you have 
any recourse? 
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ETIDCAL REQUIREMENTS 
ntis dilemma is based upon the ethical rules 
in the codes of professional conduct of attorneys 
adopted by the courts in each state. For example, 
Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association's Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which has been 
adopted or used as a paradigm for the edtical rules in 
at least 40 states and the District of Columbia, pro-
vides in portinent part: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
not communicate about the subject of 
the representation with a party the law-
yer knows to be represented by an-
other lawyer in the matter, unless the 
lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized to do so. 
The official ABA comment on this rule 
states in pertinent part: 
In the case of an organization, this 
Rule prohibits communications by a 
lawyer for one party concerning the 
matter in representation with persons 
having a managerial responsibility on 
behalf of the organization, and with 
any other person whose act or omis-
sion in connection with that matter 
may be imputed to dteorganization for 
purposes of civil or crimina1liabilityor 
whose statement may constitute an ad-
mission on the part of the organization. 
This rule specifically prohibits ex parte com-
munications with certain employees of an opposing 
party. 11 docs not explicitly apply to former employ-
ees of a party. 
Importantly, the ABAStanding Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in a solely 
adviroly opinion, has determined that the rule does not 
cover former employees. The Committee emphasized: 
While the committee recognizes that' 
persuasive policy arguments can be 
and have been made for extending the 
ambit of Model Rule4.2 to cover some 
former corporate employees, the fact 
remains that the text of the Rule does 
not do so and the comment gives no 
basis for concluding that such cover-
age was intended. 
Especially, where, as here, the effect 
of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition 
of information about one's case, dte 
Committee is loath, given the text of 
Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to 
expand its coverage to former employ-
ees by means of liberal interpretation. 
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Accordingly, it is the Opinion of 
the Committee tltat a lawyer rep-
resenting a client in a matter ad-
verse to a corporate party that is 
represented by another lawyer 
may, without violating Model 
Rule 4.2, communicate about the 
subject of the representation 
with an unrepresented former 
employee of the corporate party 
without the consent of the 
corporation's lawyer. 
The ABA Committee's opinion is merelyadvi-
sory and does not constitute law. 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
Despite the language of the Rule and 
the advisory opinion of the ABAStanding Com-
mittee, some courts have extended the applica-
tion of Rule 4.2 of its counterpart to ex parte 
communications with former employees of a 
party. The courts dealing with this issue have 
taken three approaches. A minority of courts have 
prohibited such contacts outright. Some courts 
have validated all such contacts. Other courts, 
however, have, validated such contacts only 
under certain conditions: (I) when dte attor-
ney does not inquire into privileged matters; 
(2) when the attorney abides by rules of pro-
fessional conduct regarding contacts with 
unrepresented parties; (3) when the acts or 
omissions of the former employee did not give 
rise to the matter at issue and cannot be used to 
impute liability to the fonner employer. 
Courts' interpretation of the rule, rather 
than being simply inconsistent, appoar to be 
based upon the factual context in which dte is-
sue arises. Courts tend to interpret the rule ex-
pansively when the former employees contacted 
were high-level or confidential employees or 
had an active role in the subject matter of the 
litigation. Courts tend to narrowly interpret this 
provision when the ex parle interviews wcrecon-
ducted with lower-level former employees who pri-
marily constitute fact witnesses. 
Due to the wide range of factual con-
texts in which these issues arise, some courts 
have articulated a number of factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether such ex parle 
communications violate theethica1 rules. These 
courts have considered: (\) dte positions of 
the former employees (especially whether they 
were managerial); (2) whether the former em-
ployee was privy to communications between 
the fonner employer and its counsel concern-
ing the subject matter of the litigation or issues 
involved in the lawsuit; (3) whether the former 





(4) whether the employee could make statements that 
would constitute admissions on the part of the orga-
nization; (5) the nature of the inquiry by opposing 
counsel; and (6) the time that has elapsed between 
the end of the employment and the ex parle inter-
view. One court has suggested that, when this analy-
sis indicates a substantial risk of disclosure of privi-
leged matters, the attorney should carefully instmct 
the employee not to divulge attorney-client confi-
dences and, in eertain circumstances, should notify 
counsel for the former employer prior to conducting 
any ex parte interviews. 
Courts also face fonnidable problems in at-
tempting to fashion a suitable remedy for the damage 
caused by ex parle contacts (e.g., the disclosure of 
information protected by the attorney-client privilege 
and/or the imputation of liability tothe former em-
ployer). Courts and affected parties may have diffi-
culty ascertaining what information was actually pro-
vided during such a contact. Courts may require the 
offending attorney to provide opposing counsel all 
notes of the interviews or statements obtained during 
the interviews. Courts will be reluctant to do so, how-
ever, if such documents contain trial strategies or other 
attorney work product information. Thus, it may be 
difficult for a coart to craft an appropriate order pre-
cluding evidence (and the fruits of the evidence) ob-
tained through ex parle communications from being 
introduced at trial. Some courts have imposed the 
draconian penalty of attorney disqualification; this pun-
ishment, however, may not remedy the harm inflicted 
to the opposing party (e.g., new counsel may obtain 
the same information from the file or discussions with 
the disqualified attorney). 
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE 
UNCERTAINTY 
As a general rule, courts will permit such contacts as 
long as privileged matters are protected and the at-
torney making the exparle contact abides by the eth-
ics rules on contacts with uurepresented persons. 
Nevertheless, litigators of both "hats" need to con-
sider available strategies to deal with the uncertainty 
in this area. 
Attorneys seeking information need not sub-
ject their clients to the expense involved in taking 
depositions of each witness previously employed by 
a party or risk disqualification. 
First, an attorney seeking to interview 
former employees may seek court approval prior to 
the interviews. While this may be the safest approach, 
it does have detrimental side effects; die attorney must 
apprise opposing counsel of the witnesses to be in-
terviewed. Of course, opposing counsel may quickly 
conduct his or her own interviews and gain a tactical 
advantage. In addition, such information may be tan-
tamount to disclosure of trial strategy. 
Second, litigators should engage in a risk 
analysis to determine likelihood that an ex parle con-
tact will pose an ethical violation. The attorney should 
consider the following factors: (I) whether the per-
son is likely to be represented by corporate counsel; 
(2) the person's position widl the former employer; 
(3) the level and nature of die person's participation 
in the incidents dmtgave risk to the litigation; (4) die 
nature of the inquiry and the type of information that 
the person is likely to possess; and, (5) the time in-
terval from the end of employment to the interview. 
Third, if the risk presented by the ex parle 
COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A primary reason for this continuing 
dilemma is that there are competing policy consider-
ations at issue. Courts and commentators have had 
. difficulty harmonizing these important values through 
_ communications appears to be too great, the attor-
ney may request permissions from opposing counsel 
to conduct an informal interview in opposingcounsel's 
presence. Opposing counsel may agree to this inter-
view if the only alternative is a deposition of the wit-
a workable rule. 
The extension of this rule to former employ-
ees is based upon five primary policy objectives: 
(1) to protect parties and witnesses from overreach-
ing by attorneys, (e.g., the prevention of harassment, 
intimidation and manipulations of witnesses); (2) to 
preserve the integrity of the attorney-client relation-
ship; (3) to avoid the disclosure of privileged infor-
mation; (4) to help facilitate settlement by channel-
ing disputes through lawyers accustomed to the ne-
gotiation process; and (5) to avoid uncertainty with . 
regard to the legal and ethical responsibilities of law-
yers. 
In contrast, the allowance of such ex parte 
contracts enables the parties to reduce the cost and 
burden of the discovery process (and often to prosecute 
their rights) and furthers the litigation objective of per-
mittingequal access to information. 
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ness. 
Fourth, at die inception of the interview, the 
attorney should clearly disclose to the person being 
interview the following information: (1) the 
attorney's name and fum; (2) the client who is repre-
sented; (3) the basic controversy; and, (4) the pur-
pose of die interview. In addition, the attorney should 
inquire as to whether the person is represented by 
counsel in connection with the matter. The person 
should be informed that the interview is completely 
voluntary and that they may choose to have their own 
attorney present during the interview. The person 
interviewed should be instructed not to disclose any 
information regarding advice from or communica-
tion with corporate counsel. 
Attorneys representing the furmeremployer 
may also take certain steps to protect their clients 
against the adverse effects of ex parle interviews of 
former employees. 
First, as soon as practicable after the incep-
tiooof a lawsuit, the attorney should identify al\ current 
and former employees who may have relevant infor-
mation regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit. 
Second, the auomey should, as soon as prac-
ticable, conduct interviews of all pertinent individu-
als. The attorney should provide the witness with 
basic information regarding the litigation and iden-
tify the attorney's role in the litigation (as attorney 
for the employer). The attorney may offer to present 
the witness, if necessary, at a deposition. Further, the 
attorney should explain that the corporation intends 
to keep the information derived form the interview 
confidential. 
Third, during the interview, the attorney 
should inform wimesses that they are under no obli-
gation to discuss any matters with opposing coun-
sel except under subpoena. Also, the attorney may 
ask witnesses to permit the attorney to represent them 
at any interview with opposing counsel. 
Fourth, the attorney should consider obtain-
ing formal statements from these witnesses. Such 
statements would be admissible in a trial, for example, 
to impeach the credibility of witnesses who decide to 
change their stories after speaking with opposing 
counsel. 
Fifth, the attorney should request copies of 
any and all statements made by such witnesses to op-
posing counsel in ex parle interviews. 
Sixth, if there are certain witnesses who can-
not be interviewed without impairing the employer's 
position or the attorney-client relationship, the attor-
ney should seek a protective order to prevent oppos-
ing counsel from conducting ex parle interviews. 
In sum, the ethical and legal responsibilities 
of attorneys with regard to ex parte contacts with 
former employees of an opposing party remains un-
certain. The competing policy considerations and the 
failure of the courts to develop a workable rule indi-
cate that this dilemma will not be resolved in the ncar 
future. The above strategies, while admittedly imper-
fect, may assist litigators in determining what course 
of conduct should be pursued to assure that they ob-
serve their ethical and legal responsibilities in this 
situation. 








EMPLOYMENT LAW - ETHICS HYPOTHETICAL - Burger Queen 
Client Martina Polles has come to you for legal advice. You had represented her 
earlier through the public defender's pro bono referral program and defended her 
on a marijuana possession charge. Her case went to trial 'and she was found 
guilty, but you were able to have her sentence set up for a 12 month probation. 
Martina is now working as an Assistant Food Preparation Manager at a local 
Burger Queen. The last time you saw her she looked well and was very happy 
with her new job. Today she seems extremely distraught. 
Martina tells you that she was moved from the day shift to the evening shift at 
Burger Queen. One afternoon several weeks ago Martina's boyfriend Bernie 
Gamara and one of his male friends drove her to work. They sat in the parking 
lot for a while before her shift started. While the three of them were sitting in 
the car, two men approached and began talking with the man in the back seat. 
They conversation went on for some time and when the two men walked away 
several police officers approached and arrested the two men who had been 
talking to the man in the back seat. A bag of cocaine was found on one of the 
men who had been talking outside the car. The man in the back seat was also 
questioned and the car was searched. The man in the back seat had two fifty 
dollar bills on him. He was arrested and traces of cocaine were found on the 
bills. 
Neither Martina nor her boyfriend were arrested, but when she entered the 
Burger Queen to start work, Bill Sleeze the night manager called her over and 
said he had seen her in the car where the arrests had been made. Sleeze and 
Martina had a good and friendly working relationship, but he now expressed 
serious concern about her ability to keep working if her probation officer learned 
of her "involvement" with the men who were arrested. Later that night, Sleeze 
and Martina were alone in the Burger Queen cleaning up after hours. Sleeze 
began talking about how lonely he was and then noted howlonely Martina would 
be if her probation were revoked and she was put in jail. This conversation 
pattern followed for several successive nights and was accompanied by the night 
manager's added expressed concerns about whether he had any obligation to 
"explain" the arrest situation to his superiors or possibly to Martina's probation 
officer. Finally, on the fourth night Sleeze was alone with Martina in the kitchen 
and told her that his worries for Martina over the arrest situation would be 
greatly relieved if she were to prove her sincerity to her job by making love to 
him. Martina reluctantly participated. The sexual contacts have continued for 
about 10 days. 
Martina is very upset and wants your advice on how to deal with the drug arrest 
and her "problem" with her supervisor. She is very much in love with her 
boyfriend and she does not want to jeopardize her relationship with him. She 
wants to keep her job and finish out her probation, but feels trapped. You are 
very busy, but agree to handle her situation. You advise her that you will give it 
some thought and that she should come back to your office in three days. She 
thanks you, pays you $25 and leaves. 
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The next day you have lunch with Joe Schmoe from the law firm's corporations 
and securities law department. He tells you that he has been talking to a new 
corporate client on what could tum out to be a big acquisition deal. The client is 
CEO for Mega Burger Restaurants and they are hoping to take over the smaller 
Burger Queen Restaurant chain. Mega's offer is being considered in a somewhat 
friendly atmosphere but Giant Burger Restaurants are also pursuing a takeover of 
Burger Queen. Giant's offer is being received in a fairly hostile fashion by Burger 
Queen. Schmoe thinks the deal is about to close is favor of his client Mega 
Burger. Burger Queen is considered to be well run and very successful fast food 
chain. You see two other clients at lunch and begin talking to them, not 
finishing your conversation with Schmoe. 
The next day Martina shows up at the reception desk and insists on speaking to 
you. She comes into your office in tears and says there is something else that 
she has to tell you. Her boyfriend, who she has lived with for three years, tested 
positive for the HIV virus about 8 months ago and is failing physically as a result 
. of AIDS. She cares deeply for her boyfriend and does not want others to know 
that he has AIDS. She says she is telling you this in strict confindence and 
wants to keep the "AIDS thing" quiet. Yet she worries whether she should say 
anything to the Burger Queen night manager, Sleeze. She has continued to have 
intercourse with him over the past two nights. She tells you that above all she 
wants to keep her job, not go to jail, and be with her boyfriend as he deals with 
his physical situation. 
What are the ethical! professional responsibility issues? 
What obligations do you have to what parties? 
What do you advise the client? 
Do you say anything to your partner Joe Schmoe? 
Do you have any obligation to the night manager, Sleeze? 
Do you have any obligation to Burger Queen? 
Do you have any other obligations? 
















EMPLOYMENT LAW - ETHICS HYPOTHETICAL - Melton Union Bank 
Your firm has represented Melton Union Bank for many years. Today the 
bank personnel officer, Terry Minate, has come to you concerned about a 
recent conversation he had with the chair of the bank's board of directors, 
Ed Straightarrow. You have grown up in Melton, Kentucky and are 
familiar with most of the bank's officers and directors. Before Minate gets 
to your office, you recall ... 
George Melton, sometimes known to his friends as "Gorgeous George" 
Melton has been the chief operating officer of the Melton Union Bank for 
over 23 years. He and his father started the bank and George is very 
protective of it. Over the past three to four years he has been known to 
lose his temper at bank board meetings, often over relatively minor 
issues. He has always been known to "party hard" and carries somewhat 
of a reputation for being a drinker. Last year Melton became estranged 
from his wife of 21 years after she filed a domestic violence petition 
against him. She later dropped the charges. The bank's loan officer, 
William Cash, (known as "Big Bill" to many) had a close friendship with 
Melton. They shared an apartmC?nt until a few months ago. Both Melton 
and Cash are sportsmen and both are officers in the High Range Gun Club 
which'is located about 15 miles south of town. Melton and Cash had been 
known to be "drinking buddies" ever since high school. Two years ago 
Melton, Cash and another gun club member Ed Schwartz were deer 
hunting. By the accounts of both Melton and Cash, Cash's gun 
aCCidentally discharged when he laid it down to cross over a fence and 
Schwartz was fatally wounded in the head. The coroner ruled it to be an 
accidental death. 
With that the bank personnel officer enters your office and tells you the 
latest, including the recent conversation he had with the bank board chair 
Ed Straightarrow. Four months ago, Melton and Cash had a heated 
argument outside of Melton's office at the bank. Ed Straightarrow, chair 
of the board, apparently heard about it from two bank employees. Soon 
after that time Melton went to visit Straight arrow and told him that it was 
apparent that Cash was juggling bank books and had embezzled money 
from Melton Union. He had no direct proof, but said that he would get the 
auditor to run a check on Cash next weekend. At this point Straightarrow 
became very upset and contacted Minate, the personnel officer. Together 
they decided to wait and "let it blow over". However, four days later 
Melton approached Cash's desk and told him, "you're fired as of this 
minute, but before you leave you need to put the money you have stolen 
back in the till." Cash left his desk and the bank. Melton never contacted 
Minate to complete the normal employee termination paperwork. 
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No one saw Cash until about two weeks later at the Melton Union Bank 
annual picnic at the High Range Country Club. Cash arrived and spoke 
quietly to a few people. He then walk,ed directly over to Melton and said, 
"You know I pack a rod and I'm going to put you and all of the rest of your 
stinking bank employees in the same kind of grave that we put Schwartz 
in." He then turned away a drove off in his Nissan Pathfinder 4X4. Mary 
Sure, the bank safe deposit box department manager overhead Cash's 
comment to Melton. Attending the same church as Ed Straightarrow, she 
. decided to go directly to him. On hearing her story. Straightarrow 
admitted that he had been extremely embarrassed for some time with the 
actions of both Melton and Cash. Immediately after that Straight arrow 
contacted bank personnel officer Minate. He apologized to Minate for 
maybe "getting into his area" but noted that when the safe deposit 
manager pressed the matter with him again about a week ago he was very 
explicit with her. When Minate asked Straight arrow what he meant, 
Straightarrow noted that he told the safe deposit manager, "This bank 
has a spotless history and reputation and doesn't need someone creating 
morale problems. so if that little incident at the annual picnic bothers you 
so much you should just look for another job." 
You tell Minate not to take any action for a few days and that you will get 
back with him by the first of next week. Later that afternoon you get a 
call from Ed Straightarrow, the Melton Bank board chair. He wants to talk 
with you the first thing tomorrow about some bank employees "who are 
getting a little out of line." 
To whom do you owe your primary responsibility as counsel for the bank? 
What actions, if any, should you take given what the personnel officer has 
told you? 
What counsel should you give to the personnel officer? 
What should you plan to say to the bank board chair tomorrow? 
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